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THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY

Volume II

THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY

Volume II

FROM CIVIL WAR TO WORLD POWER

By
James Truslow Adams

ILLUSTRATED

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
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THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY

Volume II

CHAPTER I

WAR COMES AT LAST

HE tension of the nation could be felt clearly in the Congress which sat through the winter and spring months of 1860. Not only did its members go armed but it is said that armed supporters of the two parties often crowded the galleries. Almost any move precipitated a crisis. For example, debate over a bill the purpose of which was to grant land free of charge to settlers in the West brought out all the antagonism of the South to the increasing of population outside of its own borders, and clearly showed the difficulty in which the Democratic Party found itself when trying to please both the South and the West. In February, Jefferson Davis gave warning to the head of that party, Douglas, by introducing a resolution demanding a slave code for all of the Territories. In spite of straddling, it was evident that the Illinois senator, who was also a Presidential aspirant, would find it difficult indeed to keep his party a national one.

In April the Democrats held their convention at Charleston, South Carolina—the first time they had gone south of Mason and Dixon's line. Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, was chairman, and although there was scarcely a man of national reputation in the meeting, the Douglas wing was in the majority. A platform embodying Davis's demand for a Territorial slave code was voted down, and one more consonant with Douglas's stand was adopted, the change resulting in the withdrawal of almost all of the delegates from South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. The seceders held a convention of their own later at Richmond, but even the regular Democrats who remained in Charleston could not agree on a candidate after 57 ballots, and adjourned to meet at Baltimore on June 18. Douglas had not been able to poll more than 152½ votes of the necessary 202.

Meanwhile, the Republicans met at Chicago on May 16. No dele-

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gates to this convention appeared from the Carolinas, Tennessee, Georgia, or any of the Gulf States except Texas, and it was a question whether some of the delegates from the slave States really represented anybody, as has been said, but themselves, although they were allowed to be seated. The party generally expected the nomination of Senator William H. Seward of New York, but as the result of only three ballots it became evident that he could not win and Abraham Lincoln received the unanimous vote of the con-

DEMOCRATIC STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

IN VIEW OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN Convention of Delegates of the Several States, who withdrew from the Charleston Convention, and at the request of members of the South Carolina Delegation, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Democratic party in South Carolina, will be held in Columbia, on Wednesday, the 9th May, for consideration of important business.

THEODORE G. BARKER.

May 5 c 2 Chairman of State Central Committee.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF A POLITICAL MEETING FOLLOWING SOUTH CAROLINA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

From "The Charleston Courier" of May 5, 1860, in the Confederate Museum, Richmond.

vention. Although the nation had watched him as he had swung around Illinois in his debate with Douglas, his future greatness was wholly unsurmised, and it was with dire fore-bodings, difficult for us to appreciate now, that great numbers in the new Republican Party saw this rather uncouth Westerner, who had never held high office

and whose abilities as an executive were greatly mistrusted, chosen to lead instead of the noted Seward, who as Governor of New York and senator in Washington had long been before the public in responsible and notable offices.

The Republicans were confident of victory against the divided and demoralized Democrats, although they knew that they themselves would have no strength except in the North and West. The Republican Party of 1860 was distinctly a sectional one, and in spite of many of the Abolitionists having joined it, it was a very practical one. To succeed it must carry not only States like New York and Pennsylvania, on account of their heavy votes in the Electoral College, but also the newer West, where it undertook to enlist the support of the settlers, notably of the substantial Germans and Scandinavians under the influence of men like the young immigrant, Carl Schurz of Wisconsin.

WAR COMES AT LAST

There was no difficulty about choosing a Vice-President to run with Lincoln in the person of Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, and the platform was skilfully constructed to please as many of the discordant elements, not yet welded, as possible. Quoting the Declaration of Independence it deduced that "the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom"; rebuked talk of disunion; stood for States' Rights and freedom in the Territories; branded the slave trade as a "crime against humanity"; and demanded the immediate admission of Kansas. To catch the West, it advocated free homestead lands and a railway to the Pacific, whereas for the East it suggested a tariff for the encouragement of industry. When the South heard of the proceedings at Chicago it muttered secession, but the Republicans did not even yet believe that their own success would really bring about disruption.

Meanwhile, the Democrats had been trying to arrange matters for their adjourned meeting at Baltimore, where the delegates arrived on the appointed 18th of June. With a good deal of difficulty over the question of delegates, organization was effected in three days, but only after most of the Southern members and a few from the North had bolted a second time. Those who were left nominated Douglas for the Presidency, but the seceders, who included delegates from twenty-one of the then thirty-three States, meeting in a near-by hall, nominated John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky, on a pro-slavery platform which included a demand for the annexation of Cuba.

A fourth party, called the Constitutional Union, had also come into being, which had existence only in this campaign, and which nominated John Bell of Tennessee for President, writing a platform which insisted chiefly upon maintaining the Union and obeying the Constitution and the laws.

The Republicans were regarded as unquestionably the strongest, and realized that neither of the other three candidates could possibly be elected, though in a four-cornered fight it might be possible to throw the election into the House of Representatives, as in 1828. The chief danger for the Republicans was the fear of the public that if they elected Lincoln they might be bringing on the dissolution of the Union. This fear the Republicans laughed at and

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soothed, but in doing so showed either a greater desire to win or a lesser political prescience than the public.

When the votes were counted, the result revealed more clearly perhaps than in any other election the peculiar workings of our electoral system. It had originally been intended, of course, that the people at large should have little or nothing to do with the election of a President. The Presidential electors, chosen for the most part in early days by the State legislatures, were expected to meet in their respective States and,-by exercising a knowledge of public men and a wisdom and experience in affairs which the people could not possess,—to vote for a suitable person for President. With the development of democracy, this system, though retained as machinery, had really come to be discarded in principle, the people voting direct for electors who were pledged to vote for certain candidates for President. Owing, however, to the fact that the number of electors from each State has to be the same as the number of the State's senators and representatives in Congress, a majority of popular votes under our system does not mean a majority of electoral votes.

To over-simplify the example in order to make it clear, we may say that four States with 1,000,000 population each might have one electoral vote each, and another with 5,000,000 population might have five. If all the people in the four States and 2,000,000 in the fifth State voted for Jones, Jones would have 6,000,000 popular votes out of 9,000,000, but only four electoral votes. His opponent, Brown, who polled not a single vote in four States and only 3,000,000 in the fifth State, would have won the five electoral votes of that State, and so be elected President.

In 1860, Lincoln polled 1,866,452 popular votes, Douglas 1,376,957, Breckenridge 859,781, and Bell 588,879, but the electoral votes were respectively 180, 12, 72, and 39. Thus not only was Lincoln elected President, although he polled well on to a million less votes than his combined opponents, but Douglas, who polled about 1,377,000 popular votes to Breckenridge's 850,000, received only 12 electoral votes to the latter's 72! The original system, devised to keep the election out of the hands of the people, has wholly broken down, without, however, placing the election in the hands of the people but rather in those of chance, for it has occurred several times that

WAR COMES AT LAST

even when there have been only two parties in the field, the candidate who received the lesser number of popular votes has been

elected to office. A reasonable reorganization of what is now a senseless system would require an amendment to the Constitution, and that would not be easy to bring about as the political parties are accustomed, in all their machinery and planning, to the present method.

In 1860, although the Republicans had entirely misread the signs of the times. and their success at the polls was to spell secession in spite of their denials, it was fortunate that chance had given us Lincoln to occupy the White House. Whatever might have been possible under happier conditions, passions had been aroused too deeply and for too long to permit of peaceful compromise. We had at last come to the inevitable turning which led to the field of blood. Whatever Republicans in the North might have said in the campaign, secession at once became the leading issue in the South, when the result of the election became known. THE QUESTION

IF LINCOLN

will be elected or not, is one which interests all parties, North and South. Whether he

IS ELECTED

or not, the people of

SOUTH CAROLINA

(whose rights have been for a number of years trampled upon) have the advantage of supplying themselves with CLOTHING, at the well-known CAROLINA CLOTHING DEPOT, 361 King-street, at such prices as

WILL LEAD

them to be satisfied that the reputation of this Establishment has been

BOLDLY

and fearlessly maintained

FOR A

number of years, supplying its

SOUTHERN

Customers with all the Latest Styles, and at as low prices as any Clothing House in the present

CONFEDERACY

of all the States.

Thankful for the liberal patronage extended, the Proprietors desire merely to inform their customers and the public generally, that their present STOCK OF CLOTH-ING IS COMPLETE in all its departments, and are now prepared to offer Goods on the mostreasonable and satisfactory terms. A call is therefore solicited by

OTTOLENGUIS, WILLIS & BARRETT, November 5 861 King-street.

THE "CAROLINA CLOTHING DEPOT" MADE GOOD USE OF DAILY EVENTS IN ADVERTIS-ING, AS THE SMALL PRINT ABOVE WILL SHOW

From "The Charleston Courier" of November 7, 1860, in the Confederate Museum, Richmond.

The Charleston Courier struck the popular Southern note when it estimated that the immediate drop in the price of slaves would

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amount to \$430,000,000 for the whole South, and asserted that "slave property is the foundation of all property in the South. When security in this is shaken, all other property partakes of its instability. Banks, stocks, bonds, must be influenced. . . . The ruin of the South, by the emancipation of her slaves, is not like the ruin of any other people. . . . It is the loss of liberty, property, home, country—everything that makes life worth having."

There were approximately 4,000,000 slaves in the Southern and border States. A prime field hand in the cotton belt was worth \$1500 to \$2000, but if we take the average of all as somewhat under \$400 each, the Southerners had \$1,500,000,000 invested in this form of property. Had emancipation come about as in the British Empire by freeing the slave and compensating the owner, the South would still have had to face a great economic and social problem in training the negro to rise from the status and characteristics of a slave to those of a free laborer. This, indeed, might not have been an insuperable difficulty. One can only surmise what might have been the results of a sudden or even a comparatively gradual, substitution in the South for the \$1,500,000,000 of capital locked up in slaves of a similar amount from compensation which would have been liquid. With free labor and adequate liquid capital, the South might have solved the social problem and entered upon a new economic and industrial phase. There is little use, however, in considering such vague possibilities.

In the first place, the South knew it would not be compensated. For several decades the Abolitionists had been shouting for emancipation or dissolution of the Union. It was true that the government had never claimed to interfere with slavery in the States where it had been legal, but that was not the view of the increasing anti-slavery party in the North. Even Lincoln had said that eventually the Union must become all one thing or the other. As it would obviously never become all slave, the inference was clear.

The discussion had for long centred about slavery, and, as *The Courier* had rightly pointed out, all Southern property was dependent upon that in the last analysis. The Southerners had watched the rising tide of Abolitionism, and had feared that eventually it must spell ruin for their property almost precisely in the same way

WAR COMES AT LAST

as, many decades later, the brewers and distillers watched the rising tide of Prohibitionism and the threatened ruin of their property, except that the situation was infinitely more serious for the South, where emancipation meant confiscation of most of the working capital of the richer element in an entire section.

Although there are no accurate statistics, it is probable that the great majority of Southern whites owned no slaves at all, the estimates placing slave-owning families as one in five, but this had little influence on the general situation. Not only did the slaveless white hope to own one some day, as the Northern poor man hoped to accumulate property, but if the crash occurred in all forms of investments,—lands, banks, and so on,—the slaveless Southerner would suffer with the slave-owners. In addition, there were the strong racial feeling, and the social and economic complications that might ensue from turning loose 4,000,000 blacks to compete as freemen with the poorer whites.

This brings us to the point that although slavery was the topic foremost in the discussions, there were in the background all sorts of intangibles. The whole way of life and the outlook on it in the South had become entirely different from those in the North, and each section naturally prized its own and, unfortunately, despised those of the other. The South had had a great history, and had given a great heritage to the Union. The first successful settlement had been within its borders and not in those of New England. Virginia had for long been the most important colony, and throughout the colonial period the part which the South had played had been as brilliant as that of the North. In the Revolution and the early years of the Republic the North had no such list of leaders to give to the common cause as the South had furnished in Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Marshall, and others.

Both sections had started with slavery, but economic conditions in the North had made it unprofitable and its passing had been painless. In the South, on the other hand, economic conditions had fastened it on the people with such apparent inevitability that even Lincoln had said he would not know how to get rid of it if he were a Southerner. It had been a huge misfortune for the South. It had developed its social life on a false basis; forced it to justify itself by opposing the strong moral currents of the day; sapped its in-

THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY

tellectual life; made it intensely sectional in its complete preoccupation with trying to save what was in truth a lost cause; and bred that unhealthy romanticism and super-sensitiveness which are the

CHARLESTON MERCURY

EXTRA:

iy at 1.15 oʻclock, P. M. Decambe 20th, 1869.

AN ORDINANCE

THE

DISSOLV

THE CHARLESTON MERCURY'S "EX-TRA" ANNOUNCING SECESSION From the original in the Confederate Museum,

concomitants of such conditions.

On the other hand, the Northern anti-slavery men, without sympathy for the plight of the other section of our nation, and with no statesmanlike plan to offer, cruelly and bitterly assailed the South in every aspect of its life,—economic, intellectual and moral. The South, feeling itself in no way inferior to the North, returned the scorn and disdain with interest, and believed itself wantonly singled out for attack by a portion of the Union bent insanely upon its destruction. The Southerners' hopes of keeping the balance at least even by the extension of slave territory had failed, and, to many, Southern civilization seemed to be standing at bay when the Republicans elected a sectional and Northern administration. The November election was the signal for action but Lincoln would not be inaugurated until March, and mean-

while Buchanan, the honest but weak and incapable signer of the Ostend Manifesto, was President for another four months.

South Carolina at once called a convention to consider the situation. This met first at Columbia, and then, on account of small-pox, adjourned to Charleston. In the convention, assertions were made that the Constitutional guarantees had been destroyed, that for its own industrial benefit the North had persisted in burdening the

South with heavy tariffs, that it had bought men to go to Kansas and armed them to prevent that State from becoming slave, that it was intent on abolition, and that, finally, there was no possibility of safe compromise or of continuing the bonds of union. On December 20, 1860, the convention repealed the Act which had bound the State to the Constitution in 1788 and declared that the union of South Carolina with the United States of America was at an end.

Even yet throughout the South there were conservative men, like Alexander H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis himself, who advised caution and delay, but the secessionist elements rapidly gained control in the cotton States, and by February 1, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana had seceded, to be followed by Texas on the 23d. In the same month in which Texas seceded, delegates from each of these other States met at Montgomery, Alabama, to draw up a provisional Constitution for the "Confederate States of America," and to elect officials of the new government.

In main outline the new Constitution followed the now discarded Federal one of the United States, but there were a few notable alterations, and, probably owing to the haste necessary, there were no definite relations established between the sovereignties of the individual States and that of the Confederation. In most respects rather inferior to the old Constitution, in at least two the new one contained marked improvements. One of these was the provision that the President, instead of having to veto an appropriation bill as a whole or not at all, was enabled to veto specific sections in it,—a device that could prevent an enormous amount of ill-advised expenditure of public funds. The other point provided that members of the President's Cabinet might be given seats in Congress and take part in the debates, thus grafting one of the most valuable portions of the British Parliamentary system on to our Congressional one. No provision was made for a Supreme Court, and the slave trade was prohibited, but slavery was protected and guaranteed extension in any new territory which the Confederacy might acquire.

Although it was to have been expected that one of the "fire-eaters" and ardent Secessionists would have been elected to head the new government, such men as W. L. Yancey, Barnwell Rhett, and Robert Toombs were discarded and Jefferson Davis was elected President, with Alexander H. Stephens as Vice-President. The passing over of the

claims of South Carolinians to high office, for Rhett got none at all, roused that State, foremost always in threatened and actual secession, to wrath. Moreover, Davis, from the standpoint of conciliating all Southern interests, was not wise in the selection of his Cabinet, which contained scarcely any of the "aristocracy" and only one man, Judah P. Benjamin, who was nationally well-known, a distinguished New Orleans lawyer who had also been United States senator.

Benjamin, however, who was an English Jew, had not been popular among the planter aristocrats, and President Davis himself, who had been born of a rather shiftless father on the Kentucky frontier, did not get on well with them, which perhaps helped to draw him closer to Benjamin. Davis, delicate in health, was sensitive, sincere and honest, with an unfortunate flair for trusting the judgment of the wrong people, including himself. He was a West Point graduate, and in his career as a colonel in the army, as a member of Congress, as Secretary of War in Pierce's Cabinet, and as U. S. senator, he had acquired above all a supreme self-confidence in his abilities as a soldier, a confidence that unhappily his ability did not warrant.

While all this was happening in the South, the position of the weak and amiable Buchanan in the White House was one of extreme delicacy and difficulty. Seven States of the Union of which he was President had seceded and formed a separate government, defying that of the United States. His difficulties had, indeed, thickened from the day his successor was elected. Even had the President been a man of great strength and ability it would have been almost impossible to strike out a policy of his own, when he had only four months to serve and knew nothing of the policy of the man who would soon have to take up the reins.

There were eight Federal forts with garrisons in such States as would probably, and soon did, secede, including Fort Sumter at Charleston. Major Anderson, a devoted Union officer, was in command there, and in January, 1861, an effort was made to reinforce and victual him by sea. A small merchant ship, Star of the West, was despatched from New York, but on her arrival at Charleston she was fired on by Confederate batteries, which Anderson did not feel justified in silencing by his own fire, and he was forced to



LITTLE BO-PEEP'S FEARS FOR HER FOOLISH SHEEP AS SHE SEES EUROPEAN POWERS READY TO DEVOUR THE SECEDING STATES

From "Strong's Dime Caricature," 1861, in the Library of Congress, Washington.

return. There was yet hope in the North that permanent secession might be avoided, and, wisely, Buchanan procrastinated.

Congress was debating another compromise measure, suggested this time by Crittenden, the successor in the Kentucky senatorship to the great compromiser Clay. The plan included the re-establishment of the old Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30' for Territories only, a hands-off policy by Congress in States and in the District of Columbia, and a provision for indemnifying fugitive-slave owners if the slaves were not returned. This was the best of a number of measures proposed, and might have been accepted by the Cotton Senators had the Republicans agreed, but they absolutely refused to do so, and in this they were firmly backed by the President-elect, Lincoln, who believed that it would only result in a vigorous Southern insistence upon further territorial expansion to the south of us. Crittenden, having been defeated in his measure in the Senate, suggested a referendum to the people at large, and while this was being debated, the seven Southern States seceded, and the situation became greatly altered.

A "Peace Conference," held in February at the suggestion of Virginia, failed to provide any practical suggestions, and the only plans brought forward were clearly unsatisfactory to both sections. While all these efforts to avert catastrophe were being made, the 4th of March was drawing near. When it came, the supreme responsibility rested upon Lincoln.

In his Inaugural Address the incoming President dwelt on the fact that there was no intention of interfering with slavery in the slave States. He asserted the validity and necessity of enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law, and discussed calmly the nature of the Federal Union. That Union, he believed, could not be broken without the consent of all the States, and he declared that to the extent of his ability, in spite of resolutions, he would see that the Federal laws were everywhere enforced, adding that in his opinion no State was outside of the Union. Why, he continued, should that Union be destroyed? "One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. . . . Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between

them." The country, he asserted, belonged to all the people who inhabited it, and if they grew weary of their institutions they could amend them constitutionally or attempt to overthrow them by revolution. "Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time."

Closing he spoke to both North and South. "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without yourselves being the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect, and defend' it. I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

There had been much prejudice against Lincoln, whose character was not yet understood, and, indeed, had not fully developed, and whose appearance and inveterate habit of seeming flippant and careless when most serious always did him harm. The Inaugural, now one of our famous State Papers, was regarded when it was delivered with almost universal disappointment, and was generally considered to be vacillating and weak. The Southerners failed to see the determination behind it, and in the North, James Gordon Bennett, the influential owner of The New York Herald, wrote in an editorial that the address would have been "as instructive if President Lincoln had contented himself with telling his audience a funny story and let them go." With all the services which Greelev had rendered to the nation as editor, and they had been great, he was now to enter upon a stage of his career in which sound judgment seemed to have abandoned him on most occasions, and throughout Lincoln's term the President was to be fiercely and unfairly opposed by one of the most influential of New York journals.

Although only seven States had actually seceded when Lincoln entered upon office, it was impossible to induce any Southerner to serve in his Cabinet, which was thus entirely sectional. For Secretary of State the choice naturally fell upon Seward, Lincoln's chief

opponent for the Presidential nomination and one of the ablest men in the party. Salmon P. Chase of Ohio went to the Treasury, and, in fulfillment of a bargain made at the nominating convention, of

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

The Inaugural Address of the new President does not require of us the usual synopsis of such documents made for the benefit of indolent readers; for apart from the interest with which it is universally looked for, its brevity will bring it within the compass of the efforts of the most reluctant readers Of Messages, while its plainness and directness of speech will make its meaning clear to the lowest capacity. It is marked by no useless words and no feeble expression; "he who runs may read" it, and to twenty millions of people it will carry the tidings, glad or not, as the case may be, that the Federal Government of the United States is still in existence, with a Man at the head of it.

Nearly ene-half of the Address is an earnest appeal on behalf of the Union. But Mr. Lincoln, while dwelling upon the folly of the South in seeking in disunion a remedy for their supposed ills, holds out to her no promise of any new guaranty of her rights. He recognizes the fact of a divided opinion on the subject of Slavery, and evidently does not expect anything more than that there should be a fulfillment of the "dry legal ob-"ligation" on either side. But he asks of the South if they expect to obtain more than this when out of the Union?

The Address can not fail to exercise a happy influence upon the country. The tone of almost tenderness with which the South is called upon to return to her allegiance, can not fail to convince even fhose who differ from Mr. Lincoln that he earnestly and seriously desires to avoid all difficulty and disturbance, while the firmness with which he avows his determination to obey the simple letter of his duty, must command the respect of the whole country, while it carries conviction of his earnestness of purpose, and of his courage to enforce it.

EXCERPTS FROM HORACE GREELEY'S EDI-TORIAL COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS

From "The New York Tribune," March 5, 1861.

which Lincoln did not know at the time but which he felt he could not repudiate afterward, the notorious political boss of Pennsylvania, Simon Cameron. became Secretary of War. It was the price Cameron had demanded for swinging the delegates from Pennsylvania, with its heavy electoral vote, into the Lincoln column, Gideon Welles of Connecticut was appointed to the Navy Department, and, approaching the South, Montgomery Blair of Maryland and Edward Bates of Missouri were made Postmaster General and Attorney General. It was a much abler group of men than Davis had been able to gather around him in the Confederate Cabinet, but was, nevertheless, to give the President ample trouble.

Whatever irresponsible hot-heads among the people on either

side might demand, both Davis and Lincoln, on whom supreme responsibility rested, wisely decided to move slowly. This was particularly necessary in Lincoln's case, as he was hoping to save as many States as possible, especially those on the border, from seceding, and therefore wished to refrain from any use of force until the Secessionists had themselves started armed rebellion by an overt act of war. Toward the end of March, he did order supplies to be forwarded by the navy to Fort Sumter, but Seward was chafing at what he considered the President's senseless and dangerous delay, which he misinterpreted as due to complete lack of policy. It must be remembered that at this time Lincoln was still regarded as a backwoods politician whom chance had put into the White House, and an inexperienced man who, the Secretary of State thought, would have to be guided and used by himself and other statesmen.

Mulling the situation over, the secretary, who really did possess ability but on this occasion lost all sense of realities, had formulated an inconceivably fantastic plan, which he presented to Lincoln on April r. The two important points in it were, first, that Lincoln, in Seward's opinion, being apparently incapable of formulating policies, should place himself in the secretary's hands, abdicating all real power and retaining only the shadow; and, second, that in order to reunite the North and South the best policy would be to force a foreign war, preferably with France and Spain, and perhaps also with Russia and England! When confronted with this extraordinary paper by his chief officer of state, the President merely remarked that if this "must be done, I must do it," and mercifully kept the document concealed for the rest of his life, so it was not until years later that the discovery was made of how complete an ass Seward had made of himself.

The egoistic secretary had also been negotiating with three agents of the Confederate Government, very much apparently on his own responsibility, for he promised them that no effort would be made to relieve Sumter when, in truth, Lincoln had already ordered the vessels from New York. This fact having been discovered by the Southern agents, the Confederate Cabinet decided, after much hesitation, to capture the position before relief arrived, and on April 12 the bombardment from the shore batteries began against the fort, which was on an island.

Major Anderson and his force replied as well as they could, but after a continuous bombardment of nearly thirty-six hours, it seemed evident to Anderson that the situation was hopeless, and he surrendered. Meanwhile the relief ships had arrived but without the most important one in the small fleet, which Seward, although he had nothing to do with the navy, had detached and sent to Florida by special order. In any case, the eventual result would have been no different, and after marching out with the honors of war, the Federal troops from Fort Sumter were embarked on the ships and carried back to the North.

The war so long dreaded had at last begun. The South had fired the first shot, had captured a Federal fort by force, and when the stars and stripes were hauled down there could no longer be any ignoring of the stark fact of rebellion. If in spite of what Webster and other Northern Unionists had declared, the South had really believed there might be peaceful secession, that section was now undeceived. A wave of patriotic emotion for the Union swept like a great tide over the hearts of men in the Northern States. Even among many in the South, who honestly felt that they must place allegiance to their State above that to the Union, there was sorrow at the breaking of the old ties. Two days after Sumter had surrendered, Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers, and immediately militia regiments were on their way to Washington from the North.

The call to war on April 15 meant that a final decision must be reached by those States which had been wavering. They must either fight for the Union or join the Confederacy. So far it had been only South Carolina and the Gulf States which had taken the plunge, while the upper South, in somewhat closer touch with Northern civilization and less irrevocably tied to the belief in slavery as a fundamental economic necessity, had been willing to try for a while longer to work out some compromise within the Union.

North Carolina had actually voted against secession, but had to reverse its decision when Virginia made its position impossible by joining the Confederacy. Perhaps no State which seceded did so more reluctantly than the Old Dominion, oldest and in many respects greatest of the original thirteen. Opinion was bitterly divided but on April 17 the State Convention, by a vote of 103 to 46,

Flag of Fort Sumter.

AIR "Star Spangled Banner."



O say, have yet heard how the Flag of our sires.
Was insulted by traitors, in boastful alliance,
When for Union's dear cause, over Sunter's red fires,
In the front of Rebellion it waved its defiance?
Over Sunter it flow,

Over pairiots true, And through all that ferce conflict still dearer it grow, Twas the Fing of Fort Sumier! we saw it still wave O'er the heads of the Free and the hearts of the Brave!

That banner so bright, it was nailed to its mast,
As a sign that for Freedom there's still no surrender!
And the staff that up-bore it, in battle's dread blast,
Yet remains to be raised by its gallant defender!
Over Sunter it flow,

Over Anderson true,

And through all the dark conflict still dearer it grew, 'Twas the flag of Fort Sunter! O long may it wave O'er the heads of the Free and the hearts of the Brave!

FORT SUMPTER.

A SOUTHERN SONG.

Come now and gather round me,
A story I'll relate,
It happened near a city
Of South Carolina state.

CHORUS.

And now Old Uncle Abe,

If you'll take good advice!

You'll ne'er invade our Southern soil.
Think o'er the matter twice

There was in Charleston harbor,

A fortress strong and great,
Commanded by Bob Anderson,
Which caused much debate.
And now Old Uncle Abe, &c.

Now Beauregard did loudly swear,
He would Fort Sumpter take,
And for to carry out his threat,
Did many batteries make.
And now Old Uncle Abe, &c.

PARTS OF A NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SONG ON THE FALL OF SUMTER

From the Collection of Union and Confederate Songs in the Library of Congress, Washington.

resolved to submit the question to the people, and on the 17th of May the verdict was for the South. Arkansas had seceded on the 6th and Tennessee on the 7th, North Carolina following on the 20th, making in all eleven States in the Confederate Union. The influence of slavery, the natural drag of the other Southern States which were more akin to these border States in mode of life and thought, a political philosophy of extreme States' Rights, and other mixed motives and sentiments, determined the result in the upper South, but not without far more division of opinion than in the Cotton country. Partly from long hostility to its eastern section, the Virginians in the far-western part of that State refused to secede, and from this refusal was born the State of West Virginia, later admitted to the Union in 1863.

The important border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were still uncertain, and it was largely to win them for the Union during anxious weeks that Lincoln insisted the war was not for the abolition of slavery but solely to preserve the Union. Unfortunately this statement of facts alienated to some extent the extreme anti-slavery opinion in the North, and also, as we shall see later, public opinion in England. The policy, however, bore important fruit, for Kentucky voted against secession, and although Missouri was in constant internal turmoil throughout the war it also remained in the Union. That Maryland should remain in it was essential, but the secessionist movement there was strong, and Southern sympathizers had mobbed the regiments from the North as they moved toward Washington through Baltimore, and had destroyed bridges and railroads. Although the State was to remain divided in sentiment throughout the struggle, it also was saved to the Union, and with it the small slave State of Delaware.

Thus eleven seceded States faced the twenty-three, of which four were slave, which still formed the original Union which they were determined to preserve by force. Now that peaceful secession was proved to have been a fallacy, it might seem at first glance as though the South had staked her all on a desperate throw. The North had a white population of approximately 21,000,000 to the South's 5,-500,000, or if we divide the population of the border States of hesitating allegiance, the figures might have stood 20,000,000 to 6,500,000. Moreover, the transportation system of the North was far




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AFIER THE 1860 ELECTION

Uncle Sam announces to Douglas, Breckenridge, and Bell that he has decided to let "Old Abe Lincoln" take charge of his affairs for the next four years.

From a cartoon by Currier and Ives, in the Library of Congress.



FORD WITH PONTOON BRIDGE, BULL RUN, VIRGINIA



PART OF THE 6TH MAINE INFANTRY AFTER THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

From photographs in the collection of the War Department.

superior to that of the South, as were its cash resources, banking facilities, ships of war and commerce, and factories for producing every sort of necessary article for war or trade. Comparatively, the South was destitute of the means of providing by large-scale production almost all the things it would need, except food, and if the North blockaded her ports, she would be unable to import necessities or export her cotton.

On the other hand she had advantages, some real and some fancied, which at first disguised the hopelessness of her struggle. If the disparity in the numbers of troops was bound to be heavily in her disfavor, she had her 3,500,000 slaves who could be kept at work back of the lines, releasing an unusually high percentage of her white population for actual fighting. The Southerner, used to an outdoor life, was also considered to be a better fighter than the Northerner from shop and office and factory, and, at least in the beginning, the Southerners were better led.

To a great extent they had been brought up in the old English tradition, and had never been attracted by a business career. Managing their plantations, or going into law, politics and the army, it happened that a large number of our leading West Point graduates were from below Mason and Dixon's Line. The decision that all had to make when war came, a decision which broke up families both North and South and arrayed parent against child and brother against brother, was a peculiarly difficult one for the officers in our army. Those from the South were among the finest men in that section, and it was only, for the most part, after a long agony of selfquestioning as to their duty, that many of them felt compelled to resign their commissions and to fight against the Union for their homes, families, and States. Thus it happened that whatever other resources the North had at the beginning it had no officers to compare with J. E. Johnston, Braxton Bragg, P. G. T. Beauregard, James Longstreet, A. S. Johnston, T. J. Jackson, and, above all, with Robert E. Lee, who remained possibly the ablest soldier of all throughout the war.

The South also had the advantage of operating on interior lines, whereas the North would have to attack from the outside, and completely overwhelm the South if it were to be conquered. This situation neutralized to a considerable extent the disparity in numbers.

Moreover, from the standpoint of being conquered, the very lack of a highly organized industrial economy, which was a disadvantage from other points of view, was an advantage from this one. In an agricultural country there is no one vital point at which an army can strike, and a war of conquest against it must to some extent be a war of attrition.

The card, however, in the hand of the South which she firmly

adington, Washington Oily P.A.

Hout of War_

the singulation of my Commission as Colonel of the 1st Rig! of Cavalry bery west you oblight

LEE'S RESIGNATION OF HIS U. S. ARMY COMMISSION

From the original letter in the War Department, Washington.

believed would be the trump one in the war, was the need of the world for cotton. In view of the huge industrial development in the previous decades and the part that cotton was playing in it, the South was certain, as one of her senators said, that if cotton were not raised and shipped, England "would topple headlong, and carry the whole civilized world with her. . . . Cotton is king." From a combination of circumstances this was to prove false prophecy, and Northern wheat was to be crowned in place of Southern cotton, but this could not be foreseen when the South seceded with the belief that she held the key to the world's industry, and that the world therefore would have to support her.

Lastly, we may note that the South felt it had a better moral basis

for the war than the North. Whatever might be thought of fine-spun interpretation of States' Rights and the original nature of the compact of Union, the fact remained that here were about 6,000,000 of people with their 3,500,000 of slaves, legally held, who only asked to be allowed to secede in peace from a Union they believed had become inimical to their own welfare and threatening to the foundations of their whole social and economic life. As opposed to this, the slavery issue being deliberately set aside as a motive for the war, the North could only advance that of its insistence upon maintaining the Union at any cost, even by the coercion of 6,000,000 unwilling citizens in a contiguous group of States.

Not only in Europe but even in the North, there were many who felt that this was both unjust and impossible. The Union might win a decision by arms but what would become of it, if it were to have to maintain itself permanently by force? As Lee and many other Southerners who were devoted to the Union as well as to their own States felt, a Union based on bayonets instead of hearts would cease to have any value and would bring in its train a demoralization of private and public life.

For a while, this view prevailed also among our best friends in England. Slavery was the root cause of the war, it is true, but Lincoln, who with far-sighted wisdom from the beginning had made the assumption that none of the States was in reality out of the Union even if it had seceded, and who, moreover, had had to keep slavery in the background in order to win the border States, asserted that he was simply defending the Constitution, and that the Constitution defended slavery. The most liberal opinion in England, which would have been whole-heartedly with us in a war for human freedom, could not follow us in a war simply to compel a Union which was no longer desired. In general the so-called English upper classes were in favor of the South, which had in the old days been in closer personal contact with England and whose ways of life, barring the existence of slavery, the English upper class much preferred to those of the mercantile North.

In addition, the waves of revolution which only a few years before had swept over Europe had alarmed the conservative elements, and as in Europe conservatism and monarchy were allied, as were radicalism and democracy, the English conservatives were ready to

look with complacency on the break-up of the greatest example of successful democracy which the world had yet had placed before it. On the other hand, the English working class, and particularly the cotton spinners of the industrial north of England, were in favor of the great republic, and before the war was over were courage-

Can they drive the Southerners tike a flock of sheep. smoke them out of their own nests like wasps, ferret them out like rabbits, and bag them like ganie? Let them just look forward a little, and consider the probable state of things next year, and the year after, and twenty years hence. Even we who sang such songs of triumph in 1814 and 1815, felt that we and all Europe would have done much better to think what we were about in 1703. If a clear foresight shows, and must show, that there must be two Federations, and that on no other footing will peace ever be made, it will be much better that it should come to pass after one year's war, than after ten or twenty. It is not as if the Union or two Unions were the only alternative. As the war proceeds, no man can tell what new powers and combinations may arise, and particularly how far the Western States will endure the taxes and financial obligations necessary for the war. The advice we offer is only what the Americans have given to all the world. It is a hank of their own cotton-a pipe of their own tobacco. Let them

PART OF A LONDON TIMES EDITORIAL REFLECTING ENGLISH SYMPATHY WITH THE SOUTH AS REPRINTED IN THE CHARLESTON COURIER OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1861

In the Confederate Museum, Richmond.

ously and gladly to suffer hardship and unemployment for the cause of the Union. Throughout the war, on the whole, the British Government, as distinct from the public opinion of any one class, steered not only an impartial, but even at times a friendly, course toward the United States.

When the war broke, however, it was clear that it was to be a great struggle, and although here in America, Lincoln's assumption that there had been no legal secession might simplify matters when it might come eventually to bringing the Southern States back into the Union if the North won, the assumption also unfortunately implied, as developed in the case of the Confederate schooner Savannah, that the men of the Southern navy, preying on our com-

merce, were legally mere pirates. This was a complication consequent upon the President's working theory. We ourselves might smooth such difficulties over by occasionally not letting our right hand know what our left was doing, but such a situation was impossible for foreign nations. A great maritime power like England



WEAT THE TYRANTS OF THE OLD WORLD THINK OF SECESSION.
"Oh! ain't we Sorry!!!"

THE JOY OF EUROPE AT SECESSION

From a cartoon in "Harper's Weekly," December 1, 1860.

could not treat the naval officers and crews of a newly formed nation of 6,000,000 fighting for their independence as mere pirates without transgressing the dictates of humanity.

Consequently, although the British Government never recognized the Confederacy as an independent power, it did recognize its status as a belligerent on May 13, 1861, the very day on which our new minister, Charles Francis Adams, arrived at his post in London. Although many in our North, little versed in international law, construed this as a hasty and unfriendly action, it was the only one which England could take, and Mr. Adams's position was in fact much simplified by its having been taken before he had entered upon his duties.

In general, Europe believed that the North could not conquer the

South, and could not hold her permanently in subjection if it did do so. The first battle strengthened this opinion. The extra session of Congress which assembled on July 4 had authorized Lincoln to borrow \$200,000,000, issue \$50,000,000 in notes, and raise the army to 500,000 men. Meanwhile we had two small armies, one of about 22,000 troops under General Patterson facing a much smaller Confederate force under General Johnston at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley; and another of 30,000 under General McDowell, the opposing Confederate force to which was that of 23,000 men under Beauregard which was lying at Manassas. The Confederacy had made Richmond its capital, and the people of the North, demanding, as the public always does in war, immediate and tangible victories, insisted upon an instant capture of the rebel centre which it was naïvely hoped might end the struggle almost as soon as begun. On both sides there was the usual belief entertained at the beginning of all great wars, that it would be "short."

Neither side as yet had a trained or properly equipped army. For the most part the troops were raw civilians, without even uniforms; and the officers, even the few from the old regular army, had had no experience in the actual handling of large bodies of men in the field. To meet the popular demand, however, in spite of the protests of old General Winfield Scott, the head of the Union army, it was decided in Washington to bring on an engagement in a thrust toward Richmond.

Patterson was ordered to keep Johnston's forces occupied while McDowell marched against Beauregard, who by July 20 had taken a position behind the small stream called Bull Run near Manassas. On that day he was joined by about 6000 men from the force of Johnston who had outplayed Patterson. McDowell's plan of attack, which he launched that morning, was not bad, and for the earlier part of the day the battle, although with increasing confusion, was on the whole favorable to the Federals. The Southerners stood their ground with granite firmness, General Jackson there gaining his sobriquet of "Stonewall," and when another detachment of over 2000 men from the force that Patterson had been supposed to be engaging arrived, the Union army became demoralized. The retreat became a rout, and, throwing away their muskets, the soldiers fled toward Washington as a disorderly mob, with not the

slightest semblance of discipline left, one of the generals on horse-back making even better time than the most panic-stricken of his men. Nearly ten per cent of the Federal troops had been killed, wounded or captured, and approximately 2000 of the Confederates.

The trouble had come from attempting a major operation with an utterly untrained and unprepared army, and the enemy, which was fortunately unable to pursue, had been as demoralized by victory as McDowell's forces by defeat. Although the battle was considered a disgraceful disaster for the Union, the Northerners pulled

In Appeal for Peace sent to Lieve. Gen. score,

A PETITION FROM THE WOMEN OF MARYLAND, JULY 4, 1861
From the original broadside in the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library.

themselves together with a grim determination which they had not felt before, whereas the Southerners were misled into believing that they could relax their efforts, and that the war was practically won.

Immediately after the disaster, Lincoln appointed General George B. McClellan, a business man who was also a West Point graduate, in command of the military forces of the Eastern department, and later, when his long refusal to move against the enemy had aroused feeling against him both in the public and the War Department, the President stood by him by raising him to the rank of General-in-Chief of all the Union forces. This was in spite of the fact that Lincoln himself had also urged action and had become impatient. Persistently, however, McClellan refused to budge, treating all critics, even the President himself, with scant courtesy or consideration, and creating a strong public prejudice against himself.

Nevertheless, during the nine months of summer, autumn, and winter when McClellan was training his men and organizing his forces, he was becoming immensely popular among the troops, and forging a magnificent weapon of offense out of the "Army of the Potomac." But until the spring of 1862 nothing further took place in that section, except occasional raids by the unopposed rebels, who

would probably have taken a much more important offensive had it not been for Jefferson Davis, who, with his unfortunate delusion as to his own military abilities, was to hamper his generals throughout the war.

There is nothing more disliked by newspapers than lack of news,

Meadquarters Pepartment of Fairfax, Virginia,

A PROCLAMATION

By Major General SANDFORD, New York State Militia, in the Service of the United States.

Fairfax county being occupied by the troops under my command, I deem it proper to repeat publicly the assurances I have personally given to many of the good citizens about me, that all its inhabitants may return to, or remain in their homes and usual pacific occupations in peace and confidence, and with assured protection to their persons and property; as the United States forces in Virginia will be employed for no other purpose than that of suppressing unlawful combinations against the constituted authorities of the Union, and of causing the Laws thereof to be duly respected and executed.

By order of Major General Charles W. Sandford;

GEORGE W. MORELL,

Division Superson.

A PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY MAJOR-GENERAL SANDFORD OF THE UNION FORCES IN VIRGINIA, MAY 25, 1861

From the original broadside in the Rare Book Room of the New York Public Library.

and by the late spring of 1862 The Examiner in Richmond was shouting the cry to the South of "On to Washington," while by June Greeley was using screaming type in The Tribune for his slogan of "Forward to Richmond." In the middle of February, McClellan had boastfully announced that he would take that city within ten days, but except for some foolish marching he had done nothing, and before we come to the real attempt at a forward movement in June, we must consider what had been happening in other quarters.

The autumn of 1861 had brought about a serious complication in our relations with England, made more dangerous by the inconsiderate haste which some of our high officials made to put their

necks in the noose of an untenable contention. One of the first moves of the Confederate Government had naturally been to despatch agents to England to seek formal recognition of the independence of the new Confederation. The commission, headed by the capable William L. Yancey, had been unable to induce the British Government to make any move in their favor but were still in England when two more agents, John Slidell of Louisiana and

James M. Mason of Virginia, were also despatched by the government at Richmond, the former to negotiate in London and the latter in Paris.

At Havana they had boarded the British mail steamer Trent, and

a Stramer. San Sacrito

Je bapt Wilhed

U.S. San formanding backent

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DRAFT OF THE FIRST PAGE OF A LETTER FROM MASON AND SLIDELL TO CAPTAIN WILKES, NOV. 8, 1861, AFTER THEIR CAPTURE, GIVING DETAILS OF THAT EVENT FOR FUTURE RECORD

From the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

their plans having been published in a newspaper which happened to come under the eye of Captain Wilkes of the U. S. S. Jacinto, stopping in the West Indies on the way home from Africa, that over-zealous naval officer determined to intercept the *Trent*, and capture the Confederate agents. This he promptly did.

Unfortunately his knowledge of international law was not equal to his zeal, and instead of taking the *Trent* into a port where the matter could be handled by a Court of Admiralty, he at once, on the high seas, transferred Slidell and Mason to his own vessel. When

news reached England that an American naval officer had illegally seized and carried off passengers from the deck of a British mail boat, the British lion roared with rage. Unfortunately the American eagle, when it had received the same news, had screamed with delight. Congress publicly thanked Wilkes, who became a popular hero over-night, and although Lincoln and one or two members of the Cabinet realized that the action was illegal, the enthusiasm of the populace had to be reckoned with for the moment.

Public opinion in England had to be taken into consideration also, and the government despatched 8000 troops to Canada, while Lord Russell drew up a demand for apology which was happily much improved in tone by the blue pencil of the Prince Consort. Eventually we had to release the two Southerners, who were returned to a British vessel, and the affair was smoothed over, but not without leaving unjustly a good deal of sore feeling in the North against England, which even such a man as James Russell Lowell, who should have known better, did not hesitate to fan into fury in popular verse.

Meanwhile, the North had for some months before the close of 1861 been maintaining a fairly complete blockade of all Southern ports. At least it was reducing the tonnage entering them by between 80 and 90 per cent; and although a good many vessels slipped through, and it was impossible to patrol the entire Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the South was beginning to feel the pinch. In the West, General Pope had cleared Missouri of Confederate forces, and Grant, under Frémont, had seized Paducah and Cairo. Frémont was displaying his incapacity with unconscious abandon, and had had to be handled rather severely by Lincoln when the inconsiderate general issued a proclamation freeing, on his own responsibility, the slaves of Missourians in arms against the Union, to the great embarrassment of the President, who was then trying to keep slaveholding Kentucky in the Union. Frémont's rather stubborn attitude toward Lincoln in this matter, a few minor defeats and proved lack of ability, ensured his removal, and Hunter was commissioned in his stead. The next year's campaign in the West, however, was to be the work of Grant. On the whole, the year ended with little to encourage either North or South, and all that it handed on to the next was the knowledge that the war would not be "short."


CHAPTER II

THE TRIAL BY COMBAT

progress made by either North or South. We Americans have never prepared in advance for war, and in any case it would have been impossible to have prepared for one between two sections of the country. Neither side had any adequate plans for military operations, and in the North a succession of generals, the newspapers, the Secretary of War, and even Lincoln himself, all took a hand in planning military operations. For a long time this had only the usual effect on the broth when there are too many cooks, especially when they know none too much of the art of cooking.

But from the beginning of 1862 onward the strategy of the struggle takes on simpler outlines, and it is those broad outlines which interest most of us who are not military experts. In the first place, as all the South had asked for was to be allowed to leave the Union in peace, and as the North had declined to consent, it was clear that the North would have to take the offensive while the South remained on the defensive. One line of policy would call for the strangling of the South by closing all avenues to the outside world. On land, this would be the work of the Union armies, and on sea of the blockading squadron. We shall comment later on the efforts of the South to retaliate against Northern commerce, efforts which had some important repercussions but did not affect the course of the struggle.

From the beginning of 1862 to the end of the war, there were three major operations of chief importance. One of these was the gaining of control by the North of the Mississippi River from source to mouth, thus cutting the Confederacy in two from east to west. The second was Sherman's march to the sea, more or less cutting it in twain again from north to south, with enormous destruction of property and effect on morale. The third and last was the forcing of the largest Confederate army, under its ablest leader, to surrender



THE TRIAL BY COMBAT

before Richmond. In the course of the four years after 1861 there were to be side issues, and many battles, but for a proper understanding of events we should keep these three main objectives in mind, though they were far from being initiated or carried on simultaneously.

At the beginning of 1862 plans had been made to open the Mississippi, hold Tennessee and Kentucky, and to press in on Richmond, the last operation to be carried on not only from Washington as before, but also with troops moving northward by way of Albemarle Sound in North Carolina. In January a new Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, had been appointed to succeed Cameron whose favoritism in contracts and other matters had become so scandalous as to necessitate his removal. Stanton was about as agreeable to handle as a porcupine, and had no knowledge of military affairs, but he brought to his department both the honesty and driving power it had hitherto totally lacked.

In the West, Major-General Henry W. Halleck was in command with headquarters at St. Louis, and Grant, now become a brigadier-general, with a force of about 15,000 men, was stationed at Cairo, some distance below Halleck on the Mississippi at the point where that river is joined by the Ohio. Although the major force of the Confederates in this district was gathered at Nashville under General Albert Johnston, smaller bodies had built two forts, Henry and Donelson, on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers near the Tennessee-Kentucky line. Johnston's troops had posted themselves on the Mississippi at Columbus, about twenty miles below Grant, and had even invaded Kentucky. Columbus itself was too strong to warrant an attack by the Federals but would have to be abandoned by the rebels if the much weaker forts in its rear on the two tributary rivers should fall.

Up to this time, Grant had been anything but a success. His four years spent unwillingly at West Point had brought him no distinction, although he was subsequently mentioned for bravery in the Mexican War. Without any interest in military life, moved about from one army post to another after peace with Mexico in 1848, finally stuck in miserable places in California and Oregon, far from his wife and child, whom he was unable to support, he had unhappily taken to drink and had had to resign his commission, Jef-

ferson Davis being the Secretary of War who accepted it. The years after that until the Civil War were filled with merely a dreary and unsuccessful succession of small jobs, ending with a clerkship in his father's leather store in Galena, Illinois. When the Civil War broke, however, he seemed to become a changed man. Volunteering for service again, he secured the colonelcy of a regiment, and to every one's surprise, including his own, had been made brigadier in August, 1861.

In January, 1862, Grant urged Halleck to let him attack Forts Henry and Donelson, which a reconnaissance had indicated to him might be taken. The permission finally given, Grant, supported by Commodore A. H. Foote with small gun-boats, proceeded up the Tennessee River with 17,000 men. Fort Henry proved easy of capture, and Grant then moved his force twelve miles overland to take the fort on the Cumberland River, the plan being for Foote to go round by water and join him in the attack. The fire from the fort was so heavy, however, that Foote was forced to withdraw, and while Grant was in consultation with him, the land forces were suddenly attacked and almost defeated by the Confederates, Grant arriving in haste only just in time, by a magnificent counter attack, to force the Confederates back into the fort.

It was mid-February, and sleet and cold made that night a terrible one for the Union soldiers, entirely without protection and partially without food. Inside the fort, however, its commander, General S. B. Buckner, realized the impossibility of holding it against assault the following day. In the morning of the 16th, he asked for terms, and Grant's reply, which was to make him famous, was immediately given: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Without further argument, Fort Donelson fell with 14,000 men; the North went wild with joy over the first victory of the year; and Grant was named a major-general by the President, and "Unconditional Surrender Grant" by the public, a play on his initials of U. S.

Another Union force, of about 37,000 men, operating under General D. C. Buell, had advanced as far South as Nashville, which had been evacuated by the Confederates, about 40,000 of whom had been massed at Corinth with the object of attacking and destroying

Galena, Ill. May 24 # 1861 Cal. L. Thomas adjl. Gen. A. S. a. Washington alle. dis: Having served for inch fifteen years in the regular army inchding four years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of way our who has been educated at the Lovernment exposer to offer then derice for the deplot of that Government, I have the lover, very respectfully, to Tender my service, until the close of the war, in such repairty as may be offered. I would say that in view of my present are and lingth of server, I feel myself ampetant to Command a symmet if the President, in his judgement, should see fit to entrust our Since the first call of the Princer I have been serving on the daff of the Governer of this that rendering such and State Militing and am will enjoyed on the Capacity. A letter addressed to me at ofmingsed All will reach sur.

GRANT'S LETTER OF MAY 24, 1861, TENDERING HIS SERVICES TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Of am very thepatfully Jon : gell: Oct. M. D. Brout

From the original in the War Department, Washington.

Grant before Buell could join him. A misunderstanding with Halleck had resulted in the temporary suspension of Grant but he had soon been reinstated, and by the middle of March was in command at Savannah, Tennessee, nine miles from Pittsburgh Landing, where he was concentrating his whole body of about 38,000. Grant appears to have been wholly ignorant of the fact that while he was making preparations for an advance on Corinth, General Johnston had decided to attack him at Pittsburgh Landing. Early on the morning of March 6, the unexpected attack was launched while Grant was breakfasting in perfect confidence at Savannah. Hastening to the rescue of his forces, which had not yet been joined by Buell's, he sent entreaties for haste to that commander, and also to General Lew Wallace, who had 5000 men at Crump's Landing.


Otherwise, Grant seemed curiously incapable of acting, but early in the afternoon General Johnston was killed, and about three hours later, his second, General Beauregard, called off the attack for that day. By evening both Wallace's Division and Buell's men had arrived, and the following morning the battle was renewed with the weight of advantage now on the side of the Union. The Confederates fought desperately all day, but by night were forced to retreat to Corinth, after one of the bloodiest and most desperate encounters of the entire war, more than one fifth of the Union forces and one quarter of the Southerners being killed or wounded, a combined casualty list of nearly 25,000.

It has always been impossible satisfactorily to explain Grant's state of mind and actions preceding and during the battle of Shiloh, as it is called, and Halleck, doubting his ability, came down the river and took command. With overwhelming force, Halleck continued down the river and occupied Corinth, from which Beauregard had been forced to retire. There the winter was spent, an attempt by Grant to capture Vicksburg with 30,000 men proving ineffectual.

Meanwhile, events had been happening much farther southward. It had been planned for some time to despatch a combined naval and military force to capture New Orleans, and proceed up the Mississippi to effect contact with the Union forces operating from the North. Early in the spring a Union fleet, under command of Captain David G. Farragut, which included boats with mortars on board to bombard Forts Jackson and St. Philip, guarding the stream



GENERAL SCHENCK'S OHIO REGIMENTS NEAR FAIRFAX COUNTY COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA From the pencil sketch by A. R. Waud. In the J. Pierpont Morgan Collection, Library of Congress.



THE BOMBARDMENT OF "ISLAND NUMBER 10" IN THE MISSISSIPPI

Commencing on March 15, 1862, and continuing until April 7, when the island fell to Commodor

Foote in command of the Gunboat and Mortar Fleet.

A Currier and Ives lithograph in the Library of Congress.



COMING INTO THE LINES

Slaves with a "spike" team attached to an old schooner, passing the picket post.

From the etching by Edwin Forbes in the J. Pierpont Morgan Collection, Library of Congress.

THE TRIAL BY COMBAT

below New Orleans, and troop-ships carrying 25,000 men under the notorious General Benjamin F. Butler, had reached the mouth of the river. The Confederates had a few iron-clad vessels on which they were counting to prevent Farragut's passage. His vessels and gunnery, however, proved more than a match for both iron-clads and forts, and by the first of May New Orleans, the largest city of the South, had been occupied by the combined Union forces.

As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall, by word, gesture or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.

BY COMMAND OF

MAJOR-GENERAL BUTLER

GEO. C. STRONG, A. A. GRM., CHIEF OF STAYS

GENERAL BUTLER'S ORDER NO. 28
From the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

The charming, leisurely old city, largely French in blood, was hotly Southern in sympathy, and the presence of an army of occupation was, as always everywhere, extremely irritating. The population was by no means all composed of Southern "aristocrats" nor were the troops all composed of Northern gentlemen who might show consideration for the feelings of the conquered. There were many cases of soldiers being insulted on the streets, especially by women, who are always likely to be more bitter than men in their war-time antipathies. General Butler, who had become the military governor, and who was afterward known as "Beast Butler," could think of no better means of protecting his men from the "insults" of the women than to issue his famous order declaring that thereafter any woman found insulting a Union soldier would be treated as a "woman of the town plying her avocation."

The insulting brutality of such an order would have been bitterly

resented in any civilized community. One has only to think what would have happened had it been issued, for example, by General Gage when the British troops were garrisoning Boston in 1774. Butler's order was, indeed, emphatically denounced in the British Parliament, and afforded the opportunity for our minister, Mr. Adams, to score one of the prettiest diplomatic triumphs of all time over the, on this occasion, unwary Lord Palmerston. Butler's order secured its immediate object in New Orleans, but otherwise its effect was extremely bad in that it served to confirm the Southerners in their generally erroneous opinion of Northerners as low, common, and determined on insulting the South.

While bad blood was thus being rapidly fomented in New Orleans by Butler, who was outlawed by President Davis, Farragut had succeeded in pushing some of his vessels far enough up the river past the Confederate defences to get in touch with Grant, but Vicksburg could not yet be taken, and the complete severing of the Confederacy on the line of the Mississippi had to await the following year. Minor fighting in Kentucky and Tennessee during the remainder of 1862 was without definite influence on the larger strategy of the war, and may be disregarded, except to note that both States had come under Union control.

We must now turn to the East, and see what progress was made in 1862 toward a second objective, the capture of the main part of the Confederate forces before Richmond. We shall find it a disappointing year, although with plenty of action.

There were various routes which McClellan might have taken toward the rebel capital and its defending forces. The Army of the Potomac numbered over 100,000 superbly drilled men, thanks almost wholly to the general himself, who, however, seemed both uncertain and loath to use the weapon he had forged. Had he decided to proceed southward, keeping himself between Washington and the enemy, he could have counted upon using the whole available Union forces in the Eastern theatre, which would have added at least fifty per cent to his strength. He preferred to transport all his own troops to the eastern end of the Yorktown Peninsula, and work his way thence toward Richmond, marching with the York and James Rivers on his flanks. This involved not only a division of forces, as the Administration not unnaturally insisted

THE TRIAL BY COMBAT

upon McDowell remaining with his army to protect the Capital against a sudden attack from Lee should he make a dash in that direction, but also necessitated McClellan's marching through a difficult and none too well-known country with the largest force which had yet been in operation in America.

It was essential for his plan that the James River be clear of rebel vessels and open for his own, as he counted on the co-operation of the navy to protect his flank. During the early part of the winter, however, the Confederates, who were in possession of Norfolk and its navy yard, had built an iron-clad of a new type, with a pointed ram on its bow. This had made itself practically master of Hampton Roads, after having destroyed two of the big wooden vessels of the Union navy, the Congress and the Cumberland. The iron hull of this strange new war-ship made it practically impervious to the shot of that day, whereas its ram enabled it to poke huge holes in the wooden hulls of its opponents and to sink them ingloriously. This vessel, formerly the U. S. S. steam sloop Merrimac, but rechristened the Virginia by the Confederates when they had altered her to an iron-clad and added her ram, was to meet her match on March 8, in one of the historical naval battles of the world.

A Swede, John Ericsson, then resident in New York, had produced in the *Monitor* a hitherto unknown type of vessel, heavily iron-clad, looking much like an oval raft with a revolving iron turret which enabled her to fire in any direction. She was unwieldy and unseaworthy, but when the *Merrimac* started out on that day from Norfolk to sink another of the wooden ships of the Northerners, she was met by this weird-looking monster, and after an engagement in which neither vessel was destroyed was forced to retreat to Norfolk. Her power was over, and when, in May, the Confederates evacuated that city, on account of McClellan's operations, they destroyed their ram before leaving.

According to Henry Adams, who was then in London, acting as private secretary to his father, the American Minister, a profound impression was created among English naval and military circles by the appearance of the iron-clads in action. It has been said by leading American historians, indeed, that the Monitor and the Merrimae caused the abandonment of the old wooden navies of the world and began a new era in naval history. This, however, is

rather over-stating the case. Iron-clads had been used in the Crimean War, a few years earlier. The French had launched a great iron-clad in 1859, and the European admiralties were already deeply concerned about the possible necessity of rebuilding all their fleets before the *Merrimac* had first slipped out from Norfolk. What the American iron-clads in action probably did accomplish was to settle the disputed point and leave no further room for hesitation. It is a mistake, however, to consider that the new type of iron naval vessel was in any way an invention of our own, though that impression is usually given.

The Confederates everywhere in the eastern theatre of war were heavily outnumbered, and the failure of the campaign of 1862 to show results for the Federals was due to the superior skill of the Southern commanders. To oppose McClellan's advance up the peninsula toward Richmond, General J. E. Johnston had no more than 60,000 men to McClellan's 100,000. A body of about 11,000 Confederates lav north of McClellan's line of advance but was confronted by McDowell's 40,000 at Fredericksburg. Stonewall Jackson, certainly the ablest officer next to Lee, even if not as some military authorities think even abler than Lee himself, was in the southern part of the great Shenandoah Valley, which at its northern end gave easy access to Harper's Ferry, from which place descent might be made on Washington, 60 miles to the southeastward. Jackson, however, was opposed by General N. P. Banks with a slightly stronger force than his own, while Frémont had another 15,000 ready to invade the valley from the west, and there was another Federal force of 7000 stationed at Harper's Ferry. Two smaller Confederate forces, one of 3000 and another of about 6000, could be counted on in the Valley, but here as elsewhere the disparity of numbers was greatly in favor of the North.

The Federals, however, both military and civil, threw away their chances. The Confederates had left only slender forces to impede McClellan's march up the peninsula, but that cautious commander took a whole month of siege work to clear them from his path, and it was not until the middle of May, when the rebels had withdrawn after their delay had been accomplished, that the 100,000 Union troops were set in motion toward Richmond.

McClellan, who in his own opinion never had enough men for

THE TRIAL BY COMBAT

any task, had asked to have McDowell and his 40,000 sent around by water to join his own force, but this would have left Washington defenseless before the swift-moving Lee. Stanton properly insisted that McDowell should remain between the capital and the



BATTLE-FIELDS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR

enemy, and march to join McClellan overland by way of Fredericksburg. McClellan's plan of campaign was to advance slowly, taking no chances, and, counting on artillery and siege operations, to win through to the Confederate capital.

On paper, the theory was sound enough, and the Confederates admitted that they would be defeated if they allowed themselves to accept McClellan's methods. They declined to do so, and their success against overwhelming odds and a perfect paper plan would

indicate that the latter was not so sound as it looked. Nor can the blame be laid upon Stanton for not allowing the Federal capital to remain wholly undefended by putting all McDowell's 40,000 men on transports and sending them around by sea to McClellan, who already immensely outnumbered his enemy. The brilliant audacity with which the Confederate generals were about to act might well have cost the Federals their seat of government had McClellan had his way against the civilian Secretary of War.

The first move was in the Shenandoah Valley, where Jackson so

From Washington.

ADVANCE OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY—THE WHITE HOUSE IN SIGHT—STRAGETIO MOVE-MENTS OF THE CONFEDERATES.

WASHINGTON, September 7.—Reports f rom various points on the other side of the Potomac represent everything quiet last night and this morning.

The Confederates are now said to be within five miles of the President's House, and three miles of Arlington Heights.

A WASHINGTON DESPATCH IN THE CHARLES-TON COURIER, SEPTEMBER 11, 1862

From the Confederate Museum, Richmond.

outplayed his adversaries that, after defeating Milroy's force 25 miles from Staunton, he frightened the life out of Frémont with his 15,000 men and left that general in a funk for days. Jackson then attacked Banks, whom he chased all the way to Winchester and from there up the valley

and across the Potomac. At Harper's Ferry he seemed to threaten Washington to such an extent that McDowell was recalled from Fredericksburg, so that McClellan lost any possible aid from that quarter. Jackson, however, had no idea of descending on Washington, and still less of being captured. He had accomplished the most important object, which was so to disarrange the Federal plans as to ruin McClellan's campaign against Richmond. Therefore, as quickly as he had advanced, he passed down the valley again, inflicting one or two more stinging defeats, and saved his force and his booty for use against McClellan.

That general was not altogether happy. The peninsula was difficult marching country and in May the heavy rains had swollen the streams and rivers. On the 31st, two of his corps, under Keyes and Heintzelman, were separated from the main forces by the Chickahominy, and the opportunity being instantly recognized by General Johnston, the Confederates fell upon them. The attack, however, was not as vigorous as it should have been and the chief re-

sult of the battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, as it is called, was the appointment of General Lee to succeed Johnston in chief command, the latter having been dangerously wounded.

The next movements were the result of the contrasting psychology of Lee and McClellan. After Seven Pines, the latter continued his slow "digging-in and siege" method, which Lee knew would be fatal to Richmond if allowed to continue. The difficulty with the method appears to have been that Lee could himself decide whether or not it should continue. As a result of his adverse decision he ordered Jackson to join him from the valley and to attack McClellan's right flank while he himself attacked directly in front, hoping to force a retreat or to cut off McClellan's line of communications.

In spite of Jackson's being late, Lee's plan succeeded in a considerable degree. Fitz-John Porter, who was protecting the Federal right, was forced to retreat from his position at Gaines's Mill. and McClellan had to shift his base to the James River. His move had left Lee uncertain, and McClellan thus gained 24 hours for an orderly withdrawal. The battle at Malvern Hill, July 1, was unquestionably an unwise attack on Lee's part, but the various engagements of the preceding week, known altogether as the "Seven Days' Battles," had pushed McClellan to Harrison's Landing on the James. The Confederate losses, of about 20,000, had been nearly 25 per cent greater than those of McClellan, and the Army of the Potomac was not defeated. In April, however, a Union army of 100,000 had faced a Confederate one around Richmond of only 60,000. As a result of two months' campaigning, it had come to pass that the Federals were outnumbered by their immediate foe at the beginning of Lee's move against McClellan.

That general now again asked for reinforcements and the chance to make another move against Richmond, this time by way of Petersburg. Around the question of McClellan's military ability has raged one of the classic controversies of American history. It is one which it is quite impossible for a layman to decide, more especially as the military experts themselves are by no means agreed. Whatever may be said of McClellan as a commander, and there is much in his favor, he unquestionably greatly over-rated himself as a man, and in that respect his own words make the case against him. His despatches both to Lincoln and Stanton are almost incredible in

their arrogance, and, a matter which has to be considered in a democracy at war, the public at large, whether justly or not, had lost confidence in him. In July he was recalled to Washington, and his army was withdrawn from the Peninsula and moved to Northern Virginia. The Peninsula campaign was over, and Richmond had not been taken.

General Halleck, who, in the West, had been fortunate in the successes won for him by his subordinates, was brought east and made commander of all the Union forces, with the rather bombastic General Pope in command of a force of about 43,000 men made up of the combined forces of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. The North was still experimenting with generals.

So, likewise, was Lee, and Pope was an opportunity for him. Combining with Jackson, the Confederate commander, knowing that it would take a fortnight or more for the McClellan forces to be transported from the James to the neighborhood of Pope, completely baffled that over-confident leader, and having driven him back to Bull Run he there won a second and more resounding Confederate victory, August 29–30. Outwitted at every turn in a brief campaign, Pope lost 14,000 men and the confidence of every one.

By September 4 the Confederates were crossing the Potomac, twenty-five miles from Washington, and the following day Lincoln orally gave command of all the forces to McClellan, who still had the unbounded admiration of his soldiers. Lee had had no intention of attacking Washington but was advancing into Maryland, where he expected to find Southern sympathy strong enough to win that State over if supported by the presence of his army. A push up into Pennsylvania might divide the North even more dangerously than the South could be divided by Union control of the Mississippi, and even in the western theatre of operations the Confederates were pushing back Union forces across Kentucky and were threatening Cincinnati.

So far, the Republican administration in Washington had little to show the people, and the mid-term elections, always likely to be dangerous for the party in power unless all has been going well, were only a month off. The change in a few months from seeing a Union army within 20 miles of Richmond and expecting to capture it, to having Lee and 60,000 Confederates swinging northward

through Maryland, was creating dismay and terror in the North, and also having dangerous effects in Europe, as we shall note later. The crisis was of the first magnitude, and it is interesting to observe how much the element of luck can play in the decision of fate by arms.

There was, as Lee had expected, very strong Southern sympathy in Maryland, but this was mostly confined to the eastern portion of the State, and the Southern general at Frederick found it difficult to get sufficient supplies for his troops. As he could not live on the country it was necessary to open a line of communication down the Shenandoah Valley. By chance, however, Harper's Ferry was in possession of a Union garrison, which under ordinary rules of war should have been withdrawn as Lee had advanced. Indeed, this had been advised by McClellan. Nevertheless no withdrawal had been effected, and thus when Lee pushed ahead to Hagerstown he had to despatch Jackson to capture the ferry. This divided his army.

McClellan had taken several days after his reappointment to reorganize Pope's forces, and, as usual, grossly over-estimated the strength of the enemy, which he set at double the real figure. On September 12, a week after he had taken command, he had reached Frederick in pursuit of Lee, and there by luck a despatch from Lee to D. H. Hill was picked up, revealing Lee's plans and the fact that at the moment the Confederate army was split. McClellan should have taken advantage of his information without delay, but his own cautiousness, increased by telegrams from Washington, made him hesitate.

A few miles to the west were two gaps in the "South Mountains," the rampart of the valley, and eight miles beyond these, in the valley, were the roads connecting the two parts of the enemy army. Instead of seizing these at once, McClellan waited, and when he moved on the 14th the gaps had already been occupied by the Confederates and were carried by the Federals only with severe losses. That same morning, Lee had discovered that his enemy was in possession of the missing despatch to D. H. Hill, and immediately moved southward from Hagerstown, taking up an entrenched position on Antietam Creek. From that place he sent new orders to Jackson to join him. That general captured Harper's Ferry, with its garrison of 12,500, the morning of the 15th, and hastened to

join Lee. He could not reach him, however, until the morning of the 16th, whereas McClellan was facing him by the previous noon.

Instead of throwing himself on Lee's army, then in a desperate plight, either on the afternoon of the 15th or the morning of the 16th before Lee could be reinforced by Jackson, McClellan contented himself with making reconnaissances and plans, with a skirmish, until the 17th, when he had to encounter the reunited Confederate armies. Even so, he had 87,000 men to Lee's 55,000, magnified, however, in McClellan's mind to double that number. Lee had taken up a strong position, and the battle that ensued, known from the Creek as Antietam, was one of the bloodiest of the war, about 23,500 men being killed and wounded, of whom slightly over half were Northerners. The conflict was a series of confused attacks. and it has been debated whether the sum of them was a Union or Confederate victory. The following day, McClellan, although numerically far superior, declined to renew the struggle, and on the 10th he unforgivably allowed Lee to retreat unmolested across the Potomac into Virginia.

However, the danger to the North from the Army of Virginia was now over, and jubilation replaced the grim fear of recent weeks. Nevertheless, as McClellan did nothing to follow up Antietam and permitted Lee to retreat southwards along the Shenandoah Valley, the mistrust of him by both President and people increased again. Lincoln begged him to pursue Lee and to prevent the Confederates from getting once more between him and Richmond, but in vain. On the 7th of November he was again deposed from command, and the wholly inadequate General A. E. Burnside was unfortunately named in his place.

At Fredericksburg on December 13, in the last attempt for a decision in 1862, the new commander with 113,000 men faced Lee trying to force his way back to Richmond. The Confederates, stationed on Marye's Heights and well defended, received the useless attack which Burnside launched against them. The Federals had to charge across a plain, completely covered by the rebel artillery and the rifles of those placed behind a stone wall at the base of the height. It was not war but murder, yet six times Burnside ordered the charge across dead bodies through the sheets of flame. Nothing more magnificent or futile has ever been seen in the annals of

war. At the end of the day nearly 8000 men lay dead on the field, sacrificed to Burnside's obstinacy, and the total Federal loss for the fight was over 12,500 to less than 6000 Confederate casualties. It was clear that Burnside could not be retained in command, and the search for a general had to go on.

The year 1862 had been marked by momentous events other than military. In spite of England's proclamation of neutrality, the Confederacy had continued hopeful of recognition by both that country and France, and meanwhile was endeavoring to buy vessels of war from English builders. The British Government had forbidden its subjects to build or equip any war-ships which might be used by either belligerent, but unfortunately although Parliament had passed an Act to that effect in good faith the Act had been carelessly drawn. On the principle that a person should be considered innocent until proved guilty, it had provided for punishment of the offenders and confiscation of the vessel only after proof of the offence, which raised very difficult legal questions in any case that might arise. In March, 1862, a small vessel was built and allowed to sail, and though seized at Nassau was released by the court there. This Florida case was merely the precursor of the much more serious one of the Alabama a few months later. The Confederates, having succeeded in getting the Florida to sea, made a contract with the firm of Lairds at Liverpool to build the commerce-destroyer which was afterwards to cost England dear.

Our Minister, Charles Francis Adams, procured evidence, which he considered overwhelming, that the vessel was being built for the Confederacy, and presented it to Lord John Russell. The Confederate agents had covered their tracks as well as they could, and, as first submitted, the evidence was not considered sufficiently conclusive to warrant the British Government in preventing the sailing of the vessel, on which work was being rushed, although high legal opinion was in Adams's favor. Finally, however, a full set of the documents in the case were sent to the Queen's advocate, Sir John Harding, who had just gone insane, a fact known to no one at that moment but his wife, who left the papers for five days without any one's seeing them. On July 28 the attorney-general and solicitor-general received them and the next day immediately declared the evidence conclusive and advised Russell to have the ves-

sel seized without an instant's delay. Unfortunately it was too late, for, being warned, the Confederates had got her to sea before she was finished, that very morning.

That the British Government, enmeshed in legal red-tape, had been careless cannot be denied, but even Adams, who had no love



THE WAY LINCOLN WILL BE LIFTED OUT OF WASHINGTON CITY BY GENERAL LEE

A cartoon from "The Southern Punch," Richmond, Va., May 7, 1864, in the Library of Congress.

for the English in general or Russell in particular, later declared that the Foreign Minister had not been actuated by any motive of ill-will, and that on the whole he was favorable rather than hostile to the North.

This, however, was not true of all English or, notably, of French statesmen. In the summer and autumn of 1862 the stoppage of cotton exports from the South was exerting its fullest effects on both European nations. The number of cotton operatives out of work in

England rose to 550,000 by the end of that year, and the unemployed in France were estimated at 300,000. The French Emperor, Louis Napoleon, was pressing hard to have England join him in recognizing the Confederacy, and France certainly, and England possibly, would have done so by autumn had it not been for friends of the North in the British Cabinet. As we have seen, by September the fortunes of the North were at a low ebb. The attack on Richmond had been abandoned and Lee was marching into Maryland, threatening Washington and Philadelphia. The war, which a large section of English opinion believed was only for forcible retention of the South and not for the freedom of the slave, was dragging on with no prospect of Northern victory. At that crisis in our affairs, however, the English prevented Napoleon from taking hostile action against us.

Meanwhile, Lincoln was to clear away one source of misunderstanding. As we have seen, he had not believed it to be either his duty or right as President to interfere with slavery within the States where it was legal. He had also framed for himself, looking forward to a successful end of the war and the need for receiving the seceded States back into the Union, the working theory that those States had never in truth been out of it, and that there should be as little interference with them legally as possible. After the war began, there was the additional problem of retaining the loyalty of such border States as were also slave States. What gradually changed his mind as to the problem of slavery and emancipation can never be known, and we can only follow his actions.

On July 22, 1862, he surprised his Cabinet by announcing to them that he intended to issue an emancipation proclamation freeing all who should be slaves within the rebellious States on January 1, 1863, and suggesting some form of compensation to their owners. It was pointed out to him, that although most of the Cabinet agreed with the substance of his proposition, the time was singularly inopportune in view of the bad military situation for the North. Agreeing with this, Lincoln laid aside the idea of an immediate proclamation.

On August 20, Horace Greeley published in *The Tribune* an open letter to the President complaining of his hesitating attitude toward slavery. To this Lincoln replied two days later, saying that

"my paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union

THE PRAYER OF TWENTY MILL. TONS.

To ABRAMAN LINCOLN, Prendent of the U. States:

DEAR SIR: I do not intrude to tell youfor you must know already-that a great proportion of those who triumphed in your election, and of all who desire the unqualified suppression of the Rebellion now desolating our country, are sorely disappointed and deeply pained by the policy you seem to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of Rebels. I write only to set succinctly and unmistakably before you what we require, what we think we have a right to expect, and of what we complain. *****

II. We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the cmancipating provisions of the new Confiscation Act. Those provisions were designed to fight

calculated to prove perilous, and probably dis-It is the duty of s Government so astrous. *** * * * * *

V. We complain that the Union cause has suffered, and is now suffering immensaly, from mistaken deference to Rebel Slavery. ギャナチャ メストド

VI We complain that the Confiscation Act which you approved is habitually disregarded by your trenerals, and that no word of rebuke for them from you has yet reached the public Fremont's Proclamation and Hunter's Ar one of the millions

who would gladly have avoided this struggle at ony sacrifice but that of Principle and Honor, but who now feel that the triumph of the Uaion is hidspensable not only to the existence of our country but to the well-being of mankind, I entrest you to render a hearty and unequivocal obedience to the law of the land.

HORACE GREELEY. Yours, New York, August 19,1982.

EXCERPTS FROM HORACE GREELEY'S LET-TER IN THE TRIBUNE, AUGUST 20, 1862

without freeing any slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone. I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union."

This was clear enough. Lincoln had long been subjected to pressure from various groups to come out for abolition, but this had had no effect upon his singularly independent mind. and we look in vain for any certain influence which made him decide the fateful question within a week or two after answering Greeley. At the Cabinet meeting of September 22, he read a few pages from Artemus Ward's "Highhanded Outrage at Uticy," which had struck him as funny, and then, becoming

serious, informed his advisers that he had asked them to meet so that they might hear what he had decided to publish to the nation.

It was merely for their information, he added, as he had already made the irrevocable decision himself.

He had made a vow, so he said, to God that he would issue an

emancipation proclamation when the Confederates were driven out of Maryland. The battle of Antietam had been fought, and Lee was in retreat. He would fulfill the vow. Then he read the proclamation which on the following day, September 23, he published to the people, declaring that after January 1, 1863, all slaves held within the States which were in rebellion would be "thenceforward and forever free." He suggested colonization somewhere of the freed negroes, and eventual compensation to owners in both the loval and rebel States. Although with one or two exceptions the members of his Cabinet agreed, the effect of the proclamation on the public at large was disappointing. The South, naturally, regarded it as confiscation and an attempt to rouse a servile revolt, but the North, which might have

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S LETTER
EXECUTIVE MARSION,
WASHINGTON, August 23, 1863.

Hon. Horace Greeley:

DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through The N. Y. TRIBUNE. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I de not now and here controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the National authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save Slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy Slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy Slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall dopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty, and I intend no modification of my oit-expressed personal wish that all men, everywhere, could be free. Yours,

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S RESPONSE TO GREE-LEY'S LETTER IN THE TRIBUNE, AUGUST 25, 1862

been expected to receive it with enthusiasm, was unimpressed, and the election the following month went against the adminis-

tration. In England, however, the response was immediate and favorable. Whatever the President's motives may have been, he had now indubitably linked the cause of the North with freedom.

When the first of January came, Lincoln issued the proclamation indicated by his preliminary one in September, declaring all the slaves in the rebellious States to be free from that date, and warning them against indulging in any violence. For long opposed to slavery as an institution, Lincoln had not considered that it could be interfered with under the existing Constitution, and there was nothing in that instrument warranting the emancipation proclamation, unless we accept the theory which he now evolved that "the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war," and that slaves being property, as property, either in the hands of citizens or their foes, they could be seized for war purposes.

Whatever hopes the end of 1862 might be bringing to the Southern slaves it was bringing little comfort to the harassed President. Although his party still had a slender majority in Congress as a result of the elections, his own hold on it was threatened. The President no more than any general had won the confidence of the nation, and in mid-December had come Burnside's crushing defeat at Fredericksburg. A group of Republican senators, headed by the trouble maker, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, determined to force the President to change both his plans and his Cabinet at their dictation.

Within the Cabinet, Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, shared the mistrust of Lincoln, and had been both indiscreet and disloyal in expressing criticism of him. Seward had long since recovered from the Presidential aspirations for himself which still troubled Chase, but was the main object of senatorial attack. To relieve Lincoln of embarrassment, he tendered his resignation. The President then called a joint meeting of the other Cabinet members and of the senatorial committee, at which meeting Chase was put in the awkward situation of having to reaffirm what he had told the senators as to the incapacity of the Administration or else to defend it. He chose to adopt the latter course and to eat his words, thus playing unfairly with both sides. The following morning, there being nothing else for him to do, he also resigned.




WRITING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

A Confederate caricature showing Lincoln, his foot resting on the Constitution, and Satan holding the ink pot. The table has negro-head gargoyles and cloven feet, and an all-seeing eye. On the wall to the left is a bloodhound with a shield supported by a negro head. From the etching by Volck in the Library of Congress.



THROUGH THE WILDERNESS

A battery of artillery dragged through the mud during a spring rain storm.



FALL IN FOR SOUP-COMPANY MESS

Winter camp showing the hurs built by the troops. A wagon is coming down the road from the distant camp on its way to the depot for forage.

From etchings by Educin Forbes, 1876. In the J. Pierpont Morgan Collection, Library of Congress.

Both men, however, were essential to Lincoln. Seward had developed into a capable statesman, was loyal to the President, whom he had now come to trust, and was indispensable in the State Department. Chase was a very difficult man to get on with but was doing excellent work in the Treasury, and with a country plunged into gloom and uncertainty it was no time to confess further fail-

ure by dismissing the leading two members of the Cabinet. Lincoln had handled the situation with extreme skill. He could afford neither to be dictated to by the Senate nor to alienate its support. The resignation of Chase, which followed from the President's confronting him with both the senators and his own colleagues, and his forced retraction of his accusations, enabled the President to decline to accept either resignation and to retain his Cabinet as before with both Chase and Seward in it. As Lincoln characteristically remarked when he got Chase's resignation: "Now I can ride; I have got a

An Uneasy Head

Lincoln takes great trouble to make the "loyal States" regard him as "the head of the nation." He seems to have no fear that "the nation" may become sensitive enough to hide its head in very shame, or that it may get so itchy in that region as to scratch its crown to pieces, or so crazed as to knock its skull against a stone wall, or so tired of life as to tie a rope around its neck and hang itself, leaving the head to bleach under all weathers, as a warning for all time, to all nations. At present "the head of the nation" is "turned;" yet, it fits the body very well, and every disease to which it is a victim has a suffering sympathy through all the members; so the head is likely to last as long as the nation, and to lie meauwhile, as uneasily as any that wears a crown.

EDITORIAL COMMENT FROM THE SOUTHERN PUNCH, RICHMOND, VA., SEPTEMBER 5, 1863

From the Library of Congress.

pumpkin in each end of my bag." The Cabinet crisis had passed. If the President could retain his statesmen, he had yet to continue his experiments with generals. The frightful and unnecessary slaughter at Fredericksburg had rendered Burnside useless as a commander, and in January, 1863, that officer was replaced by General Joseph Hooker, "Fighting Joe," as he was nicknamed, the choice being Lincoln's own in default of a better. The general was full of life and energy and his popularity and dash did much to restore the morale of the troops at a critical moment of deep depression, but he was not capable of planning campaigns on a grand scale, and was much out-classed by his opponents Lee and Jackson.

Lee, in Fredericksburg, had 60,000 men, whereas Hooker had 130,000, and with this numerical superiority he conceived the plan of cutting off Lee's communication with Richmond with one force and turning his left flank with another. In the three days' battle of Chancellorsville, which was brought on by Lee's divining all of Hooker's plans, May 2-5, the Union commander by poor generalship gave up every advantage he had held and was forced back across the Rappahannock with the severe loss of over 17,000 men. It might have been a complete rout had the Confederates not suffered one of the heaviest possible strokes in the wounding of Stonewall Jackson on the first evening of the fight. There was more or less confusion and the general with a small reconnoitring party had got in front of his own lines. On galloping back in the dark, he and his escort were mistaken for Federals, and were fired on by their own men. Jackson, severely wounded, died eight days later from pneumonia. A deeply religious man and one of the finest characters which the Scotch-Irish strain in our nation has produced, he was also one of the ablest generals on either side in the war, and his loss to Lee and the South was irreparable.

Replacing Jackson as well as he could with General R. S. Ewell, Lee determined on another advance into Northern territory, through the Shenandoah Valley. Preceded by Ewell and Hill with two corps to clear the valley, by June 27 Lee had his entire forces in Pennsylvania with headquarters at Chambersburg. On the same day Hooker, who had quarrelled with Halleck, who was continuing as military adviser in Washington, was replaced in command by General G. G. Meade, who took over the Army of the Potomac, then at Frederick. Its presence there had been due to Lincoln, who, although his interference with military plans and commanders had frequently been far from wise, had rightly warned Hooker that he should hang on to Lee's advancing army rather than try to capture Richmond in his absence.

Lee had been over-bold in this second attempt to invade the North. His continued success against one Union general after another had made a Union soldier at Chancellorsville say that "it's no use. No matter who is given us, we can't whip Bobby Lee," and perhaps Lee had himself become too confident. For diplomatic purposes in Europe it was desirable that just at that moment the

Confederacy should win a bold stroke. Lee counted on Burnside as his opponent, whom he knew he could out-play, and also on rallying disaffected elements to himself in Pennsylvania. On the other hand, he had lost Jackson, and failed to realize that his own presence on Union soil would rally men to the Northern cause rather than to himself. Meade, though not a great general, was a more dangerous opponent than Burnside, and Lee found his army of about 80,000 outnumbered more quickly than he had counted upon by Meade's forces at Frederick.

Therefore, when Ewell's cavalry had got within three miles of the Pennsylvania capital at Harrisburg, they were recalled, and Lee decided to take his stand on South Mountain and await attack. Meade had decided for his part also to await attack, about thirteen miles from Gettysburg at Pipe Creek, just south of the Maryland line. A chance encounter, however, between very small forces of both armies at Gettysburg precipitated one of the decisive battles of the war on ground not selected by either commander.

As the troops from both armies rapidly arrived near the point where fighting had started, the Federals took up their position on Cemetery Ridge and the Confederates theirs on the parallel Seminary Ridge, the result of the encounter on the first day, July 1, being rather in favor of Lee. The next day the Confederates pushed back both wings of Meade's army, and the position was becoming dangerous. The decisive action was on July 3, when Lee ventured on a direct attack against Meade's centre. After some fighting in the morning and heavy cannonading, the charge against the centre as planned by Lee, contrary to Longstreet's advice, was launched. Fifteen thousand men, with Pickett's division of about 5000 leading, started from the opposing height, approximately a mile away, toward the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge. The charge was magnificent but nothing could stand against the concentrated fire of artillery and rifle. A few Confederates actually reached the Union line and planted the stars and bars on top of the ridge, but it was all over. Of the 15,000 men who had charged across the little valley and up the slope, 4000 were captured. The rest were killed or escaped back to the Confederate lines. As a result of the threedays' fight nearly 50,000 men were killed, wounded, or missing, 20

per cent of the Union forces and 30 per cent of the Confederates.

The next day Meade made no effort to follow up his success, and at evening Lee withdrew to the Potomac, which was in flood and impassable. There he remained until the 13th, unmolested by Meade, who, after holding a council of war, resolved not to follow Lincoln's suggestion not to let the enemy escape, although his army, greatly superior in any case to Lee's in numbers, had received 40,000 reinforcements, whereas Lee had none. The President, grateful for Gettysburg, but deeply perturbed by the failure to snatch the fruit of victory and perhaps end the war, declined to accept the resignation which Meade proffered.

On the third day of Gettysburg another victory came to hearten Northern spirit. Grant captured Vicksburg. It had been essential that the city, commanding the Mississippi from the high bluff on which it was located, should be taken if the river was to be opened, and the Confederacy cut, but the task offered peculiar difficulties. Assault from the front was impossible, and the city was protected on the northern side by the streams and marshes of the Yazoo Valley.

Several attempts had been made to capture it when in March, 1863, Grant determined to move his troops down the west bank of the river to below Grand Gulf, cross the river there, and then march northward on firm ground against Vicksburg from the south, Porter slipping down-stream past the fortifications to meet him with gun-boats and transports. The latter, although discovered on the night of April 16 when making the attempt, and subjected to a lively bombardment, got through with the loss of only one transport, and the remarkably able campaign as planned by Grant then proceeded without fault.

Capturing Grand Gulf, Grant next took the important railway junction at Jackson, getting between Vicksburg and the army under J. E. Johnston, who was advancing from Chattanooga to reinforce Pemberton, who was defending Vicksburg. The latter, with 30,000 men, made an effort to cut Grant off from his communications, only to find that he had none! For the first time in the war an army was living off the country on enemy soil. Defeated in two minor engagements, Pemberton was forced back into Vicksburg with no hope of aid from Johnston. Grant, having been joined by Sherman and other forces, had about 75,000 men, and settled down to the

siege of the doomed town, although one assault was made on May 22 which cost him over 3000 killed and wounded.

With many non-combatants inside the city, which was bombarded from land and river, the situation was desperate and held out no hope. By the beginning of July, Pemberton had lost about 10,000 men, and there was sufficient food for only a few days more for army and citizens. On the 3d he surrendered the city, and his entire force of approximately 30,000 troops, 50,000 small arms, and other large supplies of military stores, Grant allowing the prisoners to return to their homes on parole. When the place was safely his, Grant returned to Sherman a letter which that officer had written strongly advising him against the plan of his campaign, a typical example of Grant's considerate kindness.

The capture of Vicksburg had cleared the Mississippi, split the Confederacy, and cut off the supplies it had been receiving from Europe through Mexican ports. Their objective won, the Army of the Cumberland and other western troops could now be utilized to capture Chattanooga, gain possession of Tennessee, and prepare the way for an attack on Atlanta and the splitting of the Confederacy in another direction. The only remaining military events of 1863 were in this field.

Chattanooga, defended by the Confederate General Bragg, was difficult to approach and attack owing to the nature of the bold mountain country in which it is located. Like Vicksburg, it was most accessible from the south, but as General Rosecrans, with 70,000 Union troops, was at Nashville, and Burnside at Knoxville, Bragg expected the attack to be made from the north. Rosecrans, however, without Grant's ability, tried to repeat that general's strategy at Vicksburg, and swung around so as to approach Chattanooga from the south. Bragg could have cut up the Union forces as they wandered about, more or less separated in the broken and unknown country, but did not do so, and when he led his army out about twelve miles from the city to face Rosecrans at Chickamauga he so placed himself as to leave the way open into the city.

When, on September 20, the second-rate, and on this occasion, panic-struck, Rosecrans was defeated, he fled into Chattanooga with a considerable part of the army. Fortunately, General George H. Thomas, a Virginian and one of the ablest generals on the Union

side to emerge from the war, held the Federal left-wing with 25,000 men against every assault from the Confederates, gaining the nickname for himself of the "Rock of Chickamauga," and saving the day for the Union army. The following evening he was ordered into the city by Rosecrans, who now found himself besieged by Bragg in the place which he had captured.

The Union general, completely shattered in nerve, sent desperate calls to Washington for help, but his incapacity being proved, Grant was put in command of all the forces in the West, and he in turn made Thomas commander of the Army of the Cumberland, with orders to hold Chattanooga at all costs until it could be relieved. Grant himself then went to the rescue, with Sherman in command of the Army of the Tennessee. When Grant arrived toward the end of October, he found Bragg entrenched on the heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and he determined to take the offensive as soon as Sherman should arrive with his forces, a month later.

On November 24 Grant ordered the battle to begin, Sherman, Thomas, and Hooker in command of the forces attacking Bragg's centre and two wings. The result was a complete victory for the Union, made notable by the brilliant dash up Missionary Ridge by Thomas's men, who, against orders, pushed straight up the steep slope, driving the Confederates down the other side. Although far less bloody than the battle of Chickamauga, there being only about 11,000 casualties on the two sides as against 36,000 in the earlier engagement, the battle of Lookout Mountain, or Missionary Ridge, was far more important in its results. Bragg was driven southward, and there was no longer a menace to the Federal control of Chattanooga, which was one of the three most important strategic points in the South, the others being Richmond and Vicksburg. Of these only Richmond now remained in the hands of the enemy, and the way was open to Atlanta and the sea for another year's campaigning. Could the South be bi-sected east and west, as it had been north and south, and could Lee be defeated definitively, the fate of the Confederacy would be sealed.

The year 1863, though thus ending so favorably for the Union, had not been without its great anxieties in foreign affairs as well as on our own battle-fields. Our chief enemy in Europe throughout

our struggle was the French Emperor, Louis Napoleon, but there were several European currents of opinion which also had to be taken into account. There had been, as we noted in the previous chapter, the mistrust of democracy on the part of many in the rich and conservative classes abroad. There was the easily understandable failure to realize that the war was really a blow against slavery. There was also, among some French and Spanish plotters, the hope of realizing anew their dreams of American empire.

The last was most nearly attained by the French. In 1861, as they could properly do even in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, England, France, and Spain had made a joint military demonstration against Mexico in consequence of one of the perennial disputes over financial affairs, but England and Spain had withdrawn their co-operation the following April after satisfactory terms had been made with the Mexicans. France alone continued to exert the pressure of force in pursuance of a greater adventure.

If the Union was to be broken, the Monroe Doctrine could be safely disregarded, whatever Napoleon might wish to do, and if he could secure the independence of the Confederacy he would have a friendly power on his side for French imperial schemes in America. In January, 1863, just after Lincoln had issued the Emancipation Proclamation, Napoleon proposed to Seward that the North recognize the South as successful, an insulting suggestion which was instantly declined. In June, a few days before Gettysburg was fought, a French army captured the City of Mexico. The following year, Napoleon set the Archduke Maximilian up as Mexican Emperor, backed by French bayonets, and, as it was to prove, by the invariably bad faith of the Napoleonic dynasty.

Throughout the war, when our hands were full, we thus had to count on the persistent enmity of the French Emperor, exerted against us in all possible diplomatic ways. On the other hand, in both France and England, notably in the latter, the tide of democratic sentiment among the ordinary people set more and more strongly in favor of the North as the struggle continued. The Emancipation Proclamation had had a great effect on the liberal-minded of all nations, and early in 1863 great meetings were held all over England demonstrating indubitably that the mass of the English people were solidly in favor of the Union.

There was yet, however, ample cause for anxiety. The Confederate agents, Mason in England and the abler Slidell in France, had not only succeeded in placing a Confederate loan of approximately \$15,000,000 but were having vessels of war built in both

HENRY WARD BEECHER IN ENG-LAND.

From our Special Reporter.

This distinguished clergyman, having traversed the cotton-consuming districts, delivering at many important points lectures on Slavery and the present condition of Lincolnia, made, on a recent occasion, a novel speech at Exeter Hall.

The fame of the orator drew a brilliant audience. Among the notabilities present were Viscount Palmerston, Earl Russell, Honorable Mr. Lindsay, M. P., Hon. Mr. Roeback, M. P., and the Duchess of Sutherland.

Mr. Beecher entered Exeter Hall, with the Duchess of Sutherland on his arm, and both under the especial escort of her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Earl Russell looked as young as he did twenty years ago, his seizure of the Confederate iron-clads doubtless giving him renewed assurance of the distinguished consideration of Mr. Secretary Seward, of the Lincoln dynasty.

PART OF A REPORT OF HENRY WARD BEECHER'S LONDON VISIT AS GIVEN IN THE SOUTHERN PUNCH, NOV. 7, 1863

countries. By carrying on their transactions in the name of foreign firms and even of foreign governments, they made it difficult to build up a legal case against the ship-builders, and the prospect, particularly of having the iron-clad rams building at Liverpool get to sea and perhaps break up the blockade of Southern ports, was a serious one. Throughout the summer of 1863, Minister Adams worked steadily and skilfully to prevent the sailing of the vessels on completion, and Russell, having learned the danger of too great observance of legal technicalities, finally ordered them seized. Those building at French ports were also detained. The bonds of the Confederacy dropped to 65, and danger from Europe was over, except for the French Em-

pire in Mexico, which we had to wait to deal with when our hands should become free.

During 1864 the most important events of the war at home were Sherman's march to the sea through Georgia, Grant's long-drawn-out fight for Richmond against Lee, the election in November, and the minor operations of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley and of Thomas at Nashville.

Lincoln had at last found his general, and early in March Grant had been made lieutenant-general and chief of all the Northern





THE POSITION AT COLD HARBOR, JUNE 2, 1864

Bostom, A.R. Waud's original sketch and (rop) the reproduction of it in Harper's Weekly, June 25, 1864.

A. R. Waud, an artist for Harper's Weekly with the Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1865, made sketches on the field from which wood blocks were made for publication in Harper's Weekly. These original sketches are now in the J. Pierpont Morgan Collection in the Library of Congress.

At the right is Gen. Howard's letter of recommendation of the artist. But Department, Since I Department, I all capati of his Bureau and others ordered in many concerns.

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
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STREET IN FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA



GENERAL GRANT WRITING TELEGRAM THAT THE ARMY HAD CROSSED THE RAPIDAN From vencil sketches by A. R. Wand in the J. Pierpont Morgan Collection, Library of Congress.

forces. Coming East, he pitted himself against Lee, and taking charge of the Army of the Potomac, numbering slightly over 100,000, he crossed the Rapidan May 4, and penetrated the wooded country of tangled growth known as "the Wilderness" in a renewed attempt to approach Richmond from the north.

The Lee-Grant campaign which followed was one of the most desperate of the war and notable for marking the transition to the modern form of trench warfare and the advent of the spade. Grant had scarcely got across the Rapidan when he faced Lee, who disputed his advance in the two days' battle of the Wilderness, May 5 and 6, which proved only a draw in spite of heavy casualties, involving for Grant the loss of nearly 18,000 men. As Lee blocked the way, Grant tried to outflank him, only to find the Confederates entrenched again in his path. The Union leader also entrenched and then followed the five days' battle of Spottsylvania Court House, in which Grant lost about 16,000 more men, bringing his total losses to about 34,000 in a little over a fortnight. Grant, however, had entrenched his will as well as his army, and simply announced that "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." It was to take more.

On whichever side he tried to outflank Lee, the Southerner was there ahead of him, blocking the way. On June 4, Grant made an assault at Cold Harbor, flinging 80,000 men against the Confederate lines, an effort that none believed would succeed and which Grant afterwards acknowledged to have been a mistake. It was over in less than half an hour, the Union loss of 7000 being more than ten times that of Lee. The total losses thus far had been about 55,000 Federal killed and wounded against Confederate losses estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000, and Grant had not as yet got nearer to Richmond than had McClellan.

He now decided to follow McClellan's earlier plan, that is, to transfer his army to the Peninsula and work up along the James toward Richmond from the southeast. He had at the beginning of the campaign sent General Butler to take Petersburg and cut off Lee's communication, but that general fought Confederate women more fiercely than he did Confederate soldiers, and had allowed himself to be "bottled up" by the forces under Beauregard. On June 15 Grant himself ordered an assault on Petersburg, which failed

with the loss of 10,000 more Union men. For more than a month he besieged the town, and on July 27 tried again to force an entry after having sprung a huge mine under a part of the Confederate defences. Once more there was no gain, and a loss of 4000. Until the following April, Grant was to remain without moving. Ugly rumors that his success at Vicksburg had been chance and that he was really an incapable man who had taken again to drink spread through the North, which counted its casualties of over 70,000 husbands and sons, forgetting that comparatively the South had lost as heavily and that the inevitable end was drawing nearer.

Grant had counted on two minor operations to assist him while he was facing Lee near the Rapidan. Both failed, for just as Butler did nothing to capture Petersburg, so Sigel, who was to have cleared the Shenandoah Valley, allowed himself to be completely beaten by General Early. Indeed, by July 11, following the old route down the valley and around by Frederick, Early was within four miles of Washington itself, which he might have captured had he been quick enough. United States paper dollars fell to less than forty cents. However, having delayed, Early was forced to retire by reinforcements sent to the capital by Grant, and having burned Chambersburg, retreated up the valley, which was now to be cleared of all Confederate forces and completely devastated by Sheridan.

On September 19, that general defeated the enemy at Winchester and three days later at Fisher's Hill, burning and destroying as he went until it was said that even "a crow flying over the country would need to carry his own rations." The object was to prevent any further threats to Washington and the North by that route, but answering the cry of rage which went up from the South, Early again advanced only to be defeated at Cedar Creek on October 19. Sheridan was at Winchester, twenty miles off, when he heard of the attack, but rode at top speed to rally his forces which had almost been routed by the Confederates. As a result of the turned tide, the Confederates finally retreated from the valley, which was the scene of no more military operations for the rest of the war.

We now have to turn to Sherman and the West. That general's work was the capture of Atlanta and the cutting of the Confederacy. Opposed to him was one of the ablest Southern commanders, J. E. Johnston, with perhaps 70,000 troops. Sherman, in command of

the Army of the Cumberland, had approximately 100,000. Early in May, Sherman began his advance, Johnston steadily falling back before him. There was constant skirmishing, although no battle except a minor engagement at Kenesaw Mountain, in which the Federal loss, about 3000, was nearly four times that of the rebels. Thomas, who was with Sherman, disapproved of such useless attacks, and Sherman returned to his former tactics. Johnston continued to fall back, and by July 17 Sherman was across the Chattahoochee River and preparing to besiege Atlanta. The same day, most unwisely, President Davis removed Johnston, with censure, from his command, replacing him by General J. B. Hood.

Hood, being forced by the conditions of his appointment to substitute fighting for Johnston's tactics, fought without avail three battles in ten days, but on September 2 had to evacuate the capital and leave Atlanta to Sherman. Hood now decided to move westward and strike at Sherman's long line of communication, but the latter sent Thomas to oppose him, the Union strength being such that while Sherman could have with him 60,000 men in Atlanta, a force of equal strength could be gathered near Nashville for Thomas. In a masterly little campaign, although marked by his usual caution, Thomas finished all hopes for the Confederacy in Tennessee when he finally inflicted a very heavy defeat on Hood at Nashville on December 16.

Meanwhile, Sherman had determined to cut all communications, even telegraphic, and to march across the richest part of the Confederacy to the sea, subsisting his army on the country. He proceeded to wage war in accordance with his belief that "war is hell," and that the quickest and therefore the most humane way in the long run to end it is to inflict as great damage on the enemy as is possible with the least delay. He left Atlanta on November 16, part of his forces having started the day before. Lincoln and Grant were to know nothing of his whereabouts except from Southern newspapers until December 14, when a despatch announced that he was within ten miles of Savannah. On his march of 360 miles, he deliberately destroyed, in a belt 60 miles wide, all of the property possible which might in any way enure to the military benefit of the enemy, and much more that could not, his own estimate being that he had ruined property to the amount of \$100,000,000,000, of which

four fifths was mere waste without military advantage. Savannah was evacuated without a fight, and on December 20 Sherman took possession of the city.

On June 10, the U. S. S. Kearsarge had met the Alabama off Cherbourg on the coast of France, and had sunk that vessel after it. with the smaller ones escaped from England, had done damage to United States commerce estimated in the later arbitration at \$15,-500,000. On August 5, Farragut, with eighteen ships, had slipped past the forts guarding the entrance of Mobile Bay and had defeated the Confederate fleet gathered there, gaining possession of that valuable port, although the city itself was not captured until the following spring. With Mobile and New Orleans in Federal possession, the Mississippi in Federal control for its entire length, the Confederacy west of that river no longer strong enough to be any menace, with no fear of further enemy thrusts up from Tennessee or through the Shenandoah Valley, with the railroads and military stores destroyed through the heart of the Confederacy, with Sherman ready to march northward from Savannah and Lee outnumbered by Grant, the end was in sight.

All of this, however, was far from being obvious in the spring and summer, when a war-weary North had to face a Presidential election in the midst of a great conflict, the most serious ordeal of that sort which any modern democracy has been called upon to face. On the 7th of June, Lincoln had been unanimously nominated for a second term by a convention of Republicans and War Democrats, who named Andrew Johnson of Tennessee as Vice-President. The call for the convention had been worded to include all who stood for Union of whatever party, and the first plank in the platform reiterated this in the statement that, "laying aside all differences of political opinion," it was the highest duty of every American citizen to "maintain against all their enemies the integrity of the Union." It approved the President's war policy and aims, and, among other things, denounced the French attempt to set up an empire in Mexico.

Prior to the Republican Convention, a group of radicals of all sorts, such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Wendell Phillips, Frederick Douglass and others, had approved of a convention which had nominated Frémont on the heterogeneous platform which such

groups usually produce, including a plank limiting the office of President to one term.

There was no danger from them. The danger was from the Democrats and even more from those Republicans who were opposed to Lincoln. The Democratic Convention met at Chicago on

THE HERO OF ANTIETA.



GEN. GEORGE S. MCCLELLAN, DEMOCRATIC CAMBIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES.

BROADSIDE ON WHICH WAS PRINTED McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOMINATION

From the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library.

August 19, and adopted a completely defeatist platform, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and loudly denouncing the acts of Lincoln's administration. General McClellan was nominated on the first ballot, and although he repudiated the platform his ambition and vanity prevented him from declining to run on it.

The campaign before the American people thus afforded the peculiar spectacle of a civilian President running on a no-compromise war platform and a general of the army running on a pacifist and defeatist one. At the end of August it seemed impossible that

Lincoln could win. In July he had had to call for another half million volunteers and one of the hated drafts, which we shall discuss in the next chapter, was scheduled for September 6. The people were weary of the endless war, and in *The Tribune* Greeley was assailing the President with profound bitterness. Luckily, the week of the draft, Sherman took Atlanta, and gave encouragement to the drooping Union spirits.

Although McClellan saved a good many votes for himself personally by the rather odd method of repudiating the proclaimed views and principles of the party which had made him its leader, the result of the election proved an overwhelming victory for Lincoln, whose popular vote was 2,214,000 to McClellan's 1,802,000, and whose vote even in the army was 117,000 to the general's 34,000. Owing to the usual vagaries of our electoral system, the President's electoral vote defeated his opponent 10 to 1 (212 to 21), instead of the mere 2.3 to 1.8 of the people's votes; but even so Lincoln had won a popular majority of about a half million, and in spite of all the discouragements of a prolonged war, the democracy of the North had shown itself capable of making the wise decision at the polls.

The doom of the Confederacy could not now be long postponed. There had already been abortive efforts to compromise, mostly got up by self-appointed agents, and on February 3, 1865, there was a meeting of official delegates at Hampton Roads, Lincoln attending if person. There was, however, no real chance of a negotiated peace. Lincoln might offer to end hostilities if the Confederacy would submit to the Union and accept emancipation as an accomplished fact, with the promise to try to have Congress pass some sort of compensation measure, but Jefferson Davis could not agree to anything except on the primary basis of recognition of Southern independence. The conference having failed, there was nothing to do but finish the fight and let arms decide.

There could be no doubt now what that decision would be. The South had at last lost courage to go on. It still had resources both in men and supplies, but the will to fight longer what seemed a hopeless and endless struggle had gone. In the autumn of 1864 Davis had admitted that two thirds of the soldiers were absent from their regiments, mostly without leave. There was no longer any

9 ~ aps 1/5-Thave sec & your note of this date. Though not witer taining the opinion you express of the hopelypup of further uses of M. Ou. I resprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, I therefore before Consider - in your proposition ask the lims you will offer on Condition of its Surrencler Very respt your obtlest Pleser. Ence

St Gen U. S. Greent -Conner armes of the U States

EPVELGATED LESS

FACSIMILE OF NOTE FROM LEE TO GRANT, APRIL 9, 1865

One of the series of surrender correspondence, facsimiled by Ely B. Parker.

In the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.


expectation of foreign recognition. The blockade was tightening. Sherman's march had made a deep impression. The women in innumerable homes were tiring, and, as in the Revolution, the men at the front got piteous messages describing conditions on farms and plantations.

On February 1, Sherman left Savannah and began his march northward. There was much plundering on the way, and, on the 17th, drunken Union privates set fire to the railroad station at Columbia, and for two days there was a reign of terror in that city. Sherman's orders had specifically stated that the public buildings, railway property, factories, and machine shops were to be destroyed, but that libraries, asylums, and all private dwellings were to be immune. Months of deliberate destruction and looting, however, had let down the morale of his army, which included, as armies always do, a large number of the lower sort who asked nothing better than the chance to pillage. There is no question that the troops behaved very badly, and in spite of efforts to control them, the capital of South Carolina was left a mass of smoking ruins when Sherman marched out of it on the 20th. Two days before, the Confederates had been forced to abandon Charleston, and there again the Union troops wreaked vengeance.

Moving northward, Sherman was confronted by Johnston, but beat him back, and by March 23 had joined General Schofield at Goldsboro, thus receiving 20,000 reinforcements, 160 miles from Richmond. From Goldsboro he intended to march to the assistance of Grant.

Grant, however, was not to need him. By April 3 he had forced Lee to evacuate Petersburg, and in consequence of threatening his railway communications had caused the Southern commander to abandon any further attempt to defend Richmond, which was now open to the Federals. Davis and the Confederate Government fled, and Grant took possession of the capital. Lee was now in retreat, and had to turn toward Lynchburg when Sheridan captured the railway at Danville. The Southern army was melting rapidly by desertions, and on April 9 Lee asked for a meeting with Grant at Appomattox Court House.

The terms of surrender of the 26,765 men, all that were left of Lee's former magnificent army, were quickly arranged. Grant,



GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER SALUTING ROSSER, HIS FORMER CLASSMATE

Rosser, graduating from West Point as Virginia seceded, joined the Confederate Army. He later engaged in engineering and was Chief Engineer of the Pacific Railroad in 1881–1882. The meeting shown above took place at Woodstock Races, October 9, 1864.



CONFEDERATES TAKING THE OATH AT RICHMOND, 1865

From the pencil sketches by A. R. Waud in the J. Pierpont Morgan Collection in the Library of Congress.



THE CHRISTIAN COMMISSION IN THE FIELD AT GERMANTOWN, VIRGINIA, 1863



HEADQUARTERS OF THE FIRST BRIGADE, HORSE ARTILLERY, AT BRANDY STATION VIRGINIA

From Brady photographs in the Library of Congress.

rough and uncultured as he was, displayed again and at their finest his instincts of considerate thoughtfulness which made him, in spite of all his shortcomings, one of the great gentlemen in our history.

According to the terms agreed, the Confederate troops were to be released on parole. Officers were to retain their side arms, which saved the gallant Lee and others the humiliation of surrendering their swords, and were also to keep their horses and personal baggage. To the suggestion of Lee that many of the privates owned their own horses also, Grant immediately responded by adding that they as well as officers might keep them, as they might be useful "for the spring plowing." Lee said the action "will do much toward conciliating our people," and the terms were accepted. Enquiry showed that the Confederates were badly in need of food. Grant ordered that rations be supplied to them. As word of the surrender spread through the Union lines, shots were fired in rejoicing. At once Grant ordered them to cease. "The war is over," he said, "the rebels are our countrymen again: and the best sign of rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the field." Lee rode back to his own lines. Scarcely able to speak for feeling, he could say only to his veterans, "We have fought through the war together. I have done the best I could for you. My heart is too full to say more."

In the course of a few weeks, the other armies had also surrendered and the trial by combat had ended.

CHAPTER III

BEHIND THE LINES IN WAR TIME

EFORE continuing the narrative of political events, which will lead us into what, on the whole, was the most disgraceful period of our national life, we must stop to consider what was going on among the civilian population behind the lines, both North and South, during the four years of war. Such a struggle, under modern conditions, is bound to affect profoundly the life of any people. Not only in a thousand minor ways does it alter all the accustomed routine and habits of daily living, but it also emphasizes existing tendencies to such a degree as to make it appear as though it had almost completely changed one's accustomed world. Indeed, in some respects the greatest wars do so, but we must distinguish between merely temporary influences, the acceleration of existing tendencies, and the new factors introduced. We shall consider first the more local conditions North and South, and then note some of the larger results of the contest on national life and outlook.

In the North as well as the South, the ordinary citizen was affected in two ways, in his direct relation to the government, and in his relations to the general economic and social conditions engendered.

Looking first at the North, we are struck by the fact that, precisely as it was in England, public opinion was confused in the beginning as to what the war was really being waged for when it broke. Writing from Massachusetts to a friend in London some three months after Fort Sumter had surrendered, Nathaniel Hawthorne voiced the confusion of many when he said: "We also have gone to war, and we seem to have little, or at least a very misty idea of what we are fighting for. It depends upon the speaker; and that, again, depends upon the section of the country in which his sympathies are enlisted. The Southern man will say, 'We fight for States' rights, liberty, and independence.' The Middle-Western man will avow he fights for the Union; while our Northern and Eastern

BEHIND THE LINES IN WAR TIME

man will swear that from the beginning his only idea was liberty to the blacks and the annihilation of slavery."

Although this confusion, as we saw, was to some extent cleared by Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamations of September, 1862, and January, 1863, it was never completely clarified in the North. Throughout the four years a considerable party in that section was



There was a Stern Statesman astute, who so often went in to recruit,
That a Rattlesnake fat revolved in his hat,
While a Copperhead squirmed in his boot.

FROM YE BOOK OF COPPERHEADS

Drawings and verses by Charles Godfrey Leland. Published in Philadelphia, 1863. This book was republished in Indianapolis as a campaign document in 1864.

From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

wholly opposed to the war. Forming themselves into an organization called at different times and places the Knights of the Golden Circle, Order of American Knights, and Sons of Liberty, with the notorious Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio as chief official in 1864, the party was defeatist and disloyal, not seldom using terroristic methods against those who were supporting the government. Apart from these "copperheads," as the members of this group were popularly called from one of the most dangerous of American snakes, the North was far from a unit either in aims or prosecution of the struggle.

As Hawthorne pointed out, Union sentiment was strongest in the West and Abolitionism in the East, particularly New England. In

so far as the latter section was vocal through its authors and orators, it cared little enough for mere Union. The chief Abolitionists, as we saw in an earlier chapter, had long been preaching disunion, and the chief concern of this strong New England group appeared to be lest their skirts might be soiled by continuing the bonds that united them to slave States. More than a dozen years earlier, at the time of the Texas controversy, Lowell had written in the first series of his Biglow Papers:

"Ef I'd my way I hed ruther We should go to work an' part, They take one way, we take t'other, Guess it wouldn't break my heart."


After civil war had begun, Hawthorne wrote to a friend: "We shall be better off without the South—better and nobler than hitherto—without them." Even the gentle Quaker poet Whittier had compared Southerners to demons, and in writing and speaking against slavery not only the extreme Abolitionists but others also had, by their fiery, intemperate, and often untrue denunciations of the Southern aims and character, done their best to instil into the Northern mind a hatred of the South and its people almost greater than the hatred of slavery itself.

For this group, the war was not a war for union but primarily a war to free the slave and to punish a people whom they had been taught to think of as almost inhuman aliens, cruel and immoral. They considered that the Southerners were not merely caught in the toils of an economic system which neither they nor Lincoln could see how to change, but were wilfully ruling by blood and lash, that they were men and women so lost to all humanity as to make the destruction of the Union preferable to the North's having any more connection with them. We shall see later the terrible results of the joining of this group of moral fanatics with others in the history of reconstruction. During particularly the earlier stage of the war, if this group cared little about a war for Union, which Lincoln proclaimed the struggle to be, the Western and other Unionist groups cared little about waging a war which should be fought for the ends of the Abolitionists, whose aims and methods they had long bitterly denounced.

Turning to the question of military service, we may note that, owing to much overlapping in various ways, it is impossible to arrive at any accurate estimate of the numbers of troops who served in both armies. In the North, the enlistments were almost 2,900,000, but it is probable that only about 1,575,000 different individuals actually

were in service at one time and another. Of these, 359,528 died, 110,000 either on the battle-field or from wounds.

Perhaps no other great nation in history has been less militaristic than our own, with the exception of China, and the raising of troops has always presented difficulties, until the World War, when the lessons from previous ones were utilized from the



ALL ABLE-BÖDIED MEN,

Between the respective ages of 18 and 45, to eared their names forthwith, in their Country's service.

New is a good time to reliet, as Government needs moreonen to crush out rebellion and bring buck the Nation to in

ONCE MORE TO THE RESCUE!

The Government will pay \$15 per month, and the State \$7

A Bounty of One Hundred Dollars.

DAVID P. BARBER. Recruiting Officer.)

A RECRUITING POSTER, PROBABLY FROM CLEVELAND
From the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library.

start. On April 15, 1861, Lincoln in the North called for 75,000 volunteers for three months' service only, and this small number, for so short a term, out of that section's population of 19,000,000 (not counting the border States) promptly enlisted. May 3, he called for about 80,000 more, approximately half of whom were to serve in volunteer regiments and half in the regular army for a three-year term. Until Congress should meet in special session on July 4, the President was in a quandary as to volunteers, the old law of 1795 providing that militia could not be called upon to serve more than three months in any one year. It was for that technical reason and

not because he believed in so short a war that Lincoln named the three months' period in his first call, however hopeful Seward may have been of a brief struggle. On the other hand, it is not likely that the North, even in its early burst of enthusiasm, would have voluntarily provided a large army for three years instead of three months.

As it was, when Congress did meet in July, it was believed necessary to offer a bounty of \$100 to every soldier who would volunteer, and this system was continued throughout the war. Not only the Federal Government but States, counties, and districts offered bounties also, so that by 1864 volunteers were receiving in some States, such as Massachusetts and Illinois, as much as \$1000 and even more for their enlistment. Before the end of the war the system had cost the Federal government \$300,000,000 and the State and local governments \$286,000,000 more. It also had the result of encouraging large numbers of unscrupulous men in what came to be known as "bounty jumping." These would enlist in one place, receive their bounty, desert at the first opportunity, go to another enlistment district, and again be paid, often repeating the process many times before being caught.

By the middle of 1862 the need for men was imperative, and in spite of patriotism and bounties they were not coming forward. On July 2 the President asked for 300,000 through the Governors of the States, who instituted State drafts.

"We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more, From Mississippi's winding stream, and from New England's shore,"

wrote John S. Gibbons, in the editorial column of The New York Evening Post, but in fact only 88,000 came.

By the next year the situation was so bad that Congress on March 3, 1863, enacted a conscription law, which, although based on State population, was for the first time in our history to operate directly on the people by machinery set up by the Federal Government instead of by the individual States. All men between twenty and forty-five were required to register, although certain groups, such as married men over thirty-five, could subsequently claim exemption from service. There were many bad features in the Act, later amended, one of which was the basing of the quota on population

instead of on the number of men of military age. At first a good many of the States, particularly in the West, where enlistments had been heavier than in the East, were practically exempt, owing to credits being given for previous enlistments. Although various

changes were made in the Act, which remained in force throughout the war, the worst features of all remained, the privilege given to a drafted man to cancel his call on any particular draft by paying \$300, or to avoid service for the entire duration of the war by procuring a substitute for a three-year enlistment.

This meant that only the poor were inextricably caught in the conscription net, and the North was treated to the spectacle of agents roving everywhere to buy men to serve in place of those who did not wish to, and could afford not to. Darkies from the South, the poor or down-and-outs in the North and Canada, even the inhabi-

Avoid the Draft!

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST MARSHAL, SIXTH DISTRICT, No. 6 Union Buildings, Main street, below De Kalb, NORRISTOWN, June 2, 1862.

DUBLIC attention is solicited to the subjoined circular from the Provost A Marshal General. All persons wishing to join any of the Regiments here referred to, will make application to these Headquarters within the next takety days.

JOHN J. FREEDLEY, CAPTAIN.
Provost Marshal, Sixth District.

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 22, 1863. All men who desire to join any particular regiment of

CAVALRY

Now in the field, are hereby authorized to present themselves at any time during the next thirty days to the Board of Enrolment, in their respective Districts. The Board shall examine them and determine upon their fitness for the service, and if found to be fit, the Provest Marshal of the District shall give them transportation tickets to the general rendezeous, at the Headquarters of the A. A. Provest Marshal General of the State. As soon as they present themselves at this general Rendezvous they shall be duly mustered by a mustering and disbursing officer, and paid by him the bounty allowed by law.

JAMES B. FRY. PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

June 2, 1863.

Herald and Free Press Print, Nerristown, Pa. All kinds of Job Work done to order.

A RECRUITING POSTER FROM NORRISTOWN, PA.

From the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

tants of European poorhouses, were drawn upon, bought and paid for. A district, however, was not submitted to the draft if it filled its quota otherwise, and although over 200,000 substitutes appear to have been purchased, the greater part by far of the men who served throughout the whole war were volunteers, there being over 834,000 volunteers at the time of the four drafts from July, 1863, to December, 1864.

The extremely undemocratic aspect of the law and its many inequitable features resulted in much violent opposition, the worst being the draft riots in New York in July, 1863. For four days that city was practically in the hands of a mob. The provost marshal's office was sacked and destroyed, as were the home of the mayor, that of the publisher of *The Tribune*, the Weehawken Ferry House,

ATTENTION

MERCHANTS, BANKERS AND MERCHANTS' CLERKS AND OTHERS

Meet for Organization and Enrolment

At Two O'clock ATTHEMERCHANTS'EXCHANGE,

III Broadway,

To take immediate action in the present crisis. Military now engaged with the Mob. The Mayor's House being Sacked and Torn Down!!

A HANDBILL OF 1863 DURING THE DRAFT RIOTS IN NEW YORK


From the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library.

and other buildings. The Colored Orphan Asylum was burned, and negroes were hunted through the city and a number killed. The draft had to be suspended, both the Governor of the State, Horatio Seymour, and the mayor of the city cravenly assuring the mob that the law was unconstitutional. It was not until Federal troops had been rushed to the scene that order was restored, after a thousand persons had been killed or wounded and about \$1,500,000 worth of property destroyed.

Although the New York riots were the most serious, there were minor affairs in other cities throughout the North. In spite of these, however, the drafts were carried out. The results, nevertheless, were



BUYING A SUBSTITUTE IN THE NORTH DURING THE WAR From the Confederate War Etching by Volck in the Library of Congress.



A SOMEWHAT SIMILAR SITUATION IN THE SOUTH From an etching by Thomas Worth, in the Library of Congress.

"Where is our little drummer?"

His nearest connades say,

When the dreadful fight is over,

And the smoke has cleared away.

As the rebel corps was scattering,

He urged them to pursue;

So, furiously he best and best

The parteness

He stood no more among them,
For a bullet as it sped
Had glanced and struck his ankle,
And stretched him with the dead
He crawled behind a cannon,
And pale and paler grew:
But still the little drummer beat
His restricted

They bore him to the surgeon,
A busy man was he:
A drummer-boy—what ails him?"
His comrades answered, "See!"
As they took him from the stretcher,
A heavy breath he drew,
And his little fangers strove to beat
The rat-test-boy!

The ball had spent its fury:

**A scratch," the stargeon said,

As he wound the snowy bandage
Which the lint was staining red!

"I must leave you now, old fellow,"

"O take me back with you,

For I know the men are missing m

And the rat-tat-to."



THE LITTLE DRUMMER

Pages from "A Selection of War Lyrics" with illustrations on wood by F. O. C. Darley, New York, 1864. From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

far from reassuring. In the draft of July, 1863, of the approximately 292,000 names drawn, the bearers of about 40,000 failed to report. A little over 252,000 men were actually examined, and of these over 164,000 secured exemption on one plea or another. Of the 88,170 who were actually drafted, 52,288 bought their exemptions for \$300 each, giving the government over \$15,500,000. Of the remaining

THE DRAFT.

MERCHANTS', BANKERS', AND GENERAL VOLUNTEER AND SUBSTITUTE ASSOCIATION,

Office, 428 Broadway, New-York.

Sra:-

We beg to inform you that we are now furnishing acceptable alien substitutes for men who are enrolled, and men who are not enrolled, for the coming Draft, and also for men who have shready been drafted.

The Provost Marshal General having officially intimated to accept substitutes for men before the Draft takes place, the present is the best opportunity that will be offered to procure good men at reasonable prices.

Gentlemen will have their substitutes sent to the office of the Provost Marshal, and examined and mustered into the United States' service, and their exemption papers correctly procured, without the inconvenience of their leaving their places of business to attend to it themselves. All inconvenience and trouble will be saved to them, by merely forwarding their full name and place of residence to this office, and their wishes will be promptly attended to.

SIMPSON & MoNICHOL,

AGENT

THE BEGINNING AND ENDING OF A CIRCULAR LETTER OF JUNE, 1864, REGARDING DRAFT SUBSTITUTES

From the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library.

35,882 men whose names had been turned up, 26,002 bought substitutes and were thus exempt for the duration of the war. Had it not been for the volunteers, the struggle would have ended then and there in defeat, but it is probable that the draft had greatly stimulated the flagging volunteering.

If it was not easy for Lincoln to fill the ranks of the army, the men who were in it were well looked after by those behind the lines. A new era of humanitarianism in military history had been ushered in by Florence Nightingale in the Crimean War only a few years earlier, and when the antiquated medical department

of the United States Army found itself helpless before its sudden task of caring for the sick and wounded en masse—there were 90,000 on the Northern side by the end of 1862—a civilian organization on a national basis, the United States Sanitary Commission,



A FOUR-PAGE MAGAZINE, WRITTEN AND ILLUSTRATED BY VOLUNTEERS IN CINCINNATI, MAY, 1861

From the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library.

rendered admirable service. Clara Barton and Louisa M. Alcott were merely the two most famous of the many nurses it put in the field. Not only caring for the sick and disabled but also supplying the well with many comforts, the Sanitary Commission was the first national organization of the sort which we had developed. Money for it was raised in part by the holding of "Sanitary Fairs," those at New York and Phila-

delphia alone netting a million dollars each. Another organization, chiefly concerned with distributing Bibles and otherwise ministering to the moral welfare of the men, although also catering for their physical needs, was the Christian Commission, which expended \$6,000,000 in all, and like the Sanitary Commission was nation-wide in its organization.

Very large sums were spent by States and smaller political divisions in caring for the families of the poorer soldiers, and the

war seems to have given a considerable impetus to the more ordinary charities of peace times. One of the difficult problems was that of the disposition of about 300,000 negroes who had either escaped from the South or were taken over by the government as parts of the South were conquered by the Union armies and the owners of the negroes fled. To a considerable extent these derelict slaves were gathered together into camps, where conditions for the most part were extremely bad, the mortality in them rising, according to a government official, to 25 per cent in 1864. When conditions were revealed, however, a wave of missionary emotion swept over the North, and much was done to ameliorate the situation. It was probably true, nevertheless, that in the long run the harm done to the cause of the negro by Northern animosity against him, which was strong, was not so great as that by the unintelligent and purely emotional fervor raised on his behalf.

It is impossible to estimate exactly the cost of the struggle to either North or South, but for the former the increased expenditure of the government above normal during the war years was unquestionably more than \$3,000,000,000. More than \$2,600,000,000 was raised by the sale of bonds, some yielding investors as high as 7.30 at purchase, the total bonded debt of the government reaching practically \$3,000,000,000, after adjustment of certain claims, by 1868. Three other chief sources of revenue were tapped—internal taxation, import duties, and the issue of paper money, the latter two having lasting results.

The system of internal taxation, which yielded over \$356,000,000, was rather chaotic, and it began to seem as though almost every object and occupation was taxed in one way or another—liquor, tobacco, bank checks, advertisements, all sorts of businesses, and incomes, and almost innumerable other things. Before the war was over, the income tax, declared unconstitutional long afterward, was levied at 5 per cent on incomes from \$600 to \$5000 and 10 per cent above the latter amount. It has been said that in levying internal revenue taxes the government went on the theory that "wherever you see a head, hit it," and owing to duplications and the taxation of the same article in its various stages of manufacture or sale, it was estimated that the taxes actually collected ranged from 8 to 15 per cent on every finished product.

From the tariff of 1846 to that of 1860, there had been little agitation on the subject of protection, and rates had tended toward lower figures. For the purpose of winning votes in the election of

> 1860, in some of the manufacturing States, no-

> tably Pennsylvania, the Morrill Bill had been pre-

> pared, considerably in-

creasing the duties on

iron and wool for protection rather than for reve-

nue. This Act, finally

passed in 1861, had been

a vote-getting and not a

war measure, but it was

scarcely passed when the

war made its heavy de-

mands for increased reve-


nue. By successive Acts

the average duty levied

rose to 37.2 per cent in 1862 and over 47 per cent

in 1864, but the essential

feature of these new tariff measures was the emphasis laid on protection, and, in not a few cases, the flagrant granting to



BROADSIDE OF THE ADDRESS ACCOMPANYING TROOPS, PROBABLY IN 1861


special industries of the THE PRESENTATION OF A FLAG TO COLORED opportunity to make ex-With names of part of the subscribers. cessive profits by govern-From the Rare Book Room, New York Public Library. ment aid. This, in the long run, was to prove of more importance than the raising of slightly over \$300,000,000 toward national expenses during the war. Although throughout the contest the government insisted upon





The first issue of *The Bugle Horn of Liberty*, inaugurating a series of "portraits of the kind of men at the head of the Northern Government," carried this design said to be "if not a likeness of the man (Lincoln) who desires so much to govern us, the exterior corresponds with his acts." The second number pictured Horace Greeley, "an entirely original 'pictur.' We do not publish the same picture more than once. We change our base every time."

From the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.



- A. CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 50-CENT BILL, 1863

 B. MAHONING COUNTY BANK, YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, BILL FOR FIFTY CENTS, 1862
 - C. SCRIP ISSUED BY DELMONICO'S RESTAURANT, NEW YORK, 1862
- D. FACE OF ENCASED POSTAGE STAMP MONEY PATENTED 1861, WITH REVERSE, WHICH WAS USED FOR ADVERTISING

From the Chase National Bank Collection of Moneys.

made the "greenbacks," as the notes were called, legal tender for all purposes except customs duties and interest on the national debt. There was nothing back of this paper except the credit of the nation, and as, by successive issues, the amount rose to \$431,000,000, and the changing fortunes of the war made redemption problematic, the greenbacks fell in value until at one stage a paper dollar was worth only thirty-five cents in gold. At the end of 1861 all banks had suspended specie payment, and it was not until the country went back on a gold basis in January, 1879, that our paper money returned to par.

In 1863 the currency which the people had to use was in confusion. Not only was there the issue of greenbacks, fluctuating in value, but there were the government "shin-plasters," bills for small amounts to take the place of those metal coins other than gold which had also disappeared. Private concerns issued small bills, postage stamps were largely used, and 1300 banks in the North were issuing their bills in denominations up to \$1000, it being estimated that there were over 8000 different varieties in circulation, without including innumerable counterfeits.

Partly to clear up this situation, and partly to assist the sale of the huge blocks of government bonds, a National Bank Act was passed in February, 1863, providing for the creation of banks which should belong to a "national" instead of State systems. These were to be supervised by national examiners, and were to issue bank notes to the extent only of 90 per cent of the United States bonds held by them, the government assuming responsibility for the ultimate redemption of all the notes as issued. Few banks were formed under this system during the war, but just at the end of it, in 1865, when the government laid a tax of 10 per cent on all notes issued by State banks, many institutions changed over and became "national." For almost exactly fifty years the new system remained the foundation of our banking currency.

There was another way in which the citizen found his life directly touched by the fact of war. We know at present of no other form of government which, on the whole, suits our modern problems and temper better than democracy. Nevertheless, popular government has its limitations. As history has shown over and over again, in many countries in the last century at times of really great

crisis (usually evolved from war conditions) democracy has had to submit itself temporarily to a practical dictatorship and to yield up some of its prerogatives and safeguards.

Whether or not this may eventually prove to be an insuperable weakness in the system, only the future can disclose. It will depend in part on how frequently, in peace as well as in war, great crises may arise and on how rapidly the democratic peoples themselves may advance not simply in knowledge, but in wisdom and freedom from passion and prejudice.

There never was less of a tyrant in heart and mind than Lincoln, and yet many of his acts led him to be so considered by numerous Northerners who were as loyal as himself to the cause of Union. His situation was difficult. The North, as we have seen, was not only not a unit in its war aims, but throughout the struggle there was a very large element in it which was opposed to carrying on the fight at all. The problem of just how far freedom of speech and press can be maintained in war without danger to the nation is an extremely complex one, depending upon a very exact balancing of the value as against the danger of the opinions of the protesting minority.

Although suppression was not carried so far by Lincoln's administration as later by Wilson's, in some respects the earlier control of citizens was more rigorous. At the very beginning, when it was uncertain which side Maryland would join, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in that State, without constitutional authority to do so. The following year he gave the force of an executive decree to the arbitrary arrests which had been made by the Secretary of War, suspending the writ throughout the United States for all persons who should "give aid and comfort to the rebels," discourage enlistments or engage in "any disloyal practice."

It was not until after the war was over that a decision was rendered on the question by the Supreme Court, in the case of L. P. Milligan, who with two other "Sons of Liberty" in Indiana had been sentenced to death by a military commission in 1864, a sentence not carried out because Lincoln did not sign the order. When Milligan's case, after Lincoln's own death, reached the Supreme Court, that tribunal handed down an emphatic opinion, declaring that under no circumstances could a civilian be subjected to military

trial where the civil courts were functioning. It is uncertain how many civilians were executed as traitors during the war, but more than 13,000 found themselves in prison on various charges.

Turning now from the consideration of how the Northerner was directly acted upon by the government owing to the war, we must inquire into how he was influenced by the general social and economic influences resulting from it.

The first thing to note, in contrast to what we shall find in the South, is that, after a panic at the start, the North fairly buzzed with an amazing prosperity throughout the struggle. The causes of the preliminary panic are not far to seek. The months between the election of Lincoln in 1860 and the actual beginning of war in April, 1861, were months of intense anxiety. No one could tell what was coming, whether it might be safe to borrow or lend, to buy or sell, or to engage in any business undertaking. The South, largely agricultural, with less than a quarter of the number of Northern business houses, owed Northern business men about \$300,000,000. There was the fear lest, in case of war, this debt might become an almost total loss, as in fact it did, New York firms alone losing \$160,000,000 when the war started.

Even before that, the banks from Philadelphia southward had temporarily suspended, and, especially in the West, the smaller banks failed in every direction, 89 out of 110 in Illinois breaking within a year. One of the causes of the collapse was that the Western banks in particular had secured their currency by deposit of State bonds. The Southern bonds, paying higher rates of interest than the Northern ones, had been preferred by the bankers, those in Illinois, for example, thus finding themselves, at the opening of hostilities, with \$9,000,000 of enemy bonds to secure their own banknotes.

The reasons for the abounding Northern prosperity which so soon followed are more varied. The fundamental basis of economic life in America has always been agriculture. It had been the enormous development of cotton culture in the South which had riveted slavery on that section, made it wealthy, and caused it to believe that it would be bound to succeed in war because the world would not be able to get along without its product. Now a peculiar combination of circumstances was about to make the Wheat Empire of the North rival the Cotton Kingdom of the South.

For any great expansion of Northern agriculture four factors would have to be present in combination—land on terms which would allow of rapid settlement, power (either mechanical or human) to work it, transportation facilities for distributing crops raised on it, and markets large enough to absorb them.

For several decades prior to the war, there had been constant demand from the West for free land, a demand opposed by the South, which did not wish to see the non-slave States grow too rapidly in population. In 1862, the Republicans, redeeming their campaign pledge of 1860, passed the Homestead Law, signed by Lincoln May 20, by which an actual settler who should remain on his quarter section of 160 acres could acquire title to it without any payment whatever to the government. The dream of the West had at last come true. In the same year, the Morrill Act, sponsored since 1857 by Representative Justin H. Morrill of Vermont, became a law. Under this Act, designed to promote the establishment of agricultural colleges, the Federal Government donated to the States 30,000 acres of public lands for each representative they had in Congress, for the purpose of providing funds from land sales with which to found the colleges. In addition to these two sources of free or lowpriced land, there was yet another in the huge land grants which had been made to the railroads to hasten their construction since 1850, and which were to continue throughout and long after the war until they were to reach the imperial total of nearly 160,000,000 acres.

Thus, almost coincident with the beginning of the war, there was an ample supply of land to be had, much of it, for the first time in our history, since the beginning of colonization, wholly free of cost to actual settlers.

Farming, either on a small or large scale, required labor, and the war naturally took thousands of men off the farms to put them in the army. This shortage of labor was more than overcome in three ways. As in the Revolution, the women left at home on countless small farms and little patches turned to and did the men's work, but in addition, although immigration was slight in 1861 and 1862, it rose rapidly and during the five war years 800,000 people arrived in the North from Europe, of whom over 80,000 were carried straight to the farms of the West by one railroad alone. Although

many remained in the centres of the East, this access of population made possible the big emigration, which also took place among native-born Americans from East to West. Within two and a half years after the passage of the Homestead Act, nearly 20,000 farms had been settled under it, besides the large number established from the other lands obtainable.

Added to this great increase in agricultural man power, came the yet greater one of mechanical inventions. The McCormick reaper, although patented in somewhat crude form in 1834, really profoundly altered life for the larger-scale farmers only on the eve of the war. A reaper, operated by one man, would cut in a day approximately ten times the acreage the man himself unaided could have cut with a scythe, and the constant difficulty in securing labor, in a country where an ambitious man found it comparatively easy to be his own master, gave a great impetus to the use of machinery under the new conditions which developed after 1860.

It was not the McCormick reaper alone which came into use but such machines as the horse-rake, grain drills, rotary spaders, and other mechanical aids. In the dozen years before the war about 85,000 mowers had been manufactured, but in the four years after 1861 there were sold over 165,000. At the Iowa State Fair in 1859 there were 26 entries of agricultural machinery. In 1865 there were 221. It was estimated in 1864, apparently without exaggeration, that a young man could buy an 80-acre farm in Iowa, fence it, build his house, and pay for the whole out of his first year's crop besides putting over \$500 in the bank. Such Western States as Iowa and Wisconsin furnished respectively 75,000 and 90,000 men to the army, yet the population rose rapidly and it was noted that "houses and barns and orchards have sprung up as if by magic."

The transportation problem had been settled by the network of railways which in the decade before the war had been connecting the West with the centres and ports of the East. The country had, indeed, been much over-built, that fact having, as we have seen, been one of the causes of the serious business panic of 1857. But with the Mississippi closed to traffic by the war, the whole business of the West had to be handled by the new railroads, which were most fortunately ready built to carry it. Owing to competition between the trunk lines themselves and also with boats on the Great Lakes,

freight charges actually decreased while the prices of farm produce were soaring, and the Western farmer was having boom times.

The last problem was that of markets to absorb the enormous increase in production. There was, of course, an increased demand at high prices within the North itself. As we shall see, it was a period of great industrial activity. Besides the natural increase in our own population, there were the 800,000 immigrants to be fed. But the greatest increase in demand came from Europe. Great Britain, more and more dependent on overseas countries for her food supplies, had crop failures in 1860, 1861, and 1862, and in one of these years the failure was of all Europe and not merely of Great Britain. Before 1862 we had been shipping abroad only 20,000,000 bushels of wheat (half of all our grain exports having gone by way of New Orleans), but by 1862 the North was shipping 60,000,000 bushels. British imports of that staple suddenly increased eight times, while its cotton imports from the South fell to almost nothing.

England needed Southern cotton to keep its workers employed, but even more it needed Northern wheat to keep them alive. As a consequence, our Northern farmer, at least in the West where the nature of the land was adapted to machinery, had ceased to be merely a weather-wise manual laborer and had become a capitalist and a business man. The West had had ample trouble before the war, and was to have again, but in those years of the first harnessing of the machine, of war prices at home and of dire need abroad, the West was wallowing in money and out of debt.

At the opening of the war, about 88 per cent of all the manufacturing of the nation was carried on in the Northern States, and conditions were to make the manufacturer as prosperous as the farmer. Not only is war wasteful of goods but government contracts are notorious for creating high prices and hidden fortunes. The 85,000,000 pounds of peace-time consumption of wool, for example, rose to over 200,000,000 pounds, of which more than one third was used in making uniforms for the army. Mills paid all the way from ro to 40 per cent dividends and the shoddy cloths sold made millionaires, in countless cases as shoddy themselves as the materials they produced. The war tariffs also gave manufacturers new "protection," and by helping to limit competition increased business and profits at the expense of the consumer.

As it did in agriculture, machinery also enormously increased the output in many other lines, and even the production of the very machines themselves created great manufacturing businesses. Reapers and all other farm machinery had to be made as well as sold. The sewing machine, which had been invented in 1849 and developed in the decade before the war, not only revolutionized the

GROVER & BAKER'S CELEBRATED

THESE MACHINES ARE UNDOUBTEDLY THE BEST SEWING MACHINES made for fine and coarse

They are Noiseless, easy to learn, simple, and not likely to get out of order.

WARRANTED.

City acceptances, orders on factors, taken in payment.

To those who have not the whole amount, arrangements can be made by monthly payments.

H. W. KINSMAN.

AGENT FOR G. 4 B.'8 S. M. CO., 249 KING-STREET.
July 18 c 2



AN ADVERTISEMENT FROM THE CHARLESTON COURIER, OF 1860, INDICATING THAT DEFERRED PAYMENTS IN SELLING ARE NOT A VERY RECENT IDEA, AND A SINGER SEWING MACHINE OF 1863–1865

ready-made clothing and other industries, but by 1864 the manufacturers of the "Singer" and "Wheeler & Wilcox" were exporting 50,000 machines a year. The contracts for hundreds of thousands of pairs of shoes at a time for the army could be readily filled because of the invention by Lyman R. Blake of a machine which could sew the soles on uppers. This machine, properly called the Blake in Europe though in America it was given the name of its financial promoter, Gordon McKay, made it possible for the man operating it to turn out a hundred times the number of shoes per day that had been possible under the old hand method. Put on the market in 1862, it was merely one of the most conspicuous examples of what was occurring to Northern industry in the midst of war.

With production speeded a hundredfold by machinery, with an

unlimited market to absorb production at war prices, industry boomed and huge profits were made. To a greater or less degree, this was true of almost all lines, even cotton textiles recovering as parts of the South were conquered by the North and the raw material could be secured from them and elsewhere. But the war prosperity of the North was not to be due alone to ordinary war-time conditions, man's ingenuity, and a coincident vast stride forward toward the machine age. The crop failures of Europe were not the only strokes of luck.

Petroleum and its possible commercial value had long been known, but the oil had been found only on the surface of the ground or streams, and had been used mostly in small quantities in patent medicines. In 1859, after many trials, a well was driven which yielded by pumping 25 barrels a day, worth \$1000. In the wilds of Venango County, Pennsylvania, where most of the land had been worth only \$3 an acre, one of the most colossal of modern industries was to take its start. Before the middle of 1861, scarce six weeks after war had begun, the first flowing well was discovered, producing \$10,000 a day. In the three years from 1862 to 1865, over 300,000,000 gallons were produced, 30,000,000 had been exported, and untold millions of dollars of profits had been made in the most spectacular fashion which perhaps has ever been seen. The Aladdin's lamp of Eastern legend produced no such fortunes as the kerosene lamp of our fathers' day.

No such sudden wealth had ever come to men before except in the rarest of mining discoveries, and even then not in such stupendous amounts. Even mines, however, were to add new and unexpected wealth to the North. The gold yield of California had been decreasing when in 1859 the Gregory Lode was discovered in Colorado, and a few months later the famous Comstock Lode in Nevada. The former started a gold rush comparable only to that of California, and "Pike's Peak or Bust" became the slogan of thousands who toiled across the plains in covered wagons, buggies, or even on foot, pushing their few goods ahead of them on carts. Although discovered just before the war, the output was chiefly important in the war years, during which the Colorado mines yielded perhaps \$22,000,000, the Comstock Lode \$52,000,000, and others found in Idaho possibly \$14,000,000 more.



5500 EACH

VOLCANO STAGE,

MORNING OF MAY 1, 1872.

le-fourth the Amount Recovered

WELLS, FARGO & CO.

From the Jesse Charles Harraman Collection, in the Library of Congress.

Reward Circular.

California.—The Overland Pony Express, bringing California advices to April 2, reached St. Loseph's on Monday, making the connection between the Pacific and Atlantic shores in less than ten days. The first express going westward had accomplished the journey in nne days, to the astonishment and joy of Californians The news by this arrival is interesting. The Bulkhead Bill had passed the Legislature, and been transmitted to the Governor, who had already signed a large number of bills. The Legislature was to adjourn to-day. The mining news continued to be encouraging. Immense sums had been realized in the Nevada region, and Washoe was still a topic of great a extilement. The steamer John L. Stephens sailed for Fananna on the 20th, bearing nearly \$1,300,000 in treasure for New York.

A news item from California in The Charleston Courier, July 14, 1860.



A Wells Fargo Pony Express Stamp.


THE DAYS OF THE PONY EXPRESS AND STAGE COACH

All of this wealth and of boiling business activity was naturally reflected in prosperity for the railroads. There was not much new railway building during those years, and the mileage already in existence, which had seemed so much more than adequate in 1857, was taxed to its utmost. On many of the most important lines, the tonnage handled doubled during the war, and prices of rail stocks soared. The Far West had, indeed, yet to rely for communication on the "Pony Express" and the overland mail coaches, but in 1862 Lincoln signed the bill authorizing the building of the Union Pacific, though this, the first trans-continental line, was not completed until 1869.

The only large industry in the North which suffered from the war, and there had been causes undermining that for some time previously, was shipping. Not only did capitalists have more lucrative opportunities for employing their wealth in other ways, but with the danger of capture at sea no American shipper would use a vessel under our flag if a neutral could be had. The war gave the last blow to our merchant marine, which declined 1,000,000 tons during it, and after peace came we were willing to leave the carrying trade to the British.

In the midst of all this genuine prosperity in the North, unhappily, fraud and corruption were rife. Washington, with huge government contracts to be given out, was the centre of the disease, which spread everywhere. The scandals of the War Department under Cameron became notorious. When Stanton took over the post of secretary, he had an investigation made which revealed loose administration and enormous plunder. A senator had taken a \$10,000 bribe from a manufacturer for securing a contract. One lot of claims pressed against the government for \$50,000,000 was quickly scaled down to \$33,000,000 when the investigation started. A large proportion of the guns supplied to the soldiers were shown to be of inferior quality, and the shoddy cloth for uniforms was a crime. Conditions were better under Stanton, but even he could not prevent graft on a gigantic scale, something which no American secretary of war has been able to accomplish completely.

The rapidity with which money was being made, especially by people who had not been used to it, brought about that wild extravagance familiar in every great war, though each generation for-



A Currier and Ives lithograph, in The Mabel Brady Garvan Institute of American Arts and Crafts, Yale University. GRAND DRIVE, CENTRAL PARK, NEW YORK, 1869



MICHIGAN AVENUE, CHICAGO, ABOUT 1860
From a lithograph in the collection of Chicago Historical Society.



MAIN STREET, HELENA, MONTANA, ABOUT 1870

Courtesy of the Northern Pacific Railway.

gets what its predecessor has been through. Never had such quantities of silks, satins, velvets, jewels, and other luxuries been sold. The "most prodigious" diamonds were sold by Tiffany as fast as that shop could import them. Groups of prominent women tried to stem the tide by organization and pledges, but to little use. The flood gates were open. Theatres and opera were crowded as though no war existed. The new millionaires of manufacturing, government contracts, oil, gold, and all the rest, set a vulgar and ignoble pace, and to a great extent the people at large followed.

Under the combined pressure of extravagance, war-time demands, and depreciating paper currency, prices for goods and food soared. As usual, the smaller "white collar" people and the laboring classes suffered most, or gained least. Salaries and wages did not keep pace with the rising cost of living. It was during the war and immediately after, that the labor movement, halted by the panic of 1857, took on its modern national features, the American form of labor unions, the union label, and the nationalizing of unions, employers' organizations, and contracts. Although there were comparatively few strikes of importance, there was some fighting for higher wages and also for lessened hours of work from the ten a day of unskilled labor, the twelve of workers in woollen mills, the sixteen of street-car men.

If wages did not keep pace with prices, so long as the war lasted there were some compensations for the working class, such as the huge sums paid in wages to the men at the front, the hundreds of millions in bonuses, and the money given in charity to soldiers' families. What we think of as a peculiarly contemporary problem today, what we call "technological unemployment," due to the throwing of hands out of work owing to machinery or more efficient production, had already made its appearance. One large group of wage earners, who had performed most useful service to the public, that of seamstresses, suffered greatly and permanently. The wide-spread use of the sewing machine, and the change in trade conditions and taste which brought about the development of the ready-made clothing business, left many thousands of honest women without work.

On the other hand, we have to contrast extravagance, low wages, high prices, and special causes of unemployment with other figures.

In 1864 the largest savings bank in New York City increased its depositors by 13,000, of whom 600 were these same steamstresses. There were 200,000 new depositors in the State, and this was true of other sections. The business of life-insurance companies more than doubled, and accident insurance was introduced, the new companies immediately doing a large business.

Although education suffered from the war, it should be noted that in addition to the government grants under the Morrill Act, private benefactors, such as Ezra Cornell and Matthew Vassar, to name only two, gave over \$5,000,000 in the war years to various institutions, and such notable ones as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell, and Vassar all had their inception during the struggle. Although attendance in the men's colleges fell off, that in the public schools increased tremendously, and the shift from men to women teachers throughout the country dates chiefly from this period. The tendency had been present for some time but the large number of men teachers who went into the army (5000 or one half the whole force in Ohio in the first two years) made a permanent change. In Illinois schools, for example, in 1860 there were 8223 men and 6485 women; in 1865, 6170 men and 10,483 women.

The drama of war, at least in modern times, begets surprisingly little of permanent literature. Noting the efforts made in the first few months after Sumter to translate the emotion of the moment into verse, Hawthorne wrote to a friend that "Ten thousand poetasters have tried, and tried in vain, to give us a rousing 'Scots wha hae wi' Wallace bled.' If we fight no better than we sing, may the Lord have mercy upon us." Under the old conditions of warfare, unless a country were actually over-run by the enemy, war, if it were not an inspiration, at least did not greatly affect the literary life of a nation, and during the years of England's great struggle against Napoleon, such authors as Coleridge, Wordsworth, Lamb, Jane Austen, Scott, and others could continue unaffected to add to the glories of literature.

The Civil War marked, half-way, the transition to modern military conditions, in which the entire people, and not merely the army itself, is warped and strained by the presence of war. The greatest drama of blood and suffering in our history, it left us a comparatively scant legacy from the men of letters. Thoreau died . never will find any satisfactory solution of the great problem now up between Lanor and Capital, or Slavery and LIBERTY, until you understand what Justice is, and what a circulating medium, or money, ought to be.



The above is one specimen of what money ought to be. It should be issued by those men, women, and children who perform some useful service, but by nobody else. It should command LABOR FOR LABOR in equal quantities, and the most disagrecable should be highest paid

among mankind is the passing off of metals or any other natural product of the earth, or the earth itself as fary for lubor! It defrauds, starves, and degrades, and then insults labor, and makes it a thing to be shunned and avoided, and forced upon whoever can be made to bear it. This is the origin of all forms of slavery, in all civilized countries, and of all poverty and crime, the insecurity of condition, the worship of money, the antagonisms of classes, and the crisis of these times. Whereas, if Labor were equitably rewarded (with an equal amount of labor), the hardest worker would be the richest man, and all would elbower, a portion of labor as a means of health and pleasure. For further explanations, see the works mentioned on the Perhaps no class or person is to blame, but the most fatal element of confusion, oppression, and violence ever introduced

This is addressed in a friendly spirit to all parties and nations. 1'OU II.11'E NO TLME TO LOSE!

JOSIAH WARREN'S PROPOSAL FOR THE SOLUTION OF MONEY AND LABOR DIFFICULTIES IN 1827 WAS THAT LABOR BE PAID IN KIND

From "The Labor Movement—The Problem of Today."

in 1862, his Maine Woods and Cape Cod being published posthumously in 1864 and 1865. Hawthorne died two years after Thoreau, long ill, leaving nothing but one bit of journalism on the war. Longfellow, largely untouched, published his Tales of a Wayside Inn, and devoted himself to his inferior translation of Dante. Motley, serving as Minister to Austria, was turning out volumes of his History of the United Netherlands. Holmes published his novel





A CONFEDERATE AND A UNION CIVIL WAR SONG
From the Confederate Museum, Richmond, and the Rare Book Room of the New York Public Library.

Elsie Venner in 1861, and then was silent except for a few war verses for which his delicate social muse was unfitted. Melville wrote some war poems, far below the level of his best work. Mark Twain, twenty-six years old when the war came, having tried a bit of soldiering and not liking it, wandered off to the Hawaiian Islands. William Dean Howells, having at twenty-three years of age written a campaign life of Lincoln in 1860, had received the post of American Consul in Venice and remained there, mostly silent, until peace came in 1865.

Whittier was touched by war but his war pieces are far from the

best of even that minor poet. Lowell tried to revive his dialect preaching in a new series of Biglow Papers but failed, and the only work of his that will survive perhaps as poetry rather than history from these years is the Commemoration Ode, written after peace came and under the inspiration of the death of Lincoln. Of the leading men of letters, the only one who rose to a new height was Whitman in his succession of war poems gathered together in 1865 under the title Drum Taps.

These last were not popular in their day, however, and the war literature of the people was mostly the work of minor figures, many of them now little read if even known—Henry H. Brownell, E. C. Stedman, Lucy Larcom, G. H. Boker, and a host of others. Of minor verse, the many songs for the soldiers have lasted longest. Julia Ward Howe tried to raise the literary quality of these in her Battle Hymn of the Republic, but this never took the popular fancy as did John Brown's Body; Tramp, Tramp, Tramp, the Boys are Marching; Marching Through Georgia; The Battle Cry of Freedom; or more sentimental songs such as When this Cruel War Is Over, and Walter Kittredge's Tenting on the Old Camp Ground.

But of all the written or spoken words brought forth by the war those that will last longest in the heart of the American people were not from man of letters or noted orator but from the simple, self-taught President himself, Abraham Lincoln. Dedicating the national monument on the field at Gettysburg on November 19, 1863, in the midst of struggle, he made the brief speech now carved in marble on his Memorial in Washington.

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that the nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

"But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor

power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth, upon this continent, a new nation, cons cewer in libert, and deducation to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engages in a great circl was, lest:

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FIRST PAGE OF THE SECOND DRAFT OF LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

From the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

remaining before us,—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this great nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

When we turn to consider the conditions behind the lines in the

South we find a situation which, although infinitely sadder than in the North, was in many ways simpler.

In the matter of preserving the constitutional liberties of the individual under stress of abnormal conditions, the Southerner fared somewhat better than the Northerner. Davis, like Lincoln, had to encounter a considerable amount of defeatism, pacifism, and disloyalty, on the part both of individuals and of organizations. For most of the war the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, but by the



Confederate Army Correspondent on the Battle-field-



Yankee Army Correspondent on the Battle-field.


AS A CARTOONIST FOR *SOUTHERN PUNCH* VIEWED WAR CORRESPONDENTS IN OCTOBER, 1863

From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

Confederate Congress instead of by the questionable executive decree of the President. Moreover, no Southern newspapers were forced to stop publication, as were some in the North, and the freedom of the press was maintained. The Southerners, partly from their nature and partly from the sort of life that most of them led, had a more lively sense of personal liberty than had the Northerners, and this combined with the doctrine of States' Rights helped to keep Davis more strictly to the letter of the Constitution than was the case with Lincoln in the North.

Allowing for the impossibility of estimating accurately the number of men who actually served in either army, one fact emerges

indisputably from the most conservative estimates for either side. The white population of the North, not including the border States, was about 19,000,000; that of the seceded States about 5,500,000, or about 5,000,000 deducting those in the loyal mountain sections who were useless to the Confederacy. These figures give the North nearly four times the white man power of the seceded South. More-



MEN to raise an ARTILLERY COMPANY for the Confederate service, during the War, any Volunteer wishing to join will find an opportunity by applying at 89 Church-street. Equipments and rations furnished. August 26

VOLUNTEER RECRUITING IN THE SOUTH An advertisement from "The Charleston Courier" of September 10, 1861, in the Confederate Museum, Richmond. over, we may note that the South did not use negro troops, a law permitting the enlistment of negroes being passed only a month before Appomattox, whereas the North used about 100,000.

If we accept the figure of about 1,750,000 for the number in the Union army, and 800,000 in the Confederate, we find the number serving in the South in proportion to population more than two to one as compared to that in the North. The total number of Northerners killed in battle was 110,000

and of Southerners 94,000, and the total dead from all causes in the Northern army 359,528 and in the Southern 368,000. Thus the South lost four times as many dead in proportion to population as did the North, and these various ratios are borne out in general by the number of veterans surviving on each side in 1890. Such figures need no comment to emphasize the far more intense suffering of our Southern States, and throw a flood of light upon comparative conditions both during and after the war.

It is quite true that the South as well as the North had its slackers, its bounty scandals, and its deserters. Lincoln's call for troops in April, 1861, was immediately echoed by Davis in the Southern call for 32,000 volunteers for a year. Later calls, from the States as

well as the Confederacy, resulted in the formation of the first armies, but by April, 1862, Davis, like Lincoln, had to resort to conscription, and all white men between eighteen and thirty-five, unless falling into certain exempt classes, were made liable to service. Passed by the Confederate Congress, the Conscription Act at once

raised the question of States' Rights, on which the Southern States had seceded, and South Carolina in particular denied the constitutionality of any such legislation.

The many classes of exemption provided-such as school teachers, druggists, printers, editors, legislators, artisans of one sort and another, and slave overseers -resulted in a somewhat disgraceful scramble on the part of many to fill such posts, and also created much ill feeling. The constant desertions from the ranks all through the war was also a source of weakness to the Confederacy, if not the chief contributing cause to its final downfall. But although there was some disorder, there was no such rioting in the South as in the North, and the statistics



The Soldiers' Friend.

This maiden, whom Southern Punch featured in November, 1863, had "knit more than five dozen pairs of socks since the war commenced and she is still knitting!"

quoted above tell their own story of the greater and more willing sacrifices made by Southern than Northern whites for their cause.

On the whole, throughout the four years, the white South was far more intent than the North solely on waging the war, and not on economic exploitation and money-making. Contrasted with the rise of wheat in the North we have to watch the cotton crop decline from over 4,500,000 bales in 1860 to 500,000 in 1864 and 1865, much of which, being merely stored, was ruined and a total loss. No gold and silver and oil were discovered in the South to make

fortunes overnight. The limited manufacturing equipment at the beginning of the war was scarcely sufficient to take care of the military needs. The railroads, instead of becoming prosperous hauling the tonnage of new industries, could not even be properly repaired for want of iron for rails and rolling stock. The lack of food in some sections, and particularly the difficulty of supplying the armies, was

Mard Winter Ahead,

This pent-up Utica of ours is overcrowded. Refugees from every section of the Confederacy have come hither in search of safety and something to do. Every railway train bears a living freight of vaitors to Richmond on transient business.

Rivery article of wearing apparel, every mouthful of food, every Calcutta Black Hole of a room, every cart-load of fuel, commands fabuleusly high prices.

Where this diabolism will stop, no one can tell. Men who extort \$75 per pair of coarse shoos, \$200 for a pair of boots, from \$75 to \$100 fer a pair of coarse pants, \$25 to \$30 for a meagre load of coal—and so on, till one gets out of breath in the recital of these robbenes—we say, men who will de this now will not scruple to extort still more on the advent of cold weather.

PRICES AND CONDITIONS IN RICH-MOND IN OCTOBER, 1863

From "Southern Punch," in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.

due to lack of transportation facilities rather than to lack of foodstuffs themselves.

With the upset conditions, the constant inflation due to declining paper money, and the opportunities which war always offers, there grew up on a smaller scale the same new-rich class in the South as came into existence in the North. After Richmond became the capital, there was a more than doubling of its population, a real-estate boom, and Southerners lamented the wild extravagance and luxury to be seen there, just as the more sober elements in the North lamented the excesses in that section. The winners of Southern government contracts, the owners of manufacturing plants, and

others, made large and quick profits. These, however, were all estimated in Confederate money, which, at the end, became mere worthless paper. Not a dollar of the Southerners' currency, or of their State or Confederate bonds, was worth anything when peace came.

The difficulties of financing the war in the South were incomparably greater than were those in the North. The people responded liberally to the first loan in 1861, but that exhausted practically all the specie available. The blockade of Southern ports cut off almost all possible income from customs duties. An internal revenue Act, similar to that in the North, was passed, but there was not the

same wealth to be taxed, and much resentment was aroused. The one foreign loan, of \$15,000,000, did not go far. The result was the issuing of over a billion dollars of paper which formed the only currency, steadily sinking in value to ultimate zero.

Moreover, with the exception of Lee's two raids, practically all fighting and destruction of property took place on Southern soil. The rich and beautiful Shenandoah Valley was left desolate. The

GENERAL ORDER.

HEAD QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA, Charleston, Va., Sept. 24, 1862.

General Order, No.

The money issued by the Confederate Government is secure, and is receivable in payment of public dues, and convertible into 8 per cent. bonds. Citizens owe it to the country to receive it in trade; and it will therefore be regarded as good in payment for supplies purchased for the army.

Persons engaged in trade are invited to resume their business

and open their stores.

By order of

MAJ. GEN. LORING. H. FITZHUGH, Chief of Staff.

A BROADSIDE DESIGNED TO INSTIL CONFIDENCE_IN CONFEDERATE MONEYS

From the Rare Book Room of the New York Public Library.

track of Sherman's march was a broad swath of ruin. The country between Richmond and Washington was said to be a desert. Columbia, Charleston, and other cities were wrecks of their former wealth and beauty. Railroads were lines of rusty and twisted iron. The rolling stock was dilapidated. When, after peace was declared, a Union commission was sent South to investigate, they found destitution everywhere, and in some cases men and women walked thirty miles to obtain food at the Federal agencies.

Banks, life-insurance companies, all Southern investments representing capital based on Confederate money and bonds, crashed and became as worthless as the paper they were based on. Even those Southerners who thought they had money when the war

ended found it could buy nothing. Over 3,500,000 slaves, worth at an average of \$500 each, about \$1,750,000,000, had been freed. Practically all that was left to the Southerner was his lands and his houses with their contents, if the houses were still standing. During all the war the slaves had been docile and loyal. Many had fled to the Union armies after the Emancipation Proclamation, but these were few compared to the total, and, though slavery was wrong, it is a commentary both on the negro nature and on the wild ravings of the Northern Abolitionists that a Southern governor, Walker of Florida, could say after the war was over that "Our women and infant children were left almost exclusively to the protection of our slaves and they proved true to their trust. Not one case of insult, outrage, indignity, has come to my knowledge."

The slaves unquestionably welcomed their freedom, not only for the obvious reasons which would have operated with a white man under similar conditions but because to a great extent, in their ignorance, they thought it meant that a millennium was coming for them in which they would not be free to work but free from work. Major Henry Hitchcock, who was on Sherman's staff on the famous march through Georgia, gave many glimpses of conditions in his letters home. Nowhere, he wrote, did the slaves show any resentment against their masters, but everywhere a desire for freedom.

How quickly ruin could overtake a wealthy Southerner may be noted from one of Hitchcock's letters on the march. "We passed 'Shady Dale," he wrote, "this A.M.—not a town or village but the farm of one man, containing 7600 acres—250 negroes. An old man, Mr. Whitfield, worth (before the war) a million. We are told he left yesterday or this morning, having collected his horses and mules and ordering the negroes to bring them along. But the darkies wouldn't follow him, and instead they remained with the stock and joined the Yanks in high glee."

The South had been weak in its educational institutions for long before the war (many Southern boys of the richer class going north to college, largely to Princeton and Harvard), and during the struggle education in the South, even such as there was, went rapidly backward. Before the war was over, conscription had been made to include white men from the age of seventeen to fifty. Recalling that

BEHIND THE LINES IN WAR TIME

four times the number of men and boys in proportion to population in the South were in service as compared with the North, and that even in the North college attendance fell off heavily, we can realize how little opportunity for college education there was in the South from 1861 to 1865. The University of Virginia, the best in the section, which had 600 students in 1861 had only 40 in 1863, and the buildings of one of the most flourishing of Southern institutions—the

Virginia Military Institute—were burned by Union troops in 1864.

In any case, the intellectual life of the South had been retrograding for a generation before the war, as we have already noted. To a great extent "the South" had come to mean the South of South Carolina and the Gulf States which were the first to secede, the South of the black belt and the great cotton plantations, a very different South from that of Washington, Monroe, Pinckney, Madison, Marshall, and Jefferson.

In spite of the charm of social life, the black belt was an intellectual desert. As contrasted with the great Southerners just named THE

GAME OF MATRIMONY:



WHO WILL BE MARRIED FIRST.

Hope had not been abandoned by the knitting young ladies as proved by this game which was popular in Philadelphia in 1862.

From the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.

we may quote the words of one of the new leaders, W. L. Yancey of Alabama, to indicate the boastfulness and barrenness that to a great extent had overtaken the South since King Cotton had made his slaves and magnates. Speaking of the lack of Southern literature, Yancey could say, with applause, that "our poetry is our lives; our fiction will come when truth has ceased to satisfy us; as for history, we have made about all that has glorified the United States."

It is not strange that of the war literature of the South, mostly occasional verse, nothing remains which ranks high as literature. Among the best contributions, perhaps, were Hayne's Battle of Charleston Harbor, Timrod's Ode on the Confederate Dead (1867),

and F. O. Ticknor's Little Giffen of Tennessee. The song, both words and music, which the South made peculiarly its own, Dixie, was written in 1859 by a Northerner, Daniel D. Emmett of Ohio, for his troupe of negro minstrels in New York; and the words of the fine Maryland, My Maryland by James R. Randall of Baltimore were, it is true, by a Southerner, but by one in a Union State and in



THE DIFFICULTY IN SECURING HOOPS LED TO TRAILING SKIRTS WHICH SOMETIMES LEFT CONSTERNATION IN THEIR PATH

From a rare copy of "The Bugle Horn of Liberty," published at Griffin, Georgia, in September, 1863.

In the Rare Book Department, Library of Congress.

that northern South which had unfortunately abandoned leadership to the Rhetts and Yanceys of cotton and bombast.

Passing from the more local conditions and effects of the war in the two sections, we may now consider some of the broader influences stemming from the conflict. Chiefly these were the abolition of slavery, the tremendous impulse given to the forces of nationalism, and the subtle influence on our political thought.

Of the moral effect of Abolition it is not necessary to speak at length. With almost negligible exceptions, practically all Americans, even the sternest of Puritans in Massachusetts, like all the world, had had no qualms about the righteousness of slavery in the

BEHIND THE LINES IN WAR TIME

seventeenth and at least the early eighteenth century. But in the world of the nineteenth it had become an anachronism, and its moral effect upon both slave and owner was bad. The civilized world had moved toward a wholly new grouping of ideas and sympathies, and slavery in the South, so long as it remained, ate into our whole national life like a cancer. The operation for removal, unnecessarily brutal and performed without the anæsthetic of financial compensation which the British Empire had administered in similar case, had been performed. The patient had nearly died, both from the disease and the operation, but in 1865 the way was open for recovery, and renewed health in harmony with the moral and economic environment of a new age.

For forty years it had been increasingly evident that the Union could not endure half slave and half free, Lincoln's "house divided against itself." No real Union could have been lastingly achieved had the South merely been conquered, and its "peculiar institution" remained to make the same trouble in the future that it had in the past. In that sense, Abolition was a Union measure even more than a war measure.

The constitutional question of Union had also been settled, as brutally, if one will, as the slave question. Both were settled not by arguments and reason but by force. Nevertheless, they were settled. Although no one doubted in our earlier history that slavery was morally just and no one could rightly affirm, not even Lincoln, that it was not constitutionally legal and protected, yet it had been extirpated by war. So, although I think it cannot be questioned that the original States in 1787 would never have formed the constitutioned Union if they had explicitly understood that under no conditions whatever could they ever extricate themselves from it, that question also had been settled by war. In the seventy odd years since 1787 the moral emotions of the world had changed as to slavery; and the political emotions of the larger part of the American people had changed as to the indissolubility of the Union. The majority and the minority, on both questions, had found argument a futile weapon at last. The questions had to be decided, and it was from the mouths of rifle and cannon that the decision was rendered. After 1865 there could be no chattel slavery in the United States; after 1865 no State of the United States could dream of peaceable secession.

The mere settlement of the question of the indissoluble nature of the Union, however crudely determined, in itself came, in course of time, to increase national sentiment. It was not only in the eyes of Europe that the United States, having survived a disastrous civil war, assumed a new power and greatness. For our own citizens, also, there came a new sense of the nation, no longer constantly trembling on the brink of dissolution, but one and indivisible forever.

Apart from the military decision, there had been many influences at work during the war to turn our minds from localism or sectionalism to nationalism. The greatest breeder of sectionalism, slavery, had gone. On the other hand, under stress of war necessities, the Federal Government had made great strides in enforcing the obedience and gaining the supreme loyalty of all citizens, regardless of State or section. For four anxious years the fate of the nation and of every citizen had depended on the acts of that government, and it emerged, with Lincoln at its head, with vastly enhanced prestige and power. Just as the firing on the Stars and Stripes at Fort Sumter in 1861 had revealed in a flash the unsuspected sentiment for Union among the people, so the years of war had developed the emotion of nationalism.

War-time conditions in business had also contributed strongly to the nationalising of our minds. The rapid increase in the use of machinery, the greater inter-dependence of the different sections, the increasing scale of business, the improved transportation, the wider markets, all tended toward nationalization. Labor found that with manufacturing developing almost as actively in Ohio as in Massachusetts, local unions would no longer serve, and the first national organization of labor resulted, as did the first national organization of employers, in certain lines. Demands on Congress for tariff favors and the need of business men in different sections for joint consideration of their problems, now no longer local, but national, called for Conventions and organizations, of which the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, and the American Iron and Steel Association were examples.

The telegraph had brought the different sections of the nation into instantaneous communication with each other since S. F. B. Morse had invented it in 1844, but it was only during the war that the Western Union installed the first transcontinental line. It was

BEHIND THE LINES IN WAR TIME

also during the war that the consolidation of all the telegraph companies (more than fifty local ones in 1851) took place so rapidly that by 1866 the Western Union had absorbed practically all the other companies into one national system owning 75,000 miles of wires. Similar tendencies were at work in the many consolidations of local railways into larger systems, and, indeed, in countless ways throughout the business world.

The vast increase in private fortunes also contributed indirectly to nationalism. By the end of the war it was stated that there were several hundred millionaires in New York City alone, and several worth some scores of millions. A. T. Stewart, in 1863, was paying an income tax on over \$1,800,000 a year income, and Cornelius Vanderbilt and W. B. Astor on approximately as much. Such aggregates of capital sought employment on a scale which could no longer be confined to business in a single locality. All the units in the economic system increased in size—fortunes, incomes, the capitalizations of corporations, the sphere of operations.

The business leaders were almost forced to think in national terms. The more aggressive owners of local concerns, as in the telegraph business, almost by force of circumstances, found themselves striving for a national monopoly. The owners of local railways began to dream of "trans-continentals." Partly owing to the closing of the Mississippi at the beginning of the war, one third of the meat packing business of the entire West had been quickly concentrated in Chicago, where the great Union Stock Yards were established, and the number of hogs slaughtered rose from 275,000 in 1861 to 900,000 at the end of the conflict. Concentration and consolidation came about naturally—indeed, inevitably—from the conditions, and both meant that the business men must think in terms of the nation instead of a locality.

Nationalism was to bring standardization, and the first great step had been taken when the South was forced to make its labor system, and its own peculiar type of social and economic life, conform to that of the rest of the nation. The business men had not wished to disturb existing business relations. The politicians of the sections had contended for power. The Abolitionists had seen slavery as a moral blot on the country of which they were also citizens. The South had insisted upon individualism, its right to continue to think along the

old lines even if the North, and the rest of the world, had begun to think differently. Its theory of secession and States' Rights was an assertion of individualism against nationalism and enforced uniformity. In this also, the South was fighting against the time spirit, which for the past two generations has seemed insistent upon bringing the entire world into conformity, until all over the globe we shall wear the same clothes, do the same things, read the same books, see the same films, think the same thoughts and become eventually, perhaps, as uniform and dull as bees in a hive or ants in a hill.

The last of the three effects of the war which we mentioned was the subtle one upon our political thought. Our theory of government had always insisted that all just governments derive their power from the consent of the governed. There had, indeed, been awkward difficulties with the theory, such as Indians, women, and slaves, but the world had not troubled itself very much as yet, politically, with any except men, and men who were white, and the difficulties had been brushed aside. What, however, became of our theory when we insisted upon governing, with a consent given unwillingly, if at all, and only as a result of conquest by force, five or six million whites who had fought for four years against us to be left in peace? They were not of alien race. They were not minors or idiots, and they formed more than a quarter of the population of our nation.

The fact was that our theory had broken down, and on a vast scale. In a democracy there is no better rough and ready mode of governing than by the will of the majority, but, to be workable and to make a contented nation, that theory presupposes that every possible protection shall be given to a minority. The huge rift made in our fundamental theory by the Civil War is not unconnected with the imperialism of the Spanish War and the increasing tendency to ride rough-shod over the wishes or sensibilities of minorities if a majority can win to power.

CHAPTER IV

THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

HROUGHOUT the war, the problems of reconstruction of the Union had been occupying the mind of Lincoln. These problems were of great complexity and were at once economic and political. Of the first magnitude was that of the negro. In the seceded States there were approximately 3,500,000 former slaves to less than 5,500,000 whites, and in some of those States the negroes were practically as numerous as the whites, or even more so. For example, in Alabama in 1860, the numbers had been respectively 437,770 negroes to 526,271 whites, in Georgia 465,698 to 591,550, in Louisiana 350,373 to 357,456, and in South Carolina the 412,320 negroes heavily outnumbered the 201,300 whites.

In many cases free American negroes had done well, and there had been a few conspicuous ones, such as Frederick Douglass, the Abolition orator, Ira Aldridge, the tragedian, and Elizabeth Greenfield, the singer, who had gained even European reputations, Aldridge having received decorations from the King of Prussia and the Emperors of Austria and Russia. Nevertheless, whatever capacities the negro might show for development, the fact remained that the vast mass of suddenly freed slaves were illiterate, unused to thinking for themselves, and ignorant of the world outside the plantations on which they worked, except in so far as they might have been sold from one locality to another. Thrown unexpectedly on their own resources, how would they take their freedom, and how quickly would they adjust themselves to the responsibilities of free life and of the modern wage system?

In innumerable cases the ex-slaves simply remained working for their former masters on a sort of wage basis, but in many others they had strange dreams of what freedom meant, and toward the end of 1865 the idea was spread that every negro was to receive "forty acres and a mule" on New Year's Day. The Freedmen's Bureau, created by Congress on March 3 of that year to aid the negroes, did good work with Major General O. O. Howard at its head, in spite

of incompetent and grafting agents. The shift from the economic system of slavery to that of wages might have been made with less friction and difficulty than had been anticipated by the South had it not been that political questions were to hamper the transition.

As we have seen, Lincoln's theory had been always that the seceded States had never been out of the Union at all, and he hoped to effect reconstruction with a minimum of restrictions upon the Southerners who had returned to their allegiance. By 1863 three of the Confederate States had come under Federal control again—Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas—and the problem of administration had then arisen.

Although on the first of January of that year, Lincoln had issued his Emancipation Proclamation, he was not personally in favor of granting the emancipated slaves the suffrage, except in certain cases, and any such sudden alteration in status would have been, when avoidable, wholly contrary to his cautious approach to all problems of such magnitude. Having appointed military governors for the three States, he offered in the Proclamation of Amnesty on December 3, 1863, pardon to all their citizens, with broad exclusions, who would take the oath of loyalty to the United States. He also offered them the opportunity of re-establishing their State governments and of re-admission to the Union as soon as one tenth of the voters had taken the prescribed oath. Congress would have to decide upon the question of seating such senators and representatives as might be sent from the newly established States, but Lincoln himself wished to have the transition from secession to re-establishment made as simple as he had suggested in the Proclamation.

The States named, or the ten per cent loyal electorate in them, accepted the offer, and in 1864 organized new governments. Congress, however, long restive over the war-time encroachment of the Executive, and hostile to the South, declined to seat members from the reorganized States, and in the so-called Wade-Davis Bill insisted that Congress, and not the President, had the responsibility for reconstruction. It then outlined another plan, including, among other changes, an increase to fifty per cent of those who must take the oath of allegiance. This bill Lincoln vetoed by the method of not signing it within ten days, whereupon its chief sponsors, Senator Benjamin Wade and Representative Henry Winter Davis, issued an

outrageous public manifesto July 4, 1864, accusing the President of base motives in not having approved of it.

Forces, of which we shall presently take note, were aligning themselves in the North against any conciliatory attitude toward the beaten South. Whether even Lincoln could have made headway against them and saved the South the bitterness, and the North the disgrace, of the next few years is at least open to question. Lincoln was, however, to have no opportunity. In March, 1865, in his second

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THE LAST PAGE OF LINCOLN'S SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS

From the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

Inaugural, he had urged his countrymen not only to continue the struggle to the end but to think also of the future reunion. "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations." In conversation he had answered the suggestion that President Davis of the Confederacy should be hanged, with the quotation "judge not, that ye be not judged." At a Cabinet meeting he warned that there was too much desire in the North for "bloody work."

Lee had surrendered to Grant at Appomattox on April 9, and the war was known to be over, though peace was not actually proclaimed until August 20, 1866. Lincoln had gone to confer with Grant and had remained with him until the day before the sur-



CIRCULAR ISSUED BY WAR DEPARTMENT OFFERING REWARD FOR CAPTURE
OF MURDERER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN

From the original in the Rare Book Room of the New York Public Library.

render, then returning to Washington. The long vigil was over, and he had lived to see the Union restored. On the evening of the 14th, he was seated, with his wife and some friends, in a box at Ford's Theatre, and all eyes were on the stage when suddenly a shot rang out. One of a small group of conspirators, John Wilkes Booth, a half-insane actor, brother of the great Edwin Booth, had gained access to Lincoln's box, and shot the President in the back of the head. Leap-

ing from the box to the stage, the assassin shouted to the audience the motto of Virginia, "sic semper tyrannis," and in spite of a broken leg, escaped to a waiting horse by the stage door. The unconscious President, carried to a house across the street, lingered until early morning when he peacefully died.

Born of a shiftless and in general a run-out stock, Abraham Lincoln had slowly and patiently trod his spiritual as well as political way from a squalid frontiersman's log cabin to the war-besieged White House in Washington. Mostly self-taught, feeding on the Bible, Shakespeare, and Blackstone, he had been slow to mature. As different from George Washington as any backwoodsman could be from a tide-water magnate, nevertheless the great founder of the nation is the only character in our history with whom Lincoln himself can be compared. Mistakes he made in plenty—mistakes in politics, in taste, in trying to run military affairs in the early days of the war -but in the four years and more of the nation's agony which he spent as its head, he steadily grew. Of all the statesmen around him, in Cabinet or Congress, there was not one who could have led the nation as did this raw and uncouth man whom they had looked down upon and thought to control and guide. Inferior to Washington in some respects, he surpassed him in others, and no other President in the long line has equalled him in that love of the nation which included the humble with the great, the common man and the rebel with the distinguished and the loyal. In the sad and patient eyes of Lincoln, we were indeed one nation, indissoluble, united, beloved.

The assassination of the President was the murder of the moral leader of the nation, the removal of the one individual who might perhaps have been able to overcome the forces of party, greed, and revenge which were gathering from all quarters, like foul birds that feed on carrion, to wreak their lusts on the prostrate South and the entire country.

Vice-President Johnson, who by Booth's insane act now became President, was in many respects a strong and able man, but some of his qualities and his lack of others made him futile as the interpreter to the nation of its own best self, and instead of ruling the whirlwind he became its victim, both in his own day and for long after. It is only in very recent years, since war-time passions and misrepresenta-

tions have been lulled, let us hope forever, that Andrew Johnson, after a generation of malignant aspersion even by historians, has come to be appraised at his true worth.

Born one of the Southern "poor whites" in a log hut in Raleigh, North Carolina, he inherited with his extreme poverty a deep resentment against the rich and patrician classes of his section. Left fatherless at three years of age, apprenticed to a tailor, he learned without schooling to read but could not write until later taught by his young wife. Having moved to Tennessee, he rose from one political position to another until, when the war came, he had become not only United States senator, but the only member of the Senate from a seceded State who remained loval to the Union. Lincoln made him military, as he had already been twice civil, governor of his State, and in 1864, by Lincoln's own wish, Johnson had been put on the ticket as Vice-President. Although he had been a Democrat, he had become a Republican from desire to save the Union. It was thought his presence on the ticket would emphasize the Republican claim to be the party of Union men of all political faiths; would reward Johnson for his loyalty; and perhaps would do something for Union sentiment throughout the nation by giving high office to a loval Southerner.

Johnson's nomination, however, had been resented by the radical Republicans, largely because he had been a Southern Democrat. When, as a result of Lincoln's assassination, he was suddenly raised to the Presidency, it was certain that he would be bitterly attacked. Unfortunately, although honest, courageous, and intellectually capable, Johnson could not manage men or guide and create public opinion, while his lack of tact, his proneness to descend to the level of stump speeches in his political utterances, and one or two unhappy occasions when he appeared to be the worse for liquor in public, gave his opponents weapons which they were not slow to wield against him. Probably no other President has ever been so persistently and unfairly attacked by the press and his own party as was Johnson, who, nevertheless, was not himself altogether blameless.

For a very brief time it appeared as though the new President might, as result of his long dislike of the Southern aristocratic class, be precisely the man whom the radicals wanted for their attack on the South. But, whether sobered by responsibility of office or for

other reasons, Johnson quickly made up his mind to fight the radicals and to attempt to carry out Lincoln's wise and large-hearted plan for reconstruction. Retaining all the members of his predecessor's Cabinet, he was unanimously supported by them in his belief that there was no need for a special session of Congress—not due to meet until December 4—and that he should begin the work of reconstruction by executive action alone.

This he did on May 29 by issuing a Proclamation granting amnesty to all rebels on condition of their taking an oath of fealty to the United States, and although certain classes were not included, notably ex-officers of the Confederate army and navy and all having taxable property in excess of \$20,000, even these were assured of liberal treatment if they would petition for pardon. By midsummer, Johnson had also appointed provisional governors for seven of the Confederate States, and in practically all of these, in accordance with his suggestion, conventions had been held which had repealed the secession ordinances, adopted new constitutions, and elected members of Congress for the coming session.

As was to be expected after four years of war and the overturn of the social and economic system, there was more or less unrest and disturbance in the South, which was much exaggerated by the hostile Northern press and politicians. In the autumn, Johnson sent Carl Schurz on a tour through the section to investigate conditions, and Schurz made a report which more than suggested that the South was not loyal and that it intended to keep the negroes in some sort of serfdom, thus providing the radicals with precisely the sort of ammunition they wished for their campaign. General Grant, however, making a similar report at the same time, took exactly the opposite view on these points.

Schurz later on in his career was to do some good work for civil service and other reforms, but at this stage it is rather difficult not to lose patience with this young German of thirty-six who had been in America only thirteen years and whose chief claim to importance was his influence with the German vote and his services to the Republicans in the campaign of 1860. The campaign services in the Middle West must have been considerable for, in 1861, when he was only thirty-two and could not have been a naturalized citizen for more than three or four years, Lincoln had appointed him Minister to Spain.

During the summer of 1865, public opinion was not unfavorable to Johnson's policy of reconstruction and conciliation, and we must examine some of the forces and causes that were to wreck both it and him. One section of Northern opinion had been outraged during the war by what it considered the usurpation of legislative power by the Executive, and by its genuine fears for constitutional liberty aroused by Lincoln's suppression of freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the suspension of habeas corpus. Naturally Congress was particularly jealous of its own prerogatives, and now that the war was over, and a Johnson instead of a Lincoln was in the White House, the members of this group would strive strenuously to regain control of policies and action.


There were also the extremists who had preached hatred of the South and who exalted the welfare of the negro above that of his former master. The leaders of this group were Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, and Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. Stevens, who at seventy-three had become almost the dictator of the House of Representatives, and was rumored to be the keeper of a mulatto mistress, was an able, narrow, intense, harsh, and vindictive old man, unlovely in almost every aspect of his character. The North, he claimed, had the right to take "the lives, liberty, and property" of all Southerners, whose States should be considered as conquered provinces, from which their inhabitants should be driven out to be replaced by Northerners. Sumner was of different type, but in his way as narrow and fanatical as old Stevens himself. Nothing would satisfy the Massachusetts senator but immediate and complete equality of the former slave with the whites. The difficulties of practical statesmanship meant nothing to this doctrinaire who had come to hate the Southern white as much as he claimed to love the Southern black.

There were also other considerations, though less openly discussed. If the Southern States were allowed to send members to Congress there was the question of the ascendancy of the Republican Party. The old compromise had provided that representation in the House should be based on the number of whites plus three fifths of the slaves, but slavery having been abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution (adopted in 1865), the entire black population of the Southern States would have to be included in the basis



THE NEW VOTER


From the original sketch made by Dr. Bracket at Negrofoot Precinct, Hanover County, Virginia, July 11, 1867. Now in the Confederate Museum, Richmond.



FUNERAL OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN, APRIL 25, 1865

The magnificent funeral car was drawn by sixteen gray horses richly caparisoned with ostrich plumes and cloth of black trimmed with silver bullion.

A Currier and Ives lithograph in the Library of Congress.



THE TEACHINGS OF THE KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN CIRCLE WERE HELD RESPON-SIBLE BY A CONTEMPORARY CARTOONIST FOR LINCOLN'S DEATH From the Library of Congress.

for representation, which would largely increase the number of Southern members in the lower House. As the Southern whites were almost unanimous against the Republican Party, this new situation evidently called for shrewd political manipulation and consideration.

As one constituent wrote to the negrophile Sumner, the Southern whites would certainly unite with the Northern Democrats, but if the negroes were given the vote, they might be used to offset the whites, maintain Republican supremacy, and thus ensure a continuance of the high tariff. How terrible to think that the free-trade South, beaten in war, its slaves confiscated by the North, might ruin Northern manufacturers, who had just been tasting the joys of high protection, by out-voting them in Congress! As one Northern governor expressed it, the readmission of the Southern States to the Union would be unwise until "their ideas of business, industry, money-making, spindles, and looms were in accord with those of Massachusetts," or until, as the Massachusetts reformer, Wendell Phillips, suggested, the North had been able to make over the "South in its own likeness." If Johnson had his way in reconstructing the South on Lincoln's plan, what might not become of the Republican Party, of Republican congressmen, of the Republican tariff, and of Northern Republican manufacturers?

Unfortunately, whereas on the one hand, Johnson was not fitted to guide the public opinion of the North on questions of economic and constitutional policy, on the other, the Southerners played into the hands of the radical groups in the North who did know how to inflame, if not to guide, popular prejudices. After all the passion of civil war, it was unquestionably a delicate matter to seat "rebels" and "traitors" in Congress again to help govern the country just as though nothing had happened. Had the war been merely a putting down of insurrection in one or two States, whose members of Congress would be in a negligible minority when returned, the problem would not have been serious, but, as it was, a good many people in the North were genuinely uneasy when contemplating the danger of a large bloc of Southern Congressmen once more in power.

In a situation calling for great self-control, confidence, and magnanimity on the part of the North, and of tactfulness on that of the South, both sides acted with a minimum of these qualities. Naturally

the ablest men in the South had occupied high military or civil positions during the war, and so had been prominent actors in the drama of rebellion. The few who, like General Thomas, had taken the Union side, could hardly be expected to command the immediate suffrages of their Southern fellow-citizens. So, unfortunately, it came about to a great extent that the South elected to Congress the very men whom the suspicious North regarded as the leaders in the fomenting of rebellion, and the feeling of fear and resentment reached a high pitch when even Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-President of the Confederacy, was chosen unwisely by the Georgia legislature to represent that State in the United States Senate.

Moreover, the laws passed by Southern legislatures with regard to the emancipated slaves, which legislation was known collectively in the North as the "black codes," aroused feeling in that section to an extent which was wholly unwarranted. Owing to the overwhelming proportion of whites to negroes in the North there was no Northern negro problem. Even so, however, in only six Northern States was a negro permitted to vote. After peace came, there was economic chaos for a while in the South. The negro, with false ideas of what freedom meant, was not inclined to work but much inclined to wander. For his own good, until he had learned to adjust himself to the new condition of being his own master, with the responsibility of looking after himself and his family, he had to be controlled to some extent.

The codes recognized his freedom, and gave him almost all the rights of any ordinary citizen, although he was not allowed to vote or sit on juries; was required to have some means of support; and subjected to penalties for breaking labor contracts. In a few States, the codes went too far with respect to the labor clauses, but on the whole they were framed justly in accord with the real conditions which confronted the Southerners. But the North preferred theory to reality, and shutting its eyes both to its own refusal to give the Northern negro the vote and to the dangers in the South, raised a hue and cry about the oppression of the negro by the Southern whites, who, it was claimed, were trying to nullify emancipation.

Such was the situation when Congress met in December, 1865. There were some fair-minded conservatives in it, but the leaders of the two houses, Representative Stevens and Senator Sumner, were

bitterly opposed to Johnson's plans, Stevens dominated by his hatred of the Southern white, and Sumner by his doctrinaire love for the negro, which, regardless of conditions, led him to be satisfied with nothing less than the immediate enfranchising of the slave of yesterday. Nor were the President's foes all in the Capitol. Like John Adams, sixty-five years previously, he had retained the whole of his predecessor's Cabinet, to be repaid with treachery, Stanton, the War



A CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF THE NEGRO'S PLIGHT AT THE HANDS OF THE

POLITICIANS

The "change of face" (and views) after election, may be seen by turning the picture sidewise.

From the Rare Book Room in the Library of Congress.

Secretary, remaining with him as adviser only to reveal all the Cabinet secrets to his foes.

In February, 1866, Congress passed a bill prolonging the life of the Freedmen's Bureau, the organization already mentioned which had been created in the preceding March with rather broad powers for relief and supervision of the freed slaves. The powers now conferred were much wider, and the Bureau was given the right to invoke military authority when civil rights were denied to the negro. This

bill Johnson at once vetoed as unwise and unconstitutional, and unfortunately made some speeches in which he bitterly attacked Stevens and Sumner in particular and Congress in general. It was now open war between the Executive and the Legislature, a war which could not have been averted but which might not have been so disastrous for Johnson and the nation had the President shown himself more adroit in the management of men.

In April, Congress passed a Civil Rights Bill over the President's veto, and also, with a more than two thirds vote, an amendment to the Constitution to be presented to the States for ratification. This amendment, in five sections, provided that no State could pass any laws depriving the negro of any of his rights as a citizen; that if he were not given the suffrage in any State its population basis for representation in Congress would be proportionally reduced; that all the Confederate and State debts in the South incurred for the war were void; that no claim could ever be made for compensation for the emancipation of the slaves; and that no person could hold Federal office who had ever held such office and then engaged in rebellion.

The amendment, which it was understood would have to be adopted by any Southern State before it could be fully reinstated in the Union, was approved by Tennessee in the summer, and its senators and representatives were seated in Congress. The other Southern States all refused to accept it, although it was ratified by a sufficient number of the total in the Union to become part of the Constitution in 1868. The radicals were far from satisfied with it, and it is at least open to question whether, even had the South accepted it, such acceptance would have altered the course on which the radicals had determined.

In the autumn of 1866 came the mid-term elections. There was a good deal of conservative sentiment in the North, and in the West there was little enthusiasm to be worked up for Sumner's enfranchisement fanaticism. Johnson, who had tried to save the Homestead Act from rape at the hands of large speculative interests, and who had the democrat's dislike of banks and the machinery of "big business," could have developed a considerable following had he brought into prominence a number of the economic questions, such as high taxation, which were troubling the people. There was really no great

unity in the Republican Party, but by not daring to split it, Johnson handed it over complete to the radicals.

The campaign was one of the most indecent in our annals. The President himself took the stump, and touring the West talked in the wrong way about the wrong things, while the vilification and misrepresentation indulged in against him by the leaders of his own party were almost without parallel. Untrue charges that he was frequently drunk on his tour were spread everywhere, as they have often been against our public men, and were all too eagerly accepted. By some queer trick in our psychology we seem always willing, without proof, to believe the worst of any one who has risen to high position.

The hidden desires of the radical leaders did not make good campaign material. It was therefore determined to appeal to the crudest emotions. The doctrine was preached that if the Southern States were re-admitted to the Union too quickly, there would be danger of a repudiation of the Federal debt. So far did Sumner go with this absurd campaign lie that the Secretary of the Treasury had to appeal to him to stop making his untrue statements because they were greatly damaging the credit of the nation. Neither the credit of the nation, nor of its President, however, meant anything to Sumner and the others if anything could be gained politically by assailing either of them.

The President was denounced as a "traitor," who had been in the conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, and who was now planning to use the army against Congress. During the summer, there had been riots in Memphis and New Orleans, natural enough under the disturbed conditions, but radical orators magnified these into dangerous plots, and Sumner charged the President with being the abettor of the mobs. "Charles IX of France," Sumner thundered, "was not more completely the author of the massacre of St. Bartholomew than Andrew Johnson is the author of those recent massacres which now cry for judgment . . . and a guilty President may suffer the same retribution which followed a guilty King." The distinguished senator must have known he was lying.

Our new citizen and very hot Republican patriot, Carl Schurz, pronounced that Johnson ought to be hanged, and that he was "worse than Judas Iscariot or Benedict Arnold." Considering the

charges which these men brought against the President for his coarseness of speech, it is interesting to note their own. Schurz, claiming that Johnson was the victim of flattery, added "you might even tell him he was a gentleman and he would believe you." Stevens had had inserted in *The Congressional Record* a statement from *The World*, which both he and Sumner repeated, that the President was an "insolent clownish drunkard," a "drunken brute, in comparison with which Caligula's horse was respectable." If this was the sort of talk in which the leaders allowed themselves to indulge, when criticizing the President himself for lack of taste and breeding, it is easy to imagine the sort of thing that was hurled at him by stump speakers and the cheap press.

All emotions were played upon. Southerners were called "rebel devils" and "redhanded traitors." On the field of Gettysburg, immortalized by the dead of both sides in the war and by Lincoln's address, Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, now proclaimed that the North would never admit again to a share in the government "the hard-hearted men whose cruel lust of power has brought this desolating war upon the land." The "bloody shirt," that was to keep the Republican Party long in power, began to be waved with frantic frenzy. Congressman Logan said the only way to treat the Southerners was to "take the torch in one hand and the sword in the other . . . and sweep over their territory."

To win the election the President, who was not the man for the place and hour but was honest, was painted as a traitor; the Southerners as still dangerous rebels who must not be admitted to a share of government (until, sotto voce, the negroes could be given the vote for the Republican Party); and the one issue of the campaign was made to appear as the saving of the nation from the dangers of reconstruction according to the ideas of Lincoln and Johnson.

It was all good campaigning according to ordinary low political standards to which Sumner, Everett, Schurz, and other reformers and "scholars in politics" stooped, and it won. The radical Republicans secured more than two thirds of both houses of Congress, and the doom of the South was sealed. In spite of the vicious slanders which the party leaders had spread about him, the President acted with dignity after the election, and prepared a markedly conciliatory message for the opening of Congress in December. Unhappily, the lead-

ers made it clear a week before Congress was to meet that they would consent to no truce and that they were determined to crush both the President and the South.

The wild rantings of Stevens left no doubt on that score, and lesser men made the same threats. In a speech at Cooper Institute, for example, Wendell Phillips called for impeachment of "the Rebel in the White House" and added, "let us pray to God that the President may continue to make mistakes." Sumner was more radical and defiant than ever, and it was evident that Congress would be guided by passion only. The places of such great statesmen and compromisers as Clay and Webster had been taken by vindictive and narrow-minded politicians such as Sumner and the dying Stevens. The President put aside his conciliatory and wise message, and sent another, breathing defiance of Congress. The last phase of the fight between the White House and the Capitol had now begun.

Before continuing the story of that to the end, we may turn to two international affairs of importance which were concluded under Johnson in 1867. The President left foreign affairs largely in the hands of Seward, as Secretary of State, and Seward, who was an expansionist, had tried in 1865 to buy the island of St. Thomas from Denmark. It is interesting to note, in view of what we have said about the change in our political theory with regard to the "consent of the governed," that it was Denmark which insisted upon, while Seward resisted, the taking of a vote of the inhabitants on the transfer. Although this proved favorable and a treaty was drawn up to cede the island and a smaller one, for \$7,500,000, the Senate declined to ratify, and the plan fell through.

In 1867, however, Seward was more successful in another direction. Russia suddenly offered to sell us all her possessions in North America for \$10,000,000. Seward jumped at the chance, but bargained shrewdly, and finally a treaty was drawn up by which we were to receive Alaska for \$7,200,000. Sumner was strongly in favor of making the purchase, and the Senate was also favorably inclined, although the real value of the acquisition was then almost unknown. It is possible that the senators were more inclined to add to our territory in the North than in the South, but the chief determinant in the Alaska purchase was the belief that we were under some obligation to Russia for having offered us her fleet during the Civil War

should England or France intervene. The story had some foundation, though not of such a nature as to warrant any such feeling of friendly obligation on our part as oddly developed. When the Senate ratified the treaty, however, it was more with the thought that it was paying an obligation toward Russia than that we were getting an amazing bargain.

The same year saw the clearing up of the French situation in Mexico. As we have seen, Louis Napoleon had taken advantage of our being occupied with war to seize that country, in spite of our protests. When the war was over, Johnson had sent General Sheridan with an army to the border, and renewed our protests to France with vigor. The French people had not been in favor of the adventure, Napoleon had wrongly counted on the success of the Confederacy, and now found himself in an untenable position. Without any qualms of conscience, he broke faith completely with Maximilian, whom he had set up as Emperor at Mexico City, withdrew the French troops, and coldly left Maximilian to his fate. Maximilian was executed by the Mexicans, the empress went insane, and an inglorious and dastardly chapter in Napoleonic imperial policy was closed.

Were it not that his fight with Congress over reconstruction has overshadowed all else in Johnson's unhappy term, his success in clearing the New World in one year from all claims of the two great Old World empires of Russia and France would have received more attention than it has. He secured peaceably the withdrawal of the menace on our south and added nearly 600,000 square miles in the north to the national domain, a country nearly three times as large as France and whose rich possibilities are even today not sufficiently realized.

We must now return to the drama that was unrolling in Washington. Congress at once took in hand the reconstruction of the South, ignoring completely the plans of Lincoln and Johnson. In March, 1867, it passed, over Johnson's veto, "the most brutal proposition ever introduced by a responsible committee," the Reconstruction Act. By this and several supplementary acts, all the former Confederate States were swept away, and the South was divided into five military districts, each under command of a general who was insultingly made subordinate to Grant and not to Johnson, in spite of

the fact that under the Constitution the President is Commander-in-Chief. Although the Fourteenth Amendment had left the question of negro suffrage optional with the States of the Union, and not a single State allowed it south or west of New York, and not even



JOHNSON OBJECTS TO THE PHYSIC GIVEN TO THE SOUTH
The differences of the President and Congress over the Reconstruction Act.

A cartoon from "Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper," July 13, 1867.

Connecticut in New England, the Act forced it on the ten Southern States, without any constitutional authority.

Under the military governments, conventions were to be called in the ten States, after all the male negroes over twenty-one had been registered as voters, and these "black and tan" conventions then were to frame new constitutions in which negro suffrage must be provided for. After this had been done, the new constitutions approved, and the Fourteenth Amendment ratified by only three fourths of all the States, but by every Southern State, then and then

only could the seceded States be reinstated by representation in Congress.

The Supreme Court had decided three months earlier, in the Milligan case, already cited, that military courts were unconstitutional except under such war conditions as might make the operation of civil courts impossible, but the President pointed out in vain that

Elc & Med be it further exacted that whire conjugation, apprentice as a foresaid, excepting pittings of the limited later courts, shall, during a needs of the cluster be shawn by wishow satisfactory to the Resident, to be quity of microadust in offer, or coins, or for any peason shall become incapable or ligally disqualified to perform its decies, in such case, and in see other, the Posselect onary surprise such officer and designate some situable person to perform temporarily the dectar of such office until the sout needing of the sheet and until the case shall be article pain by the sheets, and such person, so designated shall the outer to be a case shall be article bands required by law to be telow and given by the person duly appointed to file such office; and in peach case it places the dusty of the shoots the special pitch the first day of push next meeting of the shoots to expect to the flee such southers with the produces and produces of the shoots.

Speaker of the House of Gapunatotics La Fayette I. Toster, President of the Parate protempore

FACSIMILE OF PART OF SECTION 2 FROM THE TENURE OF OFFICE ACT AND THE SIGNATURES TO THAT MEASURE

From the original Act in the State Department, Washington.

practically the whole of the new legislation was unconstitutional. So mad had become the course of the radicals that there was even talk in Congress of impeaching the Supreme Court for its decision! The legislature had run amok and was threatening both the Executive and the Judiciary.

On the same day on which Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act it passed another, also over the veto of the President and which was aimed directly at him. From the days of Washington down, the Executive had held the power of dismissal of a Federal

employee from office without consulting the legislature. On March 2, 1867, Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act which not only took away from the President all power of removal, even of the members of his own Cabinet, without the consent of the Senate, but made any infraction of the new Act a "high misdemeanor." Not merely was a broad and important power thus stolen from the Executive by the Senate, but in making infringements of it "high misdemeanors" Congress made the Act a weapon with which it might impeach the President and remove him himself from office if he did not submit to having even his personal advisers forced on him by the Senate. The Cabinet was included in the Act partly to prevent Johnson from getting rid of Stanton, who was working with the radicals and whose secret information was of importance to them.

Although Johnson put the Reconstruction Acts into force, he defied Congress on the Tenure of Office Act, for the purpose of bringing it before the courts for judicial review. As early as January, 1867, Representatives Ashley of Ohio and Ben Butler of Massachusetts were already at work trying to force a bill through for the President's impeachment, and it was clear what would happen if he demanded the resignation of Stanton. In August, nevertheless, Johnson asked him to resign, the situation having become intolerable. Stanton refused in an insulting note.

Johnson then suspended him temporarily and appointed General Grant in his place, who, however, as soon as Congress reassembled in December, at once resigned when the Senate refused to accept Stanton's removal. Johnson then dismissed Stanton and appointed General Lorenzo Thomas. Stanton declined to get out, indulged in an undignified battle of words with Thomas and placed him under arrest. Released on bail, the general had a drink with Stanton, who, however, held his private office by force and would not surrender to the new appointee.

Congress then proceeded immediately to the impeachment of the President, the trial before the Senate beginning on March 4, 1868. This impeachment of President Johnson was not only the most disgraceful episode in the entire history of Congress but one of the most dangerous. The Tenure of Office Act had been merely a trap laid into which the Executive would have to walk, or abdicate all power for himself and his successors to the legislature. The Civil

War had threatened the existence of the nation; now the action of Congress threatened the existence of its form of government, for if a political party or faction could depose a properly elected President without Constitutional cause, there was little left of the Constitution and the balance of powers.


Although Stevens, almost at the end of his embittered days, was the most virulent against the President, Ben Butler, John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, Benjamin Wade, Thomas Williams, and John A. Logan have to share some of the heaviest of the deserved obloquy of the proceedings. Of the eleven charges made by the House, there was not one which could stand. The President was defended by five counsel, ex-Justice B. R. Curtis of the Supreme Court, William M. Evarts, Attorney-General Stanbery, Judge Groesbeck of Illinois, and T. R. R. Nelson of Tennessee, the first four being men of the highest attainments and standing.

There was no legal basis whatever for impeachment, but the prosecution pleaded as politicians and not as lawyers. Fortunately, the Senate, acting as jury, was presided over for the proceedings by Chief Justice Chase, who kept them strictly within legal bounds. Even so, the President, and the nation, escaped by only a single vote, seven Republicans ruining their futures with the party by voting in his favor, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Ross, Van Winkle, Henderson, and Fowler. It is little to the credit of three others, though it seems to be usually considered so, that they were ready to vote for acquittal if their votes were needed. Johnson was either guilty or he was not, and these three who preferred their careers to their honor were Sprague, Morgan, and Willey.

Johnson's term, however, was within a few months of its end when the final vote acquitted him on May 26, 1868, and the Republicans were looking forward to the fall election. The South had submitted again to force, and under conditions which we shall note later, new constitutions had been adopted in all the Southern States except Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, embodying negro suffrage, though Minnesota, Ohio, Kansas, and Michigan in the North had rejected it. In order to gain the benefit of the new negro vote, Congress quickly readmitted the seven reconstructed States into the Union during the summer in time for the election.

The Republicans nominated General Grant for President and

Schuyler Colfax, the Speaker of the House, for Vice-President, while the Democrats put up a ticket of Governor Seymour and General Francis P. Blair, Jr. Owing to the great popularity of Grant, there was considered to be no doubt of the result of the campaign, which, however, had several points of interest. Grant had never voted but once in his life, and then for a Democrat. The two party platforms were also peculiar in that the Republican one rancorously condemned the Republican President, Johnson, whereas the Democratic



IN 1869, DWIGHT L. MOODY, THE FAMOUS EVANGELIST OF THE NINETIES, WAS PRESIDENT OF THE CHICAGO YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

one applauded him. Both offered the bribe of pensions to the soldier vote, and both twisted the tail of the British lion. The Republicans claimed that suffrage in the South must be a matter for Congressional legislation, but not in the North, whereas the Democrats properly insisted that the suffrage question always had been and should be one for the individual States everywhere in the Union to determine for themselves. They also insisted upon the unconstitutionality of almost the whole of the acts of the Republican Congress.

Unfortunately, economic questions had also come to the front, and the Democrats took the side of those who wished to tax the tax-free government bonds, which was equivalent to a lowering of interest and partial repudiation, and the party also supported those who wished to pay the bondholders in greenbacks. On these points the Republicans adopted sound principles, and the future position of the parties for some decades was foreshadowed. The Republican Party,

with its tariff and favors for business, and its sounder ideas on currency, naturally attracted the conservative business interests, while it swept along a large part of the mob, and tried to keep its hold on the negro vote of the South by waving the bloody shirt and denouncing the loyalty of Southern whites. On the other hand, the Democratic Party, with much to offer in wholesome and progressive doctrines, and in its genuine democracy, was to suffer under the handicap of economic heresies.

For Grant himself, the apparent victory was in reality a profound tragedy. Rarely is the great soldier combined in one person with the great statesman. They were assuredly not in Grant, and the reputation which was so high at Appomattox was to become bedraggled and smirched in eight years of the White House. In the scandals which welled up in his administration, like the back-flow from a sewer, he himself profited nothing and was personally honest, but he had such a singular incapacity for choosing the right men for office, and then was so obstinate in his loyalty to the wrong ones, that the situation created was almost worse than if he had been a less honest but an abler man.

The first blow to confidence in the new President came with the announcement of his Cabinet appointments, which caused a gasp of astonishment throughout the nation. They were most of them, except Judge E. R. Hoar of Massachusetts and ex-Governor Cox of Ohio, practically unknown and small men, three of whom immediately resigned. The appointment of Hamilton Fish as Secretary of State, in place of one of the three, was good, and the only satisfactory portion of Grant's administration was to be in the field of foreign policy.


Less than a week before Grant took the oath of office in March, 1869, Congress put the finish on its Acts for Reconstruction by the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution (adopted by sufficient States in the following year), declaring that the right of citizens to vote should not be denied by the United States or any State "on account of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude," thus giving the negroes the franchise throughout the Union.

The amendment pleased those who, without regard to practical conditions, had fanatically demanded immediate equality in all respects between the two races; those who hated the Southern whites

and wished to crush them as much as possible; and those who wished to control the Southern vote in the interests of the Republican Party by manipulation of the negro voters. Had it not been for the negroes in the States under Congressional control, 650,000 of

whom took part in the election of 1868, Grant, in spite of his personal popularity, could not have won, a majority of the white vote of the nation having repudiated the Republican policies.

Conditions in the South were intolerably bad. Not only in many of the States, as we have pointed out, did the negro population approximate or even exceed the white, but for various reasons large numbers of the latter, including many prominent men, were still disfranchised. Naturally all the better class were solidly Democratic, and in view of the treatment being meted out to the South by the Republicans, could be nothing else, at least for the time



FACSIMILE OF A BILL FOR FURNISHING THE STATE HOUSE AT COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, IN 1872

being. The negro vote, mostly illiterate, was the determining political factor, and although the white Democrats tried to win it, the Republicans had little difficulty in controlling it. They could properly claim that it had been the Republican Party which had given the former slaves their freedom, and all over the South through agents of the Freedmen's Bureau and the newly formed "Union Leagues" they swept the negroes into the party fold.

The Republican Party in the South was thus made up almost exclusively of the illiterate ex-slaves and local white leaders of the lowest and most scandalous political type. These were known as

KU KLUX.

Hollow Hell, Devil's Den, Horrible Shadows. Ghostly Sepulchre. Head Quarters of the Immortal Ate of the K. K. Gloomy month. Bloody Moon. Black Night, Last Hour.

General Orders No. 3.

Shadowed Brotherhood! Murdered heroes! Fling the bloody dirt that covers you to the four winds! Erect thy Goddess on the banks of the Avernus. Mark well your foes! Strike with the red hot spear! Prepare Charon for his task! Enemies reform! The skies shall be blackened! A single Star shall look down upon horrible deeds! The night owl hall hoot a requiem o'er Charstly Cornece!

Ghostly Corpses!

Beware! Beware! Beware!

The Great-Cyclops is angry! Hobgoblins report! Shears, and lash! Tar and Feathers! Hell and

Revenge! Revenge! Revenge!

Bad men! white, black, yellow, repent!

The hour is at hand! Be ye ready! Life is short. J. H. S. Y. W.!!!

Ghosts! Ghosts!!! Ghosts!!!

Drink thy tea made of distilled hell, stirred with the lightning of heaven, and sweetened with the gall of thine enemies!

All will be well!!!

By order of the Great BLUFUSTIN. K. K. K.

A true copy. Peterloo.

> P. S. K. K. K.



"Dan' Your Soul. The Horrible Sepsiciar and Bloody Moon has at last Some live to-day to-mostrow "list." We the underrajend understand three triand "Get give "list yes have recommended a big Blook Nigger for Male, our run rucks: wel, sit, Jest you understand in time if he gets on the rede make up your unied in pull reaps. If you have any thing to say in regar factors, meret the Grand Cyologa and Concluve at Dan Mo. 4 at 12 o'clock moor, last, 1971.

hen you are in Calera we warn you to hold y your mouth or oth rwise you will be taken o earst to atretch home. Boware. Boware. Re (Nigned) ". Heware. "PHILLIP ISENBAUM.

"JOHN BANKSTOWN."
"Exall DAVEN."
"MARCUS THOMAS."
"RLOODY BONES.

"You know who. And all others of the Klau."

Above. A Ku Klux order printed in The Independent Monitor of Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

> Below. Warning sent by the Klan. From Ku Klux Report, Alabama Testimony.

"carpet-baggers" and "scalawags," the former being politicians who had swarmed down from the North with their carpetbags, to get what pickings they could, and the latter being low-grade Southern whites who helped to organize their negro machines locally for the same reason.

The pickings were, indeed, on a colossal scale. We shall note later such scandals in the North as the Tweed Ring in New York, but there has been nothing in our history to compare with the vast plunder secured under the "carpet-bag régime," in the South of reconstruction days. In South Carolina, of the 144 radical Republican members out of a total of 155 legislative members, 98 were negroes, of whom only 22 could read and write, as were also the State Treasurer and Secretary. This travesty of an American government, with a Northern carpet-bag governor at the head, which voted themselves champagne, gold watches,

horses and carriages, and other incredible things out of the public money, raised the State debt in a brief time from \$7,000,000 to \$29,000,000.

In New Orleans, \$17,000,000 of city bonds were issued at thirty-five cents on the dollar, and the State debt was increased so recklessly that it has been estimated all the way from \$24,000,000 to \$50,000,-

ooo, and the tax rate rose 400 per cent in four years. The political trash. white and black. grew rich selling franchises, public property, and political favors for any price they could to get money quickly for themselves. One carpetbag governor cleaned up a half million dollars in his term. Such régimes could only result in many cases in later re-



a Hang, gate, haber a constant of the first own place to the property and the property of the

A CARTOON BY RYLAND RANDOLPH SHOWING THE FATE IN STORE FOR LOGAL CARPET-BAGGERS AND SCALAWAGS

The figures represented two men connected with the university and educational work in Tuscaloosa who were driven out by the Klan.

pudiation of debts so corruptly incurred, and unfortunately many of these bond issues were sold in England.

It was natural that the Southern whites, to prevent this complete ruin, should wish to regain control of their own States. This was impossible if carpet-baggers and scalawags could marshal the blacks to the polls. Organizations, therefore, were formed to intimidate the negroes. Among these "White Leagues," "Knights of the White Camelia," and other secret societies, the most noted and effective was the Ku Klux Klan, started in Tennessee in 1866, and later an important weapon throughout the whole South. Riders, robed in white, would appear suddenly in the night and frighten negroes out of their wits in one way and another. At first little violence was

used, but when the methods began to prove effective, as was shown by the big drop in Republican votes in 1870, Congress passed the Enforcement Act, imposing severe penalties for infractions of the new Constitutional Amendments, and the South then met force with force. Whatever Abolitionists and theorists like Charles Sumner might say, living in white Northern communities, whites will not consent to be ruled by blacks, and the South was fighting for white supremacy. The only way to combat Congressional legislation had to be violence when other methods failed, and there is no doubt violence was used, and racial bitterness much increased.

In 1871 Congress passed an even more rigid Enforcement Act, and in it gave the President power to suspend habeas corpus and to use the army to suppress the activities of the members of the Klan. The Congressional policy had been criminally stupid. No matter what its political faith, the white South could not be expected to submit supinely to be ruled and plundered by its former slaves. The negro fanaticism of a Sumner could result only in arousing passions and delaying a solution of an extremely delicate and difficult problem.

Gradually, however, the whites regained control, and by 1877 throughout most of the South the carpet-bag-negro régimes had ended, and the section had become solidly Democratic, the combined dishonesty and ignorance of the local Republicans making any two-party system impossible. The blacks were frankly intimidated, and negro suffrage was nullified in one way and another. Federal troops were withdrawn and the South was left to manage its own affairs by its own civil governments. Gradually a new order was evolved, though economic recovery was necessarily slow. The former slave learned to work for wages, and almost a revolution in the agricultural conditions of the section can be inferred from the reduction by almost a half, in little more than a dozen years, of the average size of southern farms. The Old South of the "plantation" days with its romantic dreams had passed into history.

CHAPTER V

WE BEGIN TO LOOK FORWARD AGAIN

wholly agricultural, had been chiefly so, and when the armies of that section were disbanded the soil called back their men simply and naturally. In the industrial North the problem of re-absorbing nearly a million ex-soldiers peaceably into civil life was properly considered a serious one, and was envisaged with a good deal of misgiving. There, again, it was the land which made the transition from war to peace surprisingly easy. It was not the "old plantation" or the old farm that called the Northern soldier, however, but the new and untamed West.

As seems inevitably to be the case, there was a primary post-war depression in business about two years after the end of hostilities. This short period of bad times in 1866–7 made it more difficult for men to find places in eastern industry, and thus emphasized the westward drift. There were not only the ex-soldiers who had to find ways of living but the steadily mounting numbers of immigrants, which rose from just under 250,000 in 1865 to 460,000 in 1873.


Within three years after the end of the war the Federal Government was distributing 6,000,000 acres a year of public lands, and although much of this went in grants to the railroads, millions of acres had been turned into farms by new settlers. Between 1865 and 1872 the railway mileage of the nation jumped from about 35,000 to double that amount, much of which new building was in the West, where the railroad increasingly displaced the stage-coach. In 1869 the first trans-continental line, the Union Pacific, was completed, after four years' work. Building had been carried forward westward from Omaha and eastward from Sacramento, and the two lines met when an engine from the East and one from the West finally faced each other at Promontory Point.

The work had been colossal. The Central Pacific, for example, had had to climb over 7000 feet through the Sierra Nevada moun-

tains in the first 125 miles. The whole line, traversing the plains and mountains, was, indeed, one of the greatest engineering feats of the time. It is not easy now to realize the difficulties under which it was accomplished. For the western portion, all the machinery, iron, cars, locomotives,—practically everything except timber and water,—had had to be transported all the way from the East to California by way of the Panama Isthmus or around Cape Horn.

When the two lines met, the Central Pacific after building 688 miles from the West, and the Union Pacific 1086 miles from its starting point in the East, the entire country rejoiced. The actual physical uniting of the two sections was made the occasion of an elaborate ceremony. On the final tie to be placed, which was of polished California laurel wood, a silver plate bore the inscription reading "the last tie laid in the completion of the Pacific Railroad, May 10, 1869," and the rails were spiked to this. For this purpose, Arizona sent a spike made of iron, silver, and gold, Nevada one of solid silver, and California one of gold. This last was driven into position by the presidents of the two roads, each striking it alternately with a sledge hammer made of silver, while the telegraph carried the strokes to all the principal cities of the country. As each stroke thus reechoed, the bell of the City Hall in San Francisco repeated the sound, and the chimes of Trinity Church in New York played "Old Hundred," As the last blow was struck, cannons roared their salute across the whole continent. If the single line spanning the country was the most spectacular feat of the railway builders of this period, it was perhaps less important than the network of lines being built in every direction in the West, extending settlement and widening markets. The five years before the panic of 1873, for example, saw the mileage in Wisconsin doubled, and in one year more miles were built in Illinois than measured the whole length of the Union and Central Pacifics.


This intensive railway building was partly the result and partly the cause of the rapid development of the West. Even during the war, there had been a huge migration, the population of the Western States increasing by more than a million during the conflict. With peace, the rate of increase was immensely accelerated. Of course the basis of western industry and prosperity was agriculture, stimulated by war prices and a combination of other circumstances. The im-



ACROSS THE CONTINENT—THE FRANK LESLIE TRANSCONTINENTAL EXCURSION

The excursion train is rounding Cape Horn at the head of the Great American Cañon. In the distance is shown the South Fork of the American River, where gold was discovered in 1848.

By courtesy of the University of California, Extension Division.



A CAFÉ, GLASGOW, MONTANA, IN 1889 By courtesy of the Great Northern K ilway Company.



CUSTER'S DEAD CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF LITTLE BIG HORN From Indian Pictographs in the Tenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology.

provement in agricultural machinery, of which we have noted the beginnings, was rapid, and the few years after the war saw the advent of the self-binding harvester, the Oliver plow, the modern wind-mill, and the increasing use of steam in threshing. But if the new railways, in too many cases scandalously over-capitalized and flimsily built, were earning in gross twenty-seven per cent of their cost in a year, their business was derived from many industries besides farming. Eastward came not only wheat and corn, but ore for the rising steel and iron industries, metals from the mines, and cattle from the plains. Westward went the tens of thousands of settlers, and manufactured products of all sorts for their needs.

The American has had to learn to adjust himself quickly to fast changing conditions, and the two decades after the war saw the rise and fall of one of the most picturesque of our varied occupations. It had been found by chance that cattle which wintered on the plains were fatter and gave better meat than those in Texas, and from this discovery grew the cattle kingdom of the great plains, stretching from Texas to Montana. The pushing westward of the railroads and settlers had several effects which facilitated the rise of the cattle kings.

Most important was the problem of the Indian, and war after war now marked the last stage of driving the original occupier of the soil into reserves on lands least desirable for the white men. In 1862 we were fighting the Sioux. In 1864 it was the Cheyennes, the Apaches, Comanches, and others. In 1866 there was the uprising again of the Sioux under Red Cloud, and two years later General Custer broke the power of the Cheyennes under their chief Black Kettle.

Although the Federal troops were winning, there was constant unrest, which was closely linked with the killing of the buffalo, the main source of food and profit to the plains Indians. William F. Cody, better known as "Buffalo Bill," killed personally nearly 4300 of the animals in one year and a half, and although they had been so numerous that a train passed through one herd for 120 miles, the killing was at so furious a rate—5,000,000 in 1873 alone—that the Indian saw his main support disappearing almost as by a miracle. Although one of the chief conflicts occurred in 1876 with the Sioux under the great leader Sitting Bull, the advance of the railroads and

the presence of troops gradually opened the plains to the cattlemen and cowboys from the end of the Civil War.

Cattle by the tens of thousands were driven up along the Chisholm and other trails, first to the end of the Kansas Pacific and later up to the newer Santa Fé and the Union Pacific. The day of the steer lay between the earlier one of the Indian and the later one of the settled West, when the farmer won with his enclosed fields and towns against the cattlemen who had thrived only so long as a reasonably safe national domain was given him to use without cost or hindrance. But of all romantic pages of our history that of the cowboy has become the most typically American in our own eyes and that of the world at large. The "West" of legend and story and picture is not that of the pioneer farmer and his wife, fighting dust, hard water, droughts, grasshoppers, and loneliness, in too often slovenly, drab, and poverty-stricken homes, but that of the stage coach, the wild Indians on horseback, and the cowboy rounding up his herds on the "long drive."

Cattle towns sprang up where the cattle were sold. Then came the refrigerator car after 1870, which carried the meat from great packing plants concentrating in Omaha, St. Louis, and Chicago to households in the East which had largely depended hitherto on the local butchers. There had also been a steady drift of other great industries farther and farther west. The manufacturers of agricultural machinery followed the sunset trek of the farmers. While the Armours, Swifts and others were establishing packing houses, Pullman located his car building plant at Chicago, the great breweries of Pabst and Busch rose in Milwaukee and St. Louis, and the milling plants of Pillsbury and Washburn in Minneapolis. These were but outstanding examples of a new West, a West fatal alike to Indian, buffalo, and cowboy. In spite, however, of growing industrialization, of big enterprises, and of banks, the West was to remain primarily agricultural,—a land of farms and small towns, and its attitude toward political and economic questions was to continue to be that of the small independent producer, often in debt, and opposed to measures which seemed to benefit the creditor and business classes at his expense.

While the South was slowly and painfully trying to rebuild its economic structure, and the West was booming, the East was having

a veritable financial orgy. The vast opportunities afforded by the quick accumulation of capital in the war, the inflation following it, the expansion of the West, the new machinery, inventions, and commodities, were quickly appreciated and embraced by a type of business man as bold, unscrupulous, combative, and selfish as the worst robber barons of the Middle Ages. All business men were not as unsocial, irresponsible, and predatory as Jay Gould, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and others of that brand, but these were outstanding figures in the immediate post-war years.

The foundation of some of the so-called great American fortunes had been laid in an earlier period, such as those of the Astors and Vanderbilts, but these were enormously increased in this period, and many of the most widely known, such as the Rockefeller, Gould, and Carnegie ones, date only from it.

The Bessemer process for manufacturing steel was invented by Henry Bessemer in England in 1856, but it was after the Civil War that the new age of steel began in America. In 1867 we were making only 2600 tons, but in the next few years such concerns as the Bethlehem Steel Works, Carnegie, McCandless and Co., and others were rapidly expanded and, in spite of the panic and hard times, by 1879 we were producing nearly 1,000,000 tons annually.

During the war, young John D. Rockefeller had devoted himself solely to money-making, and by 1872 he was already trying to control the entire oil business of the nation. The policy pursued by his firm had been one of deliberate killing off of competitors by any means possible, however ruthless. One of these was the forcing of the railways to grant special low rates to the Rockefeller group, which even forced the roads to pay to them a considerable part of the freight charges received by the lines from Rockefeller's rivals in business. By this combination with the railroads on the one hand and his ability to prevent the passage in Congress of measures directed toward making the railways perform impartially their duties as public carriers, Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company had reached by 1878 the point of practically complete control of the American oil business in all its phases.

The railroads themselves were the foot-balls of speculators, grafters, and bribers, and, in a large number of cases, were built, operated, and their stocks manipulated with the sole thought of personal

profit. In the spectacular war between Jay Gould and Cornelius Vanderbilt, both of them bought senators at Albany and judges in New York as readily, though more expensively, as they could have bought hogs. Gould, who by his issues of illegal stock in the Erie



WHO STOLE THE PEOPLE'S MONEY?

From the cartoon on Tweed and the Tammany Ring by Thomas Nast in "Harper's Weekly,"

August 10, 1871.

wrecked that road, made in that and other ways a fortune of \$25,000,000 in not much more than a decade.

Corruption, indeed, was so rife throughout the country as to disgust honest men. As is the case far too often with us, however, they could not be moved to action so long as they themselves were making money, and until the moral stenches in one place and another became so bad as to be suffocating. New York was merely a classic example although, unfortunately, not the only one. There William H. Tweed had made himself head of Tammany Hall and political boss of the city. Almost two thirds of the voters were foreign born. Using the well-known methods for controlling this foreign vote together with false registrations and illegal naturalizations, and in alliance with the legislature at Albany, it seemed for a while as though Tweed were invincible.






Left: The original expressman, William F. Harnden. He travelled by boat from New York to New Haven, and then to Boston. Henry Wells and William Fargo were in his employ at one time. Top: Concord stage coaches ready to start, Reno, Nevada, in the early sixties. Bottom: An express-wagon of about 1875.

THE RAILWAY EXPRESS


From the Jesse Charles Harraman Collection, Library of Congress.



HARVESTING IN THE EIGHTIES

The ranch of Henry Best, Sullen County, California.

By courtesy of the University of California, Extension Division.



TWELVE McCORMICK-DEERING 16-FOOT HARVESTER THRESHERS WORKING IN ONE FIELD, 1933, CUTTING A SWATH 192 FEET WIDE, OR APPROXIMATELY 640 ACRES PER DAY

By courtesy of the International Harvester Company.

Of course the ignorant and venal foreign voters were merely the debauched tools of the bosses who found their power and profit to rest on an alliance with the big business leaders. When a Mr. Gould or a Mr. Vanderbilt or others of that sort bought an alderman or a senator, a franchise or a legislative Act, they wanted to know what, and for how long, they were paying their money. They wanted to deal with an individual who could "do business" and "deliver the goods," and from their standpoint the boss, then, as he has since, performed a useful function. Political corruption in America can never be wiped out until the American business man, large or small, ceases to seek for himself the fruits of corruption. So long as business, autocratic and unsocial, buys what the boss is there to sell, and so long as democracy tries to clear its life by an occasional uprising at the polls against the boss only, the symbol of its party will properly remain an ass.

Every possible source of graft on city contracts, selling offices, dispensing favors and franchises, was tapped by Tweed and his henchmen, and not content with those, false bills were presented to the Board of Special Audit and paid. By the time the boss was overthrown in 1871, the stealings from the city probably had aggregated close to \$50,000,000 if not more. But New York was not alone. Pennsylvania politics, under the disgraced ex-Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, and Mat Quay, were filthy, nor were other States without scandals of their own.

In 1869 the slimy trail, in fact, reached perilously near the White House and President Grant himself. From early in the war, the United States had been off the gold basis, but gold was required by business men for several purposes, such as the payment of customs duties, and shipment abroad to settle the balance of trade. There was therefore a market for gold, where business men bought and sold it for their needs. As the Treasury drew in to itself gold through its Customs duties, it was in the habit of selling it to keep the metal from going to such a premium as would make it difficult if not impossible for business men to meet such of their engagements as had to be settled in gold.

Gould conceived the idea of cornering the metal, buying all of the limited amount in the market, and forcing merchants to pay his price for it or go bankrupt. To succeed in this he had to make sure

that for the period of his speculation the United States Treasury could be kept from selling any of the government supply. Playing on Grant's vulgar liking for extremely ordinary men provided they had wealth and power, Gould so managed that Grant became the guest of himself and his disreputable associate, the notorious Jim Fisk. The two on several occasions entertained the President, who was no financier, and persuaded him that it would be for the benefit of the country if gold were temporarily at a high price in New York. They had also worked on Grant's brother-in-law, A. R. Corbin, whom they actually bribed with a share in the deal, and \$25,000 cash.

Grant, having allowed himself to become converted to the idea that a higher price for gold would benefit the farmer, ordered Boutwell, the Secretary of the Treasury, not to sell any government metal. It was only after the conspiring gamblers had forced the price of gold up to 163½ on Friday, September 24, 1869, and the country was in a panic, that Grant, who had come to realize his mistake, allowed Boutwell to sell \$4,000,000 from the Treasury. Gould, who had got wind of the President's change of mind, had quickly sold out on his partners, without letting them into the secret. Fisk repudiated his contracts amounting to \$70,000,000, and the corner collapsed. As Fisk remarked it was now a case of "each man drag out his own corpse."

Meanwhile on what came to be known as this "Black Friday," hundreds of reputable merchants had been ruined while the country as a whole had faced disaster. The President, Mrs. Grant, and his secretary, Horace Porter, were exonerated, but Grant's stupidity and his having allowed himself to be seen as intimate with such notorious crooks and swindlers as Gould and Fisk left a smirch that cannot easily be wiped out, though personally he never had any intention of profiting himself.

Meanwhile, affairs were going far from well in Washington. For some reason Grant had become determined to annex Santo Domingo in the West Indies, and had sent his secretary, O. E. Babcock, there in 1869. That gentleman came back with a treaty of annexation in his pocket. The President unexpectedly presented this to his Cabinet, who were utterly opposed to the project, especially when engineered in such a dubious way. A second treaty, secured rather more ac-

cording to diplomatic usage, the following year, failed of passage in the Senate by a tie vote, Sumner speaking strongly against it. Grant had already asked his Attorney-General, Hoar, to resign so that he might appoint a much inferior Southerner in his place to buy votes for the treaty. Not long after, he forced his Secretary of the Interior, Cox, also to resign because Grant refused to support him in trying to save the Indian Bureau from plunder by such men as Cameron and others who were friends of the President.

So wide-spread was becoming the discontent with certain aspects of the administration by 1870, that there developed an ominous break in the party ranks. Starting first in Missouri, under the leadership of Schurz, who was now entering upon the greater career which lay ahead of him, and of B. Gratz Brown, a former Democrat, a new party, known as the Liberal Republican, was launched with success in the State elections.

Among other demands made by the leaders of the new organization was a more enlightened policy toward the South, and as a consequence, in the following May, 1871, Congress at last passed a general Amnesty Act by which all but about 500 Southerners were restored to full rights of citizenship, thus taking the last step in giving back home rule to the South. It has been estimated that the Act enfranchised over 150,000 ex-Confederate soldiers, almost the entire number of whom could be counted on to vote for the Democratic ticket.

In view of the coming Presidential campaign in 1872, and the growing dissatisfaction throughout the country with the inefficiency and scandals of the Grant régime, soon to be increased by the investigation into the Crédit Mobilier, it was fortunate that the election year witnessed a signal success for the administration in foreign affairs.

Negotiations had been begun by Seward under President Johnson to reach a settlement with the British Government for the damage done to our commerce by the *Alabama* and other vessels which had been built in England for the Confederates during the war and allowed to escape. Lord Russell, however, had denied that any just or legal claim existed on our part, while American public opinion was being goaded and driven astray by the wild bunkum of Charles Sumner, who absurdly but dangerously insisted that England owed

us not only for the damage done directly to our shipping by the English-built Confederate cruisers, which was estimated at \$15,000,000, but also for the "indirect damages," amounting to \$110,000,000 caused by loss of shipping profits due to the fear of the cruisers, and

A FACTORY OPERATIVE'S APPEAL,

To the President of the United States.

Respectfully dedicated to all our Fellow Operatives engaged in the manufacture of Cotton and Woolen Goods throughout the Union.

BY WILLIAM FORSTER,

OF FALL RIVER, MASS.

To thee, O Grant, who art our Nation's pride, laying mercenary thoughts aside, we wish to honor thee, and therefore pray, God give thee tuition to recommend the conditions to our Constitution, guaranteeing to every citizen throughout our land, Freedom's fundamental institution.* Ope one night each week for six months in the year where they may meet and generate, † And preserve all pure, free government throughout our Union; making of it one vast communion; a brotherhood of man. ‡ We pray for thee and them.

AN APPEAL TO GRANT IN 1869 FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO SHORTEN THE LABORING HOURS OF COTTON AND WOOLEN GOODS OPERATORS

From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

a further \$2,000,000,000, or half the cost of the war, because the cruisers had prolonged it!

It is hard to conceive that Sumner could honestly believe that there was any basis in law or equity for such a preposterous claim, though such English-haters as James Russell Lowell was at that time backed him up, and even Grant at first accepted the theory of "indirect" damages. Instead of appealing to popular prejudices like the sonorous senator from Massachusetts, Hamilton Fish, the Secretary

of State, quietly carried on negotiations with England, and found the British officials in a more receptive mood in the following year, when the Franco-Prussian War had broken out. In 1871, the Treaty of Washington was signed in that city, on May 8, becoming a milestone in Anglo-American relations, and indeed, in the history of diplomacy and the settlement of international disputes.

By this treaty both England and the United States agreed to abide by the decision of an impartial board of arbitration, the five members of which were to be appointed by President Grant, Queen Victoria, the King of Italy, the President of Switzerland, and the Emperor of Brazil. The following summer, the five arbitrators met at Geneva, and the whole matter was amicably settled. Charles Francis Adams, who as our Minister to England throughout the war had continually warned Russell of the building of the vessels, was our perfect and natural choice as American arbitrator. England was less happy in her selection of Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn, a somewhat narrow-minded Britisher of the insular and irascible type. The other three, Count Sclopis of Italy, Jacques Stampfli of Switzerland, and Vicomte d'Itajuba of Brazil, were fair and impartial.

The honor of guiding the proceedings, which more than once threatened to break down completely, was due chiefly to Adams, for the American advocate, who presented the American claims, J. C. Bancroft Davis, was as impossible in his way as Cockburn was in his, and, with an eye on the Irish vote at home for the election due in a few weeks, included at first all the nonsensical "indirect damages" urged by Sumner.

The "Alabama claims," as the damages to our shipping by the several British-built vessels were called, was not the only subject in dispute, although the chief. The final verdicts were unanimous with the exception of Cockburn, who disagreed with distinctly bad grace. The United States was awarded \$15,500,000 damages, in gold, for the "Alabama claims." England, in turn, was given approximately \$7,430,000, of which \$5,500,000 arose from fisheries disputes and the remainder for damages sustained by her during our war, while a minor boundary dispute was also adjudicated, the two questions being settled by special commissions and the arbitration of the German Emperor. Leading English statesmen, and not Cockburn, were responsible for the settlement of these various sore spots in our

relations with the old mother country, and the air once cleared, those relations greatly improved, though it was to take several decades before the two English-speaking nations could be said to be really friendly, and war between them to become almost unthinkable.

Although the Geneva Award and the settlement of all our disputes with the most powerful nation in the world were claims to distinction for Grant's administration, they were the only ones other than the passage of the Amnesty Act, whereas the scandals were becoming more odious as the election approached. Nevertheless, it was clear that Grant would be the leader of the party again, and he was nominated unanimously by the Convention held in Philadelphia on June 5, although Henry Wilson of Massachusetts was substituted for Schuyler Colfax as Vice-President.

Not only was Grant re-nominated, but the platform, discreetly silent as to scandals, praised the President's "earnest purpose," "sound judgment," and "incorruptible integrity." In our true American party fashion it also claimed for the Republican policies the full credit for winning the war, the "unparalleled magnanimity" shown toward the South [!], the establishment of "universal" suffrage, and —quite blind to what was immediately to come in a Republican administration,—the avoidance of financial crises and the maintenance of prosperity. A protective tariff and a large increase in war pensions were also recommended.

The opposition was confused, although not unimportant. A new party, the Labor Reformers, made its appearance, and adopted a platform which seemed wildly radical in that period, and conservative and sane today, on which Charles O'Conor, an able New York lawyer and reformer, agreed to stand for the Presidency. It was also in this campaign that the Prohibition Party made its first appearance.

More important, however, was the question of what the Liberal Republicans would do. Not only had that new party gathered into its ranks many liberal and reform Republicans of the sort which had been prominent in the original founding of the Republican Party, but the President had antagonized important party men who had little in common with the original liberals, men such as Horace Greeley and Charles Sumner. It was also generally understood that the Democrats would probably endorse the candidates named by

the bolting Republicans, and that in view of the weakness and scandal of Grant's administration such a combination might have a good chance to win.

If it ever did have such a chance, it threw it away by nominating Horace Greeley for the Presidency and straddling on the tariff question. In retrospect we can see that every other plank except that on the tariff was sound, including the strong condemnation of the scandals of the administration, and the demands for civil service reform and the return to a gold basis for the currency, but no party could win with Greeley for a candidate.

As editor of *The New York Tribune* he had wielded possibly the widest influence of any editor America has seen. He possessed marked ability and had rendered great service, but right as he had been on some questions, he had been as stubbornly wrong on others. Moreover, he had taken up with so many "crank" movements, and was himself so erratic, that the thought of him in the White House could only be looked upon by the people generally as a joke. The first candidate who had been seriously suggested had been Charles Francis Adams, but he had given no encouragement to the plan, and it was understood that the Democrats would not accept him. At their convention in Baltimore in July they did accept Greeley, with wry faces and deep dissatisfaction, and adopted both the candidates and platform of the Liberal Republicans.

Neither of these, however, seemed possible of acceptance by a considerable section of the Democrats. These refused to follow their party, and at a convention held at Louisville, Kentucky, in September, nominated O'Conor for President and John Quincy Adams, a brother of Charles Francis, as Vice-President.

The result of the election was never in doubt. Grant was re-elected by a larger popular majority than he had received the first time, and the Republicans controlled both houses of Congress by large majorities. Greeley, who had spent years venomously denouncing the party whose nomination he accepted, and who as a rabid protectionist was nominated by free-traders and low-tariff men, was snowed under, and died a few days after the election. With a better candidate it may be questioned whether the result would not have been approximately the same, and it probably would have been. Post-war periods are always periods of low public morals, and just as we re-

fused to be stirred by the scandals of the Harding régime after the World War, because we were prosperous, so the public of 1872 was evidently unmoved by those under Grant. Prosperity, however, in 1872, was soon to give place to one of the worst panics and longest periods of depression in our history, and scandals were to become more odious than ever.

Grant was to be inaugurated for his second term on March 4, 1873. Toward the end of February the Congressional Committee which had been appointed to investigate charges made by The New York Sun in regard to scandals in connection with the building of the Union Pacific Railway made its report. It appeared from this that the promoters of the great engineering feat in which we had taken so much just pride, had formed a construction company, called the "Crédit Mobilier," through which they had secured great and corrupt profits to themselves. Fearing adverse legislation in Congress, these men, through Oakes Ames, a congressman from Massachusetts, had distributed blocks of stock among other congressmen where they would "do the most good"; in other words, had bribed members of Congress to wink at and share in corruption.

Ames was found guilty and censured by Congress. The Vice-President of the United States, Colfax, was clearly also involved, and in an unsuccessful effort to prove his innocence revealed that he had been guilty of an even greater breach of political morality. He retired from office a ruined man. The reputation of James A. Garfield, later President of the United States, was also smirched, and although his latest, and scholarly, biographer claims that he was wholly innocent, he was involved in this and another matter in ways that appear to reflect either on his integrity or his good sense, and the best that can be said is that he was somewhat obtuse as to high standards in public office. Others also were entangled, and the nation was widely aroused.

On the last day of Congress, March 3, 1873, the day before Grant was to be inaugurated for his second term, Congress passed an Act raising the salaries of many government officials, from the President down, not only increasing their own remuneration fifty per cent, from \$5000 to \$7500 a year, but as respected themselves making the Act retroactive so that each member of Congress drew \$5000 of back pay. This was so extremely raw as to cause an unexpected out-

burst of public resentment, and the "salary grab," as it was called, had, in this particular, to be repealed in the next session.

Other scandals were vet to come. In 1875 the frauds on the revenue perpetrated by the "Whiskey Ring" were uncovered, and involved Grant's private secretary, General Babcock, whom Grant shielded, as he did also his Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, whom he allowed to resign "with great regret" the day before he was to be impeached before the Senate for graft. Frauds in other departments were also uncovered, and the total unearthed in the President's second term amounted to about \$75,000,000. If the trail went very close to the White House, it did not, however, quite reach it. The charge against Grant is that, with apparently a fatal inability to choose either his officials or his friends among the right sort of men, he allowed his mistaken sense of loyalty in private friendship to overshadow completely his sense of what he owed to the public. In many respects he had the same qualities as Harding, though he had an ability and a real greatness that were both far beyond the reach of the later President who allowed his administration to become honevcombed with public scandal precisely as did Grant. One act in Grant's unhappy second term was to prove that he had high political courage and was to do much to redeem his reputation.

In its platform of 1872 the Republican Party had taken the credit for the prosperity which, at least in the North and West, had been enjoyed after the war. It is with no wish to hold a brief for either of our great parties that the fact must be stressed that no party has a monopoly on prosperity. Economic laws continue to operate, and in surprisingly regular cycles, regardless of the political questions of any campaign, and to a great extent it is a matter of luck which party happens to be in power when crises occur. It is an odd fact, however, that the Republican Party has always claimed, and much of its prestige has come from the ready belief given to the claim by the public, that it alone can provide us with prosperous times. The fact is that since the two parties assumed their modern forms, that is from the beginning of the Civil War, the most severe and most numerous periods of depression have been under Republican and not Democratic rule.

The Democrats were in power during the brief depression of 1884-5, the panic of 1893, and the brief depression at the beginning

of the Great War in 1914–15; whereas the Republicans were in power in the small depression of 1865–6, the panic and long collapse of 1873–78, the so-called "rich man's panic" of 1903–4, the panic of 1907, the deep depression of 1920–22 and the great collapse since 1929. It is high time that these facts were recognized, not for the sake of party but for that of clear thinking. Politics have far less to do with prosperity than they are supposed to have, and less than we wish they might have. It is not only unfair but dangerous to blame the Democrats for their three periods of bad times and ignore the far worse times we have had in Republican administrations.

Grant had been elected in part on a platform of prosperity, but he had been in office only a few weeks in his second term when the storm broke. It was to prove one of the most disastrous and prolonged economic catastrophes in our history, and if political ability or foresight can be held responsible for the action of economic laws, the Republicans, who had been in continuous power since the winter of 1861, could not possibly escape responsibility. It would be, however, as unjust to blame Grant and the Republicans for the panic of 1873 as to lay that of 1893 on the shoulders of Cleveland and the Democrats.

It is possible, although the point is much disputed, that had the party been willing to force resumption of specie payments in 1871, when it could have been effected without too great danger of hardship, the severity of the crisis might have been somewhat mitigated, but it assuredly could not have been avoided.

As we have seen, there had been enormous expansion of business and credit after the war, and, as in 1929, men became drunk with the seeming prosperity and the limitless possibilities for the future. Money borrowed from banks in America and from foreign lenders had been poured into new enterprises with utter recklessness. In the four years, 1869–72, for example, the railway mileage of the nation was increased by 25,000 miles, or fifty per cent of the previously existing total. Everybody was gambling on the future. When such conditions exist, it is certain that a crash will come, though it is never possible to forecast its date or the precise happening which will topple over the house of cards.


There were many warnings in 1872, such as the failure of four large savings banks in New York, but such warnings are seldom

noted, and business leaders, like Jay Cooke, the great financier of the Civil War, Thomas A. Scott, the vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and Cornelius Vanderbilt of the New York Central, sailed gaily into the hurricane with all sails spread. In the spring of 1873 there was a disastrous panic on the stock exchange in Vienna. Europe suddenly became cautious. Credit from that source was stopped for us. Our bankers, manufacturers, and other leading business men unexpectedly faced realities instead of dreams. The summer was ominous. Then on September 18, the banking house of Jay Cooke & Co., the greatest then in America, which was too heavily involved in the building of the uncompleted Northern Pacific Railway, closed its doors. The next day nineteen Stock Exchange firms failed. The Union Trust Company of New York followed, and other great firms crashed. The Stock Exchange closed for eight days, but the panic was on, and many banks continued to break.

By November, pig iron could scarcely be sold at any price, and half the furnaces and mills in the country closed down. Building stopped on every railroad, and all hands were discharged from car shops. In many lines it was impossible to sell goods for the cost of manufacture. As the depression continued, there were strikes and violence everywhere, culminating in the first nation-wide railroad strike of 1877. Between 1873 and 1878, over 50,000 commercial houses failed, and the maximum annual figure was not reached until the latter year, after which recovery set in fairly rapidly. But in the now almost classic description of those five years of misery by James Ford Rhodes, they were one "long dismal tale of declining markets, exhaustion of capital, a lowering in value of all kinds of property, including real estate, constant bankruptcies, close economy in business, grinding frugality in living, idle mills, furnaces and factories, former profit-earning iron mills reduced to the value of a scrap heap, laborers out of employment, reductions of wages, strikes and lockouts, the great railroad riots of 1877, suffering of the unemployed, depression and despair."

Ugly, sinister and sordid as was much of the political and economic life of this post-war period, it would nevertheless be a mistake to dwell upon these aspects of America in those years to the total exclusion of other and more hopeful ones. Our life was not all politi-

cal graft and business money grubbing. If big business scarcely as yet recognized social obligations, and had a low code of business ethics, it was indirectly accomplishing much for the comfort and mental quickening of the people. The labor-saving machinery on the farms



5RICKTOP'S ALMANAC for OCTOBER, 1874, FEATURED THE SEASONAL CHANGE IN HEADGEAR

From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

made the farmer less of a weary manual laborer, and gave him more time and energy for a better rounded life. The network of railways, the quicker postal facilities, the telegraph, the telephone, invented in 1876, the better news service of the papers following the founding of the Associated Press, and such magazines and journals as The Atlantic Monthly, Scribner's and The Nation, all helped to broaden the daily intellectual interests.

In the fine arts, a period must be considered as notable in our


history which, after the barren decades before, saw the first rise of such artists as Winslow Homer, Whistler, John La Farge, Sargent, Mary Cassatt, Edwin A. Abbey, Joseph Pennell, George Inness, William Morris Hunt, F. D. Millet, Homer Martin, Howard Pyle, Alfred Parsons, Timothy Cole, and Augustus St. Gaudens, many of whom were to continue work to the end of the century and later. There was a strongly marked broadening of American culture, not merely in the small cultivated groups here and there, but of the public at large.

Many more people went to Europe, and if they were not altogether happy in their environment when they returned, they brought with them, in shoals, ideas of what a more finished civilization could offer in addition to the qualities of their own. Criticism, especially of books and politics as provided in *The Nation* under the editorial leadership of Edwin L. Godkin, assumed an importance and achieved a standard that it had never before possessed with us, and in 1875 a professorship of Fine Arts was established at Harvard with the appointment of Charles Eliot Norton. The 1870's also saw the founding of such notable institutions as the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston and the Metropolitan Museum in New York, as well as other lesser ones and the beginning of many important private collections.

Not less hopeful was the change in literature. The position of men of letters was greatly improved by better methods of book distribution, by the rise of such publishing houses as Henry Holt and Company, Charles Scribner's Sons, and E. P. Dutton and Company, and by such opportunities for remuneration as made writing a possible career not only for men without private means but one which might provide them with ample incomes. There grew up a much wider reading public with a catholicity of tastes and interest no longer satisfied, as the smaller public had been, with the Boston and Concord group of Holmes, Longfellow, Emerson, Lowell, Hawthorne, and Whittier.

Two notable points about that group had been its extraordinary minute geographical locus, and the extent to which their writings served for the most part merely to transmit European culture. The change in the 1870's was marked in both respects. The new authors hailed from all parts of the United States, and dealt almost wholly

with the American scene, even though they showed a tendency to drift into New York or Boston. Sarah Orne Jewett painted the slowly decaying life of the old New England, but from the Middle West came Mark Twain with his Roughing It and Life on the Mississippi; John Hay with his ballads, and Will Carleton and Edward



ONE OF DEWITT'S ROMANCES OF 1866 A POPULAR TYPE OF FICTION OF 1873

From the Library of Congress.

Eggleston with their tales of Western life. Across the Rockies were Joaquin Miller and Bret Harte with their poems of the Western mountains and stories of rough mining camps, while in the South were George W. Cable, Miss Murfree (Charles Egbert Craddock), and others telling of Old Creole Days, of life in the Appalachian Mountains or on the old plantations.

Then, as usual, the mass of the people were contented with less admirable fare, and this period saw the rise of the dime novel

devoted to the wild life of the West, and the reading of colossal amounts of sentimental fiction, though the vogue of Dickens throughout the country was astounding. Between the end of the war and about 1875 was the period of the amazing success of the

BEADLE'S AMERICAN BATTLES.

PITTSBURG LANDING.

(SHILOH)

AND THE

INVESTMENT OF CORINTH.


DRAWN PROM

ORIGINAL SOURCES, OFFICIAL REPORTS, ETC.; WITE ANECDOTES, INCIDENTS, ETC.

BEADLE AND COMPANY, MEW YORK: 141 WILLIAM STREET. LONDON: 4 PATERNOSTER ROW.

TITLE-PAGE OF ONE OF THE FORE-RUNNERS, IN 1862, OF BEADLE'S DIME NOVEL

From the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.



BEADLE'S DIME NOVEL

Captain Cool Blade or The Man-Shark of The Mississippi was published July 2, 1872.

From the O'Brien Collection in the New York Public Library.

Lyceum and the lecturers of all sorts, from Emerson to the temperance orator John B. Gough, who addressed millions of hearers on every conceivable subject.


If the Lyceum was in a sense the university of the people, the real universities were advancing very rapidly, along with the graft and scandals of business and political life. Post-graduate work, leading to the higher degrees, was inaugurated for the first time in America,

at Yale, in 1871, and not only was the possible sphere of studies greatly enlarged at many of the colleges but the period witnessed the beginning of the influence of a remarkable group of educators in Charles W. Eliot, Daniel Coit Gilman, Andrew D. White, James B. Angell, and James McCosh.

The age, like all, was full of conflicting currents, and if we have to chronicle the doings in New York, for example, of the Goulds and Vanderbilts and Boss Tweeds, and other such ruck, we must not forget that at the same time in the same city Barnard was reorganizing Columbia. Theodore De Vinne was laying the foundation for the fine art of American printing, the Metropolitan Museum was being established, and many other things happening in the currents of the most vigorous artistic and intellectual life that city had yet known, and this was true of other parts of the country. The 100th anniversarv of the Declaration of Independence was celebrated with the Exposition in Philadelphia, one of the earliest of the World's Fairs, and if our own exhibits were rather in the inventive field of farm machinery, the telephone, the new typewriter, and such things than in the arts, and if the taste of it all was rather atrocious, the affair nevertheless marked a certain coming of age in our national life, and a looking forward to new endeavor in many directions instead of backward to the Civil War.

The war was at last passing in influence, and new issues were forming, although neither political party was as yet willing to commit itself positively on any of them. The more important of these, as the campaign of 1876 drew near, were those of national finance and currency, the tariff, and the reform of the civil service. All of them were tinged with strong emotion and had to be discussed against a background of deep discontent.

Both the industrial laboring class and the farmers had been hard hit by the deflation following close on the heels of peace, and by the great business depression which set in with 1873. In each case, national organizations were formed, which were to be of considerable influence, the industrialists forming the Knights of Labor, and the agriculturists the secret organization known as the Grange, which latter by 1874 had a million and a half members and was daily increasing. Industrial labor has open to it the weapons of the strike and mob, and we can consider their grievances better in the next



MADAME GAUTREAU

Portrait by John S. Sargent, painted in 1884, now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art,
New York.



THE KNIGHTS OF KING ARTHUR'S ROUND TABLE RECEIVING THE BISHOP'S BENEDICTION Copyright by E. A. Abbey.

A panel of the Holy Grail Frieze in the Boston Public Library, painted by Edwin Abbey in 1892.



THE GULF STREAM Painted by Winslow Homer in 1899, now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

The Heathen Chines.

Yet the cards they were stocked In a way that I grieve, And my feelings were shocked. At the state of Nye's sleeve:

Which was stuffed full of aces and bowers, And the same with intent to deceive.

By that he also Chure.

And the point that he mode.

Were quite trejlited to the aright hower.

Till at Let be not shown a right hower.

When the core Nyerhad dealt unto me.

"THE HEATHEN CHINEE," BY BRET HARTE Illustrated by S. Eyringe, Jr. Published by James R. Osgood in 1871.

In the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.



chapter when discussing the riots of 1877 in the first year of the administration of President Hayes, but, although farmers cannot go on strike, their grievances were no less acute than those of the railroad and mine and factory employees.

In spite of prosperity during the war, and the help of the labor-

saving machinery of which we have spoken, the life of the Western farmer in the 1870's was for the most part one of comparative poverty, hardship, deep anxiety, and bitterness. The great mass of our Westerners belonged as little in the romantic picture of cowboys, train robbers or lucky prospectors and cattle kings as did the great mass of antebellum whites in the old South with the aristocratic owners of vast plantations and troops of slaves.

Our Western farmers were small people who had trekked west with little or



THE ABANDON OF YOUTH AS SHOWN IN CA-PERS, DESCRIBED AS "SOMETHING BETTER THAN SOMETHING TO EAT," PUBLISHED IN NEW YORK IN 1873

From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.


no capital, to scratch a living out of the boundless prairie. The hard work, loneliness, forlorn living conditions, and the usual hardships of the pioneer, fighting droughts and blizzards, had been bad enough in the boom time when prices were high, but when, after the temporary rise during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, wheat appeared to have fallen permanently to a price that did not permit a profit, there seemed no hope at all. In 1874 in Kansas and Nebraska the plague of locusts completed the destruction.

The farmer felt rightly that he was fighting for his life not only against poverty and nature but against the capitalists of the great centres. The stocks of the railways had been criminally watered on a vast scale, and on capitalizations that to a great extent represented speculative profits to favored insiders, the owners insisted upon

earning dividends by charging rates which often deprived the farmer of all chance to pay the interest on his mortgage and to keep his farm. Corn selling at seventy cents in the East might bring the farmer in the Middle West only eighteen cents or less.

The railroads bribed legislatures to allow them to do as they

The railroads bribed legislatures to allow them to do as they pleased and seemed impregnable, but if the farmer could not go on strike he decided he could attack the enemy if he could secure con-



THE OFFICERS IN POSITION AT A MEETING OF THE GRANGE From "The Grange," published under direction of William Saunders in 1874.

trol of the legislatures, and this he proceeded to do. In 1871 the farmers won control in Illinois and passed a law aimed against both high rates and discrimination. Other States followed, and a howl went up from the railroad men and the East that radicalism was in the saddle and capital was unsafe.

The rapidity with which the Grange increased its membership further alarmed them. That organization, by arranging for co-operative buying, reduced costs by half for the farmer and cut out the middlemen who had been making high profits. It was natural that the farmer should regard the capitalist as his enemy, whether in the guise of mortgagees, stock-yard owners, railway magnates, or bankers. Feeling himself to be the primary producer of the basis of the nation's wealth, working hard and fighting against heavy odds to

keep himself and his family from being dispossessed, the farmer watched most of the profits from his toil go to men whom he pictured as rich and luxurious, fattening on his labor. For the next twenty-five years, American politics were to be largely influenced by the economic ideas of the West.

One of the chief questions working to the fore in the early 70's was, as we have said, that of finance and currency. There was little or no objection made to the wise measures by which the Secretaries of the Treasury, Hugh McCulloch and John Sherman, had consolidated the various forms of the national debt and completed the reorganization of the war-time financing by 1878. The main objection to the treatment of the debt had been to its being paid in gold instead of paper, especially as in the case of a number of the issues nothing had been specified as to the nature of the currency in which interest and principal were to be paid. In 1868 the Democrats had advocated payment in greenbacks when not otherwise specified, whereas the Republicans had insisted upon gold, though both parties were split on the question.

The problem of the currency, however, was then, and for long was to remain, a more serious one. In 1871 the Supreme Court, reversing its own decision in the preceding year, had decided that the greenbacks could lawfully be used to fulfill contracts entered into before the Act making them legal-tender had been passed. When they had been issued as a war measure, there had been no intention of keeping them in circulation as a permanent part of our currency system, and by 1868 Congress had reduced the amount outstanding from \$433,000,000 to \$356,000,000, but at that time we were emerging from the first post-war depression, and the natural demand for currency was rapidly increasing instead of diminishing.

Moreover, as gold was at a premium, the deflation of the currency and the bringing back of our paper money to a parity with gold lowered the prices of commodities, and made it harder for the farmer, for example, to pay his debts, most of which he had incurred in paper money. He was not unnaturally quite blind to the advantages of a high national credit and a sound currency when all he could see was that if he had borrowed \$2000 in paper when wheat was \$1.50 a bushel he was being asked to repay the debt in gold with wheat

at 75 cents. Periods of inflation and deflation affect different classes differently. When inflation is in progress, creditors are bound to suffer by being repaid in money of less value than that which they loaned. When deflation, on the other hand, sets in, it is the debtors who suffer by being forced to repay borrowed money in currency of a higher purchasing power. This cannot be helped, and in innumerable individual cases, in both movements, much hardship is bound to ensue.

Inflation is like an insidious drug. Its first effects, notable in a general rise in prices, appear so pleasant that there is demand for more, but if the process is continued indefinitely it can end only in worthless paper money, as in Germany, where a suit-case full scarcely paid car-fare. Long after that stage is reached, however, all business is disorganized because the founts of credit dry up, any one with money being afraid to lend it lest he be repaid in paper worth far less. It is naturally the wealthier and more experienced portion of the community which best realizes the dangers inherent in a bad currency, whereas the poorer class sees only rising prices and the chance to pay off debts cheaply.

It is said that the cry for "cheap money" always comes from the debtor class. This is not quite true, for a rich man not only has money invested but is apt himself to be a debtor on a somewhat large scale, but he sees more clearly the essential need for a general basis of stability which can come only from a sound and little-fluctuating currency. The demands for cheap money come from the smaller debtor class, which sees only the chance to pay the debt without realizing the wider significance of a depreciating medium of exchange.

In 1868 the Republican Congress had heeded the discontent of this class, and stopped reducing the amount of greenbacks. Six years later, in April, 1874, they allowed themselves to be so influenced as to revoke their sound-money policy and to pass a bill increasing the amount of paper money again to \$400,000,000. It was in vetoing this bill that Grant showed his courage, for the party leaders claimed that if he did not consent to inflation the party would be ruined in the South and West.

In the mid-term election of 1874, the Republicans had lost control of Congress, largely on account of the panic and the scandals of the

administration, but, having lost in any case, their backbones were stiffened on the subject of money, and in January, 1875, they passed a bill, which Grant signed, providing for full resumption of gold payments on January 1, 1879, including the retirement by that date of the greenbacks which should by then have been reduced to the amount of \$300,000,000. Although, as we shall see, specie payment was resumed on the date named, the greenbacks were not retired, and are today outstanding to the amount of \$346,681,000.

Prominent Republicans, like Thaddeus Stevens, had been for cheap money, and prominent Democrats, like that party's nominee for the Presidency in 1868, Horatio Seymour, had been for sound money. The same confusion ruled with regard to the tariff.

The tariff Act of 1864, with its extreme rates, had been considered simply as a war measure to raise revenue, but, as always happens, industries which had made large profits under its protection were loath to give them up when the need for revenue or temporary measures ceased. There were other taxes which were more unpopular with the public at large because more directly felt, and these were done away with first after peace was declared, leaving the revenue to be raised to a greater extent from the tariff duties.

There was a fairly strong high-tariff group among the Democrats, and a section of the Republicans were for tariff reform. For reasons quite other than any controversy over tariffs, the chief stronghold of the Republicans had come to be the Eastern States, which happened to be industrial. The negro vote in the South had largely ceased to count, and the whites in that section had been forced into the Democratic ranks by Reconstruction. The West was naturally Democratic. Both the cotton growers of the South and the Western wheat farmers had come to believe that the high prices which tariffs made for domestic manufactured goods more than offset the supposed market at home for their produce which protection was claimed to create. On the other hand, the States which were Republican came to demand protection. Moreover, the Republican Party, during the war and after, had been the one which had passed tariff measures, which they were called upon to defend. Being Republican, the Democrats naturally attacked them. It was in this way that the Republicans drifted into being the party of protection and the Democrats of tariffs for revenue only. A little later they both took definite stands

and attracted followers of the two schools and the several sections, but in the early 70's there was no sharp line between them.

In view of the scandals, only some of which we have mentioned, among office-holders, it was natural that the more decent element of the community should become interested in a partial reversal of the policy of "To the victors belong the spoils" and demand a reform in the matter of appointment to public office. In the next twenty years this question was to loom large, and a considerable amount of good was accomplished, but along with many upright and able practical men who demanded reform there were many cranks and theorists who did not realize the difficulties in the way. On the other hand, the very "practical" politicians, the bosses of the machines who were accustomed to winning by the use of patronage, were all opposed to any change in the system. In spite of the efforts made, the time was not then, and evidently is not yet, ripe for a thorough cleansing of our public life.

In the late eighteenth century there could have been no more corrupt political methods of appointment than those in vogue in England. Within a half century it changed, and today there is no such unpolitical and incorruptible body of public servants as those who comprise what is called the "Civil Service" in England, none of whom are in the slightest degree influenced either in their loyal service or in tenure of office by politics. No Englishman has been able to tell me how it came about, and no explanation is to be found in history. One thing is certain, that nothing very much can be accomplished by legislation which does not agree with the public opinion of the time, and it was evident that our efforts to improve our political service by reforming the Civil Service by legislation did not meet public opinion, though it loomed large in politics in the three decades from the early 70's.

Reform, however, could scarcely be a sharp party issue. Like the pensions scandals, both parties had to hedge and give lip service to reasonable ideals while sticking in practice to what influenced votes for their machines. It was thus in a time of confused issues and of extreme economic distress that the democracy of the nation was to be put to a unique and severe test in the election of 1876.

There were four parties in the field, though two were unimportant. The first to hold their convention were the Prohibitionists, and

their platform is not without interest as showing the inveterate habit of reform or third parties to sweep into their fold every possible sort of reformer and crank, with the consequence that such parties are likely to enter the campaign burdened with a multiplicity of controversial issues, creating as many opponents as followers. In this case, the Prohibitionist platform demanded the total prohibition of the manufacture, selling, or transportation of all "alcoholic beverages" in all parts of the United States under the control of Congress; woman suffrage; the reduction by law of postal, telegraph, and railroad rates; the suppression of speculation in stocks and in "every form of property"; the abolition of polygamy and prostitution; an enforced strict observance of Sunday; the use of the Bible in public schools; and the abolition of "executive and legislative patronage."

On May 18, the day after the Prohibitionists met, a new party, the Independent Nationals, or Greenbackers, met in Indianapolis, and adopted a brief platform demanding paper money and protesting against any further issue by the government of bonds payable in gold, "by which we would be made, for a long period, hewers of wood and drawers of water for foreigners."

The real contest, of course, was between the Republicans and Democrats, and the prospect was extremely black for the former. The foulness of the administration scandals and the depth to which the economic depression had now gone were, in combination, an almost impossible load for any party to carry.

When the Republican Convention met in Cincinnati on June 14, there was no question of renominating Grant for a third term, and the favorite candidate appeared to be James G. Blaine of Maine. The Republicans had become split into two factions, the "Stalwarts," who had stood by Grant and all his works, and the "Half-Breeds," who had been opposed to him. Among the latter the most eminent was Blaine, who regarded himself as one of the saviors of the party. Although exonerated from specific charges, he also had been smirched somewhat by one of the railroad scandals of the day, and although, then and later, nothing was ever definitely fastened upon him, the fact remained that with only a small government salary Blaine became wealthy and persistently declined to explain how.

He had made a powerful and bitter enemy of Senator Roscoe Conkling, the boss of New York, who was said to possess the "finest torso" in American public life, and whom Blaine had pilloried for his vanity in describing his "turky-cock strut." Conkling was personally honest but was a machine politician of the ordinary sort, his aides in New York politics being Chester A. Arthur and the young Thomas C. Platt, the future boss.

Both Blaine and Conkling desired the nomination, but when on the sixth ballot it became evident that none of the leading candidates could secure the requisite two-thirds vote, the convention suddenly swung around and nominated Rutherford B. Hayes, Governor, for his third term, of Ohio. Hayes was a perfectly colorless candidate, who had a fortune acquired with entire honesty, whose personal rectitude was above question, and who had had a good record as an officer in the Union army and had made a good governor.

Two weeks later, the Democrats nominated Governor Samuel J. Tilden of New York, a lawyer and reformer who had been one of those chiefly responsible for the overthrow of Boss Tweed and of the "Canal Ring" at Albany.

The platform of neither party was a notable document. The Democrats denounced the high tariff, and the Republicans rather mildly endorsed the doctrine of protection; both stood for sound money and the resumption of specie payments; each threw mud in considerable quantities at the other. With two perfectly honest men as candidates, both without magnetism or sharp flavor, with no very clear-cut issues, the campaign was dull and uninteresting until the close. Then the nation suddenly awoke, in fear and anger, to find itself facing one of the most serious crises in its history.

When the election returns were in on the evening of November 7, it seemed clear that Tilden had been elected by 185 electoral votes to 184, having carried all the doubtful Northern States. Hayes considered himself defeated. Apart, however, from a minor irregularity in the electoral vote of Oregon, there were three Southern States,—South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana,—which had had disputed elections and had sent in two sets of returns. The popular majority of Tilden over Hayes was 250,000 of all votes and 1,250,000 of the white vote, but the chairman of the Republican National

Committee, Zachary Chandler, at once claimed the Southern votes and insisted that Hayes had won.

There was no provision in our Constitution covering such a situation, and no legislation provided for settlement of such a dispute. The Senate at the moment was Republican, and the House Democratic. There was much public excitement, and threats of violence, but the people behaved with remarkable moderation, and waited quietly. As the weeks went by, however, and the methods of our election were laid bare and the danger of reaching the 4th of March with no President became clear, disgust and anxiety permeated all quarters.

Finally, in January, Congress passed an Act providing for a commission of fifteen members, including five Democrats and five Republican members of the two Houses, two Democrats and two Republican judges of the Supreme Court, and a fifteenth to be chosen by these fourteen. The commission when organized had eight Republicans and seven Democrats, and it was not until March 2, almost on the eve of inauguration, that the commission, having decided every disputed point on strictly party lines, and having given every questionable vote to Hayes, declared him elected President by 185 to 184.

Throughout the trying months both candidates had behaved in the most exemplary way, each placing the good of the nation in its crisis above his personal ambition. There was no appeal to public or partisan passion, and the people were asked to await the outcome with calmness and to accept the result of the verdict. Both candidates exhibited patriotism of a high order, and the country was extremely fortunate in that there was practically nothing to choose between them in conduct or in qualities for the office of chief executive.

The investigations of the commission revealed so much fraud, intimidation of negroes, and other crimes, by both parties (in which the candidates had had no part), that it was a rather chastened America which received the verdict. Unfortunately, the Hayes-Tilden campaign was no dirtier than many others in our history. The only difference was that in this case crime and fraud were dragged into the light of day for all citizens to see.

The deeper one goes into the filthy mess of 1876, the more im-

possible it is, as the circles of fraud widen and widen, to determine which candidate was really elected, but, on the whole, historians, including a number of those strongly attached to the Republican Party, incline to believe that Tilden was defrauded of his election. In any case, not from personal ambition but the good of the country there was nothing for Hayes to do but to accept at once the findings of the commission, and it is to the credit of the people at large that after precisely a century of the experiment of democratic government on a scale never before attempted, they had sufficient self-control and understanding of the basis on which a self-governing nation must carry on that the "stolen election," as it was considered by the majority, should have been quietly and peaceably acquiesced in for the good of the country.

Unhappily, the Republicans marred their victory, when the power was theirs, by slandering the ill and suffering Tilden, who had given such an exhibition of honor and patriotism, and by bringing suit against him for a fraudulent return on his income tax in 1862, an untrue charge that they could not prove, but with which they harried him until it was clear on account of his declining health that he was definitely no longer a political opponent. The American people have many things to be proud of, but the conduct of our politics is emphatically not one of them.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATION AT DEAD CENTRE

Mrs. Hayes a "great lady." They were markedly what are called "folks," but were to win the esteem and respect of the people by the perfect rectitude and courage of the President and the simplicity and modesty of the wife. Because of her refusal to serve wine at the White House, society might nickname her "Lemonade Lucy," but she won the hearts of the ordinary people, who were interested in the doings of the Hayes children and the unaffected hospitality to old friends with whom the White House was often overflowing. The President, however, did not win the hearts of the politicians.

The nation, as Professor Muzzey has well said, had reached a "dead centre." It had, for the most part, pulled out of the issues and passions of the Civil War period, and had not yet fully sensed those that were approaching in the new economic period. Political parties are not marked by high courage, and neither of the major ones had yet taken definite stands on issues which were still rather inchoate and the popularity of which was uncertain. But if the parties were not divided by issues, they were both of them keen on the spoils of office, and success at the polls. Hayes had not been a popular choice among the politicians of his own party, and his way was not to be made easier from the fact that two of the most powerful of these, Blaine and Conkling, who also hated each other with a bitter hatred, had each wished the high post for himself.

Moreover, the problems which confronted the new President were all, as we say, "full of dynamite" from the standpoint of the practical politician. These were, in the main, the final reinstatement in the national life of the now reconstructed Southern States, the reform demanded by the people in the civil service, the resumption of specie payments, the whole problem of the disastrous business depression, and the threatened overturn of the balance of powers demanded by the nature of our government due to the efforts of Congress to build up the power of the legislature at the expense of the Executive.

The political danger to be run in trying to carry out a programme of reform and rehabilitation might well have daunted a President who was sure of his overwhelming popularity with the people at large, which might offset the attacks of politicians, but Hayes was



ZERO WEATHER AND PREVAILING STYLES AT THE HAYES INAUGURAL BALL Featured by Harper's Weekly in the issue of March 22, 1873.

an obscure man. He had been nominated for that very reason, and had no public following to give him confidence. The unflinching courage with which he persisted in what he believed to be the right course throughout his term is the more notable on that account.

He had already shown physical courage, for during the tense weeks while the disputed election hung in doubt, not only had many threats been made against his life but one actual attempt had been made to assassinate him by an unknown assailant who fired a pistol at him through the window one night while he was dining. Unusual precautions had to be taken on his trip to Washington to assume office, but the courage which he was to be called on to show during the next four years was of a different and a higher sort.

Trouble started at once with the announcement of his appointments to the Cabinet. Although he had to yield to the demand of Oliver P. Morton, the boss of Indiana, in the appointment of Richard W. Thompson as Secretary of the Navy,—the only thoroughly bad selection,—the rest of the Cabinet officials made a strong group. Among the notable members were John Sherman in the Treasury, William M. Evarts in the Department of State, and Carl Schurz in that of the Interior. As part of his plan for giving back to the South its proper place in the government, Haves had wished to place a Southerner in the Cabinet, and had even considered the rebel general, Joseph E. Johnston. As it became clear that this would be going too fast for public opinion, the President compromised, and gave the Postmaster-Generalship to David M. Key of Tennessee. Although less prominent than Johnston, Key had fought on the Confederate side and, what was even worse in the eyes of the politicians, he was a Democrat.

Good as the Cabinet was for the country, it immediately made trouble for Hayes. Blaine, who had gone to the Senate, combined his resentment against the President for having defeated him for the nomination with the pique he felt because Hayes had declined to include a Maine man in the Cabinet, and he violently denounced the man whom his party had just elected. Conkling of New York considered he had a right to dictate New York appointments. He disliked Evarts from his State, and had wished a post for his underling, Tom Platt, so he, like Blaine, was also at once in opposition. So likewise was the powerful Cameron of Pennsylvania, who wanted a job for his son, and most of the practical politicians were bitterly opposed to Schurz as a civil service reformer and to Key as a Southerner and a Democrat. For some days the Senate withheld confirmation of Hayes's appointments of his advisers, but it being evident that this senatorial obstruction was not popular in the country, they at last grudgingly confirmed all the nominees.

By the time Hayes reached the White House, all the Southern States but South Carolina and Louisiana had got rid of carpet-bag governments, and had been restored to white, which now meant Democratic, rule, but Republican governments were still upheld by the army in the two named. In each of them it is as impossible to tell which party had won the local election as whether Hayes or Tilden had been

munication in which you callupon) me to deliver up to you the Great seal of the State, re. re. il do most recognise in you amy right to make the was demance and I hereby pleance therewith (Naxe Champton. Ca As Governor of South-Carol chesen by the puple throng I have qualified in accordance with his truck. hihim + I henry call upon you on his medicahu in the office to talium up to me the qual-real of the state logether with the pepine of the Llate Home. The public leaned , + all other mally & things appealacing to Jaice office Rufy Jr. obt-Soul-G. H. Chambulain Es

AN INCIDENT OF THE STATE ELECTION OF 1876 IN SOUTH CAROLINA, WHEN BOTH HAMPTON AND CHAMBERLAIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN ELECTED GOVERNOR elected in them as President. Those who had been elected to local office by each party proceeded to organize State governments, and for a while there was complete confusion.

It was perfectly obvious, however, that except for the presence of the troops under control of Congress, the people, or at least the whites, would declare for the Democrats. In South Carolina the Republican governor was a Massachusetts carpetbagger named Chamberlain, and the Democratic was the distinguished South Carolinian, Wade Hampton. The State, like Louisiana, had been counted Republican by the commission which declared Haves to have been elected President, and when Hampton's title to office was taken into court a negro Republican judge decided adversely to him. In Congress, men like Blaine demanded that the Republican governments

must be considered legal and maintained by force or Hayes's own title to the Presidency would be put in question again.

Hayes, however, realized that the time had passed for continuing to govern any part of the South by troops in the interest of a party. He hoped, also, too optimistically, that with freedom from restraint a two-party system might be restored in that section, and that many whites as well as almost all blacks might join the Republican ranks. That could not be. Bitterness against the Republicans for the long agony which they had forced on the South, racial feeling which their course had fostered, and the fact that they had made the Republican Party in the South almost wholly the party of the negroes, had created the solid South of the Democratic whites.

Nevertheless, Hayes's policy was the right and wise one, but he was not playing politics. He did, indeed, have to find berths for a rather unconscionably large proportion of the local politicians, black and white, who had brought about the recent Republican decision in the two States and in Florida, but that once done, the South was clear of Federal troops and could organize itself in its own way.

That way would clearly be to rid itself by various means of the dominance of the negro vote, and practically to nullify the Fifteenth Amendment. On this there are a number of things to be said. Had Lincoln's plans for a sympathetic reinstatement of the South in our national life not been thwarted by such men as Stevens, Sumner, and others in Johnson's term, the way might have been opened for the Southern whites to have adopted the two-party system. Had they also been allowed to work out the negro problem by themselves, they might have included the negro in such a system, in the course of time. But the Republican politicians and the fanatic pro-negro reformers having caused the political lines to be drawn on racial ones, the only result could be to drive the whites out of the Republican Party, and greatly to accentuate the serious racial problem.

If any one objects to the nullification for more than fifty years of an amendment to the Constitution, he has to answer the question as to what else could have been done which was better under the circumstances? Even the wildest of Abolitionists would hardly have desired to live long himself under negro domination and government. What that might be under the lead of unscrupulous

Northern politicians had been shown clearly enough in the carpetbag era. The amendment had been forced unfairly on States in which the negro element ran from 40 to more than 50 per cent of the total by States in which the negro element was negligible, socially and politically.

Haves not only withdrew the troops from the South but made several trips to that section, the first President since the war to do so. Unfortunately, however, he did not reap any benefit from his policy of reconciliation. The dislike and mistrust now felt for him by Northern Republican politicians were understandable. On the other hand, in the Democratic South he was looked upon as having been unjustly seated in the Presidency in place of Tilden, and as a Republican he could gain no adherents in that section. In addition, although he had withdrawn the troops, he opposed the repeal of the law which gave Federal deputy marshals and supervisors the power to regulate elections and to appeal to the courts in case of fraud, and of the law which empowered the President to use troops in election contests. He seems to have at once feared the encroachment of the legislature on the Executive, from the way the bills were passed; to have wished to conciliate the South and to do nothing which might appear officially to withdraw protection from the free vote of the negro. The consequence was that he pleased no one.

In less than two months Hayes had lost the support of the leaders of his own party, and the bitterness of the contested election prevented him from gaining any support from even the most independent of Democrats. His next move after settling the Southern question alienated him yet further from his own party.

From the day of Andrew Jackson, the spoils system had become more and more strongly entrenched in our national life. In fact, the whole political machinery of both parties had come to rest upon using Federal as well as State offices to secure votes, and the practical politician, usually a man of stunted morality, not only accepted the system as a matter of course but did not see how his own power or that of his party could be maintained on any other.

As the system had developed, it had had two results. One was greatly to strengthen the power of the Senate and the party managers at the cost of that of the President, who in the Constitution

had been given the right of making appointments. Gradually it had become customary to consider the Federal appointments in any State as a sort of perquisite of the senator from that State, and the President was expected to choose his nominees from among the list of names agreed upon by the senator and the State boss, if the latter two were not, as they often were, one and the same person. Under this system, the names offered were likely to be those of men who were locally useful to the machine organization rather than those of men chosen solely for their fitness for the office. The other result of the system, besides that of buttressing the political machine by graft, was the wastefulness and inefficiency of the Federal service.

The condition of that service had become appalling in the eyes of honest citizens who wanted decent government, and men of very different types, such as Charles Sumner, Carl Schurz, George William Curtis, and others, who had been working for improvement, had secured the passage by Congress in 1871 of an Act providing for the setting up of a civil service commission to study the question. Grant, however, who was reported to have claimed, in spite of the stench of his administration, that our civil service was then "the best in the world," gave no aid, and in 1874 completely surrendered to Congress on the subject.

Hayes was the first President to grapple seriously with the evil, and he did so courageously, understanding fully the forces which he was bound to antagonize. Unfortunately the time was not yet ripe, and public opinion not yet sufficiently stirred, to allow the President to make any permanent change in the system. Nevertheless, as a result of the fight made by him, the question could not thereafter be allowed merely to slumber in innocuous and hypocritical paragraphs of party platforms.

The problem was not an easy one to solve. In a democracy there is no way known to us of carrying on government other than by means of parties. A party to be effective must be organized and lasting, which means that it must have a hierarchy of organizers of all grades from the national leaders down to the smallest of ward bosses. The motives which these can count upon in their followers to maintain allegiance to the organization will naturally depend upon the moral and intellectual level of those followers. If the general mass both of politicians and voters are motivated by desire of

personal profit, the spoils of office, in one form or another, are bound to be highly important, if not indeed wholly essential, in holding the organization together. If organization is necessary, and it apparently is, then bad as is corruption in office, if reform is carried out so rapidly as to destroy the cohesion of the organization, we merely substitute for the evil of corruption that of a breakdown in party organization, with ensuing political chaos.

All such problems may be approached from three standpoints, that of the practical politician of the ordinary moral level, that of the impractical reformer, and that of the statesman. The politician wishes no reform whatever in a system which he understands how to use and believes to be essential. The crank reformer wishes to change everything so rapidly as to make him, perhaps, even more dangerous than the politician. The statesman wishes to make progress, and as rapidly as possible, but realizes that he cannot go faster than he can induce public opinion to support him. In any case he is likely to be damned by both the other types, by the reformer because of his alleged inconsistency and because he does not do enough, and by the politician because of his alleged lack of loyalty and because he does too much.

The practical exigencies of the situation were only too unhappily pressing at the very beginning of Hayes's term, and it must be confessed that the number of offices he bestowed upon the Southern politicians, including the officers of the returning boards in Florida and Louisiana who had made his election possible, had an exceedingly bad odor. On the other hand, he was genuinely devoted to reform, and in large part sacrificed himself upon its altar.

In the Department of the Interior, where the start was made, he gave Schurz a free hand, and supported him in his sweeping removals when it was established beyond a doubt by investigation that the Indian Bureau was a gangrened mass of corruption. Although the negro had innumerable friends, friends like the Abolitionists who were willing to break up the country that his position might be improved, the woes of the Indian had never interested any one. Almost no voice had ever been raised on his behalf.

Screened by the spoils system of office and this lack of public interest in our wards, to whom we have many times broken our most solemn national oath, the Indian Bureau and agents waxed fat

on graft at the expense of the redskin. Forced to depend upon the agents, he was given miserable blankets and rotting food, bought by the government at high prices, officials making huge profits on the transactions. His lands were trespassed upon, and he could get no remedy. The consequence was constant unrest and a succession of minor wars, both of which markedly diminished after Schurz had made, temporarily, a clean sweep of the incompetent and corrupt political appointees whom he found in office. But he did so at the expense of having war waged upon himself, for the politicians never forgave him for his efforts and eventually drove him from politics.

Hayes himself led the attack on one of the most notorious strongholds of the spoils system,—the New York Custom House. Although this service was under the Treasury Department in Washington, the New York boss, Senator Conkling, had come to look upon it as his personal satrapy, and its personnel as mere pawns in the local political game. When in May, 1871, Hayes told the Secretary of the Treasury that "party leaders should have no more influence in appointments than other equally respectable citizens," the gage of battle was thrown down. The President went even further and declared that no Federal office-holder should be subjected to assessments on his salary for political purposes, nor be permitted to take part in political organizations or campaigns. To men like Conkling it seemed as though the President was not only threatening their personal power but that his policy would ruin the whole Republican organization.

When an investigating commission headed by John Jay reported on conditions in the custom house, it was found that 200 of Senator Conkling's local henchmen were on the pay roll without doing any work whatever for the government; that all salaries were levied upon in campaigns; that technical positions were held by ignorant politicians; that imports were undervalued; and that there was in general gross fraud and inefficiency. At the head of the organization, as collector of the port, was Chester A. Arthur, who up to that time had been merely a spoilsman politician and a friend of Conkling. The naval officer of the port was A. B. Cornell, who was also chairman of the State and National Republican Committees. Similar conditions were found to exist in customs houses elsewhere,

but the President at once declared war on Conkling and his gang as representing the worst centre of infection.

Arthur, Cornell, Conkling, and Platt were the four who controlled New York politics, and when the first two were asked to resign by the President, they declined. Conkling, Republican boss though he was, did not hesitate to say that Hayes had never been elected and that Tilden should have been put in the White House. In September, at the State Convention, he prevented the passage of a resolution upholding the "lawful title" of Hayes to the office, so that the Republicans in the greatest State in formal convention declined to recognize the legality of their own President!

It is not necessary to recite in detail the long struggle of Hayes to have Arthur and Cornell replaced by men capable of giving an honest and business administration in one of the most important departments of the government. Although the Senate blocked every effort he made, the President would not admit defeat. When Conkling won one of the strategical moves, Hayes wrote in his diary, "The end is not yet. I am right and shall not give up the contest." In July, 1878, when Congress was not in session, he removed Arthur and Cornell, but it was not until early in February, 1879, that the President won and the Senate at last confirmed his new appointees.

Conkling was completely defeated, but neither the party nor the people supported Hayes. So strong among the bosses and the rank and file of the Republican voters was the opposition to reform that in the elections of 1878 even such Republican States as Pennsylvania went Democratic, as did the President's own State of Ohio; and in the election of 1880 the party nominated Chester A. Arthur for the Vice-Presidency. But although the Republican leaders like Conkling and Blaine would have liked to read the President out of the party, and Conkling even attempted to have his title to office invalidated by a reopening of the election question, he had done more than any of them for the rehabilitation of that party in the eyes of honest and independent voters. If it had not been for his fight for good government it is unlikely that the party would have won in the next Presidential campaign.

Reform had to wait, but the New York Civil Service Reform League was founded in 1877, to be followed by a national league

four years later, and Hayes undoubtedly deserves the credit for being the first President to fight to cleanse our politics of the gigantic evils of the spoils system. In this, as in his effort to free and reinstate the South, he belonged to the coming era rather than, as Grant had, to the one which was passing.

Throughout almost his entire term the country was deeply concerned with the business depression noted in the preceding chapter, and with the more technical problem of the currency. If the most

Seconds. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as ready as the conditions of good administration wite warrant, at follows:

First, for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the public suries now classified or to be classified becaused bush examinations shall be practical in their character, and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to descharge the duties of the service into which they seek to be appointed.

Fifth, that no prison in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political funds or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed a otherwise prejudent forepring to do to.

Sight, that he person we said service has any right to use his official authanty or cufficure to come the political action of any presson or body.

SECTION FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF DECEMBER 4, 1882

From the original Act in the Department of State, Washington.

spectacular financial episodes of the panic had occurred in Grant's régime, it was to be the duty of Hayes to suppress the physical violence which was so to alarm the nation in 1877.

There had been local violence in the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania from 1862 onward, due to the activities of the notorious "Molly Maguires," members of a secret Irish society known as the Ancient Order of Hibernians, originally organized in Ireland to resist the unjust demands of landlords. Although in our own day the coal miners are mainly southeast Europeans, in this earlier period they were Irish, which accounts for the fact that the "Molly Maguires" were all of that race. If they were also all Roman Catholics, it is only fair to say that that church was itself wholly opposed to the movement. In the fight with the operators for better condi-

tions, the weapon of the Mollies was cold-blooded murder, either of owners or gang bosses, and the amount of their activity rose and fell in inverse relation to the strength of legitimate trade-union activity. The reign of terror which they maintained was at last broken in 1876 by the work of an Irish Catholic detective, James McParlan, but in 1877 a far more serious situation was brought on by organized labor.

Railroad earnings had dropped 50 per cent since the beginning of the panic, partly from diminished business and partly by cut-throat competition for such business as remained, until it was said in the first six months of 1877 that there was not a single road making a cent of profit on through freight. Wages had already been cut more than once since 1873 when in July, 1877, the leading companies announced another 10 per cent reduction. As a result, serious strikes, starting on the Baltimore & Oho, and running thence, as *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle* said, "like a wave of fire along all our principal lines," immediately ensued. The militia proving insufficient to cope with the rioters, Federal aid was invoked, and Hayes despatched regular troops to a number of points.

Serious as the rioting was at such places as Baltimore and Martinsburg, the worst situation of all was confronted at Pittsburgh, where many lives were lost in pitched battle and the property damage was not less than \$5,000,000. This amount was doubled by the rioters in other places, in not a few of which the militia fraternized with the strikers and proved wholly unreliable. The great strikes of 1877 resulted in the employment for the first time of Federal troops to settle a labor dispute, and the effects were notable, both in the subsequent growing opposition to labor organizations in the courts, and in the greater solidarity to be noted thereafter in the labor class itself. The President had maintained order, but in spite of the obvious problems arising from the changed relations between employer and employed in the new economic order of great corporations, no effort was made to grapple with them. Laissez-faire and force were as yet the only doctrines with which the government could meet the new situation emerging.

The problem of sound money, which Hayes also had to consider, offered a typical example of the way in which a great public question is usually confused by a mixture of ignorance, prejudice, and

private interest, though the President himself was as correct in his attitude on this as on the problems of the South and of reform.

The extremely hard times through which the country was passing made the payment of debts by those who owed them peculiarly difficult and unpleasant. Such periods as we noted in the preceding chapter always arouse deep resentment on the part of the debtor class, and afford special opportunity to the demagogue and for the spread of financial heresies.

There were particular factors at work in the depression of 1873–79 which accentuated the condition, and the administration of Hayes, although it saw the end of one evil, saw also the introduction of another. It ended the paper money of the war but introduced the silver fallacy which led straight to the great scund-money panic and fight in the 1890's.

As the business depression widened and deepened, the cry for cheap money on the part of the ignorant or dishonest became louder. Our currency system at this time was peculiarly rigid and incapable of expanding and contracting with the real or fancied need of business. It is a fallacy to believe that business prostration can be cured by an easy-money policy, whether of expanded currency or extended credit, but a large part of the electorate believed that it could be so cured, and in any case demanded cheap money in which to pay their debts. Moreover, the currency system really was faulty in its over-rigidity, and was to remain so for another four decades.

Speaking generally, the currency consisted of gold, paper, and bank notes. The twenty years from 1870 to 1891 were years of stationary or declining production of gold in the entire world, just as the twenty years following 1891 were to be years of vast increases in supplies. Practically no increase in our currency could therefore be looked for in gold coinage or gold certificates backed by deposit of gold.

The administrations of Grant had seen the rise of the greenback movement, demanding that expansion should be achieved by the issue of mere fiat paper money, but that had been blocked by the action of the expiring Republican Congress in January, 1875, which had passed the Act providing for the gradual reduction in the number of greenbacks and their final redemption in gold to be effected January 1, 1879.

The third form of currency, bank notes, was also comparatively inelastic, as the notes had to be based on the deposit of government bonds, which were limited in amount and which were being retired rather rapidly.

Thus, those who demanded cheap money had to find some other form, especially after the Democratic House of Representatives had passed a bill in 1877 demanding the repeal of the Resumption Act, only to have it properly blocked in the Senate.

A combination of circumstances, including those just mentioned and the others to be noted, raised the ominous silver issue, which unfortunately-for political life is far healthier with two strong major parties—was to blight the Democratic Party as effectually as its stand on slavery and the South had done just before the Civil War.

The policy of bi-metallism, that is of trying to keep both gold and silver in circulation and interchangeable, had been attempted by the United States for seventy years, after the initiation of the experiment by Alexander Hamilton in 1792. The effort had finally proved a failure in our country as in others. Adopting the comparative commercial value of the two metals in his own day, Hamilton had thought that if a gold dollar and a silver dollar each contained the amount of gold and silver respectively which had the same commercial value at any moment, their parity could be maintained, and they would be interchangeable as coins, both remaining in circulation. As a grain of gold was worth in the market 15 times a grain of silver when he started, he fixed the ratio at 15 to 1, the silver dollar having in it 371.25 grains of pure silver and the gold dollar 24.75 grains of gold.

As long experience has proved, however, the two metals cannot possibly be kept at any fixed ratio commercially. Not only the amounts of each produced annually from the mines, but the demands for each all over the world for purposes other than coinage, vary so constantly and so greatly as to make each fluctuate in terms of the other as readily as, let us say, do the comparative prices of a bushel of wheat and a pound of coffee. Moreover, according to a well-established economic law, if there are two kinds of metal currency and the commercial value of the metal in one is more than that in the other, the one which is worth more will be hoarded

by the public and the one of lesser value will circulate as "money." This is precisely what happened to the gold and silver dollars of Hamilton. Even before they had got into circulation from the mint, the delicate ratio had been destroyed by commercial prices, and as the gold in a gold dollar was worth commercially a little more than the silver in the silver dollar, gold dollars disappeared from circulation. In 1834, an effort was made to readjust the balance, and the coinage ratio was changed to sixteen to one. As this, however, threw the balance out again slightly in the opposite direction, the gold dollars quickly came back into circulation and it was the commercially more valuable silver ones which in turn disappeared.

By 1873, the silver dollar had been out of circulation for so many years that when Congress was revising the coinage laws the silver dollar was dropped from the list of coins which were to be minted. There was no objection to this at the time, though the subject was thoroughly threshed out in debate. The coinage of silver was of interest to almost no one at the moment, and the currency would not have been increased, for it would have cost the government more to turn out silver dollars than gold ones, so those who demanded cheap money had nothing to gain, and the silver mine owners could get more for their silver by selling it in the open market than by having it coined into dollars.

The production of silver from the mines, however, unlike gold, was increasing with enormous rapidity, rising from 43,000,000 ounces in 1870 to 75,000,000 in 1880 and 167,000,000 by 1893. At the same time there was a much lowered demand. India, which had been almost a bottomless sink for the hoarding of the metal, ceased to absorb it, and some nations, notably Germany, which had become convinced of the bi-metallic fallacy, not only stopped coining silver but dumped large quantities on the market. The consequences of all these factors working together was that silver, which in 1873 had borne a ratio to gold of 15.92 to 1, dropped to one of 18.39 to 1.

The American mines were producing huge quantities, and if the mine owners could induce Congress to begin coining silver dollars again at the ratio of sixteen to one, they could make a large profit by taking their depreciated silver to the mint and receiving back dollars at that ratio when the commercial ratio was 15 per cent lower. If the government could be made to do this in unlimited

quantities, the mine owners believed that they could dump all their surplus on the government at a good and fixed price, and some of them at least were incorrectly but honestly convinced that such a process, even if it were to continue indefinitely, would not affect the gold currency.

This error, however, was nothing but the greenback paper money fallacy in as bad, if somewhat more subtle, form. Not only would the gold dollars, as had been shown before, disappear from circulation and be hoarded, being worth more commercially than the silver ones, but if the government were forced to buy silver in unlimited quantities and issue dollars at a fixed ratio while the real value of the silver was steadily declining in the world markets, there would come a time when the government's ability to redeem these silver metal dollars would be just as small as its ability to redeem unlimited issues of mere paper money. It had not yet redeemed even the greenbacks of the war.

The mine owners suddenly began to talk about the failure to include silver in the currency revision bill as "The Crime of '73," and in November, 1877, the House of Representatives passed an Act, introduced more than a year earlier by the Democratic representative from Missouri, Richard P. Bland, providing for the free and unlimited coinage of silver. It passed the House by a vote of 165 to 34, but the Senate was more cautious, although Senator Allison of Iowa believed, as he said, that "legislation gives value to the precious metals"! The Republican Blaine, like his fellow Republican Senator Allison, also came out for free silver, whereas, on the other hand, the Democratic Senators Lamar and Bayard spoke strongly in favor of sound money, so little was the question as yet a party one.

Finally, in spite of a majority in the Senate in favor of free coinage of silver, the bill as passed by that body directed the Secretary of the Treasury to buy not less than \$2,000,000 nor more than \$4,000,000 of silver each and every month, and to have the amount bought coined into dollars. In the House, "Silver Dick" Bland, as the leader of the silver forces came to be called, denounced the compromise, and fulminated in demagogic fashion against the capitalists who were betraying the people by preventing the unlimited coinage of the cheaper metal. He declared that if they could not be

forced to capitulate he was "in favor of issuing paper money enough to stuff down the throats of the bond-holders until they are sick," a remark loudly applauded by the House, regardless of party.

The pressure brought on Hayes to sign the bill, which had passed both Houses, was extraordinarily great, the number of people who really understood the problem and its dangers being small compared with the vast number who saw in the bill merely a panacea for the extreme financial distress under which they were suffering. In spite of the opinion of even three members of the Cabinet, including the Secretary of the Treasury, John Sherman, that the President ought not to veto the bill, Hayes had both the wisdom and courage to do so and to return it to Congress. With it he sent a message justly pointing out that to make a dollar which was worth only ninety cents legal tender for the payment of all debts, including the interest on the government bonds, was dishonest repudiation, and that in the last analysis a nation's credit depended on its honor. His action was of no avail, and on February 28, 1878, Congress in a burst of passion passed the bill over the Presidential veto.

Nevertheless, the courageous stand of Hayes may not have been wholly without effect. Had the unlimited free coinage which Bland desired been permitted by law instead of the moderate purchases directed by the Bland-Allison bill, the effect upon the nation, just preparing to resume payment in gold, would have been immediately disastrous. There was a much smaller Congressional party in favor of such a measure than of the one finally enacted, and as it required at least a two-thirds vote to re-pass a measure over the President's veto, any measure agreed upon would have to be such as to command that requisite two thirds. As it was, though the honor of the country was sullied and a dangerous precedent had been created, complete disaster was avoided, and when, nineteen years later, the question came up for final settlement it was understood by a much greater element of the voters than in 1877.

Meanwhile, Sherman, who was not a Free Silverite and whose opposition to the veto had been based on political considerations only, was carefully preparing for the resumption of specie payments which had been set for January 1, 1879. He had accumulated a stock of about \$140,000,000 in gold in the Treasury, and as January approached the greenbacks slowly rose to par. The day, how-

ever, was awaited by both the government and business men with deep anxiety. Would there be a run for gold on the Treasury and the banks in larger quantities than could be paid out even with all the preparations made? After five years of panic and economic ruin, the nation was beginning to glimpse better times ahead. Would the catastrophe of a failure to make redemption a success plunge it again into the misery from which it was just emerging?

The day came and passed with a calm that was almost ludicrous in view of the natural and intense anxiety with which it had been awaited. At the Treasury only \$135,000 of greenbacks were presented for payment in gold, whereas \$400,000 in gold was presented for exchange into greenbacks! The credit of the government was evidently considered unassailable, and the country heaved a sigh of relief, though throughout it there rolled the ground-swell of discontent on the part of those who having borrowed money when paper was at a heavy discount were now called upon to repay their debts in a currency at par with gold.

The feud between Hayes and Congress kept up until the end, as did the effort of Congress to encroach on the powers of the Executive. Hayes had been unwisely insistent that the laws authorizing the use of Federal troops to keep order at the polls when needful should not be repealed. The Democratic Congress was as insistent that they should be. The only constitutional way of securing the repeal was either to have them declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, which was not tried, or to have Congress pass a bill repealing them over the President's veto, which Congress could not muster enough votes to do.

Congress therefore adopted the method of achieving its aim by tacking on to the end of appropriation bills clauses which were practical repeals of the Force Acts. Whether the President was wise or consistent in opposing repeal may be open to question but there is no question that his duty was to fight the unconstitutional method adopted by Congress. As the President pointed out, if the government could be brought to a stop by failure of appropriations unless the President should consent to any and all legislation on all subjects which Congress might embody in appropriation bills in the shape of "riders," then the Presidential veto became a farce, and the whole theory of our government and its division of powers fell to the ground.

If the Congressional theory was correct, then Congress might pass the entire legislation of an entire session as a "rider" to a single bill providing for the national expense, and adjourn leaving the President with the alternatives of approving everything which Congress might have suggested or vetoing the bill as a whole and stopping the functioning of the entire Federal service for lack of funds. Congress, both in the regular and special sessions necessitated by its actions, was obstinate, but at last, after five vetoes, in the course of which the entire Judiciary Department had been left without pay for months, Hayes won his point and scored the victory.

On the whole, few Presidents have left a better record, and Hayes's efforts to heal the wounds of the South, to bring about the reform of the civil service, to maintain the honor of the nation by a sound money policy, and his resistance to the unconstitutional usurpation of power by Congress, entitle him to a high place as an able, honest, and courageous Chief Executive.

The very struggles, however, which have won him the respect of posterity made him anathema to the politicians of his own day and party. Nor did he possess those qualities which might have given him popular support against the politicians. He was not the military hero which Jackson and Grant had been; he had no personal magnetism, not even the odd quaintness of a Coolidge, to intrigue the public; nor had he that gift of dramatizing a situation which Roosevelt could employ so well. There was not the faintest chance for him of a renomination in 1880.

The campaign of that year was singularly uninteresting and equally unedifying. In the Republican Convention which assembled at Chicago on June 2 the leading candidates at first were Grant and Blaine, who were not on speaking terms with each other. It having been shown, after thirty-five ballots, that neither could be nominated, there was a sudden shift to General James A. Garfield of Ohio, and the Republican ticket became Garfield and Arthur, the nomination for Vice-President having been given to the discredited collector of the port of New York who had been removed from office by Hayes.

After the Greenback Party, which was not to gain a single electoral vote and whose influence had much declined, had nominated James B. Weaver, the Democrats met at Cincinnati on the 22d and nominated General Winfield S. Hancock.

There was little to choose between the platforms of the leading two parties, both of which hedged on the issues, although the Democrats flatly advocated free and unlimited coinage of silver, while the Republicans omitted any reference to that question. The Democratic platform, indeed, was thoroughly unsound as to currency and finance. In the Republican Convention a resolution endorsing civil service reform was passed only with difficulty after a debate which brought out the classic question from delegate Flanagan of Texas, who asked on the floor if the victors were not to have offices to give out "what are we up here for?"

The campaign was tame, and there was no difference in the methods of the two parties, which were those of the time—if not also of ours. The Republican campaign committees, Congressional and National, demanded in all about 7 per cent of their annual salaries from all Federal office-holders, and the Democrats levied where they could. Scandals, or what could be made to appear such, were raked up against each candidate, and Garfield's alleged connection with the Crédit Mobilier and a paving contract were given wide circulation. Toward the end of Hayes's administration the problem of Chinese labor in California had become acute, and in order to damage the Republican nominee in that State, a forged letter purporting to be signed by Garfield was circulated just late enough to do harm without opportunity for convincing refutation. At heavy expense, the vote of Indiana, which had been Democratic in 1876, was admitted by the Vice-President-elect, Arthur, to have been bought and paid for by the Republicans. In a total popular vote of 9,218,251 Garfield won by a majority of only 9,464. A shift of 10,517 votes out of the total of 1,103,045 in New York, where Conkling and Platt reigned, would have given the election to Hancock in spite of Garfield's 214 electoral votes to his 155.

Although it is impossible to tell before he assumes office how a man will succeed as President, as we shall soon discover in this chapter, it is probable that Garfield was a better candidate for the office than Hancock, though both were men of sound personal character. Garfield, who had started life as a canal-boy, and was the last American President born in a log-cabin, had made a successful and characteristically American career for himself. He had worked his way through Williams College, been a teacher, then

won a major-generalship by good work in the war, and from 1863 had been a member of Congress.

The new President did not announce his Cabinet appointments until after his inauguration on March 4, 1881, when it became evident that he had tried to reconcile the two groups in his party as well as the several sections of the country. Blaine of Maine was named Secretary of State, Senator William Windom of Minnesota, a sound-money Westerner, Secretary of the Treasury, Robert T. Lincoln, son of the war President, was put in the War Department, William T. Hunt, a Louisiana lawyer who had been loyal in the war, was given the Navy, and Wayne McVeagh of Pennsylvania became Attorney-General, while Thomas L. James, postmaster of New York, became Postmaster-General. It was the last appointment which was to prove the most important for the moment.

The "Stalwarts" of the party, notably Conkling, had been opposed to the nomination of Garfield and had only reluctantly supported him in the campaign. When, on March 23, the President sent in a list of nominations to the Senate, including appointments in New York as to which he had not consulted Conkling, the latter declared war. Unable to secure the rejection of the nomination of W. H. Robertson as Collector of the Port, a man whom Conkling especially disliked politically, the irate Senator resigned his seat, while his follower Platt simultaneously took the same step, thus winning the nickname of "Me Too," and they asked for vindication against the President's interference with local patronage by a re-election by the New York Legislature. To their discomfiture and the no little amusement of the nation, the legislature declined to re-elect either of them, and the President had won his first round.

Meanwhile, the postmaster-general had been unearthing scandals of the most odoriferous sort in the letting of contracts on what were called "Star Routes," that is, routes on which the mails were carried by rider or stage. In spite of attempted intimidation by Congress, Garfield was pressing the investigation when, while waiting for a train in the Washington station, he was shot by a disappointed office-seeker, Charles J. Guiteau, on July 2. Although the wounded President lingered on for two and a half months, the shot proved fatal in the end, and he died at his summer home at Elberon, New Jersey, on September 29.


"'Chet Arthur, President of the United States! Good God," some one remarked, and it was in that spirit of consternation the nation received the long-feared news.

It is impossible to say how much Garfield might have been able to accomplish had it not been for Guiteau's bullet, which made him a martyr in the eyes of the people. He appears to have been to some extent weak and vacillating in character, and Blaine had expected to be the power behind the throne. One of the results of the sudden change in the administration was the relegation of that statesman, who had taken a rather jingo attitude in foreign relations, to private life, as in the reorganization of the Cabinet Arthur replaced him by F. T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey.

The sobering effect of responsibility and high office has often been noted in public life, but seldom have they had such unexpected influence as upon the spoilsman politician who now became President. Even as late as February, within a fortnight of his inauguration as Vice-President, at a great public dinner in New York he had boasted cynically of the purchase of the vote of Indiana, as though it were an amusing joke.

From the moment, however, that he became President, there was an extraordinary change, a change that first amazed and then angered his old political gang. He declined to remove Garfield's appointee Robertson at the behest of Conkling and Platt, and in his first message to Congress came out squarely for civil service reform, as he did also for a repeal of the Bland-Allison Act, better treatment of the Indians, and a revision downward of the tariff. During his administration the Pendleton Act was passed, in 1883, which placed about 14,000 Federal offices in the civil service open to competitive examination, and empowered the Executive to extend the list. Arthur, who promptly signed the bill, worked loyally with the commission which it created, and when he left the White House about 16,000 offices had been rescued from the spoilsmen.

His political courage was also shown in his veto of a Chinese exclusion bill, because it was contrary to a treaty with China, an action which seriously damaged his popularity in California. The river and harbor bill, passed regularly by Congresses, presumably for the improvement of such bodies of water as might have real commercial importance, had become a national scandal. This "pork




UNCLE SAM'S XMAS STOCKING

"It doesn't promise very well at the start but maybe it will pan out better toward the bottom."

"I do not repel but invite inspection and observation on the part of military officers."—Carl Schurz. From "Harper's Weekly," January 25, 1879.

From 'Loslie's Illustrated Weekly," December 31, 1881.



The celebration of the completion of the work begun in 1870 was attended by President Arthur and many distinguished visitors. Fireworks followed the celebration of the completion of the specches and parade. THE OPENING OF BROOKLYN BRIDGE, MAY 24, 1883

From a colored lithograph in the J. Clarence Davies Collection, Museum of the City of New York.

barrel," as it was called, had developed into a huge source of legalized graft for the strengthening of the popularity of congressmen in their home districts, and by 1882 amounted to nearly \$19,000,000. In that year Arthur vetoed it on the ground of its "demoralizing effect," but an angry Congress at once re-passed it over the veto.

Although the legislature had passed what is called the Presi-

Although the legislature had passed what is called the President's "Snivel Service Reform" measure, it treated his demand for tariff revision much as it had his effort to cleanse the pork barrel. Duties had remained at practically the highest level attained as specifically emergency war measures, but the return of prosperity after the long depression had resulted in such an increase of imports that the annual surplus accumulating in the Treasury was becoming embarrassing, amounting for the year 1881–2 to approximately \$100,000,000.

Such recurring surpluses evidently called for a reduction in taxation and revenue, but, as always happens, the beneficiaries of protection were loath to let their special privileges be reduced or lapse. In May, 1882, Congress did authorize the appointment of a tariff commission, one of the many which have been supposed to study the question without prejudice.

The report of this commission recommended numerous changes which would have resulted in a total lowering of duties by about 25 per cent, but Washington was soon swarming with the lobbyists of the protected industries, and when Congress at last passed the Tariff Act of 1873 the report had been torn to shreds, and there were no marked changes, as a whole, from the high war tariff, the reduction in government income being secured by reductions in internal taxes.

Although Arthur had made a good President, he had alienated the old "Stalwart" group of Republican leaders, and his earlier record had made him somewhat suspect to the reform element in spite of their approval of what he had done while in office. Dignified in person, he had given the nation a dignified administration, but he had not caught the imagination of the people, and unfortunately reform is never popular. There was no demand from any important quarter for his renomination, and as Platt announced, "Blaine's turn has come."

There were signs that all might not be easy-going for the Repub-

licans in the campaign of 1884. The mid-term elections of 1882 had been marked by Democratic victories, including an overwhelming one in New York, and there was a growing feeling that the efforts of the greater State bosses to control national politics and conventions which had been so notable in 1880 had gone too far.

When the Republican Convention met at Chicago the result was almost a foregone conclusion. Arthur received a large complimentary vote but the heavy political guns were on the side of Blaine, who was nominated for the Presidency on the fourth ballot, and John A. Logan, long the boss of Illinois, was added for the second office. Both nominations were extremely disliked by the better elements in the party. Theodore Roosevelt, then a young man beginning public life, wrote to his new friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, that "It is impossible for me to say that I consider Blaine and Logan as fit nominees, or proper persons to fill the offices of President and Vice-President." Later, when he had taken the stump for Blaine, he told one audience that Blaine "was nominated against the wishes of the most intellectual and honorable men of the great seaboard cities," but that he had been honestly nominated and therefore it was necessary for the party to stand by him.

On the other hand there were many Republicans, with less strong stomachs than Roosevelt and Lodge, who could not bring themselves either to vote or to advise the American people to vote for candidates whom they considered totally unfit.

An unexpectedly large bolt from party regularity occurred, and those independent Republicans who felt that the attainment of decent government was worth one Republican rebuke organized committees and advised the Democrats that they would vote for their candidate if he were such as they could accept.

That party, in its convention at Chicago, which met on July 8, took only two ballots to nominate Grover Cleveland, reform Governor of New York, in spite of Tammany opposition. Cleveland, who was a self-made Buffalo lawyer, had risen with clean hands through the political offices of sheriff of the county and Mayor of Buffalo to the Governorship of the State, though Roosevelt, hidebound to party, referred to him only as "the Sheriff." The nomination was acceptable to the reform Republicans, and the fight for election promised to be the most hotly contested in many campaigns.

It proved to be one of the most disgraceful in our annals, the charges brought against both candidates being "worthy," as The Nation said, "of the stairways of a tenement-house." Private papers which reflected on Blaine's private life were bought and submitted to Cleveland for use in the campaign. When he read them, he immediately tore them up and threw them into the fire with the remark that the other side could "have a monopoly of the dirt." His followers, however, were less scrupulous, and every possible old calumny against Blaine was raked up and made the most of. On the other hand, Cleveland's public record being found above reproach, his life was searched for a smirch which might serve to deprive him of votes.

Although the war had been over nearly twenty years, the "bloody shirt" was still considered one of the drawing cards for the Republicans, so orators tried to prove Cleveland's lack of patriotism because he had not been in the army. The facts were that during the war his mother was a widow with four sons, and extremely poor. Two of the sons promptly enlisted and of the other two, Grover was the only one who was in a position to contribute to his mother's support. The Republicans, however, found a fact which they hoped to be a winner. Cleveland's private life during his maturity had been as blameless as his public, but it was discovered that some years earlier he had made a slip, and had had an illegitimate child, although he had made what amends he could by the subsequent support of both mother and son. When informed that the enemy had unearthed this and was going to use it, he telegraphed to his supporters "whatever you say, tell the truth," and the truth was told.

Both parties were trying to gain the Irish Catholic vote, which was important, especially in the pivotal State of New York, and as The Irish World was supporting Blaine it looked as though he might get the suffrage of this then alien-minded group, until the very last week of the campaign. He had just reached New York after a speaking tour in the West, and a dinner was tendered him at the old Fifth Avenue Hotel, at which, for some reason, the Reverend S. D. Burchard had been chosen to make an address. Blaine was tired and was paying little or no attention to what the clergyman was saying. He thus did not notice when the reverend gentleman, engaged in a sphere in which he obviously did not belong, de-

clared that "we are Republicans, and don't propose to leave our party and identify ourselves with the party whose antecedents have been Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion."

"RUM, ROMANISM AND REBELLION."

Religion, Without Regard to Sect, Rises in Indignation.

PROTESTANTS, HEBREWS AND CATHOLICS.

Sharp Denunciation of the Blaine Ecclesiastical Ovation.

The Heraun has received numerous communications denouncing as indecorous and injudicious the remarks made by Rev. Dr. Burchard at the Blaine ecclesiastical reception on Wednesday.

TWO INSULTS.
[World, Oct. 51.]

WILL LOSE BLAINE THOUSANDS OF VOTES.
[Star, Oct. 31.]

Graphic, Oct. 81.]

MIGHT HAVE SPARED THE CHURGE.
[Truth, Oot. 81.]

BLAIME KNOW NOTHINGISM REVIVED.
[Albany Argus, Oct. 31.]

THE BLAIMS BANQUET LYING SLOGAN, [Newburg Begister, Oct. 30.]

DEAGGING RELIGION INTO POLITICS.
PHILADELPHIA, Pa., Oct. 30, 1884.

HE WAS REPORTED CORRECTLY.
PHILADRIPHIA, Pa., Oct., 30, 1884.

NEW YORK HERALD OF NOVEMBER 1, 1884, PRINTED PROTESTS AROUSED BY BUR-CHARD'S SPEECH

The alliterative political catastrophe ran over the nation like fire. Blaine was ruined. The election was so close that for several days after it the result was in doubt, and depended on the electoral vote of New York, where it was finally conceded that Cleveland had won by the narrow margin of 1140 votes in a total of almost 1,200,000. Considering the number of votes always bought on both sides in an election, which would certainly have amounted to many times 1100 in a State like New York, it may be impossible always in so close a contest to say which side had been "honestly" elected, but it seems certain that the Reverend Mr. Burchard's inept sally into politics turned enough votes from Blaine to dash the last hope of that candidate for the highest office in the land.

For the nation there can be no doubt of the benefit of having had the Republican rule of nearly a quarter of a century come to a temporary end. As we have said, in

such a form of government as ours or England's it is highly advantageous to have two strong and virile parties, whichever one's own views may induce one to adhere to. It is almost equally bad for an opposition to wander too long in the wilderness without being sobered by the responsibility of office as it is for the party in power to remain there so long as to become corrupt and irresponsible through an overweening sense of its ability to retain control of office whatever it may do.

Unfortunately, although the Democrats had at last, for the first time since Buchanan, elected a President, they had done so under circumstances which would make his success almost impossible. Cleveland's election had been brought about only by the aid given by the discontented Republicans known as "Mugwumps"—a term now applied to any independent voter—but they, having rebuked their own party for the nomination of Blaine, could not be counted permanently in the Democratic camp. Moreover, though the Independents had decided the election, they were made up of many reformers and extremists, who would only be satisfied with much more than any practical statesman would be able to accomplish. Both parties, also, were still split on the question of sound money, a majority of the Democrats being against it. In the civil service, Presidents from Arthur on felt the need and duty of reform, but in this they were all, of either party, to have the professional politicians against them, most of the public lukewarm or opposed, and only a small group of the better element appreciative.

Cleveland at once encountered this condition. The Democrats had been out of office for twenty-four years. They were hungry for spoils. Practically all public offices were held by Republicans, and only 12 per cent were protected by the civil service. The resultant pressure on the President was colossal. For months the killing business of filling minor positions, "the d—d everlasting clatter for office," as Cleveland expressed it in a desperate personal letter to a friend, kept up. This disgraceful waste of the time and strength of our Presidents will continue until, as in England, we get all our postmasterships, custom-house positions, and innumerable other minor appointments which it is absurd to have depend on the party in power, out of politics, and on a permanent basis of non-partisan efficiency.

Cleveland did his best, but satisfied no one. When, after the most careful examination, and in the face of the threat that it would lose him 10,000 votes, he reappointed the Republican postmaster in New York City, a howl went up from the politicians and "political workers." They would not be satisfied with less than all the possible offices open to them, 88 per cent of the whole. On the other hand, the Mugwumps and reformers, men like Carl Schurz and Elliot F. Shepherd, were disgruntled at any signs of political appointment, and strong Republicans like Roosevelt, who understood the exigencies of the case well enough, emitted howls of glee whenever the President made an appointment that could be made to appear an abandonment of the reform principle.

One of the most interesting threads running through our history, though it has never received any special consideration other than episodic, is that of the conflict between the Executive and legislative powers, to which we have several times referred. Except for occasional dramatic episodes, like Wilson's contest with the Senate over the ratification of the Peace Treaty, it is assumed that the various departments work more or less in harmony. In fact, especially between legislature and Executive, there has been a constant struggle for power, chiefly due to the desire on the part of the Senate or Congress as a whole to encroach on the prerogatives of the President. We saw this as one of the crucial moments in the administration of Andrew Johnson, and it was due to Cleveland that in one point the balance was restored.

In his Cabinet, which included Thomas F. Bayard as Secretary of State, William C. Whitney in the Navy, and Daniel Manning in the Treasury, the President had decided to number two Southerners, L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi as Secretary of the Interior and Augustus H. Garland of Arkansas as Attorney-General. The Southern appointments aroused much resentment among the Republicans, both in the press and Senate, but were confirmed. In July, however, a few months after his inauguration, Cleveland suspended a Federal district attorney in Alabama and appointed another in his stead. When the Senate met in December, it demanded that the attorney-general submit to it all the papers in the case, and passed a vote of censure on him when, on the President's advice, he declined to do so.

The Senate pointed to the Tenure-of-Office Act, which it had passed to entrap President Johnson and to enlarge its own power, but Cleveland was obdurate, and it was clear that in cases in which an official did not come under the civil service the executive head of the government could not be held accountable for his running of the governmental machinery if he lost all control of his subordinates. In this case the President was supported by the public and finally, in 1887, the Senate repealed the law which had violated the spirit of the Constitution, thus closing the last chapter in Johnson's impeachment case.

One of the great dangers in a democracy is the influence exerted upon legislators by what have come to be known as "pressure groups," and the purchase of the votes of such groups by passing legislation especially designed to win their favor. One of the most powerful of these groups for the past two generations has been that of the veterans of our several wars, who have been responsible for the huge scandals of our pension disbursements, which to a considerable extent have come to be nothing but a dole given to a favored class. The topic will be referred to again in our final chapter, but finds its place here because Cleveland was the first President who attempted to grapple with the growing evil, and thus added to his list of enemies the influential Grand Army of the Republic.

Since the Civil War both political parties had bid for "the soldier vote" by favoring pensions in their platforms, and in the first two years of Cleveland's administration 56,875 names had been added to the pension roll as against 41,467 in the last two years of Arthur's term, bringing the total by the end of 1887 to over 406,000, including 33,000 Mexican War survivors or their widows whom Cleveland had added. The President had no wish to deprive any ex-soldier or his dependents of a pension if his case merited one, but the amount of fraud and graft which had grown up about the system had already become staggering. An impetus to these had been given by the passage in 1879 of the Arrears-of-Pension Act, one of those measures which are always enacted in response to pressure as postwar years pass to extend the field of government bounty.

Under this Act, a pensioner could claim not only his pension for disability but also back pay from the time to which the disability could be traced. The number of claims presented monthly rose six-

fold immediately after the passage of the Act, and a class of pension lawyers grew up who made their living by seeking out persons with real or fraudulent claims, and getting the pensions awarded for a share in the back pensions. In many cases Congress took the matter out of the hands of the Pension Bureau by passing special bills awarding the pensions to individuals, more than 2000 such bills being sent to Cleveland for his signature. On investigation a great proportion of the claims were shown to be wholly fraudulent, and the President vetoed as many of these as he had time to examine.

In 1887, Congress, under pressure, again attempted to widen the circle of those who could share in the plunder by passing the Dependent Pension Bill, under which any one who had served three months in the war (finished twenty-two years before) could demand \$12 a month if he were disabled and dependent on himself for support even though he had never received any injury from his brief war service. In other words, if a man got drunk, fell off a wagon and disabled himself, he could claim \$12 a month for life from the United States because, somewhere from twenty-two to twenty-six years before he had served for three months in the army or navy. This bill also Cleveland vetoed.

Any honest and loyal citizen, whether ex-service man or not, should have seen that such a veto was wholly justified, as were those of all the vetoed private bills, none of which were negatived by the President without an exposition of their fraudulent character. Although the Grand Army of the Republic formally upheld him, the resentment against him among the members of that body was so strong that he had to withdraw his acceptance of the invitation to appear at their meeting in September on account not only of threats of personal violence against him, which he did not fear, but of clear evidence that the office of President would be subjected to great indignity if he attended.

The feeling of the veterans, which had reached the "100 per cent" stage of post-war emotion, had been further stirred by a gracious act which the President had endeavored to perform toward the South, although himself, of course, a Northerner. The war had been over for nearly a generation. The South was reinstated, and Cleveland thought it time that old resentments should be buried. In the attic of the War Department were a lot of Confederate regimental

flags, and the President made the suggestion that these be restored to the States of the South. Although this was done with the approval of the entire country under Roosevelt in 1905, the time was not yet ripe for such action, and Cleveland was so bitterly assailed on all sides, especially by the Republican politicians and the Grand Army posts, that he had to withdraw the order. Honest as was his attitude on pensions and kindly as was his intention in the flags epi-

sode, both won him the hostility of a considerable section of the voters.

Another act won him enemies in other quarters. The public land and its usurpation had become no less a scandal than pensions, and Cleveland was the first President to be greatly interested in conservation. During his term he rescued 80,000,000 acres which had been occupied illegally, but this gained him the hostility of the railroads, cattle kings, and innumerable lesser fry who had been profiting at the expense of the nation.

The railroads, and with them a Courtesy of the Confederate Museum, Richmond. number of the big business inter-

GINIA FLAGS AT HOME AGAIN

Secretary of War Returns All That Can be Identified.

IN PLACED THE MUSEUM

Box Contains Sixty-two War Banners-Was Sent to Governor.

FROM THE TIMES DISPATCH, RICH-MOND, OF MARCH 28, 1905

ests affiliated with them in one way and another, were further outraged by the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act on February 4, 1887, one of the most important measures of Cleveland's first term, though it was not generally effective in practice until considerably later. It was, however, a landmark in the relations of business to government and in our ways of thought.

We have already noted the facility, as in the case of the Standard Oil Company, with which powerful and unscrupulous men could build up their own larger enterprises at the expense of the small and weak by secret agreements with the roads by which they got rebates, lower rates, and other favors. We have also noted the fight on the roads made by the Western legislatures in the interests of the

farmers and other shippers. Many of the State laws which were aimed at curbing the abuses had been fought by the railroads through the courts, as well as by less legitimate means, but in 1876 one of the cases, which had been appealed to the Supreme Court, that of Munn vs. Illinois, had brought an epoch-making decision from that tribunal.

This decision affirmed that "property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good."

Other decisions had followed, and finally, under Cleveland, the Interstate Commerce Act was passed which, among other things, prohibited special rates, rebates, and other unfair practices, such as discrimination between persons or places. It also made pooling illegal, required that schedules of rates must be made public, and instituted a commission to hear complaints, supervise the interstate roads, and assist in bringing suits against offending companies.

Although the Democratic Party was for cheap money and free silver, the President was sound on both points and continued throughout his term to urge upon Congress the repeal of the Bland-Allison Act which had forced the government to buy, before Cleveland was to leave office, a total of about \$311,000,000 of silver from the silver mine owners, and to coin this huge sum into steadily depreciating silver dollars. These were worth only about seventy-five cents in 1888, were useless in foreign exchange, and disliked by the people. Cleveland clearly recognized that it would be only a question of time when this steady adulteration of our currency system at the minimum rate of \$24,000,000 a year would seriously damage the national credit, cause the disappearance of hoarded gold, and threaten the very solvency of the government, but he could secure no action by Congress.

Nor was he any more successful with the tariff. Like his recent predecessors, he was faced with an annually mounting surplus of revenue over expenses, due to the prosperity of the country and the excessive duties collected under the war tariff. Such surpluses as \$103,000,000 in 1887 and \$119,000,000 in 1888 could not be retained

in the Treasury without curtailing seriously the amount of money in circulation. Nor could they be used to purchase the moderate amount of government bonds outstanding, both because there was a question as to the legality of such action and also because, as such bonds formed the basis of the national bank currency, the debt could not be retired without heavily curtailing the circulating medium. On the other hand, if the surpluses could neither be retained nor used to pay off our debt, they were a constant temptation to Congress to resort to all sorts of extravagant measures of expenditure.

Cleveland studied the problem from the other standpoint, that of reducing the unnecessary revenue and lightening the burden of taxation. The more he did so, the more he became convinced of the impolicy, from the point of view of the welfare of all citizens, of continuing to raise prices by protecting certain manufacturers, employing only about 15 per cent of the total number of persons engaged in industry. On December 6, 1887, he devoted, for the first time in our history, the whole of the annual message to one problem, the tariff. In his last message, 1888, he returned to it again, as he did to his other plans of reform, and complained of "the many millions more to be added to the cost of living of our people" under the tariff, and "to be taken from our consumers, which unreasonably swell the profits of a small but powerful minority," which "is not equality before the law."

Though a tariff revision bill was passed by the House at the very end of Cleveland's term it was blocked by Senator Nelson W. Aldrich and others in the Republican Senate, and the President was able to accomplish nothing more than focussing public attention upon the question. From then on, it was to become one of the leading political issues.

In some of the phrases of Cleveland's last message we begin to feel that we are entering upon the arena of the political struggles of the new age. The Civil War had cut a wide swath between the ante-bellum and post-bellum America, and now that struggle was fast fading into history. We glimpse the new period ahead when the President declared to Congress that "Communism is a hateful thing and a menace to peace and organized government; but the communism of combined wealth and capital, the outgrowth of over-

weening cupidity and selfishness, which insidiously undermines the justice and integrity of free institutions, is not less dangerous than the communism of oppressed poverty and toil, which, exasperated by injustice and discontent, attacks with wild disorder the citadel of rule. He mocks the people who proposes that the government shall protect the rich and that they in turn will care for the laboring poor. Any intermediary between the people and their government or the least delegation of the care and protection the government owes to the humblest citizen in the land makes the boast of free institutions a glittering delusion and the pretended boon of American citizenship a shameless imposition."

The nation had passed across the dead centre, and was beginning to gain momentum in the direction of new and vital issues.

CHAPTER VII

WE ENTER THE NEW ERA

travagance, the excess taxation, the need for reform, had all properly weighed heavily on Cleveland's mind. Whatever else he may not have accomplished, he had created at last a clear-cut issue for the two parties in the campaign of 1888—the first real issue since slavery in 1860.

Had not Blaine, who was spending the year in Europe, absolutely declined to have himself nominated by the Republicans, he would unquestionably have again been their candidate. At St. Louis, where the Democratic Convention met on June 5, Cleveland had been unanimously renominated, with Senator A. G. Thurman of Ohio as his running-mate, Vice-President Hendricks having died in office. When the Republicans met at Chicago on the 19th, nineteen candidates were balloted for, and it was only after three days that the choice fell on General Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, a grandson of old "Tippecanoe," with Levi P. Morton of New York for Vice-President.

The issue of the tariff was squarely met by both parties in their platforms, though in the campaign the Republicans unfairly misrepresented the Democratic position and Cleveland's own views. He believed that "unnecessary taxation is unjust taxation," that the surplus obviously called for the reduction of taxes, and that for the benefit of the farmers and other elements in the nation who suffered from the high costs resultant from excessive duties, there should be downward revision of the worst schedules in the old war-time tariff. Cleveland made it clear that he in no wise advocated free trade, but the Republicans raised the cry that he did, and that he would ruin the country. On the other hand, they declared in their platform that "we are uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection," and protested against "its destruction."

Rather illogically the Republicans also declared their "opposition to all combinations of capital . . . to control arbitrarily the condi-

tion of trade among our citizens," and claimed to favor legislation to "prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the people by undue charges on their supplies." The mixture of opinion between the two parties is interestingly indicated by the Republicans' coming out against "trusts," and also in the plank on money, in which they demanded the use of silver and denounced Cleveland for his stand in favor of the gold basis!

The tariff, however, for the first time in our history, overshadowed all else in the campaign, and enabled the Republicans to raise a huge corruption fund. The manufacturers who had been growing rich by the excessive duties were "put under the fire to have the fat fried out of them," as a Pennsylvania politician phrased it. John Wanamaker, for the Republican National Committee, in a circular letter to the manufacturing interests, put it more elegantly but with no less directness, asking them what they would pay "to be insured" against a lower tariff? Their responses were all he could have desired, in all the manufacturing States.

There were the usual tricks and misrepresentations in the campaign, and Cleveland lost some votes by an incident which cost the far from astute British Minister at Washington his post. A Republican in California, who pretended to be an Englishman naturalized as an American, wrote to the Minister, Sackville-West, asking which Presidential candidate would probably be most friendly to England if elected. The minister, with incredible stupidity, forgetting that a diplomat has no right to meddle in the domestic affairs of a country to which he is accredited, advocated Cleveland to his correspondent. The Republicans published the letter broadcast, and tried to prove that Cleveland truckled to England and was attempting to commit us to free trade for the benefit of that country and not ourselves. The unhappy minister was at once handed his passports, but it was too late to undo the damage. On the whole, however, the campaign was much cleaner than the preceding one, and no personal scandals were raked up.

The result of the election was a victory for Harrison who received 233 electoral votes to Cleveland's 168, although the latter received a plurality of apparently about 100,000 over his rival in the popular vote. It was the tariff question, and the large electoral votes of the manufacturing States which had defeated him. His friends had

warned him not to send in his tariff message but to wait re-election and then act, but this suggestion he had thrust aside as dishonest. He felt, he said, that this would not be fair to the country, and that the people should know before they elected him just where he stood.

The people had voted for him, but in the wrong States, and, as has

Bayard

(Dear 25' 1888

Copy.

DEARMENT OF STATE.

WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Gayard.

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Ofter leaving your

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Then for your our idea of war a trick to make use

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
Constructors of the plot

Sackville.

A COPY OF SACKVILLE-WEST'S LETTER TO BAYARD ADMITTING HE HAD BEEN DUPED, AND A LETTER FROM BAYARD TO THE PRESIDENT COMMENTING ON IT From the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

several times happened, in our peculiar system, we were again to have a President elected by a minority of the voters. As a Republican House was returned to Congress, the majority for Cleveland may be considered as a personal triumph. It is a fact worth pondering by politicians that an electorate will insist upon a weak man following them, but they admire a strong man, and if a man is strong enough they may follow him. Perhaps so many Congressmen follow, in fear for their seats, because they realize they are not strong enough to lead. In this they are usually right.

Harrison had slight claim to national distinction when he entered the White House, and gained none afterward. A creditable career in the war, always valuable for a Republican candidate, one term in the Senate, and an unblemished personal record as an able lawyer in a small city, an ability to charm audiences by his oratory and an unfortunate frigidity of manner in personal intercourse, were the most notable attributes of the new President. He failed to understand



AN ILLUSTRATED POEM. By H. CLAY PREUSS.

Respectfully dedicated to the Members of the New York Delegation to the National Democratic Convention, at St. Louis, June 5th, 1888, as a just tribute to a noble son of the old "EMPIRE STATE."

When like Diogenes of old,
The people ruled by power of gold,
Cried out aloud on every hand,
"Oh! God, for a true and honest man!"
They found in you what they had sought,
A man too honest to be bought,

And by the magic power of gold Our ruling men were bought and sold. Twas then you took your noble stand, To weed corruption from the land: To bravely face the coming storm, And introduce all true reform:

@ 1888.

A TRIBUTE TO CLEVELAND BY A MARYLAND ADMIRER From the Library of Congress.

the new currents in the life of his day, had no quality of leadership, and the entire story of his term can be made up of the activities of members of his Cabinet and of Congress without mention of his own. For the first time in more than a dozen years the President and both Houses of Congress were of the same party, and the way seemed open for the enactment of important legislation if the party so willed. Unfortunately about all the party wanted was to distribute money and favors. The administration was to prove utterly reckless, and was to pay the penalty.

Harrison chose an undistinguished Cabinet, with the exception of his Secretary of State, Blaine, whom he did not want but who could not be ignored. Blaine had made Harrison President by refusing to run himself, and the next highest post in the administration obviously belonged to him. John Wanamaker, who had been so useful in "frying the fat" in the campaign, was made Postmaster-General, and a leading business lawyer of New York, Benjamin F. Tracy, went to the Navy Department.

The party had been elected on the tariff issue, but the situation was not simple, and the tariff bill to be passed had to depend on other elements as well as on the eastern manufacturers. Although Harrison was inaugurated in March, 1889, it was not until the next year that important measures began to be put through with the help of the new Republican House.

In that, there were two men, Thomas B. Reed of Maine, and William McKinley of Ohio, who like Blaine were much more important than the President, whose very lack of achievement, and thus of enemies, had made him a compromise candidate.

One of the dangers of "government by the people" is that of substituting endless talk for action. The lower House of Congress had become a body in which a few resolute obstructionists could hold up the public business indefinitely. Although when the Republicans had been in a minority, Reed had declared himself in favor of such possibility of obstructionist tactics, when he was elected Speaker of the House which assembled in December, 1889, he had made up his mind to end them by introducing new rules.

One of the most important innovations made by him early in 1890 was the counting of the members actually in the room, instead of merely those responding to the roll-call, to determine whether a quorum were present. Another was that the Chair might decline to entertain motions which it considered offered solely for the purpose of delaying business. These and other new rules, which gave him his title of "Czar," while unquestionably strengthening the power of the majority in the House, were really called for in the interests of the public business. When the Democrats later secured a majority in the House they continued to enforce the "Reed Rules." At the time of their introduction, however, the rules met with a storm of opposition, and although they greatly assisted the Republicans to pass their

legislation in the next two years, they also were a factor in the turning out of the party in the mid-term elections.

For some years the situation in the South had been considered a sore grievance by the Republicans. Legally the negro had the vote, but the Southern white, determined at all costs to keep a white government in power, had, in one way and another, practically nullified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The problem, as we have said, was racial, but the negro vote was Republican, and it is hardly open to question that such staunch Republicans as Henry Cabot Lodge would have seen less iniquity in the Southerners' refusal to live under negro governments had the negro vote been as largely Democratic as it was Republican!

It may have been unjust to deprive the negro of his vote, though that is open to question considering the history of the amendments, but when Lodge demanded "protection" for the negro in his rights he well knew that it could only be gained at the expense of depriving the white American of his "rights," which would have disappeared promptly on a return to the negro-carpet-bag domination system. The population figures according to the latest available statistics at that time were those of the Census of 1880 which showed the comparisons noted below for some of the Southern States.

	Whites	Blacks
South Carolina	391,000	604,332
Georgia	198,328	243,266
Alabama		600,103
Mississippi		650,291
Louisiana	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	483,665

If the Republican Party could force the South to count negro votes the advantage to the party and the disaster to the South were both clear as noonday.

Under the new Reed Rules, a bill passed the House by the narrow partisan vote of 155 to 149 designed to prevent interference with the "right" of the negro to vote. This would have had the happy result of returning many more Republican members to Congress, and the less happy one of throwing the South back into a condition of political barbarism. There were no Reed Rules in the Senate, and senators could talk and obstruct in relays as long as lungs and the dictionary held out. A minority in the Senate refused to look kindly on a Re-

publican tariff bill as long as the Republicans threatened to set up a carpet-bag régime in the South again with the aid of Federal supervisors, and this was the first obstacle that McKinley met in the effort to redeem his party's campaign pledges and to reimburse the manufacturers for the tortures to which they had been put when the "fat" was fried out of them.

A disadvantage of the protectionist system is that if certain manufacturers are to be awarded pickings by government favoritism, other interests will also want their share at the public trough. Some of these others were the silver mine owners. If they voted the Republican ticket and Eastern manufacturers got high tariffs, which the mine owners cared nothing about, the latter considered it only reasonable that if they voted for tariffs they should get in exchange something they did care about.

Their ranks had gained much in Congressional influence owing to the fact that four new States,—Montana, Washington, and the two Dakotas,—had just been admitted to the Union. The Secretary of the Treasury, William Windom of Minnesota, was a silverite, President Harrison was favorable to bi-metallism, and the Westerners thought the time had come to insist on the free and unlimited coinage of that metal. Largely because Cleveland had been for gold, the Republicans had come out for silver, and on July 14, 1890, Congress passed the bill known as the Sherman Act, as it was fathered by the former Treasury head, John Sherman.

The Act provided for the purchase by the government of 4,500,000 ounces of silver each month, to be deposited against Treasury notes which were to be legal tender for all payments, including those of duties at the Customs Houses. The Act also committed the United States to the impossible and highly dangerous task of maintaining the two metals on a parity with one another. In view of the campaign of 1896 it is interesting to note that not a single Democrat voted for the fatal bill and not a single Republican against it.

The 54,000,000 ounces of silver which Congress thus ordered the Treasury to buy annually was practically the entire output at that time of the American mines. There was no more reason why the Government should be required by law to buy the entire output of the silver miners than the entire wheat output of the farmers, and many Eastern Republicans must have had some realization of the

danger entailed to our whole currency and financial system. However, as one of the Massachusetts Republican Representatives said: "all there is in this silver bill is pure politics."

The politics were based on the tariff. The Eastern manufacturers had not paid "insurance" for nothing, and they were determined to get something for it at any cost. For most of them it was a matter of



AS THE CARTOONISTS REGARDED THE SHER-MAN SILVER BILL

From the Library of Congress.

dollars and cents, as free silver was for the mine owners, but for the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the House (who was also a free-silverite), William McKinley, it was a tenet of faith. He believed as firmly that protection was for the good of the whole people as some agitators believed in free silver for the same assumed reason.

As early as May, 1890, the Tariff Bill which had emerged from his committee, and which embodied the most radical extension of the protective system yet offered, was passed by the House on a strictly party

vote. In the Senate, however, it encountered opposition. Two bargains had to be made to get it through, and in order to do so the tariff senators agreed to buy the votes of Southern senators by abandoning any effort to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and of the Western senators by passing the silver purchase Act. The "rights" of the negro, of which so much had been heard, suddenly became transformed into higher duties on woollens and hemp, and if, as McKinley said, "cheap merchandise means cheap men," we were saved at the added price of buying 54,000,000 ounces of silver a year to debase the currency and bring on a panic.

The problem of the surplus was not long to remain. The same Congress which passed the tariff also passed the Dependent Pension Bill, vetoed by Cleveland, under which applications for pensions at once multiplied tenfold, and Harrison watched the annual payments to the combined forces of worthy veterans and political crooks rise from \$81,000,000 to \$135,000,000. "Rivers and Harbors" fared royally in the "pork barrel," and the reckless Session won its nickname of the "billion-dollar Congress."

On the other hand, in spite of his appointment of Roosevelt as Civil Service Commissioner, Harrison, with the exception of McKinley, was the most reactionary President who has held office since reform was inaugurated under Arthur. Even such hide-bound partisans as Lodge had to complain publicly of the abuse of the spoils system, and Roosevelt wrote that Boss Platt seemed "to have a ring in the President's nose," as he never gave the Civil Service Commission "one ounce of real backing."

The recklessness that the administration had shown brought about a revulsion in public sentiment, and in the mid-term election of 1890 the Republicans were disastrously defeated in a veritable landslide. Although the party managed to hold on in the Senate, only one-third of the members of which are elected every two years, the overturn in the House effectually stopped further extreme Republican legislation.

Outside of Congress, the leading figure of the administration was Blaine. Even in Congress, though occupying the office of Secretary of State, he did not hesitate to wield influence as though he were still in the Senate. In the Department of State he was intensely interested in fostering relations with the countries, too often neglected by us, of South America; and when the Tariff Bill was being considered he urged with all his strength that provision be made for a system of reciprocity. Against much opposition he won his point, in an amendment to the bill, and as a result negotiated treaties with a dozen West Indian and South American countries, which he hoped would win us a far larger part of the trade to the South in which, considering our geographical and economic position, we then shared only to a nominal amount.


Blaine's conduct of his office was spirited, and he was perhaps more genuinely interested in foreign policy than any other Secretary


of State between Seward and John Hay, but there is little of lasting importance to record. A settlement with Germany of a dispute over Samoa was chiefly interesting as indicating a willingness on our part to consider it our right to intervene in the affairs of a far distant land quite outside the sphere of all our activities hitherto. An effort to settle the troublesome question of the seal fisheries in the Behring Sea was determined against us but had an importance as being the second warm dispute which we settled amicably with England. Another hot controversy, with Chili in 1891, which threatened what might have been the only war in our history with a South American nation, was also adjusted peacefully.

Of more significance than these, because of the prominence which it again gave to one of the weak and dangerous features of our constitution, was the difficulty which arose with Italy in the same year. It may be recalled that in 1840 the possibility of the execution of the English subject, McCleod, had brought about the threat of war from Lord Palmerston if the Federal government could not control the State of New York. Now a similar case arose.

For some time there had been much violence and a number of murders in New Orleans, due, it was suspected, to the operations of the Mafia, an Italian secret society, and many of the victims had been Italians. The Chief of Police, David C. Hennessy, had done his best to track the murderers, when he was himself murdered. Eleven persons, three of them Italian subjects, and the rest naturalized, were indicted for the crime but appeared to be likely to be acquitted on account of the fear of the jury that vengeance would be wreaked on them if a verdict of guilty were found. A mob of several thousand persons then stormed the jail, and lynched the eleven suspects.

The United States had a treaty with Italy guaranteeing Italian citizens in our country "constant protection and security," but the Federal government had no control over the Louisiana government. Italy adopted a high tone, demanding the immediate punishment of the offenders. This, of course, no government could guarantee until they had been proved guilty, and fortunately, although diplomatic relations were broken for about a year by the mutual recall of ministers, Italy had placed herself in a weak position by demanding too much.





DESIGN FOR A SMALL BUT BEAUTIFUL VILLA

To be executed in the quiet and charming village of Rhinebeck on the Hudson.


From "Groft's Progressive American Architecture," 1875, and University of California, Extension Division.

A CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE Another dwelling of the period, at San Francisco.



NEW YORK (FORTY-SECOND STREET) IN THE EIGHTIES

Horse car lines came into use in New York about 1832. The last was abandoned July 26, 1917. Cables were substituted for horses in 1893 and followed by electric propulsion in 1901.



TYPE OF EARLY HORSE CAR USED IN NEW YORK Built in 1862. The body turned on the truck to avoid switching.

By courtesy of W. F. Reeves, Esq.

Eventually, the Federal Government settled the matter by the payment of 125,000 francs to the families of the three murdered Italians. In spite of the fact that Governor Nicholls of Louisiana showed himself more accommodating than Governor Seward of New York had in the preceding incident, the weakness of our theory of divided sovereignty had again appeared.

On June 4, 1892, four days before the Republican Convention was to meet to nominate a candidate for the Presidential campaign, Blaine suddenly resigned office. But before we continue the political narrative, we must glance at what had been happening in other parts of the national life.

America in the late '80's and early '90's seems almost incredibly different in thought, surroundings, and ways of life from the America of our own day. It is true that the age of steam and machinery had wrought great changes, some of which we have already noted, in the social and economic life of the people. Those changes, however, had been slight compared with such as were to come within another few decades. Labor-saving machinery had done away with much drudgery and had increased leisure and productivity—the cable, telegraph, and improved printing-presses had brought the modern newspaper into existence; factory production, replacing home crafts, had forced a rapid urbanization of the population; and such a list of changes could be long extended.

Yet with all of them, life for most people had not altered greatly, and their list of wants had not been much extended. They travelled more rapidly and often, read more widely, and had more conveniences, such as gas lights and friction matches, than their fathers had had in their early days, but there had been no great revolution in our life and its ways. Except for the very poor in the very largest industrial centres, a home still meant for almost every American a house of his own in which the family lived its own life in privacy. The "apartment" was scarcely known.


Family activities and friendships were largely confined to the immediate neighborhood of the home. In the cities, there were no subways, few electric cars, and for the most part busses and horsecars jogged along at about four miles an hour. There was not an automobile in use in the country, and even the "safety" bicycle was not invented until 1884, and pneumatic tires somewhat later. Every one,

in city and country, relied upon a horse and carriage, if he had a conveyance of his own. There was not a mile of concrete road in the whole United States, and most of the roads were of dirt, and bad. The household of the farmer was isolated to an extent it is almost impossible to conceive today.


Although the telephone had become practical it was not in wide use and was to be found in few city homes even of the well-to-do, and scarcely at all in the country. Not even all the offices of New York Stock Exchange firms found it necessary to have one in the early '80's. The radio, of course, was utterly unknown, and even the phonograph was put on the market, in very crude form, only in 1886. Two years later came the invention of a portable camera. In looking back, one is forcibly struck with the simplicity of life and its lack of "apparatus." The typewriter was coming into use, but when Cleveland first became President he did not feel the need of employing even a single stenographer and there was but one telephone for all the White House business, which he would answer himself when the clerks had gone for the day.

The skyscraper had scarcely appeared, and although some experiments were made with steel-frame buildings, notably by Louis Sullivan, John W. Root, and Daniel Burnham in Chicago, it was not until past this period, in 1902, that the twenty-story Flatiron Building in New York marked the real beginning of a general architectural transformation, with its accompaniment of soaring prices for city real estate. Although much good and competent work was being done in the arts, chiefly by the men who were noted as beginning their careers in the preceding decade, the one original and virile contribution which the nation made was in the skyscraper, now being experimented with, and it is notable that it was one in which feminine influence was wholly lacking.

The rest of the arts were still very strongly under that influence as exerted by the woman of the day. Nudity in painting or sculpture was still looked at askance as "not nice," and the most realistic, and in some ways the best, literary craftsman of the period, W. D. Howells, carefully skirted away from anything more realistic in life than could be considered proper reading for a girl in her 'teens. Public taste was sentimental and romantic, and in the '90's such books as Doctor Weir Mitchell's Hugh Wynne, Booth Tarkington's



Left: Old Home Insurance Building, Chicago, 1885, designed by Jenney and Mundy, the world's first skyscraper. Centre: the Flatiron Building, New York, 1913, designed by D. H. Burnham. Right: the Woolworth Building, New York, 1913, designed by Cass Gilbert.




THE OMAHA BOARD OF TRADE IN THE MOUNTAINS NEAR DEADWOOD, APRIL 26, 1889

The Gentleman from Indiana, and James Lane Allen's Choir Invisible enjoyed a great vogue.

The period, however, was not without its literary effort to get beneath the parlor aspects of American life, which contained plenty of elements not quite suited for discussion in that room. Henry Adams in *Democracy* had laid bare the shoddiness of the national

government and politics, and novels began to deal with "problems," while such men as Henry Demarest Lloyd were forerunners of the "muck rakers" of the years immediately after 1900.

Underlying the surface of our life there was deep and justified discontent which we shall discuss presently, and America was maturing. In 1890 the frontier was officially declared at an end, and although this did not mean that there was no more free or unoccupied land, it did mean that the old dream of being able to grow



TITLE-PAGE OF A BOOK WRITTEN AND ILLUSTRATED BY JOSEPH AND ELIZABETH PENNELL IN 1885

From the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.

up with a "new country" from the start by the simple process of moving to a frontier had passed. Discontented Americans, to a far greater extent than ever before, would henceforth have to face their problems instead of dodging them by going off into the "great open spaces." Expansion, if there were to be any more, would have to take place outside the well-defined boundaries of the United States.

After the set-back of the Civil War, what may be called generally the woman's movement had taken on renewed vigor, and under such leaders as Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Carrie Chapman Catt, Doctor Anna Howard Shaw, and others, made rapid progress. In the

two decades after 1870 the number of women over sixteen employed in factories, shops, and offices multiplied threefold to nearly 1,200,000. The number going into such professions as the church ministry, dentistry, medicine, and the law rose surprisingly and by 1890 women furnished nearly three quarters of the school teachers in the nation. Indeed, their activities spread in every direction. For some years they had been increasingly granted suffrage in local elections for certain purposes but in 1890 Wyoming was admitted as a State with full and equal voting powers for women, and the same year saw the founding of the General Federation of Women's Clubs. Three years later the Anti-Saloon League began its work, largely as a result of the earlier Women's Christian Temperance Union founded in 1874 under the lead of Frances E. Willard. By 1893 eight States had adopted absolute prohibition, and twelve were partly dry under local option legislation.

One of the great changes in the short period was in the character of the addition to our population by immigration. Until 1880 almost all our immigrants had come from northern and western Europe, and although they had affected our national life and formed large racial groups, notably the Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians, they had been assimilated to the population at large with comparative ease as contrasted with those now about to arrive. Until 1870 those coming from eastern and southern Europe,—Italy, Russia, Hungary, and other States,-had been negligible. Between 1870 and 1880 the proportion rose to over seven per cent of the total and in the suceeding decades it became approximately eighteen per cent, fifty-two per cent, and seventy-one per cent, falling off somewhat again after 1010. Although in part this sudden change in the character of our population, which had received in four decades over 0,000,000 immigrants of racial stocks not allied to our own, was due to conditions in the countries from which they came, it was more largely the result of the demand for cheap labor in America.

This point brings us to a consideration of the economic conditions prevailing during the final decade of the last century, which had such resounding effects on politics.

Let us try to plot out in simple diagrammatic outline the chief groups and forces which were to come into conflict.

Most strikingly in the public eye were the great Titans of the new

business era, the coal and meat "barons" and the copper, railway, steel, and other "kings," men of the type of the elder J. P. Morgan, of James J. Hill, William H. Vanderbilt, Carnegie, Frick, William H. Clark, and Rockefeller. Such men had certain broad traits in common, differ as they might from each other as individuals. They were men of wide economic but intensely narrow social vision, and of colossal driving power and iron wills. They could lay their economic plans with imperial vision in time and space, but for the effect of their acts on society they cared nothing whatever. They claimed the right to rule the economic destinies of the people in any way that would enure to their own personal advantage. Illogically they insisted upon the theory of laissez-faire for all except themselves, while they demanded and received every favor they wished in the way of special privileges from the government, as in the tariff and the silver purchase Act. The whole machinery of government must be at their disposal when desired,—legislation, court decisions, and Federal troops. They combined their business units into "trusts" and combinations of almost unlimited power, yet they insisted on 'freedom of contract" when dealing with labor, whose organization in any form they almost wholly refused to sanction.

There were two other groups, far more numerous, though less powerful and spectacular—the farmers and the industrial laborers. Although times had in general been good for some years after 1879, when recovery from the great panic of 1873 had fully set in, by 1890 they had been becoming much less so. For various reasons, the prices of farm products had been falling, and particularly in the South and West the agricultural class was beginning to suffer severely. Efforts were also being made to reduce wages in manufacturing and other industries, and there was much discontent and numerous strikes among the employees.

Gradually and quite naturally, there grew up the belief in a great conspiracy on the part of the very rich to ruin the poor. The farmer, for example, found himself at the mercy of the railroads while he saw a railway magnate like Vanderbilt enlarge his private fortune from about \$10,000,000 to more than \$100,000,000. Appeal to the law seemed hopeless. When the possible interest of the public was suggested to the younger Vanderbilt, who was associated with his father, his famous answer, which rang through the land, was "The

public be damned." When the law was pointed out to the coarse and vulgar older man, with his tricky little eyes and heavy sensual mouth, he answered in much the same way, "What do I care about law? Hain't I got the power?" Such were the men whom the small shipper saw in control of the nation's transportation system while at the same time he saw big shippers, like Rockefeller, spreading ruin right and left among his competitors while he drove his own freight-rate bargains with these rail magnates, and was amassing tens of millions.

The iron and steel industry was one of those benefiting most from government favoritism under the tariff, and the labor unions in that industry were also the strongest of all in the United States. In 1889 H. C. Frick, the largest coke manufacturer and a bitter enemy of organized labor, became chairman of Carnegie Brothers & Co., and bad feeling at once developed between the owners and the workmen. In 1892 the wage contract expired and after fruitless conferences the owners delivered an ultimatum to the men that if the wages offered were not accepted the operators would no longer deal with the union but only with the men as individuals. The men then went on strike to save their union.

Frick had already arranged to have 300 Pinkerton detectives sent to the plants to act as guards, and this embittered the operatives who had threatened no violence. When the imported detectives reached Homestead on July 6, a pitched battle ensued in which a number were killed on both sides. The strike spread to the other Carnegie plants, and the State militia was called out and remained for several months, although there was no further disorder. By November 20 the funds of the strikers were used up, and the men, facing winter without work, were forced to go back, giving up their union. Organized labor was broken in practically the whole steel industry, the other mills following the example set by the Carnegies, and labor had learned that its strongest organization was powerless before organized capital.


That summer there were also strikes in other industries and sections, the most violent being at the silver mines of the Cœur d'Alene district in Idaho. The price of silver, like that of most commodities, had been steadily falling, and although the silver-mine owners, unlike the farmers, had forced the government to come to their aid as

we have seen, by buying a very large proportion of their annual output, they had forced several wage reductions when at last the workmen struck. The owners imported strike breakers and there was a good deal of violence, including the blowing up of a mill. The Idaho militia proving ineffective, Harrison was called upon and sent Federal troops to suppress the strike.

It began to seem that the power of the government was always on the side of the rich. The high tariff men talked about protecting the standard of living of the American workmen but the steel industry gave the lie to this. Entrenched behind their high duties and with the new abundance of cheap immigrant labor to pick from, so far from handing on the benefits of protection to the men, the owners of that industry seemed bent on beating the wages down and even destroying what effectiveness in bargaining and self-defense the men might gain from organization. As between an individual workman, out of work and with a family to support, and the Carnegie Steel works, it was sheer hypocrisy to destroy the union as a means of upholding the right of the individual to make such contracts as he might choose. It was the same in the silver industry. The American people were being forced to relieve the mine owners by buying a large part of the output at nearly double its market price, yet none of the benefit was passed on to labor.

When cases involving working conditions or wages came into the Courts, labor found the same favoritism. The Supreme Court of the State of New York declared that the law making it illegal to manufacture cigars in tenement-house homes was unconstitutional because it depreciated the value of property without compensating public advantage. This was but one of the many decisions in which the courts appeared to set the rights of property above those of man. The New York decision just mentioned, which so roused the ire of Roosevelt, struck that note of sanctimoniousness which we have found before and shall again, and which was so irritating to those whose interests were involved. The law had been aimed to break up in part the system of "sweated" labor under which families lived, ate, slept, and worked in vile conditions, often in one room; but the judges declared they could not see how the health or morals of the worker would be benefited by forcing him to labor outside the "hallowed associations and beneficent influences" of his own home!

There was, indeed, no general conspiracy of "the rich" (who fought fiercely enough among themselves for government favors and private profits), but if the masses of farmers and industrial workmen were mistaken as to the great conspiracy they were right enough as to there being something radically wrong with the system. The masses were not economists and for the most part their knowledge and views were limited to the range of their own daily needs and woes. The intelligence of the nation, unfortunately, was



A TILT BETWEEN THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND THE TRADE UNIONS, WITH CAPITALISM THE ARBITRATOR

A cartoon by Nast from "Harper's Weekly," June 12, 1886.

almost wholly busy in making money as fast as possible, and was on the side of the larger capitalists. The leadership of the masses thus had to come mainly from their own ranks.

What the masses saw was a government granting huge favors to men and groups who were amassing enormous fortunes while screwing down wages and taking heavy toll on all products. Political parties, Congress, and the Courts seemed to be on the side of the magnates and against the "people." Moreover, as prices declined in terms of gold, and debts contracted in paper became harder to pay when demanded in gold, and when government bonds which had been bought with paper were repaid to the capitalists in gold, the conspiracy to defraud the poor man and make the rich richer and more powerful appeared to the former to be unquestionable.

Many movements and organizations arose from this seething discontent. In the ranks of industrial workers the Knights of Labor de-

clined but in 1886 with the organization of the American Federation of Labor there was initiated the most important workingmen's organization in our history, which was to weather the storms of this period and exert lasting influence. Started by Samuel Gompers, a cigar maker, it developed in him one of the greatest of American labor leaders, who was to remain in control and exert a beneficent power for nearly forty years.

The Federation of Labor worked through economic pressure for immediate aims of higher wages and better conditions, and meddled but little in politics. For the most part the workers' particular grievances were such as could be remedied only by State and not by Federal legislation, if relieved by legislation at all. The farmers, however, could gain nothing by organizing as unions and striking, and their grievances, which sprang largely, as they thought, from abuses of the currency, from the "money-power," trusts, and from inter-State commerce freight rates, could be most rapidly remedied by legislation, largely Federal. By 1890 many separate political parties had arisen, in addition to the Farmers' Alliance, to elect legislators and exert political pressure.

In the South the Alliance worked through the only white man's party in that section, the Democratic, but in the West the various new parties worked independently, such as the People's Party in Kansas, the Industrial Party in Michigan, or the Independent Party in South Dakota, and in the 1890 elections they managed to send two senators and eight representatives to Congress.

Their success was not to be wondered at. In the South the price of cotton was steadily declining, and in the West the prices of wheat and corn were fast falling to the point at which, in 1893, they were less per bushel than the cost of production. In four years, over 11,000 farms in Kansas alone were taken from their owners under fore-closure of mortgages. "Ten cent corn and ten per cent interest" were driving the West to despair. The sources of the Populist movement, which was so to frighten the conservative East, were not hard to discover, though the East chose to ignore them, and as usual, when anything threatens to disturb the rapid making of money, to brand the leaders as dangerous reds and anarchists and their followers as fools, dupes, and enemies to the Constitution.

The leaders were a picturesque lot, for the most part conservative

and honest enough, if not always well informed. The South had its "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, Kansas its "Sockless" Jerry Simpson, and in that same State Mrs. Mary E. Lease roused the West to enthusiasm and the East to terror by exhorting the farmers to "raise less corn and more hell," extremely wise advice under the existing eco-

REPORT OF PROCEEDING MEMBERSHIP AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 4,000,000 1881 101931 3,500,000 3,250,000 3,000,000 2,750,000 2,500,000 2,250,000 1,250,000 750,000 500,000 250,000 90,000

FROM THE REPORT OF THE ANNUAL CONVEN-TIONS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR!

nomic and political conditions.

Nor, by the time the campaign of 1892 came round, was the East itself confident of its own position. The Republican tariff measure had been bought at a terrific price. and the evils of the Sherman Act for the purchase of silver were becoming appallingly manifest. By the end of 1892, after having rapidly dwindled, the import duties were being paid ninety-six per cent in silver and only four per cent in gold. Gold was being hoarded, and the solvency of the national government, further weakened by the wild

extravagance of the Harrison administration and Congress, was seriously in danger.

Our trade balance was, for practically the first time since the war, becoming adverse instead of heavily in our favor. Our railroads and other enterprises had been loaded down with watered stock for the benefit of speculators. Partly from the fears aroused in Europe by the threatened default of the great English banking house of Barings on \$100,000,000 obligations in 1890, partly from other European conditions, and partly from fear of our continued ability to pay in

gold, Europe began to draw that metal from us in payment of debts in large amounts. The Eastern banks had to curtail credit, and it looked as though our whole financial structure might collapse, and the bankers and magnates follow the farmers into the bankruptcy courts.

Such was the atmosphere in which the Presidential campaign of 1892 was fought, and such the depressing prospect for any candidate who might be elected.

The Republican Convention met at Minneapolis on June 7, and as was always customary until the Democratic Convention of 1912, adopted its platform before voting for candidates. With the sublime disregard of facts which can be compassed only by politicians in a campaign, the platform pointed to the prosperity of the country and claimed that the tariff was its cause. It "reaffirmed" the "American" doctrine of protection, and straddled the money issue by demanding at once bi-metallism and the maintenance of the parity of gold and silver.

Although Harrison had aroused no enthusiasm, and Blaine had a considerable following who wished, in spite of his ill health, to see him nominated for the Presidency, there was little question but that Harrison would secure re-nomination, as he did. Marcus A. Hanna, who was not a delegate, had gone to Minneapolis to help along the political fortunes of McKinley, who was made Chairman of the Convention. The episode is chiefly interesting in the light of later events, and Hanna, who had made a fortune as an iron manufacturer, was not at that time a national figure. Harrison was easily given the nomination in luke-warm fashion, and Whitelaw Reid, the owner of *The New York Tribune*, received second place.

In spite of the boast of the prosperity of the country, the record of the Republicans in the previous four years clearly gave the Democrats an unusual opportunity to come back to power, but the problem of a candidate was more serious for them than for their rivals. Some months before the convention met at Chicago on June 21, it had seemed as though the strongest candidate was Senator David B. Hill of New York, who had twice been governor of that State. Cleveland was unquestionably the strongest man in the party, but he had made many enemies, had apparently definitely retired from politics, and had been subjected to scurrilous abuse by even such Democratic papers as *The New York Sun*.

Moreover it had been thought that an incident of February, 1891, had lost him his last chance to be again the leader of his party. Both parties and most professional politicians with ambitions hedged on the silver question as adroitly as they could. Cleveland was asked to address a meeting of business men at the Reform Club in New York which had been called for the purpose of opposing an unsound currency. Although his friends advised him not to express himself strongly he declined to accept the advice, and, unable to be present in person, wrote a brief, clear-cut letter in which he stated that he considered the "experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage" then before Congress to be "dangerous and reckless." As in his previous pronouncement on the tariff, he insisted that the people should know where he stood even if it involved complete defeat.

The result was interesting. Almost every practical politician at once decided Cleveland was dead politically. Hill, who was a consummate politician, used every political trick known, including the attempt to call a "snap convention" four months before the meeting of the National Convention, to nominate delegates from New York. In Chicago, Bourke Cockran's eloquence and the whole power of Tammany were put forth to defeat Cleveland, who, nevertheless, won the nomination on the very first ballot taken. Without minimizing the exceedingly able work done for him in the preceding months by William C. Whitney and others, it must be conceded that it was Cleveland's own strength of character and his complete independence in saying what he thought, instead of "pussyfooting," which gained for him the support of the rank and file of voters, and it was this popular demand that determined the votes of the delegates with their ears to the ground. They tried to soften the effects of Cleveland's forthrightness by nominating Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois as his running-mate.

The platform was also trimmed to suit varied tastes. It did, indeed, "denounce the Republican protection as a fraud," which was straight enough, but the currency question was handled with gloves and a concession to the cheap-money advocates was made in the suggestion that the ten per cent prohibitory tax on the notes of State banks should be repealed. However, the Republican Convention had been equally timorous whereas the Democratic candidate himself had spoken clearly.

From the various parties of discontent which we have mentioned emerged the national Populist Party, which held its convention at Omaha on July 2, and nominated General James B. Weaver of Iowa for President, and James G. Field of Virginia for Vice-President. The platform demanded free and unlimited coinage of silver at sixteen to one, and that the amount of currency in circulation be increased at once to not less than fifty dollars per capita of the population. In addition to the dangerous cheap-money planks, there were others which seemed to the conservatives almost as heretical and radical. Many of these latter, however, have been enacted into law since then and are now commonplaces of our own time. Among them we may mention the establishment of Postal Savings Banks, restriction of immigration, a graduated income tax, and the popular election of senators.

Although the record of the Republicans appeared to give the Democrats an excellent chance to win, the outcome of the election was considered to be far more doubtful than it should have been. For this reason, in a number of States, such as Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, and Wyoming, the Democrats fused with the Populists, and in the South the Populists fused with the Democrats, so that it is impossible to judge of the real strength of either as shown by the figures, inaccurate in any case, of the popular vote. The campaign, which was a rather dull and quiet one, resulted, however, in an overwhelming victory for Cleveland, who secured 277 electoral votes to Harrison's 145 and Weaver's 22. In the popular vote the figures were approximately, Cleveland 5,566,000, Harrison 5,175,000, and Weaver 1,040,000.

On Cleveland's second accession to office, his position was at once strong and weak. In the House of Representatives his party numbered 220 against only 126 Republicans and 8 Populists, but on the other hand there was scarcely a move he could make which would not disgruntle a large part of the people. That the Republicans would be bitterly hostile to tariff revision in itself and to everything which he did as a Democrat was, of course, a foregone conclusion. But the condition of the currency and finances demanded immediate action with regard to silver, and that would be almost equally displeasing to many of his own party and to the Populists to whom, in part, he owed his election. If he did his duty wisely, it would seem

that his doing so would inevitably alienate him from what, with the rising tide of Populism, would, unfortunately but probably, be the main currents of thought in the nation's opposition to the Toryism of the Republicans.

The Cabinet members whom he chose for advisers formed a strong group, among them being John G. Carlisle at the Treasury, Daniel S. Lamont in the War Department, and Richard Olney as Attorney-General. The chief position, that of Secretary of State, went to Judge Walter Q. Gresham, until recently a Republican. It was Cleveland himself, however, who throughout his second term dominated the policies of the administration.

The President was at once confronted with an alarming situation which he had inherited from Republican rule. Well before he assumed office the folly of the Sherman Silver Act of 1890 had made itself evident. In the national currency there were the \$346,000,000 of paper money, the old "greenbacks." By early summer under the Sherman Act the government had already been obliged to buy \$147,000,000 of silver, of which over \$135,000,000 had gone into circulation as silver notes, and there were also, under the Bland Act, \$328,226,000 as Treasury notes. We have already mentioned the hoarding of gold and the failure to pay customs duties in that metal under Harrison.

At the same time that the Treasury had been accumulating the \$147,000,000 of silver, each "dollar" of which was worth only about 60 cents in gold, the amount of the latter metal in the Treasury's possession had been lessened by \$132,000,000. Against the combined total of \$809,716,000 of paper and depreciated silver, the government had tried to keep a gold reserve, for exchange on demand, of \$100,000,000. Just before the end of Harrison's term, this amount was threatened with impairment, and the Republicans had made preparations to issue bonds to buy gold, but New York bankers came to the rescue, and Harrison left Cleveland just a trifle over the \$100,000,000 when the latter came in.

The "endless chain," however, was working rapidly. Greenbacks could be presented for payment in gold. Then the government was forced to reissue them again, and the next holder could again present them for gold. Also, the purchase of \$54,000,000 a year of depreciated silver had to continue. People both in America and abroad

had become frightened at the probability that the government would not be able to continue to pay in gold, and the more frightened they became, the more gold they demanded. Clearly a step of the first importance was to repeal the Sherman Purchase Act. The danger to the country, as many could see, was great. There was another which was not guessed at the time.

Cleveland could be counted on to defend the gold standard, but the Vice-President, Stevenson, was a silverite. Just before Cleveland's inauguration, the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad had failed. Toward the end of April, the government reserve fell below \$100,000,-000. A week or so later came a devastating panic, initiated by the failure of the great National Cordage Company, followed within a few weeks by a great number of banks and important commercial concerns. On June 30 the President sent out a call for a special session of Congress to repeal the Sherman Act, but, for reasons not then understood, it was not to meet until August 5. The unknown reason was that the President was in danger of his life from the development of a cancer on the roof of his mouth, and a critical operation was immediately essential. On the day he issued the call for Congress, he went aboard E. C. Benedict's yacht in New York harbor to undergo the operation in complete secrecy. With a Vice-President who believed in free silver, the nation faced bankruptcy if Cleveland died, and the truth could not be told or the panic already raging would have become instant destruction. Fortunately the surgeons were successful, and it was not until many years later that the nation knew how critical that June 30 had been.

In the message which Cleveland sent to Congress he clearly stated the situation into which the Sherman Act had brought us, and demanded its repeal after "the ordeal of three years' disastrous experience." With the aid of about 100 Republicans—a large part of the President's own party voting against the measure—repeal passed in the House by 239 to 108, the most determined and eloquent opponent of the President being a young Congressman named William J. Bryan. In the Senate, the Democrats were equally divided for and against, but there also the bill was passed with Republican help, and on November 1 was signed by Cleveland.

Meanwhile the panic was raging. The Erie Railroad had defaulted on July 25, and the number of commercial failures in 1893 was

three times as large as in 1873 with liabilities half again as great. Among financial institutions, 158 national banks failed (almost all of them in the West and South), 172 State banks, 177 private banks, 47 savings banks, 13 trust companies, and 16 mortgage companies. Recovery did not begin until 1895, and in the meantime the Atchison, Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, and other roads, great and small, had followed the Reading and Erie into receiverships until 169 of them, with a mileage of 37,855 miles and a capitalization of over \$2,400,000,000, were bankrupt. Union Pacific stock sold at \$4 a share, Northern Pacific at 25 cents, and the stockholders of both were assessed \$15 a share for the privilege of participating in the reorganization. The nation seemed prostrate, and unemployment and labor troubles were universal.

Bands of workless men wandered about the country, and one of these, under the lead of a certain Jacob Coxey of Ohio, gave the nation a genuine thrill of terror by marching from that State to Washington early in 1894 to demand, among other things, that the government at once issue a half-billion of paper money. This episode ended in a farcical anticlimax when the remnant of the "army" which reached Washington was quietly arrested for not "keeping off the grass" of the White House grounds!

The grievances of labor, however, were deep and real, as were its sufferings, and in 1894 about 750,000 workmen were involved in disturbances of one sort or another. In the early summer the panic was punctuated by one of the most serious and important strikes the country has known. George M. Pullman, head of the Pullman Palace Car Company, was a "hard-boiled" example of the type of the great business magnate then in economic power. He had built a town, Pullman, in which his workmen were to be housed in "model" dwellings. The men felt constrained to dwell there whether they wished to or not, and the philanthropic corporation charged from twenty to twenty-five per cent higher rents than the workmen could find comfortable houses for elsewhere. In May, 1894, the company cut wages twenty per cent, although salaries were untouched, and the grievances of the men were treated with brutal indifference. On the 11th a strike at the shops began, without violence.

Two months earlier, many Pullman men had joined the American Railway Union. In June the Union threatened to go on strike also,

and to stop moving any trains with Pullman cars attached unless the company would arbitrate with its men. This it refused point-blank to do, although the mayors of about fifty cities urged Mr. Pullman in fairness to consent. Eugene V. Debs, head of the Railway Union, gave orders to start a railway strike on June 26, and to avoid all violence. The governor of Illinois was John P. Altgeld, whose name was anathema to the larger business interests, partly on account of his support of those trying to get better laws regulating factories and largely because, on reviewing the case of the anarchists still confined in jail for the Haymarket affair of 1886, he had decided they were innocent and had pardoned them.

The Haymarket riot had been one of the sporadic outbreaks of violence in its period, but bomb-throwing was new to America, and the word anarchist sent a shudder down every one's spine. The public had been in much the same state of nervous terror as it was to be later over the "reds" at the time of the Sacco-Vanzetti case after the World War, and although some men were undoubtedly guilty (four were condemned and hanged), the best opinion today supports Altgeld in his conclusion that those whom he pardoned in 1894 were innocent of the crime alleged against them. Altgeld, however, was denounced with extreme rancour and was considered by business men as an enemy of society.

In fact, Altgeld, although strongly in favor of a square deal for labor, was a conscientious public officer who was prepared to maintain law and order, who posted State militia where called for, and had a force in Chicago. How violence began in the strike, which soon spread over a large territory, it is impossible to say. As in the Homestead strike, the employers,—in this case the Railway Managers' Association,—engaged their own guards, selecting and paying for 3600 deputy marshals, and the larger business interests were anxious not only to see the strike broken with discredit to the men but also to take revenge on Altgeld. Chicago, full of lawless characters, and especially so with the riff-raff left over after the World's Fair which had ended a few months before, offered ample opportunity at the moment for a flare-up of any sort.

Although the railway men had obeyed Debs's orders to keep the peace, violence suddenly broke out, and there was mobbing and destruction of railroad and other property on a large scale. The worst

of this occurred after the Federal government had obtained an injunction from the courts forbidding any one to interfere with the moving of trains and the transportation of the United States' mails. This had been done by Olney, the overbearing Attorney-General who had appointed a railway attorney as special counsel for the government. Cleveland himself, sensing in the case only the maintenance of law and order, backed Olney, and made his famous pronouncement that he would see that the mails were carried if it took every soldier in the army and every dollar in the Treasury to deliver a single postcard in Chicago. Federal troops were sent to that city and after their arrival on July 4 there were serious clashes with the mobs. Debs and three other labor leaders were arrested for conspiring to restrain trade, and were tried for contempt of court in disobeying the injunction. When the president of the American Railway Union had been sent to prison for six months, the strike collapsed.


Altgeld had protested against the sending of Federal troops into a State against the wishes of its governing authorities, claiming that there was nothing left of the Constitution if the President on his own initiative could interfere with the internal affairs of a State by the use of the United States Army. Cleveland was honest in his intentions but had it been only a question of transporting mails, mails were not carried in Pullman cars, and trains carrying mail only could probably have been run without interference. That was not tried, and by the use of the injunction and Federal troops, the whole power of the national government was thrown on the side of Pullman and the railways owners to break the strike. The employees had a sound case, and at first public opinion was with them. They had offered to arbitrate their grievances, and it had been the obstinate injustice of Pullman which had brought about a situation in which many lives were sacrificed, about \$80,000,000 in property and wages lost, and an extremely ugly feeling engendered between capital and labor.

The use of the injunction was declared legal soon after by the Federal Supreme Court in an amazing decision, and the owners of property were thus given an enormously powerful weapon in labor disputes. The strike was a landmark in the rising tide of opposition to wealth and "big business" among the laboring class.


Another incident, which seemed to indicate to the farmers and



MISS JESSIE COUTHOUI READING "THE PROPHECY, 1492"
The opening of the World's Fair, Chicago, May 11, 1893. Immediately behind her is Presiden Cleveland.



A DA ATATTOWN A MINOR



BOUND DOWN THE BINER,

RIVER TRAVEL IN 1870 A Currier and Ives lithograph in the Library of Congress.

workmen that the Federal Government, including the Supreme Court itself, was on the side of the rich and against the poor, had arisen in connection with the effort of the administration to redeem its campaign pledge and reform the tariff. In the Wilson Tariff Bill, passed by a very large majority in the House, duties had been materially reduced and many articles put back on the free list. As usual, it met its end in the Senate, where a handful of senators forced over 600 amendments to be added, making a less well-balanced measure with scarcely lower duties than that which Representative McKinley had sponsored in the previous administration of Harrison.

Cleveland, disgusted with the bill, which special interests had completely wrecked by their selfish demands and trading of votes with each other, allowed it to become a law without his signature. As a sop to the increasing discontent of the country there had been added to the bill a clause levying an income tax of 2 per cent on all incomes over \$4000. But here again the Supreme Court intervened, and, as it seemed to the people at large, on the side of wealth. Although that tribunal had decided by a unanimous vote fifteen years earlier that an income tax was constitutional, it now decided, in the case of Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, that such a tax was unconstitutional as being "direct."

The three facts, that a previous unanimous decision was reversed, that it was now decided by a vote of five to four, and that one of the justices had changed his vote at the last moment, not only made it appear that the Court had changed to the side of capital but lessened also the public respect for its decision, which appeared to be based not on legal principles but on prejudice or political views.

Meanwhile no improvement in business had appeared, and the depression continued throughout the country, with the usual increasing hopelessness and decreasing confidence. Everything that Cleveland had done had been unpopular, and in 1894 the Congressional elections went heavily in favor of the Republicans. The bad business conditions alone would have accounted for an over-turn, and they had been getting worse even before the election.

The drain on the gold in the Treasury, for which the Republicans, and not Cleveland, had been to blame, continued with increasing menace to the reserves. By January, 1894, these had dwindled to \$70,000,000 instead of the customary \$100,000,000. The Treasury sold

\$50,000,000 of government bonds at a price of about 117, thus securing somewhat over \$58,660,000, but the "endless chain" was still work-



ISSUING BONDS IS LIKE POURING WATER IN Λ SIEVE

A cartoon by Coffin after the Leroux painting.

From the Isabella Solomons' Collection, Library of Congress.

ing and by November the reserve was down again to less than \$62,000,000. The sale of another \$50,000,000 was of no permanent avail. In the year 1894, over \$172,000,000 in gold had been withdrawn against only \$117,000,000 gained by the bond issue.

Issuing bonds while Treasury notes could be handed in to the Treasury to be paid in gold, and then, having been re-issued according to the requirements of the law, be presented again for more gold, was obviously pouring precious liquid into a vessel which was leaking faster than it could be filled. As lack of confidence in the government's ability to keep up this game increased, the game itself went on with ac-

celerated swiftness. In February, 1895, the reserve was down to \$41,-000,000.

On the 7th of that month, Cleveland had an interview in the White House with J. P. Morgan, the leading banker of the country.

WE ENTER THE NEW ERA

Merely to issue another block of bonds as the President had done before would be futile. He had asked Congress to pass a law by which the Treasury notes when presented and paid in gold could be cancelled instead of being re-issued. Congress had refused. The President now arranged with a syndicate headed by the Morgan firm to sell to them bonds to the extent of about \$62,300,000 at a premium of four and one-half per cent, which the syndicate re-sold to the public at 118.

A howl of rage went up from the country, and the President was accused of having sold the country to Wall Street. There is no question, however, that he was justified. The syndicate had done more than buy the bonds. By their management of the gold market and foreign exchange they stopped, for a while, the "endless chain," which Congress had refused to stop. They made a loss on their own business to keep gold from flowing to Europe, as called for by the rate of exchange. They provided the government with \$15,000,000 more gold than they had agreed to.

Confidence slowly came back, and in January, 1896, when \$100,000,000 more was needed, and the last bond issue was floated, it could be offered directly to the public and was taken at a premium of over eleven points. Much gold was still hoarded by the people but the danger had passed. Nevertheless, Cleveland had scarcely a political friend left. The Republicans, who had done their best to ruin the country by refusing to assist him, hated him for his action. The rank and file of his own party, who were growing more and more opposed to gold and Wall Street, were as hostile to him as were the Republicans. Few men who have rendered so great a service to their country have been so bitterly reviled for it.

Among Cleveland's outstanding characteristics were independence, honesty, and courage, but he had nothing of the jingo in his make-up, which renders it somewhat difficult to understand the famous sally into international affairs which he made toward the end of his term. Detesting imperialism and the "big stick" methods with which we were to become familiar later, he had blocked the attempt to annex Hawaii which had started under Harrison. Indeed, the treaty of annexation of the new Hawaiian Republic, which had been prepared for submission to the Senate by the previous administration, was pigeon-holed by Cleveland because he felt that we

had not been honest in so far as we had helped to foment trouble in the islands for our own ultimate benefit.

In another and more important affair, however, he was to wield the big stick with a vengeance, and gain, for a moment, the applause of even such Republican imperialists as Roosevelt and Lodge. In South America, the British colony of Guiana lay next to the republic



PUBLIC APPROVAL OF CLEVELAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JINGOISM From a cartoon from "The Evening Telegram" in the Library of Congress.

of Venezuela, and for decades a boundary dispute had been dragging its weary length. At Venezuela's request we had offered to mediate in 1887, but England had declined to accept our offices. The Venezuelan claims were too sweeping to be justified, but, on the other hand, there were somewhat delicate questions involved, in view of our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, in allowing a European nation to enforce demands for a considerable extension of its own territory on the American continent.

The Doctrine, of course, was mere assertion on our part and had

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no place in international law. Bismarck had in fact referred to it as an "international impertinence," and the only sanction it might possess would be our physical power to enforce it. In 1895 our navy did not include a single first-class battle-ship. Cleveland wished to have the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute settled by arbitration, but having failed in that in the spring of 1895 there is no entirely satisfactory reason known for his allowing Olney, the Secretary of State, to dispatch such a note to the British Government as would almost certainly have brought on war between any other two nations.

Olney brusquely demanded a settlement of the Venezuelan dispute which should be satisfactory to us, and claimed our right to intervene. After a long and somewhat erroneous interpretation of what the Monroe Doctrine was intended to be, the Secretary indulged in some extraordinarily brutal jingoism. "Today," he wrote to Lord Salisbury, "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers."

Such an extraordinary challenge would have involved us in war with England, whose naval power at that time was about five to one as compared with ours, had it not been that England genuinely wished to keep the peace with us. Salisbury did not reply for four months, and our own public was not aware of the seriousness of the situation until Cleveland submitted all the correspondence to Congress in December, with a war-like message. There was almost a panic in Wall Street, and general consternation in both countries.

Fortunately, to the sane public opinion in each of them it appeared to be the height of criminal folly to bring on war between the United States and the British Empire over a minor imperial boundary dispute. Luckily, also, at the beginning of January, the German Emperor sent his famous telegram to old Kruger in South Africa congratulating him on having captured the Englishman Doctor Jameson, and this insult, as it was considered, offered to England

by the Kaiser, acted as a lightning-rod to ground some of the very natural anger felt against the United States.

In his message to Congress, the President had asked for the appointment of an American commission to determine for ourselves the boundary in dispute, after which the force of the United States was to be pledged to keep England from advancing beyond such a line as we should determine. England, of course, could not consent to that, but after a good deal of diplomacy and a marked show of friendliness by leading English statesmen, the whole question was finally submitted to arbitration, as a result of which most of England's claims were conceded.

The episode undoubtedly brought to the attention of Europe with startling suddenness the fact that the United States was no longer a fourth-rate and negligible power, but this was accomplished at terrific risk and by our assuming a position that was not logically tenable. Fortunately it also brought to light the very strong feeling in both countries against their ever again engaging in war for any reason whatever if there were any other way out. That was probably the most valuable by-product of the incident. In a few years England was to have her energies absorbed by her war in South Africa, and we were to have our thoughts forced into wholly new channels by our war with Spain and all the results flowing from it. The whole affair of Venezuela and Olney's jingoism left much less lasting impression than might have been expected, but the lurid danger which played over the destinies of both peoples for some months was more or less in accord with the whole of the stormy period of Cleveland's second term.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REPUBLIC BECOMES AN EMPIRE

standpoints, and from none more so than that of studying the relation between politicians and the unknown laws or accidents of the universe. Cleveland, by his strength and honesty, had antagonized almost every interest and prejudice of his followers and opponents. In time his reputation among both was to be raised high, there being, perhaps, no better touchstone for it than the contemporary and subsequent opinions of such a bitter Republican partisan as Senator Lodge. Writing in 1897 to Roosevelt, Lodge "took a kind of grim satisfaction," as he said, in noting that to the very end (in his veto of an immigration bill) Cleveland had continued "to injure the country as much as he could." Many years later Lodge wrote, in comment on this remark of his own, that he had become "very certain" that Cleveland "was not only a strong but an honest man and thoroughly American."

But in 1896 the President was reviled on all sides, and had got hopelessly out of touch with his own party on account of his defense of the gold standard. The two important questions in the campaign of that year were to be prosperity and free silver, with the tariff as a subsidiary one. The irony of the situation was that prosperity was returning in any case, and that free silver was almost at once to lose importance as an issue, both of these happenings coming from causes with which parties and platforms had nothing to do.

Periods of business depression come in cycles of about twenty years, and that which was due in the early nineties had run its course by 1896, recovery being ensured by Cleveland's stopping the operation of the "endless chain." Prosperity had begun to return before the campaign in the fall of that year, and, although no one knew it, the nation was at the beginning of the greatest period of speculation and business advance it had yet experienced.

Apart from the recovery which might have been anticipated from the law of cycles, there was to be another factor operative which was greatly to increase business, expand credit, and for forty years to lay the ghost of the silver menace. This was the discovery in several parts of the world of immense and hitherto unknown deposits of gold. For the twenty years preceding 1891 the world production of that metal had never again reached the figure of 6,270,000




THE FREE TRADE BIRD BUILT ITS NEST ON EVERY CHIMNEY

A Republican National Committee cartoon, by Leon Barritt, used in 1904 ounces mined in 1870, and in five of the years had been well below 5,000,000 ounces. This had been one of the causes, if not the leading one, in making the low prices for agricultural and other products, and thus of much of the hardships suffered by primary producers and debtors. From 1801. however, the annual gold production began to rise. There was a big

jump in 1897 to 11,420,000 ounces and by 1912 it had reached 22,-600,000.

As there were no great wars in the period, practically all of this enormous increase was available for the needs of normal business, and consequently resulted in a general rise in prices. The tremendous political fight for free silver approaching in 1896 was thus staged just at the very moment when underproduction of gold was ceasing to be a menace to the classes which feared it. The Democratic Party repudiated Cleveland on what was for many decades thereafter to be merely an academic question.



Copyright, 1895, by C. A. Ruddock.

PROHIBITION PROPAGANDA OF 1895

This temperance poem would seem to have been very much in the spirit of an even earlier day.



A cartoon by W. A. Rogers showing the public's belief in Government favoritism of special interests.

From "Harper's Weekly," May 12, 1894.

But there was nothing academic about it in the campaign of 1896. The fact is that by that year the question of the gold standard had become infinitely more than a problem in economic theory. Gold had become the symbol in the eyes of vast numbers of our people of the "money power," of Wall Street, of a plutocracy riding rough-shod over the happiness and rights of the ordinary man. At the centre of the vast wave of emotion which was to overtake the nation and make the campaign almost a religious crusade, there was, however, the fact that the failure of the gold supply to keep pace with expanding commercial needs had in truth been in large part the cause of low prices and of the troubles of the farmers South and West.

There was also the other truth that the common man was not getting what Roosevelt later called the "square deal" from his government. The Republican Party, being that of the bankers, manufacturers, of other business magnates and of wealth in general, was particularly vulnerable to suspicion and attack on that score. It seemed as though the rich and powerful could get any favor wanted, whereas both in Congress and the courts the ordinary man believed his interests were increasingly sacrificed. There were great cancers of corruption in the Democratic Party also, such as Tammany Hall in New York City, but Croker was no worse than the Republican Boss Platt, and the ordinary people of the country believed rightly that, whether wisely or not, the Republican Party laid most stress on the rights of property whereas the Democrats laid it on the rights of man, and that that broad distinction had been true from the days of Hamilton and Jefferson.

We must not be blinded by the gold issue in the campaign of 1896 to what the real issue was. That was, in the opinion of many millions who voted for Bryan, precisely what we have stated, a belief that the candidate stood for the rights of the plain man as against the powers of a plutocracy which was threatening to make the plain man a slave and the government a mere machine for increasing the wealth of its plutocratic controllers.

As we have said before, a nation to progress sanely and safely requires both a conservative and a liberal party of more or less equal strength and ability, just as society needs both the counsel of age and the optimistic courage of youth. Unfortunately we in the United

States have suffered from having only a conservative party which has tended to run constantly to special privilege for its supporters, and a liberal party which has been wanting in the broad-minded leadership which would keep it from running after all sorts of "isms."


The situation in 1896 was interesting in this regard. Twice before, in 1800 under Jefferson, and in 1828 under Jackson, the democratic elements in the population had risen and won. They were to fail in 1896 in spite of a tremendous fight. They were to do so in large part because they fought for their cause under the symbol of a wrong and dangerous idea, that of free coinage of silver. The campaign showed that there was tremendous resentment against what we may call the conservatives and their theories of economic and social government, but the rank and file of the liberals were largely ignorant and there was not a sufficient leaven of wise leaders in the party to keep it straight.

This lack of sound leadership has been an extremely serious one for liberalism in America. By leadership I do not mean merely a few outstanding national figures, but men in all communities and in all ranks of life who adopt the liberal attitude. To a considerable extent our lack of such leadership and of an intellectually sound liberal tradition may have come about from the fact that to a degree not known in any other country we are business men and our ablest men tend to be great business leaders or associated with business on a large scale.

Two results have come from this. Large-scale business, and this was particularly true of the era on which our story is now entering, demands a government from which it can get favors and which will be amenable to it. Secondly, as a rule, the successful business man is extremely conservative and fearful of trying anything politically that may in the slightest endanger his position. By the time we have now reached, not only were a preponderant number of the ablest and most powerful men in the nation heads or owners of great business concerns—railroads, banks, manufacturing, and other enterprises—but in law and some of the other professions the ablest men were drawn into close alliance with what was coming to be known as "big business."

It is all too easy for any class, as we have learned from the expe-

rience with socialistic as well as plutocratic governments, to think of national welfare in terms of what affects their personal power and profit. Joseph H. Choate, for example, was an able and honest man as well as one of the leading lawyers of this period, yet he could denounce the attempt of the Democrats to enact an incometax law as "anarchy." Almost any law which threatened the profits or entire freedom of action of the magnates was considered by them, and probably in good faith, as extremely dangerous radicalism,



SKETCHES MADE AT THE "POPS" CONVENTION] IN ST. LOUIS IN 1896, FOR THE CHICAGO JOURNAL

From the Library of Congress.

whereas the people at large merely saw the Republican Party as providing all sorts of favors to the magnates and blocking reforms which might help lesser men.

Nor were the people wrong. There had in truth grown up a combination of the ruthless and unsocial-minded big business men with the dishonest political bosses which seemed too strong for honest men to struggle against. Writing to Lodge in 1897, Roosevelt, who was as strong a Republican partisan as ever lived, said, "The ugly feature in the Republican canvass is that it does represent exactly what the Populists say, that is corrupt wealth. The Pierpont Morgan type of men forced Fitch on the ticket; and both Platt and Tracy represent the powerful, unscrupulous politicians who charge heavily for doing the work, sometimes good, sometimes bad, of the bankers, railroad men, insurance men, and the like." If a Republican like Roosevelt could write in confidence in that way to a Re-

publican like Lodge, it is easy to understand the rising resentment of the ordinary citizen.

How thoroughly entrenched the system was may be seen from the necessity which even Roosevelt found himself under of working with the corrupt bosses whom he denounced in private. In 1895 he wrote, again confidentially, that "Platt's influence is simply poisonous. I cannot go in with him; no honest man of sincerity can." Yet three years later when Roosevelt was running for Governor of New York he wrote to the same correspondent that "Senator Platt and Congressman Odell are doing all they can for me, and I could not wish the canvass to be in better hands"! It is needless to say that the ordinary Democratic politician was no better, and where, from local conditions, a Democratic boss had become firmly established, big business dealt with him or his henchmen just as readily as with the Republicans of the same stripe.

There was, however, a marked difference between the parties. The Republican was that of the rich men and the Democratic that of the poor. This had its evil effects on both. Any class, as we have said, tends to look at affairs through the lens of its own self-interest, and the world is rapidly increasing in complexity, especially economically. If the plutocrats had too little interest in the larger social implications of what they were doing, so the small menfarmers, laborers, factory employees—although they recognized the social injustice about them, had too little knowledge of the complex forces which were operative in society, and were too easily captured by false doctrines.

In Cleveland, the Democracy had had a sound leader, but aside from the fact that he had already run for President three times, he was considered too subservient to high finance to be longer acceptable to the people at large. During 1895 and early 1896 the young Congressman Bryan, who had opposed Cleveland's stand on gold, had been going up and down the country preaching his economic doctrines. Also a little book on free silver, by W. H. Harvey, called *Coin's Financial School*, had been selling at the rate of 100,000 copies a month.

Bryan's views on gold and silver were as erroneous as those of Harvey, but it is a mistake to think of the young orator whose voice and appearance won him literally millions of devoted admirers as

a mere spell-binder or demagogue. Now that the passions of the day have faded somewhat it is possible to appraise him more fairly, and I think it may be said that few men in public life have been guided more consistently in all their actions by morality as they have seen it or by a more genuine desire to serve the people. Unfortunately, he had an almost unbelievably restricted mind. Starting with a certain stock of ideas, many of them erroneous, he scarcely grew at all mentally during a long public career. Unluckily,



ONE OF THE ILLUSTRATIONS FROM COIN'S FINANCIAL SCHOOL ON THE RISING VALUE OF THE DOLLAR

the ideas which he had were those of millions of his fellow-countrymen, and his very possession of them seemed to his followers to make him an ideal leader as being one of themselves.

In some respects, on the other hand, he was broader-minded than any of his Presidential opponents during that career except Roosevelt. He cannot be very heavily blamed for his advocacy of free silver in 1896, for he had distinguished company. William McKinley, who was to be the Republican candidate, was himself a free-silverite, as were also such Easterners of distinction as Brooks and Henry Adams and E. Benjamin Andrews, the president of Brown University. But Bryan saw something more in the campaign than silver, and it was precisely that "something more" which most Republican leaders, except Roosevelt, refused to see, and which maintained Bryan's hold on the public for a score or so of years.

In one of his speeches he clearly stated that "this is not a contest for the supremacy of one of two metals—it is not a miners' campaign." The fight, he added, was to save the American people from being "dominated by the financial harpies of Wall Street . . . to make money the *servant* of industry, to dethrone it from the false position it has usurped as master." This he believed could only be



MISS DEMOCRACY IN A QUANDARY AS TO WHICH WAY TO GO BEFORE THE 1896 CONVENTION

A cartoon in "The New York Advertiser."

done by preventing the continued fall in prices due to the gold standard and the scarcity of gold, and by fighting the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of the few who manipulated business, the currency, and the government for their own benefit. In another decade, Roosevelt was to fight the corrupt power of wealth with greater wisdom, and

in 1931, with the world again overwhelmed with debts, personal and international, the gold question was again to come to the fore.

The party conflicts in the 1896 campaign were unusually complicated. The Prohibition Party, which was the first to hold its convention, split into two factions, each putting a ticket in the field. The Republicans, meeting at St. Louis on June 16, nominated Mc-Kinley on the first ballot, with Garret A. Hobart of New Jersey as Vice-President. Platforms are not very important usually in American campaigns but in this year they proved so. Not only McKinley himself but a considerable wing of the Republicans had been for free silver, and although all delegates could unite in proclaiming that the business depression had been due solely to the Democrats; that the reduction in pensions deserved the "severest condemnation"; that America sympathized with the Armenians and the Cubans;

that the Monroe Doctrine should be upheld; and the rest of the usual bunkum, there was a real struggle over the money plank.

The candidate himself became converted to the gold standard, and the platform declared that all money must be maintained on a parity with gold, but a sop was thrown to the silverites by adding the phrase "except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations." The gold Republicans felt themselves safe, for, although they pledged themselves to promote such an agreement as might permit the free coinage of silver, they knew perfectly well that no such international agreement could be made. The silverites considered the concession as of no value and after 110 had voted against the plank, without avail, 34, including 4 Republican members of the U. S. Senate, bolted the convention and withdrew, most of them going over to the Democrats.

The latter held their convention at Chicago on July 7, where a fierce fight took place over the money question, the national committee being in the control of the gold Democrats whereas the majority of the delegates were for silver. It soon became evident that the silverites would have things their own way, and when Bryan made his famous speech (much of which he had often delivered before) the convention was in a frenzy.

Pleading for the little business man, the farmer, the country-storekeeper, the wage-earner, as against the big business man, Bryan claimed that he spoke in their name. "We have petitioned," he said, "and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated, and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged, and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more; we defy them!" In his peroration he repeated a phrase of his congressional speech which had attracted little attention when first used but which was now to stir the whole nation. "Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: 'You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns—you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." The wildest excitement seized the delegates.

In the platform as finally adopted the convention came out

squarely for free and unlimited coinage of silver, declared the money question the paramount one in the campaign, and refused to pass the usual vote endorsing the administration of the retiring President. On the fifth ballot Bryan was nominated for the office, with Arthur Sewall, a rich free-silverite of Maine, as running-mate.

Almost immediately the gold Democrats, who felt they could neither vote for Bryan nor turn Republican, organized the National Democratic Party, which on a platform declaring for sound money put another ticket in the field with John M. Palmer and General S. B. Buckner as candidates. Meanwhile both the People's Party and the National Silver Party had also held conventions, both endorsing free silver and the nomination of Bryan.

The ensuing campaign was an extraordinary one, perhaps best described by Mrs. Lodge, the wife of the Republican senator, in a letter to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. Immediately after the result was known she wrote: "The great fight is won and a fight conducted by trained and experienced and organized forces, with both hands full of money, with the full power of the press-and of prestigeon the one side; on the other, a disorganized mob at first, out of which burst into sight, hearing and force—one man, but such a man! Alone, penniless, without backing, without money, with scarce a paper, without speakers, that man fought such a fight that even those in the East can call him a Crusader, an inspired fanatic, a prophet! It has been marvellous. . . . We acknowledge to \$7,-000,000 campaign fund against his \$300,000. We had during the last week of the campaign 18,000 speakers on the stump. He alone spoke for his party. . . . It is over now but the vote is 7,000,000 to 6,-500,000."

The Republicans had indeed had the money. Marcus Alonzo Hanna, the Ohio iron magnate who was responsible for McKinley's nomination, had seen to that. Ordinary business men and the great corporations were properly frightened at the possibility of a debased currency, and their fright was easily coined into campaign contributions. Much of the vast sum collected was spent honestly and it was estimated that the Republicans distributed a quarter of a billion of pamphlets and other printed matter in a score of languages to educate the voter. Much was also spent dishonestly, as it always is.

Speaking of the primary elections in New York in February, Roose-velt had confided to Lodge that the Republican frauds were "so unblushing as to be comic. On examining the rolls of their voters there were found over 600 from vacant lots, from houses where no such men lived, from houses of ill fame, and the like. . . . In certain streets the Platt people simply took the names on the signs of all the shops along the streets and voted under them right in order." Such a large number of decent men were disgusted, he wrote, that it is "pretty difficult for me to keep them from bolting."

It is evident that \$7,000,000 thrown into that sort of politics might be very effective. Other methods of influence were used. Farmers were offered a five-year renewal of mortgages on easy terms if Mc-Kinley were elected. Factory hands were paid off the day before election with the notice that there would be no further work for them if Bryan won. He did not, although so great was the polling owing to public interest, and so great was his own popularity and that of the fight he was making against corrupt wealth, that he polled almost 1,000,000 more votes than Cleveland had four years before, and was beaten by about 600,000, the vote being approximately 7,110,000 to 6,510,000.

The fervor which Bryan aroused, comparable only to that of the old religious revivals, and the huge vote he polled, not only among Western farmers but Eastern industrial workers, were not in the last analysis mere endorsements of free silver. That indeed became, and properly, the foremost issue in the campaign, and with a party committed to it, it would have been a calamity for the country had Bryan been elected. But the great uprising under Bryan was an uprising against the growing injustices, as the ordinary American saw them, of the combined economic and political system as it was then developing. Free silver was merely the weapon he had unwisely been taught he could use to bring about reform. He sensed in Bryan his genuine moral fervor and his devotion to the ordinary man.

Unfortunately these cannot balance intellectual errors, and of those in Bryan's teaching the ordinary man was unaware. Also, unfortunately, however, Bryan's opponents, who should have sensed the real issue, did not do so. They were content to call him an "anarchist" and point to his economic heresies. It was not until nearly a

decade later that Roosevelt took up the same fight as Bryan had fought, and became almost as much hated by his own party as Cleveland had been by his. The campaign of 1896 taught big business and the Republicans generally nothing, and because of their large majority they felt no need to try to remedy abuses.

Back of the new President stood the figure of Hanna, who was to become the symbol of the "trust" and of plutocratic wealth, made



BRYAN—''A SUGGESTION FOR THE 53-CENT DOLLAR''

From a cartoon in "The New York Press."

familiar to the people through the medium of bitter cartoons. Hanna, who had backed Mc-Kinley for years and was genuinely devoted to him, was typical of both the best and the worst of the new business leaders. In personal intercourse he was kindly and loyal. He treated his employees well and was liked by them. He did not consider himself corrupt and that he did not do so was in itself one of the best indices of the outlook of big business of his day. A strong-willed, self-made man, "neither very far-sighted nor very broad-minded," as Roosevelt said, he was imperious and

autocratic. There was no difference between his business ideals and methods and his political. In business when he wanted to control an enterprise he manœuvred and bought it, and when he wanted the votes of the public or a legislature he bought them in precisely the same way. If he was acquiring a street railway, he apparently saw no difference between buying the stock from one set of people and a favorable franchise and legislation from another set. Yet on the whole he stands out very favorably among the crowd of similar magnates in that period.

McKinley wished to have him in his Cabinet, but as Hanna preferred the Senate, a deal was concluded by which the venerable John Sherman, also of Ohio, was made Secretary of State, and

Hanna elected senator in his place. Sherman, who had had a distinguished career but was now almost senile, was not fit for the post and was soon replaced by William R. Day, who, in turn, in about a year was succeeded by John Hay. Among other Cabinet members were Lyman J. Gage, a Chicago banker, who went to the Treasury, C. N. Bliss, a New York banker, in the Interior Department, Russell A. Alger in the War Department (an unfortunate appointment), and John D. Long in the Navy, with Roosevelt as assistant secretary.

In spite of the fact that the election had been fought and won on the question of the gold standard, legislation in regard to that issue was to be postponed for three years, and McKinley preferred to consider the tariff as paramount. During the campaign he had been proclaimed as "the advance agent of prosperity," and the pernicious practice began (to be raised to its most absurd and disastrous height in the case of Hoover) of regarding the President of the United States not as the head of our government but as the purveyor of prosperity to the business of the nation. The prosperity following 1896 was even less due to McKinley than was the economic débâcle of 1929 due to Hoover.

McKinley's idea of prosperity was a higher tariff, and the administration at once set to work to secure one. The two houses of Congress were Republican and there was little difficulty about passing a bill, though there were the usual log-rolling and tinkering in the Senate. In their platform the Republicans had advanced far beyond their views on protection of even a decade earlier. They had unqualifiedly proclaimed protection to be the foundation of American prosperity and had denounced the repeal of certain reciprocity agreements by the Democrats as "a national calamity." The Dingley Bill, which was now enacted, raised duties to the highest point they had ever reached—an average of approximately 50 per cent, with some duties collected much higher than that, such as 91 per cent on woollen goods, 97 per cent on sugar, and 119 per cent on tobacco. Although some of these would have been reduced by reciprocity agreements with other nations, such agreements were killed in the Senate when introduced. The "interests," as they were beginning to be called, were in the saddle and meant to ride.

Purely economic questions, however, were quickly to be over-

shadowed by an adventure into world politics that was to change the United States more profoundly than any other single event between the Civil and the World Wars.

Cuba and Porto Rico were the last remaining possessions of Spain in the New World. There had long been unrest in the larger of the islands where the situation was difficult. Much of the capital used in Cuba had been provided by the American and English owners of the sugar estates. Other than the comparatively few American and English residents, the population was made up of some pure-blood Spanish, and a mass of negroes and mixed-bloods, to a great extent illiterate. There was no "public," in the Anglo-Saxon sense, educated and fit for self-government, but there were plenty of the unfortunate type of South Americans who take naturally to political agitation and insurrection.

On the other hand, the government by Spain was inefficient, weak, and venal. In 1895 a new insurrection had broken out, under Maximo Gomez, a Santo Domingan, and General Weyler was sent from Spain to quell it. The "insurrectos" kept up a guerrilla warfare, killing the Spanish from ambush, burning sugar cane and levying tribute on American and English planters, who had to pay the patriots large sums to save their crops, while the Spaniards were not above levying the same tribute for "protection."

Weyler's policy was one of ruthless suppression, and in the course of carrying it out he adopted the plan of gathering the people from certain country districts into "reconcentration camps," leaving him free to deal with the rebels outside. The problem was a difficult one. Owing to the absence of a large organized force of rebels, it was impossible to strike a vital blow at them, most of them being mere civilians who alternately worked when they felt like it and fought when they felt like it. Due partly to the basic impossibility of Weyler's plan, partly to the natural inefficiency of the Spanish authorities, and partly to other causes, there was much suffering among the reconcentrados herded into the camps. Sickness and insufficient food took a large toll of life, though the number of deaths, like all else in the situation, was enormously exaggerated for propaganda purposes by the rebels and the American newspapers committed to a war policy.

Near the end of his term, Cleveland had offered to intervene but

the offer had been refused by Spain. The President, however, realized that strenuous efforts were being made to embroil us in the affair, even by our own Consul-General, Fitzhugh Lee, and to avoid war Cleveland had asked Frederic R. Coudert, the noted international lawyer, to go on special mission to Spain to try to adjust matters, agreeing to get McKinley's approval, as Cleveland himself had then only a few days more of office. Mr. Coudert declined. Such was the situation when McKinley was inaugurated, with as great and as honest a desire to avoid war as Cleveland had felt.

The United States, however, as well as Cuba, was full of combustible material in 1897. There were four chief factors involved. In the first place there was the genuine idealism, combined with the "under-dog complex" of the great mass of the American public. The average American seldom has very accurate knowledge of conditions in foreign lands or clear notions of the difficulties as well as the abuses, real or seeming, of administration in them, but for reasons already suggested, it is always easy to rouse our sympathy for any people which appears to be struggling for its liberty. We also have a rather naïve belief that all peoples and races are capable of orderly self-government, a belief scarcely lessened at all by our insistence that the Filipinos are not. Emotionally based on an expansive good-nature and our own history, rather than on knowledge or reason, this belief is a force to be reckoned with, and both parties in their 1896 platforms had expressed sympathy with the Cubans, the Republicans throwing in the Armenians also, as we have seen, for good measure.

Moreover, there was at work in New York a Cuban junta of no mean ability which expended much of the money it extorted from the American and English sugar planters under threats of destroying their property, in clever propaganda, doing its best to enlist the sympathy mentioned above.

There were, again, a good many Americans in high places in government or business who desired a war and imperial expansion for their own several ends. For example, powerful business interests were chafing because we did not annex Hawaii. Senator Lodge had his eye on Porto Rico and the Philippines. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt was anxious for something to do with his ships. All of these, and others with their own axes to grind, well under-

stood the background of our idealism which could be depended upon.

In the summer of 1897 Roosevelt confided to Lodge that "it

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BEING

A TRUE STORY OF LOVE, WAR, AND STARTLING ADVENTURES.

The Messacre of the Young Students! shooting the Mes Pouxd ox the American ship "virginius."

SPANISH DEEDS OF BLOOD-CHILLING ATROCITY'

**MINNIE DALLAS, the daughter of a well-known and wealthy jeweller of New York City, follows her lover to Cuba. He has been accused of being her auther's numbere, but is moocent. The estigates against him, however, is strongly circumstantial, and he escapes from prison, with the estigates of his sweet-heart, quits the country, and joins the Cuban patriots. Shortly afterward, Miss Dallas follows him, in make disguise, and soon becomes the ido of the near struggling for their freedom, and by them she gains the sobriquet of "Lattle Cuba," She performs many devels of true bravey and acts of noble charity, and aids in clearing up the mystery surrounding her lover's life.

S.B.—The dramatic effects, striking situations, and all the ideas, in this book contained, has been capyrighted and worked into a drama bearing the above title, and it will be performed shroughout toe country.

PHILADELPHIA:
PUBLISHED BY BARCLAY & CO,
No 21 North Seventh Street.

SPANISH CRUELTIES AND INTRIGUE IN CUBA FORMED THE PLOT OF A THRILLER BACK IN 1873

From the Rare Book Room in the Library of Congress.

would be everything for us to take firm action on behalf of the wretched Cubans. It would be a splendid thing for the Navy, too." After Lodge had been parading the woes of the Cuban patriots in the Senate for a vear or so until war came on, he wrote Roosevelt. then in Cuba in the midst of it, "From everything I hear I get a very poor impression of the insurgents, and if you get time I wish you would write me about them." If it had not been that he had helped to plunge the country into war and imperialism for the sake of Porto Rico and the Philippines, rather than for that of the "patriots," this would be rather amazing. One might have expected that the time for the distinguished senator from

Massachusetts to find out something about the insurgents was before, and not after, he had done his best to bring the war on in their alleged behalf.

Lastly, there was the newspaper situation. The decade of the nineties saw a great change in journalism. Although there had been

"yellow" journalism before, notably due to the efforts of James Gordon Bennett on *The Herald*, it was about 1890 that the format of the modern paper, with big headlines and the attempt to make sensational news of everything from a murder to the stock market, became general, and at that time *The World* and *The Journal* were fighting one another to win as large a following as possible by sensational news and methods among the new reading public.

Prosperity was returning, and failures and strikes as sources of headlines were beginning to disappear. Companies beginning to earn dividends again and men going soberly to work were insignificant news items for selling papers as compared with mobs, and defaults of great railroad and industrial enterprises. The newspapers were looking about for something to create excitement. Mr. Pulitzer, owner of *The World*, remarked "that he rather liked the idea of a war—not a big one—but one that would arouse interest and give him a chance to gauge the reflex in circulation figures." Meanwhile Mr. Hearst was making the new public spin like a whipped top with all sorts of sensational and heart-rending stories, many of them without the slightest foundation, from Cuba.

Incidentally in the previous decade we had advanced from twelfth to fifth place as a naval power and were rather proud of our new "white squadron," with Roosevelt as anxious to use it as a boy with a new shot-gun.

Such, then, were the conditions:—an idealism in the people at large that could be easily aroused in favor of any people supposed to be oppressed and struggling for freedom; a really bad and difficult situation in Cuba; a group of powerful business men and politicians bent on imperial expansion; a group of newspapers callously searching for sensational news which could be translated into circulation; and a shiny new gun in our hands of which we were proud. A spark thrown into such a collection of combustible material would be bound to cause an explosion.

On June 27, 1897, the old and distinguished Secretary of State, John Sherman, whose unhappy senility was soon to be so grossly manifested as to cause his replacement to become an obvious necessity, sent a note of protest to Spain against Weyler's inhumanity. The Spanish Government replied with a denial, and a hint that Weyler's conduct in Cuba under the necessities of the case was no

more inhumane than had been that of the American Secretary of State's brother, General Sherman, on his famous march through Georgia.

If the Cubans were not satisfied with the Spanish Government, neither were many of the Spaniards themselves at home, and soon after the above note was received by the indignant old Secretary, the reactionary Spanish Premier, Canovas, was assassinated and the Liberal Sagasta became head of the government. Weyler in Cuba was replaced by an abler and more humane general, Blanco, and autonomy was promised to the island. Our Minister at Madrid, General Stewart L. Woodford, was working hard for peace and affairs looked more hopeful.


However, there were powerful forces that did not want peace. Senator Proctor of Vermont, who had gone to Cuba, painted a lurid picture of conditions there. Our consul-general, who Cleveland had feared would precipitate a war if he could, was sending despatches alarming to our people and demanding the presence of American war-ships at Havana. The newspapers were fanning our idealism and emotions into a blaze which was sending their circulation rapidly mounting. The battle-ship *Maine* was ordered to pay a "friendly visit" to Havana.

Meanwhile, an unfortunate incident had occurred. The Spanish minister in Washington, Señor Depuy de Lôme, had written a private letter to a friend in Cuba, in which he expressed a very unfavorable opinion of McKinley, as was within his right in personal correspondence. The letter was stolen from the Havana post-office and published both in a Cuban newspaper and in *The New York Journal*, arousing a storm of resentment. His usefulness obviously over, de Lôme at once resigned, though protesting against the publication of a stolen private letter.

The letter had been published on February 9, 1898. Before the public excitement over this incident had had time to cool, on the morning of February 16 the public read in the papers the ghastly news that the previous evening the battle-ship *Maine* had been blown up by an explosion and sunk in Havana harbor with the loss of 260 officers and men.

It has never been satisfactorily determined what caused the explosion. An American board of naval experts examining the sunken

hull claimed that the vessel had been blown up from the outside. A Spanish board, who were not allowed to examine the hull but who did examine the bottom of the harbor, determined that the explosion must have been internal. Thirteen years later, the hull was raised and examined afresh by our own naval experts. They decided that the first board had been wrong as to the part of the ship where the ex-



AS THE NEW YORK JOURNAL VIEWED THE SITUATION ON MARCH 8, 1898

Cartoon by Davenport.

plosion had occurred, a majority still claiming, however, that the explosion had been external and a minority that it had been, as the Spaniards claimed, internal. As the ship was then towed out into deep water and sunk, no one can examine her again and the truth will always remain uncertain and the verdict suspicious. We refused to allow any one but ourselves to examine the evidence and then destroyed it.

That, however, made no difference in 1898. The newspapers and the public at once decided that the ship had been blown up by the deviltry of the Spaniards, and the war-cry of "Remember the Maine" swept the country. Three weeks after the sinking, Congress voted \$50,000,000 for the national defence. On March 29 McKinley sent an ultimatum to Spain demanding the immediate rescinding of the order for the reconcentration policy, and an armistice in Cuba. Spain complied immediately with the first demand, and on April 9 to the second. Two days earlier, the six greatest European powers had offered their services to intervene and bring about a peaceful solution. Woodford from Madrid reported that the Span-



ARMED INTERVENTION SPAIN PLANTS 40 MINES IF M'KINLEY DODGES. IN HAVANA HARBOR.

THE NEWSPAPERS HAD DECLARED FOR WAR "The World" of April 4, 1898.

ish Government was moving as rapidly as possible to comply with all our demands without bringing on revolution, the overthrow of the dynasty, and chaos.

McKinley himself had desired peace, but the pressure on a man who was honest and amiable but not strong had become overwhelming. The powerful groups who wanted war were determined on it. The newspapers fanned the fury of the populace to a roaring blaze. The President decided to throw the decision on Congress, and on April 10 had his message ready. That day he received despatches from Woodford stating that Spain conceded practically anything we might ask.

It was too late. The next day, McKinley sent his message to Congress with merely a casual reference at the very end to Woodford's despatch and Spain's offer. On the 19th, Congress passed a resolution declaring Cuba independent, calling on Spain to withdraw from her colony, authorizing the President to enforce this demand with the army and navy, and finally declaring that we would ourselves withdraw from Cuba as soon as we had secured her inde-

pendence and would leave her to govern herself. Five days later, Spain declared war. We declared war on April 25.

At this stage, the idealism of the American people was in full flood. The Cuban patriots had been painted in glowing colors, the ferocity of the Spaniards in deepest black. We were on a crusade to help a glorious little people win their freedom from oppression, and we had guaranteed that we would altruistically leave them their independence when we had helped them achieve it. How immensely



THE PLIGHT OF THE CUBAN PATRIOTS ROUSED THE PATRIOTISM OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS

From the original card in the Confederate Museum, Richmond.

finer we thought ourselves than the empire-grabbing States of Europe who, particularly since about 1880, had been seizing territory all over the world and subjecting alien races to themselves because of markets or raw materials! If the thoughts of newspaper owners were on circulation and profits, and those of certain astute statesmen and captains of industry were strongly flavored with plain European imperialism, it is only fair to emphasize that the people at large who favored the war did so at first in a fine spirit of unselfishness.

They immediately, however, received something of a shock. The island of Cuba was definite enough. It was almost at our doorstep, a few miles only from our coast. The job seemed to be to go down

there and put the Spaniards out, if they did not get out voluntarily. The President called for 200,000 volunteers. If, in more than a month, only 120,000 had come forward, that did not make much difference. They were a good many more than our incompetent War Department knew what to do with anyway, and ample for the Cuban job.

If the people had been thinking only of Cuba, others had wider views, the "large policy" which Lodge, Roosevelt, and others had been trying to educate McKinley up to adopting. Roosevelt had sent Dewey to the Far East, and the day before we formally declared war, on April 25, that officer at Hong-Kong received orders to proceed to the Philippine Islands and to destroy or capture the Spanish Oriental Fleet. So the American nation, with its eyes on Cuba, on May 6 was stunned to hear that five days earlier Dewey had destroyed ten Spanish men-of-war at Manila, killed or wounded 381 men, without the loss of a single American, and with no damage to our ships. He had then settled down to the blockade of Manila with the intention of taking the Philippine Islands.

Hardly any of us knew where the islands were and it all seemed remote from the patriots whom we were supposed to be rescuing in Cuba. That island, in fact, was more remote in policy than the Philippines in space, though the idealism of the people had not yet grasped that fact. In May, Lodge was writing to Roosevelt, now Lieutenant-Colonel of the Rough Riders in Texas instead of in the Navy office, that "we are not lugging that monitor across the Pacific for the fun of lugging her back again. They mean to send not less than 20,000 men to the Philippines. As to Cuba I am in no sort of hurry . . . Porto Rico is not forgotten and we mean to have it. Unless I am utterly and profoundly mistaken the Administration is now fully committed to the large policy that we both desire." A week later he added, "for various reasons I am not anxious to see the war jammed through. . . . Let us get the outlying things first."

The Cuban patriots and America on crusade had overlooked the desirability of the "outlying things," but the war was to be in many ways a surprise. It was a short and, as far as America was concerned, an almost bloodless one. We had only about 379 men killed or died of wounds, though the toll of sickness, largely due to the colossal inefficiency of the War Department, was heavy in comparison. Per-

haps no other war has had such amazing results at so slight a cost in life. The Spaniards were brave and showed themselves chivalrous, but the fighting at all points was thousands of miles from Spain, and her navy was made up of antiquated ships in bad condition. The fight in Manila Bay was about as exciting and glorious as killing a deer which walks out of the woods to look at you.

Although Dewey could take the city of Manila he had no troops to hold it and had to await the reinforcements of which Lodge wrote to Roosevelt. While waiting, a British, French, Japanese, and two German ships of war arrived to look after the rights of their nationals. All behaved with exemplary courtesy except the German Admiral, Von Diedrich, who blustered and threatened until Dewey, after accusing him of gross discourtesy and suggesting that if he wanted a fight he could have it at once, brought him to some sense of decency. The chief result of this otherwise unimportant incident was the beginning of a far more friendly feeling for England in America owing to the fact that the British commander, Chichester, had made it obvious to the Germans that if they did try a fight he would be on the side of Dewey. After our troops had arrived, an assault was made on the city and on the 12th of August the capital of the islands passed into our possession. Meanwhile, Congress by joint resolution had annexed the Hawaiian Islands on July 7, as a valuable naval base and a handy stepping-stone to our embryo Oriental empire.

In the West Indian theatre of operations we had been trying to locate the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera. For a while it could not be found, and there was tremendous excitement up and down the Atlantic coast lest it should appear and bombard one summer resort or another. After the game of hide-and-seek had gone on for some time it was found that Cervera had taken refuge in the harbor of Santiago in Cuba. Although he had sailed into the harbor on May 19 and Rear-Admiral Sampson had ordered Schley to blockade him there with the American fleet, it was not until the 29th, and after inexplicable backing and filling, that Schley got there.

The troops destined for the island had been gathered at Tampa, Florida, where the confusion due to the incompetence of the higher military authorities was almost beyond belief, as it was to continue throughout the brief struggle. No attempt was made to improve the

single-track railroad; the food was bad, when there was any; troops had to move by themselves without orders and capture their own freight cars to get to docks nine miles off to reach the embarkation point; lighters had to be seized by energetic officers for their men to get on board transports; cavalry regiments were shipped without their horses; orders to sail were given and countermanded; men herded like cattle on the decks of ships were left there for days in the tropical sun. Roosevelt wrote to Lodge begging him to bring pressure to get some one to bring order out of the chaos. Lodge replied soothingly, saying, "I am devoting all my strength to get the annexation of Hawaii," adding that there was no longer any doubt we must have Porto Rico and that the Administration was coming round to the annexation of the Philippines. The Cuban "patriots" had ceased to count.

Finally, however, troops did reach the coast of their island, and on June 24 won against the Spanish at Las Guasimas, and on July 1 assaulted the heights around Santiago. The most noted minor engagement was that at San Juan Hill where Roosevelt under Colonel Leonard Wood led the Rough Riders on foot (their horses were still in Florida), against the enemy. The American charge against fortified positions was magnificently carried out, and much valor was shown on both sides.

Santiago itself had not yet been captured but was in imminent peril, although sickness was taking a heavy toll of the Americans, and General Shafter was inclined to withdraw the troops. On July 3 Admiral Sampson had steamed to Siboney, where the sick general had his headquarters, to confer with him, and had been gone from the blockading squadron only about half an hour when the Spanish fleet made an effort to escape from the harbor. No braver man or more courteous enemy has ever commanded at sea than Admiral Cervera. He had known from the start, when ordered overseas by the government in unfit and unprepared vessels, that only surrender or destruction could await him.

Realizing that when Santiago fell, his fleet would be bombarded from the heights, he preferred to dash out to sea and end in glorious fight. There was never any chance for him, and one after another his ships were destroyed, Cervera himself leaping from the burning deck of the *Maria Teresa* into the sea, to be picked up by the Americans, as they rescued hundreds of others from the blazing and ex-

ploding vessels. The fact that Sampson, who outranked Schley, had been absent at the beginning of the fight, and the jealousy between them and their partisans, resulted in one of the most notable and unedifying controversies in our history, which divided the American people and lasted for years.

Ten days after the battle, General Toral surrendered Santiago to Generals Shafter, Miles, and Wheeler, and on the 25th, Miles, who had proceeded to Porto Rico, received the surrender of that island. The war was over.

In the meantime, American sentiment had suffered a profound change. Whatever many leaders had had in their minds, when the people had applauded the war at the beginning the people had thought only of freeing Cuba. But as we gathered islands into our arms in the Atlantic and Pacific, a wave of imperialistic ambition swept the nation. Men who believed that America as an empire, governing alien and subject races, would change its character from that of the great self-governing Republic, were denounced as unpatriotic fools or worse. The conventions of the Republican Party all over the country were passing resolutions declaring that "where the flag once goes up it must never come down." McKinley wrestled with the problem of whether or not to demand the Philippines while imperialists like Lodge and large business interests which wanted materials and markets, and clergymen who dreamed of saving the souls of natives, all brought pressure on him. Finally he decided it was destiny that we must keep the islands.

The Peace Commission which met the Spanish Commissioners in Paris secured all that the most ardent imperialist could have wished. Spain gave up her sovereignty over Cuba, ceded Porto Rico and Guam to the United States, as, for \$20,000,000, she also surrendered the Philippine archipelago to us. The Treaty further provided that Congress should be empowered to determine the rights of the inhabitants of the ceded territories.

The Treaty, however, met with strong opposition in the Senate, where many senators felt that the constitutional and other problems involved in our becoming an empire were bound to have serious and unhappy results. Oddly enough, in view of his stand on another Treaty twenty years later, likewise negotiated in Paris, Lodge insisted that not to accept it would "be a repudiation of the President

and humiliation of the whole country in the eyes of the world." Bryan, who was opposed to imperialism but who wished also to end the war, voted in favor of the Treaty which was ratified by a majority of only one vote.

On April 11, 1899, peace was declared. We had acquired 8,500,000 "subjects"—about 1,000,000 Spaniards and negroes in Porto Rico, and 7,500,000 Filipinos, a large part of the latter being savages. Many, however, were not so but were civilized and educated, and under their leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, had, like the Cubans, been fighting for independence. This insurrection was now directed against us instead of Spain, and it took us three years to suppress it.

It was not until the spring of 1900 that we began to provide forms of government for our new dependencies, but Cuba received attention more promptly. We had pledged ourselves to her independence, so the main problem was settled. Much to the mortification of the Cubans, however, we tied a string to their sovereignty, and forced them to add an amendment to their Constitution by which the United States could in part control their foreign policy and finances. The Platt Amendment, as it is called, also gave us the right to intervene at any time to maintain an "adequate" government for the protection of life, property, and liberty; and forced Cuba to cede us a couple of coaling stations on her coast.

It should be added that the American army of occupation, under General Wood, did extraordinarily good work in sanitary and other improvements in the island before they withdrew and Wood handed over the government to the first elected President, Estrada Palma, on May 20, 1902. It was a fine piece of colonial administration, and the efficiency displayed, in notable contrast to the muddle of the war, was of lasting benefit to the island. The Platt Amendment was also for the good of the Cuban people, and if we threw to the winds the idealism with which we had started the war, we at least maintained it with regard to Cuba, and gave an example of restraint in leaving the rich "Pearl of the Antilles" to work out its own destiny in comparative freedom if it could.

Little by little, since the Peace of 1783 we had been extending our territory, but now for the first time we found ourselves a world power, and were so recognized both by our own people and foreign statesmen. This did not come about from our having defeated a



ENTRENCHMENTS AND UTAH LIGHT BATTERY IN ACTION

Vear Chinese Church, Caloocan, February 10, 1899. Smoke on left is from the 3d Artillery, engage as infantry.



RECRUITING FOR THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR From photographs in the War Department.



OREGCN VOLUNTEER INFANTRY RETURNING TO MANILA AFTER THE FIGHT OF FEBRUARY 5, 1899



OFFICERS' MESS OF THE ROUGH RIDERS IN SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, 1898

Col. Leonard Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt at head of table. Cadet Haskell, badly wounded in the San Juan fight, at the left.

From photographs in the War Department.

decrepit and tottering second-rate European nation with a glorious past. That was not a great feat in itself, and at least the ostensible cause of the quarrel had been conditions just off our own coast in Cuba, and had had nothing to do with world politics. Nor did the recognition of our new status come altogether from our having become an Asiatic power by the acquisition of the Philippines, though that did indeed mark a great departure from our traditional policy and might presage almost anything.

It came, rather, from the sudden recognition of what had been largely overlooked until the war turned the spotlight of the world's interest on us, the fact of our colossal economic growth. In the new world system then developing, wealth and economic resources had begun to spell power as never before, and the world all at once discovered that there were 75,000,000 of restless and energetic people, possessing the richest half of one of the richest continents in the world, who were beginning to emerge from their self-centred isolation and to spread out in trade and conquest. Small and short as the war had been, it had also fired the enthusiasm of most of our own people for taking a place among the nations of the world.

If one overlooked the almost pathetic weakness of our foe, the naval victories at Manila and Santiago had certainly been smashing ones, and the people suddenly developed an immense pride in their navy. Atlases had been in much request during the war, and great numbers of citizens whose interest before had scarcely gone beyond their "Main Street" found themselves thinking in terms both of Europe and the Far East. Minds were opened and victory brought a sense of power. For the next twenty years, until we shut ourselves up again, it seemed as though we were destined to play that rôle in international affairs which all expected that we should.

In 1899, when the Czar of Russia sent out invitations to the powers to meet at The Hague to discuss the problem of the economic burden of armaments, breaking with our traditional policy of isolation, we accepted, and sent an able delegation with Andrew D. White at its head. They were not mere "observers," and it was chiefly owing to American influence that the Conference agreed to establish the permanent Court of Arbitration, before which, three years later, the United States and Mexico were the first nations to appear to settle a serious dispute by amicable methods.

Our delegates were scarcely home from The Hague, when Secretary of State Hay took the lead in endeavoring to save the Chinese Empire from practical dismemberment, in the guise of concessions, by competing European powers. On September 6, 1899, he initiated the policy which became known as "the open door," by asking France, England, Russia, and Germany that each should make no discrimination against other nationals in the spheres of their "concessions," to which they all acceded,—a distinct liberalizing of the older imperialism. Some months later there was again a serious

This Government is animated by a sincere desire that the interexts of our cftizens may not be prejudiced through exclusive treatment
by any of the controlling Powers within their so-called "spheres of interest" in China, and hopes also to retain there an open market for the
commerce of the world, remove dangerous sources of international irritation, and hasten thereby united or concerted action of the Powers
at Pekin in favor of the administrative reforms so argently needed
for strengthening the imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China in which the whole western world is alike concerned. It believes that such a result may be greatly assisted
OFFICE COPY OF INSTRUCTIONS OF JOHN HAY TO AMBASSADOR CHOATE IN
LONDON, RELATIVE TO THE "OPEN DOOR" POLICY
Courtery of the State Department, Washington.

threat of the dismemberment of the empire. Floods, famines, and hatred of the foreigners stirred a revolt, and the revolutionists, or "Boxers," threatened to destroy the foreign legations at Peking. A complete massacre of all the foreigners and their families in the beleaguered city was feared, and the world was in suspense until a rescue was effected by a force made up of 2500 American troops, 3000 British, 800 French, and 8000 Japanese.

Such an incident under the old imperialism was considered an opportunity to acquire territory as a means of punishment, and the European nations were ready to dismember China by securing large punitive grants. Hay blocked this plan by claiming that the rebellion was a domestic one against the Chinese Government, and that all

THE REPUBLIC BECOMES AN EMPIRE

which foreigners could claim would be the proper punishment of offenders and the payment of a cash indemnity for actual losses. America placed hers at \$24,000,000 and it was only with much difficulty that the European nations were induced to place theirs at \$110,000,000, secured by Chinese taxes and duties. America, however, had saved the territorial integrity of the empire, and five years later, when it was found that our actual loss had not been much more than half the sum first named, we remitted \$11,000,000 of the payment, which China in gratitude put aside as a fund to send Chinese students to American universities.

Although the issue of the bitter campaign of 1896 had been free silver, it was not until March 14, 1900, that an Act ensuring the gold standard was finally passed and signed. This established that all forms of our money must be redeemable in gold on demand, created a redemption fund of gold metal to the amount of \$150,000,000, and provided that paper notes, when presented for payment in gold, should not be issued again except for gold. The endless chain, which Cleveland had pleaded to have broken, was at last shattered.

The rapid increase in the annual production of gold, of which we have spoken, and a series of unusually fine harvests, had brought abounding prosperity to the United States. There was, however, much dissatisfaction with the distribution of its fruits, and Roosevelt noted in 1899 that "the agitation against trusts is taking an always firmer hold," and that he was surprised to find how many workmen in New York State who had been strongly Republican in 1896 were now grumbling. But on the whole there was little doubt of the outcome of the election of 1900.

There was no doubt at all as to candidates for the Presidency. Mc-Kinley might, as Roosevelt somewhat unjustly said, have "no more backbone than a chocolate éclair" but he had got on well with Congress, had been dignified in office, and was popular and respected. In the Democratic Party, Bryan had made himself practical dictator and the attitude of the rank and file toward him was rather that of the followers of a prophet than of a mere political leader. In their eyes he stood for the cause of humanity rather than for any particular policy, but the exigencies of a campaign demanded specific issues, and there was none in 1900 on which he could rouse the country.

He came out strongly against imperialism and our governing subject races, but with the exception of a comparatively small group of intellectuals, the mass of the people were proud of the war and of our new acquisitions, and the issue, both in its constitutional and ethical aspects, was rather above the head of the average voter. Besides, it had been Bryan's own vote and influence which had made possible the ratification of the treaty by which we acquired the Philippines, and this fact made a weak point in his armor. With abounding prosperity, both the tariff and the free-silver issues roused comparatively little interest, and it was probably Bryan's attacks on the trusts and corporate wealth which brought him the greatest number of followers.

To a certain extent Hanna, who was again manager of the campaign, afforded Bryan ammunition. Whether Hanna was becoming a bit tired or merely lazy, he found it much easier to get contributions to the \$2,500,000 he wanted to elect McKinley from a comparatively few rich men and corporations than from the people at large, and the election of 1900 was financed more exclusively by the "interests" than any one previously had been. On the other hand, full revelations of the scandals of big business had not yet been made, and Hanna was able to make effective use of the slogans of "Republican prosperity" and the "full dinner pail."

As it was to turn out, the most important event in what would otherwise have been a rather stale political season was the choice of McKinley's running-mate.

In many respects there has been no other figure in American public life to compare with Theodore Roosevelt. After a rather sickly youth he had become a man of almost incomparably abounding physical as well as mental vigor. Never a profound and often not a logical thinker, the range of his intellectual interests was wide and his memory unusual. Standing firmly for the ideals, which he was fond of preaching, of the ordinary clean, honest American, he also delighted to describe himself as a "very practical man," a combination which sometimes brought him into strange combinations with political bosses. He was essentially pragmatic, and believed in working with what tools one had, even if they were pretty filthy at times.

Of his patriotism, ideals, and ability both in politics and statesmanship, there can be no doubt. He had an extraordinary capacity



TROOP L, 6TH U. S. CAVALRY, AT THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA, NEAR THE MING TOMBS From a photograph in the War Department.



BRONCHO PHILOSOPHER

The

LOVE, SONG AND LAUGHTER

SAY! LISTEN!

When a bit of sunshine hits ye' after passin' of a cloud,

An' a lit of laughter gits ye' an' yer spine is feelin' proud,

Don't forgit to up an' fling it at a soul that's feelin' blue

For the minit that ye sling it, it's a boomerang to you.

From a sacred song-FAITH-Copyrighted

Oh, I want to tell the story to the friends I love today I shall tell it to my Saviour in the morning, In the morning, in the morning, with the halo of His love But I want to scatter sunshine ere my soul has passed away, I have no regrets to offer, I have no desire to stay,

I am clinging to His hand, I shall know and understand, When I meet my blessed Saviour in the morning.

What are you? What am I? But a stew and a fry, A broil and a siz, and a scramble for biz, And six feet of earth when we die.

PRESS OF GEORGE SETON THOMPSON, CHICAGO

Copyright, 1937.

JACK CRAWFORD—THE LAST OF THE POET PHILOSOPHERS

Famous as a scout and composer and reciter of verses from the late seventies until his death in 1917.

THE REPUBLIC BECOMES AN EMPIRE

also for making himself popular, which he used as an actor does, but apart from this, there were genuine qualities in the man himself which enormously interested people of the most varied sorts. No other American, if any statesman anywhere, has ever aroused the world-wide interest in himself and his doings which attended Roosevelt in the fifteen years after the Spanish War.

He had a way of making himself, or at least of becoming, the centre of every scene in which he figured, a characteristic popularity commented on in the saying that if he attended a funeral he would insist on being the corpse. In the Spanish War he had promptly abandoned his desk to raise a regiment of Western cowboys, and although he was only second in command, Wood being the colonel, the spot-light of publicity was always on Roosevelt. He did good work but when the regiment got to Cuba, the impression created was that there was almost no one on the island but Roosevelt, and his ordinary brave part in the charge at San Juan Hill was magnified into one of the glories of the ages. As McKinley remarked, no one else had got so much out of the war as Roosevelt had, and even before his return he was being boomed for governor of New York.

He was accepted by Platt, and elected, but his honesty and energy in office antagonized the larger business interests, who preferred to know just what a legislature cost rather than to indulge in purity in politics, and they were anxious to get rid of him. In view of his enormous popularity as "Teddy" throughout the country, the safest thing seemed to be to kick him upstairs to the innocuous office of Vice-President, and although McKinley was not desirous of having this political *enfant terrible* and erratic human dynamo as his running-mate, it was arranged between the bosses that he should be given the nomination. Roosevelt himself swore that he did not want it and would not take it, but although warned that if he went to the convention he would be nominated by acclamation, he went, in Rough Rider hat and red bandanna, and received and accepted the nomination.

The popular enthusiasm is one side of the picture but we may look at another, for the nomination of Roosevelt is as good an example as any for the study of the National Convention as an expression of the choice of the people for candidates. It had been hoped that such a system of nomination by delegates chosen by State conventions,

delegates to which in turn had been chosen by district conventions, delegates to which last had been chosen by "the people," would express the people's choice. In fact, to a very great extent, the National Convention system, although none better has yet been suggested, had come to descend to and rest upon, through the hierarchy of



THE PRODIGAL'S RETURN

A cartoon by Coffin in the Isabella Solomons' Collection, Library
of Congress.

delegates, not "the people" but the local and State bosses.

According to as shrewd an observer of politics as the old Joe Cannon, what happened at the Philadelphia convention was something quite different from the people's choosing Roosevelt. Platt, the boss of New York, wished to rid himself, as did big business, of Roosevelt as governor. The simplest method, as we have said, was to "kick him upstairs" to the seemingly innocuous office of Vice-President. On the other hand, the powerful

party boss, Hanna, was strongly opposed to having the irrepressible governor as the running-mate for the less picturesque McKinley. There was, however, another factor in the situation. Matthew Quay, the boss of Pennsylvania, had conceived the notion that if the number of delegates to the National Convention were based on party strength instead of population in each State, his own position as controlling the delegates from the overwhelmingly Republican State of Pennsylvania would be much increased. He wished to have the rules changed to compass this desirable result. Such a change would in

THE REPUBLIC BECOMES AN EMPIRE

many ways be beneficial to the country, and was later advocated by Taft, but Hanna, controlling the delegates from the Democratic South, naturally had no wish to have his own power shorn for the benefit of Boss Quay. Platt, however, had agreed that he would vote for Quay's change of rules in exchange for the promise that Quay would have his delegates vote for Roosevelt.

As between Roosevelt and a change in the rules, Hanna considered Roosevelt the lesser of the two evils, as less permanent. He therefore split the Platt-Quay alliance by promising Platt his own backing of Roosevelt if Platt would oppose Quay's plans. This was what was going on behind the scenes, while the delegates applauded Roosevelt's red bandanna, and is much the sort of thing which goes on in all National Conventions. As between Platt and Quay as political bosses there was not much to choose, but Quay's plan, although proposed for the purely selfish purpose of strengthening his own corrupt power in a notoriously corrupt State, was really constructive in its more permanent effects. No one was thinking, however, in terms of statesmanship, but all three,—Hanna, Platt, and Quay,—in terms of immediate political advantage. So, amid vast enthusiasm, the hero of San Juan Hill was put on the ticket with Major McKinley.

Although, in the ensuing campaign, there was an unusual number of parties in the field, the real contest, as always was between the Republicans and Democrats, and, as had been anticipated, the ticket of McKinley and Roosevelt easily won, 7,219,000 to 6,358,000 in the popular vote and 292 to 155 in the Electoral College. Apparently Roosevelt had been respectably buried as presiding officer of the Senate, and big business sighed relief. It did not dream of assassination.

CHAPTER IX

THE ROOSEVELT ERA

he last year or more of McKinley's life as President, both before and after his second election, was chiefly notable for the adjustment of our relations to our new dependencies. In a series of cases which reached the Supreme Court in 1900 and 1901, it became all too clear that the overseas possessions, "the outlying things" of Senator Lodge's phrase, had no legitimate place in our constitutional system. Unlike the areas acquired in the course of our steady continental expansion, these islands inhabited by alien races, many of them savage and all speaking languages other than our own, could not be passed through a "Territorial" stage to be admitted within a reasonable time as States of the Union.

We had, however, acquired them, and the Supreme Court was faced by a condition and not by a theory. If the logic of its decisions was far from clear, that was chiefly because the situation itself was not logical. The new possessions were declared not to be foreign countries but on the other hand neither were they parts of the United States, and their citizens were left suspended in a sort of Mahomet's coffin of an anomalous status. What mainly came out of the decisions was the verdict that Congress had the power to legislate for the possessions and to do about as it chose, subject to revision by the Court, which reserved the right to decide on each topic as it might come up without laying down any general principles.

At first, largely owing to the insurrection, the Philippines had to be placed under strict military rule, but Aguinaldo surrendered to General Funston in March, 1901, and the backbone of the revolt was broken, though the islands were not entirely pacified. We may note that although we paid Spain only \$20,000,000 for the archipelago, and had complained of her inability to put down the Cuban revolution upon our immediate demand, it took us four years and cost us \$170,000,000 to quell the Philippine one. An adjustment of disputed and titles with the friars cost us over \$7,000,000 more, so that our

new possession really cost us about nine times the sum first contemplated by the imperialists.

Civil governments of different forms were set up in all the newly acquired islands, in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, before the end of McKinley's term, following in many respects the precedents of the old British colonial governments before the American Revolution. It is interesting to note that in ruling our own dependencies we have found it necessary to do not a few of the things of which we so bitterly complained as being tyrannical in 1776. It is the old story of the different viewpoints of those in opposition and those in power with the responsibilities of office. In Porto Rico, for example, we erected a government in which both the governor and members of the Upper House were appointed by the President of the United States. and the Lower House was elected by the qualified voters in Porto Rico. As Congress had also the power to legislate for the welfare of the island, we reproduced the old type of Royal colony, merely substituting the President for the King, and Congress for Parliament.

In April, 1900, both Hawaii and Porto Rico were made Territories, but although their populations warranted Statehood, they have never received that status, and it is uncertain if they ever will. The United States undertook its obligations of governing in good faith, and all of our possessions have improved greatly in such matters as public health, education, and order. There has been much advance in building of roads, in the sanitation of cities, the establishment of hospitals, in water supplies and many other fundamentals of modern life, while our administrative services have been freer from graft and scandal than have our own domestic governments. They have, indeed, beginning with Wood in Cuba and William H. Taft in the Philippines, developed a series of administrators of whom we may well be proud.


Nevertheless, it is improbable that these possessions can be absorbed as integral parts in our self-governing system for a long time, if ever. How completely outside our normal course of expansion they were was shown at once in the disputes over levying tariff duties on the products imported from them. It would be as unthinkable as it would be unconstitutional, to lay duties on the import of products of any of the continental States or Territories into the rest of the

country, but both Congress and the Supreme Court decided that we could do so on the products of even Hawaii and Porto Rico after they had become "Territories," and we did so also in the Philippines. Of course we could not do so if they ever became States, and this fact has large political significance.

McKinley was chiefly concerned with these insular questions in the early months of his second term in 1901 when he attended the Pan-American Exposition at Buffalo in September. He was not a great man, but he was an able, gentle and lovable one, and since he had been in the White House he had endeared himself in an unusual degree to the American people. He had also developed as a statesman, especially in his views of international relations and policy. As a small-town Congressman he had believed in a Chinese wall of tariffs around protected American industries; as President he had come to realize that, as he said in a speech on September 5, at Buffalo, we cannot "forever sell everything and buy little or nothing." He had come to regard the tariff not as protection for American industry but, in reciprocity treaties, as a means of expanding American commerce. The nation applauded the speech, and with three and a half years yet to serve, McKinley seemed to have a great and useful future before him.

The next day, at a reception, he held out his hand to shake that of a young Pole, one of whose hands, apparently injured, was done up in linen. Instantly a flash of flame came from the bandage, followed by another, and the President fell back, shot through the stomach by a madman. Rallying from the operation which was immediately performed, his recovery was looked upon as certain, but a week later he began to sink and died on the 14th. Roosevelt, the man of whom the bosses and the big business interests had thought to have rid themselves by burying him as presiding officer of the Senate, was President of the United States.

The mourning country, which now so unexpectedly found the young Roosevelt,—he was yet but forty-two,—at its head, had changed much in the preceding decade. Not only had it become a world power but there had been a similar change of scale in many other aspects of its life. We were on the threshold of the era in which we are still living, in spite of the vast changes which have occurred since.




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A BYGONE ERA


Fifth Avenue, looking north from 11th Street, New York, 1898.



ALL SET FOR THE RIDE
A Haynes-Apperson automobile of 1901.



By courtesy of W. F. Reeves, Esq.



Wood engraving, circa 1880, in the J. Clarence Davies Collection, Museum of the City of New York.



Top, First car in world operated by cable, on Greenwich Street, from Battery Place to Cortlandt Street, New York, 1867; it was the first passenger car on an elevated railroad; Charles T. Harvey, designer and engineer of the Ninth Avenue Elevated Railway, New York, is in car. Centre, the first Grand Central Terminal, New York, 1871-1910; Grand Union Hotel (right), and the end of the Elevated spur in use from 1878 to 1923, between the two. Bottom, Subway secrety built in the early seventies on Broadway from Murray to Warren Streets,

New York. The tube was 9 feet in diameter, built mostly of brick with the car designed to be operated by compressed air. No franchise could be obtained and the company went out of existence. The work of building a new subway nearly fifty years later brought the tunnel and car to light.

The age of electricity, after many experiments, had come, and its effect was being felt in many directions. In 1900 there were about 2500 power stations, and their number was increasing rapidly every year. The first trolley cars had been installed in 1898, and in a few years were to be common everywhere. In that year, Boston had built the first subway in America, and New York followed in 1900. Roosevelt's presidency was to see the electrification of the great railroad systems well begun, and the tunnels built connecting New York with Long Island and New Jersey.

The transmission of electric power from central stations to homes and offices quickly brought into the market innumerable sorts of electrical appliances, such as irons, dish-washers, and so on, as well as electric lights. The cheaper power made the elevator more practical, and with the elevator came the apartment house and the skyscraper. The Flatiron Building in New York rose to its twenty stories in 1902, and in a few years was followed by the great Metropolitan Tower, the Singer Building and the Municipal Building, as well as the beginning of the super-skyscraper in other cities, and, in just a decade, by the Woolworth Building, in New York, 785 feet high. As part of the change, we may note that in the late 80's about 1300 private houses were built annually on Manhattan Island, but that by 1904 only 40 were put up whereas apartment houses were rising rapidly, completely altering not only the physical form of the old "home" but the life of the women and children within it.

The new architecture marked a profound change in the mentality of the people. One has only to contrast the low, small and exquisite City Hall in New York, perhaps the most perfect of the early nineteenth-century buildings in America, with the soaring bulk of its neighbor, the Municipal Building, to realize the psychological as well as the architectural gulf that separates the builders of each. There was profound significance in the fact that we Americans had suddenly started to build our communal and public edifices on a scale equalled only by the Egyptian and the Roman. Not only the office skyscraper but the vast railway stations of this decade were symptomatic of the change. While Europe was content with small, grimy, and purely utilitarian structures, the Americans undertook that series of great marble buildings, unsurpassed save by Rome in vastness and satisfying dignity, beginning with the Union Station at

Washington, completed in 1907, and reaching the summit in the Pennsylvania (1910) and Grand Central Stations (1913) in New York.

In other respects we were also standing at the threshold of a new era in 1901. In America, at least, perhaps no other mechanical invention has so altered the entire life and ways of living and of thought as has the automobile. In 1895 there were but four motor cars registered in the whole country. By 1900 there were 8000, and the flood of production was soon to be let loose. In 1903 the Wright brothers in North Carolina made the first flight in the air in world history in a machine which had raised itself by its own power, and eight years later Glenn Curtiss made the first successful hydroplane. A new world was indeed coming into being.

The change of scale and the growing interest in communal rather than personal life was as notable in the field of letters as in that of architecture. Improvements and reduction of costs in printing and illustrating, as well as the discovery of the great profits in advertising, doubled and trebled the circulation of the new types of popular, low-priced magazines, such as Collier's, Munsey's, McClure's, The Cosmopolitan and others. The Saturday Evening Post, bought for \$1000 in 1897, was soon to rise to amazing figures of circulation. Among books, the best sellers were also sold in hitherto unheard-of quantities,—such as, in 1901, 275,000 copies of Janice Meredith, 320,000 of The Crisis, 420,000 of Richard Carvel, and 520,000 of David Harum.

It was not merely, however, the increase in scale which was notable in publishing. In the decade after the war, the attention of both authors and readers was almost wholly concentrated on the American scene, as is shown by glancing over the list of titles of such leading writers of the period as Booth Tarkington, Jack London, Mrs. Wharton, Hamlin Garland, Harold Frederic, John Fox, Frank Norris, Miss Wilkins, Owen Wister, and others. Moreover, increasingly after 1901, the articles which helped to sell the popular magazines were those dealing with the evils and scandals of our economic and political régime, exposed also in such books as The Octopus (1901) and The Pit (1903) by Norris, The History of the Standard Oil Company (1904) by Ida Tarbell, The Shame of the Cities (1904) by Lincoln Steffens, or The Jungle (1906) by Upton Sinclair and

The Iron Heel (1907) by Jack London. These and such authors also as Burton J. Hendrick and Ray Stannard Baker, although imitated by a host of mere sensation-mongers, did careful and able work in uncovering the corruption and injustice which were eating into our national life from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Their popularity testified to the deep discontent and mistrust of the people with their leaders.

Both emotions were wholly warranted. Although as we have seen, the "trust" and large corporation had appeared before the war, the change in scale and the tendency toward consolidation were most notable immediately after. Between 1898 and 1900 more than two score combinations took place in the iron and steel industry alone, and in those years were formed such huge companies as the Amalgamated Copper, the American Smelting & Refining, the larger Standard Oil, and the Consolidated Tobacco, to be followed in 1901 by the United States Steel.

The last, which was characteristic of all of them in the extent of its over-capitalization, issued securities of a par value of over \$1,400,000,000 though its actual assets were estimated at only about \$682,000,000 so that a large part of its 7 per cent preferred stock, as well as its whole issue of more than \$500,000,000 of common, was water. Huge quantities of water were also similarly injected into the new railway and other combines. The only way to make profits on all this gigantic mass of capital, issued for the benefit of those who floated it, and much of which represented no tangible property or earning power, was to keep expenses, including wages, to their lowest point, to charge unwarranted and sometimes outrageously high prices for services or products, and to utilize all possible means of controlling markets and prices.

Both the consumer and the wage-earner had begun to feel completely helpless before these colossal aggregations of wealth and power. Such a railroad man as E. H. Harriman boasted openly of being able to buy both legislatures and courts for whatever he needed. The word of these financial titans, and not of the people's representatives and judges, appeared to have become the law of the land. They seemed, and felt themselves to be, all-powerful. Harriman did magnificent work in rehabilitating the broken-down Union Pacific railroad system, but on the other hand he considered himself

a czar in the vast Western territory which he ruled. The people of Oregon complained bitterly that they could not develop their State, in which there was a section as large as Ohio without a mile of railroad, because Harriman was not ready to build himself and would allow no one else to do so.

The great change in the scale of business, the vast opportunities for sudden and incalculably great riches from stock watering and market operations, had gone to the heads of these leaders who were corrupting and threatening the whole of American life, growing colossally rich while wages were being lowered. Speaking of them five years after the Steel Trust had marked the advent of billiondollar companies, Roosevelt wrote that "in their hearts they take the ground that to take legal proceedings against them when they violate the law and to endeavor to have them pay their proper share of the taxes is as much of an outrage as to excite the mob to plunder the rich. As you know, in San Francisco many of the big corporations have deliberately stood by the labor union party, saying with utter cynicism that they preferred the chance of occasional violence if they could temper it with corruption, to an honest government that would permit neither corruption nor violence." It was the old story of corrupting governments, municipal, State, or national, in order to obtain special privileges which would enable their possessors to crush competitors, and make profits on bogus capital.

Free silver as an issue was dead, but what had been the underlying issue of the 1896 campaign was not. Neither the Republican Party nor the great business leaders had learned anything. Having downed Bryan they had merely become more reckless and cynical than ever. On the other hand, the discontent of the people had become more profound, wide-spread and intelligent. The question of a sound currency was settled. The question in 1901 was of a sound national life and of the rights of the tens of millions of ordinary citizens as against the new concentrated power of a few dozen.

By 1904, 164,500 miles of railroad, practically all that was worth anything, was controlled by six groups of individuals, who by means of their own wealth, and yet more by the control they held over banks and life insurance companies, were coming to dominate the life of the people in every department. The organization and control of the business concerns were, in truth, concentrating so rapidly that

by 1910 an investigating committee of Congress could report that the two banking groups in New York, known generally as the Morgan and the Rockefeller groups, held 341 directorships in 112 companies with aggregate resources of \$22,245,000,000. In the face of this situation the old political system of government appeared to have become useless.

On the other hand, the people were becoming very much alive to the evils, though they did not know how to cure them, and the spiritual forces of the nation were gathering strength. For the first time, the women, who had been given a great increase of leisure in many classes by the change in the type and management of the home, began to take their part in forming public opinion. The women's clubs throughout the country tended rapidly to become not merely blue-stocking reading circles but aggressive centres in their communities for the militant improvement of local conditions. Here and there, in such cities as Cleveland, Toledo, Milwaukee or San Francisco, efforts, more or less successful, were made to clean up the municipal governments, such efforts in the last city in particular bringing out clearly that the power of the great corporations was wholly on the side of graft and bribery and against any attempt to cleanse the filth.

Not much good was accomplished permanently, for the system of building up, by corruption, political machines dominated by a boss whom the corporations believe essential to them for corrupt purposes of their own, is too deeply entrenched even yet in our national life. Every link in the chain that runs from the corporation desiring political favors down to the policeman on the beat levying his toll on the prostitute or the apple-seller is too strong to have been broken yet. Roosevelt was right. Big business does not want honest government, and so long as government is not honest, and the laws are not justly and impartially administered, every business man, even if he desires to be honest, finds himself caught in the system of great or petty graft and bribery.

In 1901, however, among a very large and steadily increasing part of the ordinary people, there were developing a vast disgust and a vast fear. The magnates believed even more firmly than old Vanderbilt had a generation earlier that they had the power, and refused to accede to any demands of the public. In truth they were living

over a smouldering volcano which might blow them into the air at any moment if no vent were provided for the forces of discontent.

The Democrats had understood that much in 1896 but they had been able to find no leader save Bryan, who, honest and well-meaning as he was, could lead them only into the wilderness because he was not intellectually capable of understanding the economic forces and tendencies of his time. He had been, however, no more dangerous to the peace of the nation than were the great business leaders and the Republican politicians who were equally blind to the social forces, and as to whither their own economic policies were carrying the nation.

The shot that killed McKinley had by chance installed in the White House a Republican leader who did understand both the social discontent and the inevitability of large aggregations of capital under the conditions of the new economic era. It was Roosevelt's sympathy with all classes, his love of fairness, and his ability as a statesman that led him to undertake, not the leadership of the forces of discontent but the reconciliation of the conflicting parties on the basis of what he called the "square deal" in what was promising otherwise to become serious social upheaval.

Roosevelt was far from being a perfect character, and there are not a few traits and episodes in his career which even his most ardent admirers have to deplore. One has only to consider his character in terms of a Washington to realize vividly some of his shortcomings, but his general love of honesty, his devotion to the people as a whole and not to any one class, his practicality, his fighting spirit, and his equal courage when faced either by labor unions or entrenched wealth, together with the extraordinary popularity which he possessed, made him the best possible leader in the struggles of the next eight years and the commanding figure in the entire nation.

It had been McKinley and not himself who had been chosen President by a great majority, and Roosevelt declared that he would continue his predecessor's policies, as he did his Cabinet. The latter had been an unusually distinguished one, including John Hay as Secretary of State, Lyman J. Gage in the Treasury, Elihu Root in the War Department, and Philander C. Knox as Attorney-General. It was impossible, however, that Roosevelt should merely carry on the policies of another. The most dynamic and explosive personality that has

ever crossed the stage of American public life, he could be no one but himself. During his service as President he made no less than twenty-three changes in his Cabinet, and in his first message to Congress, on December 3, 1901, he went at once to the attack of the economic problems of his day.

It was, in truth, a distinctly conservative message, decrying any rash attempts to destroy the existing delicate economic machinery of the nation. Nevertheless it seemed radical to the business men who had considered themselves above the law, because the President suggested that corporations should be amenable to the law and subject to investigation and, "within reasonable limits," controlled by the government in the interest of the people. The addition of another member to the Cabinet, a Secretary of Commerce and Industries, was also suggested, and the extraordinarily long document of about 20,000 words laid down all the principles on which Roosevelt was to act for the next eight years. Reasonable as most of it would seem today, it sent a shiver down the spine of big business, which waited, in considerable fear and anger, to see what the new President might do in acts rather than words.

Meanwhile, the Sherman Anti-trust Law had been almost wholly neglected since its passage in 1890, and the great combinations had given it scant attention, if any, as Court decisions appeared to have shown that it was a mere toothless bogey. Suddenly, in the spring of 1901, all Wall Street, and a good deal of the country, were made to realize how powerful for good or ill had become the forces wielded by the super-business men who could play with the rest of us like pawns on a chess-board. It was as though a terrific flash of lightning had made us realize the strength of the electrical forces in the sky.

The Hill-Morgan group controlled the Great Northern and Northern Pacific lines in the northwest, and wished to obtain control of the Burlington, running out of Chicago. The Harriman-Kuhn, Loeb and Company group owned the Southern and Union Pacific lines, and wished to block the purchase. Hill and Morgan won, securing control of 97 per cent of the Burlington stock, which they divided between the two northern roads. Thinking themselves secure, Hill went home and Morgan went to Europe. The ambition of the comparative new-comer, Harriman, however,

would not be balked, and, backed by Kuhn, Loeb, he suddenly began to buy Northern Pacific stock in the expectation of wresting control from Morgan, and so getting not only that line but half of the Burlington stock with it.

Sensing what was being attempted by the action of Northern Pacific stock in the market, Morgan cabled to buy 150,000 shares.

Vistag first Congress of the United States of America;

At the First Session,

Bagun and hold at the City of Washington on Monday, the Alcoud day of December, one thousand eight handred and eighty-wine.

AN ACT

To protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and

Affrant July 2 4590 News Amien Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Lie & Moston
Vice-breidert of the Rented States and

homas B Reed

President of the Senate

HEADING AND SIGNATURES TO THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT, PASSED IN 1890

From the original in the Department of State, Washington.

Ordinarily selling for about \$100 a share, many brokers had sold it short as it rose, and as the violent fight for control between Morgan and Harriman reached its climax, the brokers were unable to deliver. On May 9, Northern Pacific soared to \$1000 a share, bid up by frantic "shorts" who were trying to make good their contracts and avoid bankruptcy. As that stock rose, others fell with appalling rapidity, Standard Oil dropping 150 points between sales. By noon there would have been scarcely a Stock Exchange house which would have been solvent if it had to settle at the prices then prevailing. The chief contestants, to save the whole banking structure, had to call a truce, and allow the shorts to settle.

Each side claimed to have approximately half the stock of the

Northern Pacific, having in fact purchased from short-sellers 78,000 shares more than existed. As a way out of the difficulty, a great holding company, capitalized at about \$400,000,000, under the hospitable laws of New Jersey, was formed to take over the stocks of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific, with their joint ownership of the Burlington. As the Harriman-Kuhn, Loeb interests would have heavy representation on its board and already owned the other two Western transcontinentals, it seemed as though the entire Western railway system would come under one control, and the West was immediately up in arms.

This had been done in November, less than a month before Roose-

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. Complete Transactions in Stocks—Thursday, May 9, 1901.						
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
PART OF THE NEW YORK TIMES FINANCIAL PAGE OF MAY 10, 1901, SHOWING NORTHERN PACIFIC AT \$1000 A SHARE

velt sent his first message to Congress, and those who were waiting to see what he would do had not long to wait. In February, the government brought suit for the dissolution of the holding company under the Sherman Act, and in a little less than two years had won its suit and dissolved the company. By his action, Roosevelt had antagonized practically all the greatest leaders in finance and industry, but in the summer, after his Attorney-General had started the suit, the President made a speaking tour of the country. The wild enthusiasm of the audiences in response to his reiterated statements that there should be no one in the nation so great or powerful as to be above the law and that he intended to enforce it, showed clearly that the people stood behind him.

Roosevelt was no demagogue but he had grasped the fact that the time had come to control irresponsible power for the interests of society as a whole. On the other hand, the business leaders, used to riding rough-shod toward their ends, denounced the suggested

right of control as socialistic demagoguery, destructive of the business interests of the nation. This attitude was to appear rather brutally in another contest between Roosevelt and the business leaders in the autumn of the same year, 1902.

The condition of the coal-mining industry had been scandalous



TAFT'S KITE IN 1906 COULDN'T RISE VERY FAR BECAUSE OF THE SHER-MAN ACT

A cartoon by Gilbert in "The Rocky Mountain News," by courtesy of the Roosevelt Memorial Association.

for many years, both legally and socially. Contrary to law in some States the great railroads, such as the Reading, owned mines, the products of which they carried, and contrary to social justice the owners treated their employees shamefully. Kept on low wages, forced to live at exorbitant rents in houses belonging to the mineowners, required to buy even the tools of their trade, such as blasting powder, at more than double cost from the companies whose own coal it was that was to be blasted, and receiving in many cases the bulk of their wages in certificates good only for purchases of sup-



THE FAMOUS FLORODORA SEXTETTE

Florodora opened November 12, 1900, at the Casino Theatre and ran to five hundred and forty-seven performances in New York. The original members of the sextette were: Margaret Walker, Vaughn Texsmith, Marie Wilson, Marjorie Relyea, Agnes Wayburn, Daisy Green.



A FARO GAME IN FULL SWING AT THE ORIENT SALOON, BISBEE, ARIZONA, IN 1903

Recognized: Left to right: Tony Downs (standing with derby—part owner of saloon); Doyle, a concert-hall singer, at the corner of table sitting, with derby. Back of him standing is Dutch Kid. Sleepy Dick, the porter, to right with light felt. Charlie Bassett, wearing soft felt, in rear, next wall; dealer is Johnny Murphy. Smiley Lewis is in silk hat.



plies at the companies' stores, the status of the worker in the mines had come to be that of economic slavery.

There had been a flare-up in 1900, when the miners had offered to submit their grievances to fair arbitration and to abide loyally by the decision. This the owners refused, but to avoid serious trouble and scandal just before the presidential election, Hanna had patched up a truce. There was no real redress of grievances, however, and in the early summer of 1902 the storm broke.

The leader and spokesman for the miners was John Mitchell, one of the finest and broadest-minded of the labor leaders we have had in America. On the other hand, the leader of the owners was George F. Baer, president of the Reading Railway, one of the most reactionary, narrow-minded and arbitrary of the inner ring of big business magnates. Refusing to consider complaints, to arbitrate or to recognize the union, his attitude was summed up in his incredible statement that "the rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for, not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of this country." One scarcely knows whether to wonder most at the ignorance, arrogance or blasphemy of such a view of the relations of the new coal barons to their new serfs. Unfortunately the view was accepted as natural by the owners, the great bankers and all the small group of big business leaders. These resented any assertion of rights by labor or the ordinary citizen which might challenge their own absolute control, reducing their personal profits or limiting their entire freedom of action.

Almost 150,000 desperate men had gone on strike in May, and as the cold of autumn approached without any settlement, the price of coal to consumers had risen to \$30 a ton. Even such a man as Stuyvesant Fish, who a few years later was to be financially murdered by Harriman and other leaders because of his firm stand on the reform of the life insurance companies, warned Roosevelt that the coal owners had the right to make all they could out of the situation and that nothing should be done by the government to end the strike and interfere with the "legitimate" increase in profits. In view of the enormous suffering in store for the people at large, as well as the miners, when winter should come, the President wrote that "the only analogy" to Fish's suggestion, "I could think of would

be a protest by the undertakers against the improper activity of the government quarantine officers in preventing the admittance of Asiatic cholera."

As President, Roosevelt had no constitutional power to do anything beyond maintaining order by force, if necessary, in the mining districts, but he undertook personally to bring about a settlement. Calling a conference at the White House of Mitchell and some of the representatives of the owners, he asked them to reach some agreement which, for the good of the suffering nation, might result in resumption of mining. Mitchell immediately offered to arbitrate, but the owners flatly refused, and the meeting broke up in anger, Mitchell, according to the President, being the only one of all, including Roosevelt himself, who kept his temper.

The public, however, which had been on the side of the men, was deeply aroused and alarmed, and the owners began to take fright. Moreover the President was considering taking over the mines with Federal troops and operating them for the benefit of the people regardless of the owners. At last the latter agreed to the appointment of a Commission of Arbitration, and although they absolutely refused to allow a representative of labor on the Commission they agreed to it if he should be designated as "an eminent sociologist"! As Lodge wrote, "the business man dealing with a large political question is really a painful sight."

Mining was at once resumed and the nation was saved unthinkable suffering. Four months later the Commission decided largely in favor of the miners, who received a ten per cent increase in wages, recognition of the Union and other advantages. The willingness of the owners to entail any amount of suffering on the people rather than yield an inch on the side of fairness and justice had taught the public again how completely it was coming under the control of a small and arrogantly arbitrary group. Roosevelt's able handling of the situation enormously increased his popularity as a leader.

An episode at the very end of the same year was to do so yet further, as well as to give him prestige abroad, although the details were not disclosed for many years after. Venezuela, which under its dictator Castro, owed considerable sums to several European nations, had been involved in disputes over payments for a long time, when England and Germany, working in harmony, broke off dip-

lomatic relations, and both sent some war-ships to the Venezuelan coast. Roosevelt had no objections to the European nations' bringing Castro to book, but he became convinced, apparently justly, that Germany intended to use the incident to acquire at least a permanent naval base in the Caribbean. This we would not have allowed in any case under the Monroe Doctrine, but in addition, as we shall see, we



A CARTOON ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE From "The New York Herald," December 16, 1902.

had begun negotiations looking to the building of the Panama Canal. The President had no intention of allowing Germany to establish a fortified base commanding its eastern end.

England, which had no such intention and had no wish to pull Germany's chestnuts out of the fire, withdrew her ships and there was no trouble on that score. Germany, however, refused arbitration with Venezuela, and contented herself with denying that she intended "permanent" occupation of any Venezuelan territory. Roosevelt pointed out to von Holleben that "permanent" was a very vague word, and that Germany had seized the Chinese port of Kiauchau on a ninety-nine-year lease. Meanwhile, the President had ordered Dewey, with a fleet of over fifty ships, including every battle-ship and torpedo boat in the American navy (at that time more powerful

than the German), to "manœuvre" in the West Indian waters, with secret orders to have the fleet ready to sail to Venezuela at an hour's notice. The German ambassador was then informed that if Germany did not agree to arbitrate within ten days, Dewey would be ordered to Venezuela.

According to Roosevelt's version, unfortunately the ambassador advised his government that Roosevelt was bluffing. When some days passed and no word came from Germany, the President asked von Holleben if he had any answer. Roosevelt's story is that when von Holleben replied "No," he was informed that, in that case, Dewey would receive his orders twenty-four hours earlier than had been planned. Recent research has thrown grave doubt on Roosevelt's tale; but it is certain that von Holleben miscalculated his purpose.

The Emperor agreed to arbitration and von Holleben was dismissed from the service. It was a wound to the Kaiser's prestige and self-esteem that must have cut deep, but in a public statement Roosevelt gave the German praise for his offer of arbitration and let him off easily. Although the Emperor had asked Roosevelt himself to be the arbitrator, the President declined, and strengthened the position of the Hague Tribunal by having all the nations take their cases to that Court. Although the full story of the negotiations was not to be revealed for more than a decade, it was clear that the President had scored a heavy diplomatic victory over the Emperor, and between his defence of American rights abroad and his defence of the ordinary small citizen at home, Roosevelt was attaining a degree of enthusiastic popularity which has fallen to the lot of no other President.

Few, indeed, have had such a successful year as Roosevelt had in 1902. Perhaps the most important and beneficent policy which he initiated in it, and which Congress embodied in the Newlands Act, was that of the much-needed conservation of our national resources. For generations we had been recklessly wasteful of them. Private ownership had destroyed the forests of State after State, with no replanting, so that the vast forest areas which under proper management might have lasted us a thousand years had disappeared almost in one generation. But we had also been wasteful of our waterpower and other resources, the government having taken little or no interest in preventing their rapid dissipation in private hands.

Cleveland had made a beginning, and a few Acts, such as the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, and the Carey Act of 1894, had been passed, but fraud, graft, and greed, combined with lack of aggressiveness on the part of the authorities, had largely made them dead letters. Roosevelt initiated a wholly new era and indeed changed the current of national thought on the subject. He not only withdrew 85.000.000 acres of public lands from sale until their mineral resources could be examined, but, whereas under the Act of 1891 former Presidents had set aside about 30,000,000 acres each of forest land, he formed a national forest preserve of nearly 150,000,000 wooded acres, out of the 200,000,000 that existed when he became President. Moreover, by the building of dams and the utilization of our Western water powers for the irrigation of "desert" lands, the results of Roosevelt's policy and foresight are crops now valued at about \$250,-000,000 a year. In this, as in all else, he encountered the strong opposition of private interests of one sort or another, who much preferred the old opportunities for making money by exploiting the resources of the moment to considering their value for future generations.

Although 1903 was chiefly notable for the acquisition of Panama at its close, it began less spectacularly with continued social legislation. In February an Act was passed by Congress creating the Department of Labor, and another giving precedence in the Courts to cases against the trusts, such as that against the beef combine which was won by the government in May. The Elkins Act, although it did not give the government control over railway rates, made an important step forward by making illegal any secret rebates from published rates, and making the receiver as well as the giver of such rebates liable to punishment.

Fear, mistrust, and hatred of Roosevelt were increasing almost as rapidly in Wall Street as was his popularity outside of it. The brief, but rather sharp, depression in business in 1903, which was due to the reckless way in which the bankers had floated enormous amounts of "undigested securities" in capitalizing their new consolidations, was, of course, attributed to the President, either because the financiers believed it or because they wanted a scapegoat for their own misdeeds. Even so extraordinary a judge of values as Morgan had lost his head, and in throwing together the International Mercantile

Marine combination had displayed an utter disregard of realities in the prices paid for the White Star Line and other constituents.

Whatever other things he accomplished, and they were both many and great, Roosevelt himself always believed that the greatest was the building of the Panama Canal. It is certain that no other action of his life brings out more clearly both his qualities and their defects

The background of the situation in 1903 may be briefly described in its essential points. For at least a decade, Roosevelt had been deeply interested in the project of an isthmian canal, which, owned, controlled, and fortified by us, he deemed essential to our security and naval policy, and which he was most keen to have as the chief claim to glory of his own administration. To accomplish what he wished, it was necessary to abrogate honorably the old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 with England, and after a couple of years' negotiation this was done amicably by the signing of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, February 21, 1902.

There was a question whether the route across Nicaragua or that across Panama was the more suitable, the decision finally being in favor of the latter. A French company had long before secured a concession, terminating in 1904, from the Colombian Government, and had done some work but had been unable to make a success of the undertaking. In January, 1902, the company offered to sell out to the United States for \$40,000,000.

There was also in the background an old treaty made in 1846 between Colombia (then called New Granada) and the United States. For nearly sixty years this had been interpreted by both parties to mean that we should protect the neutrality of Panama (a province of Colombia) against foreign attack; preserve freedom of transit across the isthmus; maintain Colombia's sovereignty over it; and avoid interference with any effort of Colombia to suppress insurrection, indeed to assist her in so doing.

In March, 1902, negotiations were begun with the Colombian Minister in Washington for a treaty which should serve as the basis for our undertaking to build the canal. On January 22, 1903, a Convention was signed by John Hay and the Colombian chargé d'affaires, Thomas Herran. The terms on which the United States had insisted had been so repugnant to the Minister from Colombia and his government that the former had declined to sign the Convention and had

left Washington. The terms were, in brief, that there could be no negotiations between Colombia and the French company; that the United States should have full control over a strip of land six miles wide across the isthmus, Colombia renouncing her sovereignty; and that for these and other considerations we should pay Colombia \$10,000,000 in gold, and after nine years \$250,000 a year. On the 17th of March the American Senate ratified the agreement.

On the other hand, the Colombian Government did not. There had been a dictatorship in that country for five years, and the politicians were unquestionably difficult to deal with, but popular sentiment upheld the Colombian Senate in its contention that Colombia should not give up its sovereignty and that the \$10,000,000 offered to that country for all it was asked to yield was too little compared with the \$40,000,000 paid to the almost defunct French private company. In August, the Senate rejected the proposed treaty.

There is no question that however useful the canal might prove to us and to the world, and however anxious Roosevelt may have been to link his name with it, Colombia was entirely within her rights in declining to ratify the treaty, precisely as our own Senate has declined to ratify innumerable treaties. It is also almost certain that although more time would have been involved, a satisfactory treaty could have been made by the use of more courteous negotiation and by the payment of a larger sum. It was none of our business what might become of the money after we paid it to the Colombian Government, and in truth what we offered was very small. Within a few years after the opening of the Canal our annual net profits from its operation, quite apart from its strategic value to us, were about fifty per cent more, not allowing for capital charges, than the total capital sum we offered Colombia for the Zone.

However, Roosevelt, always impatient, would brook no delay. Powerful interests had become involved in the possible payment of \$40,000,000 to the French company, and so careful was the protection accorded to it that although its charter had only one year to run, we insisted, by prohibiting all negotiations between it and Colombia, that the Colombians could get none of the \$40,000,000. Moreover, no Vice-President who had succeeded to the Presidency had ever been subsequently elected, and the Presidential election was only a year off. Roosevelt preferred therefore to wield "the big

stick," and throughout the negotiations there was an air of haste and bullying which was most unusual in diplomatic intercourse.


The Province of Panama itself naturally wanted the canal built, and when Colombia declined to sign the treaty and we declined to negotiate further, it was not difficult for those interested in the \$40,000,000 payment to the expiring French company, and others, to stage a revolution. There is no evidence that Roosevelt took an active part in bringing it about. He did not have to, but he was aware that it was coming, and was prepared to act. He had already contemplated seizing the Canal Zone by force and declaring war against Colombia, but the revolution offered a simpler way out. Although by our Treaty of 1846 we were supposed to uphold Colombian sovereignty, Roosevelt gave a different and wholly new interpretation to that document, and as a result of the intervention of our naval forces we established the independence of the revolted province as the Republic of Panama. We then made a treaty with that new State, getting all we wanted in the way of a Canal Zone for ourselves at our own price.

The evidence points to the almost certainty that if we had agreed to give Colombia \$7,500,000 more, we could have got all we wanted from her, but it seems to have been less a question of money than of time-time which was growing short for those interested in the French company with its expiring concession and for Roosevelt with only a year or so more of his term. The consequence of the way the affair was handled was that not only did Colombia become our bitter enemy, and justly so, but fear of the "big stick" and of the brutal aggressiveness of the great American Republic spread throughout the whole of South America. Roosevelt's later statement, "I took the Canal Zone," was all too clearly understood by our southern neighbors, and in spite of the fact than in 1922 tardy justice was done to Colombia, partly under pressure from American oil interests on Congress, by the payment to her of \$25,000,000, or more than three times what we would have had to pay extra in 1903, irreparable harm had been done to our reputation for friendly and honest dealing.

In the treaty with Panama we reserved to ourselves the right to intervene to maintain order in that new "sovereign" state, as we had done in the case of Cuba, and, largely as a result of our interest in the Canal, we were in succeeding years to develop further the theory of

our "protectorate" over the countries of the Caribbean. Most of them were unstable in government and in debt to Europe, a situation which, in order to prevent European occupation, might cause us, as Roosevelt pointed out in his message to Congress in December, 1904, to exercise "an international police power."

This, within a few weeks, he proceeded to do in Santo Domingo,



EXPANSION LED TO THIS CARTOON BY LEON BARRITT, USED BY THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 1904

From the Library of Congress.

which had become bankrupt, owing money to France, Italy, and Belgium, which nations had announced their intention of extorting payment by force. Roosevelt made a treaty with the small republic under which the United States was to take over the finances and assets of Santo Domingo in the capacity of a receiver and to administer them for the benefit of that nation and its creditors. Although the Senate declined to ratify the treaty and denounced Roosevelt's usurpation, the President went ahead and carried out his plan by Executive action only. The plan worked well, and the treaty was ratified three years later, but the extension given to the Monroe Doctrine by

Roosevelt marked an important, and perhaps dangerous, step in the interpretation of that very vague policy. On the other hand, until the Drago theory of non-intervention by force to collect international debts is generally accepted by the nations of the world, probably Roosevelt's policy of our acting as policeman in the Caribbean is the lesser of two dangers.


It was a policy, however, that by no means approved itself to all Americans, many of whom had also been shocked by the way we acquired the Canal Zone. The settlement of the Alaska boundary dispute with England and Canada in 1903, the courageous handling of the coal strike the year before, and above all the President's attitude on the trust problem, had won him enormous popularity. On the other hand, the last two points had also made him a host of powerful enemies among the leaders of business and his party, to which were now added many who had formerly approved of his course but who objected to our wielding the "big stick" in foreign relations.

Mark Hanna, who had made Roosevelt's predecessor President, and was now himself spoken of for the office, was one of the bitter enemies to be reckoned with, but his death in February, 1904, cleared the path, and made Roosevelt's nomination practically a certainty. When the Republican Convention met at Chicago on June 21, Roosevelt was unanimously acclaimed as the candidate, with Senator Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana for Vice-President. The Democrats at their convention at St. Louis, July 6, were torn between the radical section under Bryan and the conservatives under Cleveland, finally uniting on a respectable but weak candidate, Judge Alton B. Parker of New York. There was no doubt of the result of the election. Roosevelt, in resisting the demand of trades unions when pushed too far against public interest, just as he resisted the trusts, had made some enemies in the labor ranks but he had made for himself a place in public opinion comparable only to that of Andrew Jackson.

His personality was the issue in the campaign, which was carried on in the returning flood-tide of prosperity after the set-back in 1903, and Roosevelt was overwhelmingly elected by 336 electoral votes against only 140 for Parker, who polled about a million less popular votes than Bryan had in the previous campaign. Roosevelt

was now at last President in his own right, and consequently in a much stronger position. The independence of this he also strengthened by announcing that "the wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for, or accept, another nomination," a statement which was to plague him later.

Whatever else may be said of Roosevelt, it must be conceded that



A CONTRAST—A 1904 CAMPAIGN CARTOON

Returning prosperity led to "Don't give the Democrats another chance," as campaign material.

From the Library of Congress Collection of Cartoons.

in spite of the "big stick" and big business, the idealism and aspiration of the American people were steadily rising with him as leader, and they were growing more determined to set their own house in order and to play a distinguished part in the international life of the world. Oddly enough, one of the marked features of the decade and a half before the World War was to break upon the world, to its destruction, was the increase in many countries of the sentiment for peace. Peace societies multiplied, and America was one of the lead-

ing nations in favor of arbitration and the resort to the Hague Court.

The Russo-Japanese war, which had been going on since February, 1904, with heavy losses and with no apparent termination, gave Roosevelt a great chance, which he seized, to lead both the world movement for peace and to bring his own country into the larger life of nations in a beneficent way. In June, 1905, he urged on both warring governments that they should send representatives to negotiate peace, and after many delays and much adroit statesmanship on his part, representatives of the two nations did meet at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Over and over in those sweltering August days, it seemed as though his efforts had been in vain, but to the relief of the entire world, a treaty was signed on the 5th of September.

The other nations gladly acknowledged the part which America had played, and America only, for European diplomacy had wholly broken down in the effort to end the strife. In America, the entire credit must go to Roosevelt, who displayed statesmanship of a high order and an unexpected degree of patience and tact. John Hay, the Secretary of State, was dying, and Taft, who had become Secretary of War, was temporarily in the Philippines. In any case, Roosevelt was always very much his own foreign secretary, and the entire burden of reconciliation fell upon him.


Not only had America, almost ignored a decade before, played a great part in world affairs but the President had gained a standing as one of the leading statesmen of the entire world, a position which was to be enhanced the following year by his entrance again into European affairs, although his full part was not realized until the publication of documents some years later. In the summer of 1905, war was imminent between France and Germany over the advance of the former in creating what was practically a protectorate over Morocco. The Kaiser, who was then claiming for his country that "place in the sun" which was to cost it dear, was bellicose, and the French Foreign Minister, Delcassé, had manœuvred France into a position from which it could not easily retreat. The despatch of the German war-ship *Panther* to Agadir made the situation so tense as to make it appear that a Franco-German war was inevitable.


Through the good offices of Roosevelt, a conference was arranged to meet at Algeciras, January, 1906, in which the United States was represented by Henry White and S. R. Gummere, and in which




THE GREAT AMERICAN DURBAR

As W. A. Rogers pictured Roosevelt's Inaumnration for H. L. 111.111.







UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The first session was held in the Royal Exchange, New York (bottom, left), in 1790. From 1791 to 1800, sessions were held in the Old City Hall, Philadelphia. The Old Senate Chamber (lower, right) has been its home since 1859. Top, the new home of the Court, opposite the Capitol, Washington, D. C.

THE ROOSEVELT ERA

what had appeared as insuperable difficulties were smoothed away. Even more important than the Portsmouth Conference, the credit again was almost solely Roosevelt's. When we consider the part which America was playing in international affairs in Roosevelt's second term with that of her "unofficial observers" and almost complete refusal to participate officially from 1920 onward, we can realize better the immense reaction which was to come in America's international feeling. Both our growing power and the transition through which we had been passing from a nation chiefly agricultural to one largely manufacturing, with the need of overseas markets, had led Roosevelt to grasp the idea that, as he said, "we cannot sit huddled within our own borders and avow ourselves merely an assemblage of well-to-do hucksters who care nothing for what happens beyond."

In 1906, work actually began on the Panama Canal, and in eight years and at a cost of about \$375,000,000, it was opened for traffic. The two American continents had been cut apart from each other by one of the greatest engineering feats yet attempted. Great as that was, however, it was scarcely greater than the sanitary and medical work of Colonels Gorgas and Goethals who transformed our tropical jungle, ravaged by diseases, into a healthy land for white men. Whatever may be objected to our method of acquiring the Canal Zone, we completed in record time the digging of the Canal where the French had failed, and also, what they had not even dreamed of doing, we made an almost magic transformation of the Zone both physically and morally. In those respects we have everything to our credit.

In the same year that dirt began to fly at Panama, we were called upon to intervene again in Cuba, at the request of the Cuban authorities. The government had been lax, and had allowed much of the sanitary and other work of improvement we had bequeathed the island from our former occupation to be undone. Moreover the electorate, largely illiterate, had shown itself more apt at revolution against its own government than at governing. Elections became a farce, and in 1905 the actual number of qualified voters, about 300,000, was increased in registration by approximately 150,000 fictitious names, a fraud on so colossal a scale as to make the operations of our political bosses seem almost morality itself.

Taft was in charge of administration in this second occupation, which lasted about two years, and although supported by a small body of American troops, no force had to be used. The intervention had been entered upon with genuine reluctance on our part, and when an orderly election had been held in the autumn of 1908, we withdrew on the inauguration of the new President in the following January and again turned the island over to the Cubans.

Roosevelt's first message to Congress in 1901 had outlined practically all his views and policies, and these he continued to carry out throughout his two terms. Both the "muckraking" and public dissatisfaction with big business methods reached their climax between 1903 and 1906, the year 1905 being marked by the investigations of the great insurance companies in New York. Charles E. Hughes, who was in charge of the probe, conducted it with such skill and success as to give him a national reputation, and surprising and disgusting scandals and graft were disclosed on the part of men who had stood high in the business life of the country. One of the astounding features of the investigation was the pettiness of much of the graft to which men whose wealth was reckoned in millions and even tens of millions had been willing to stoop, and the belief they seemed to hold that the great companies over which they presided were private preserves for themselves.

The public resentment, emphasized by the feelings of hundreds of thousands of policy-holders, who felt themselves personally injured, was intense, and Roosevelt's opprobrious term, "malefactors of great wealth" took on new meaning. Congress, conscious of the strength of public opinion, continued to place new social legislation on the statute books. In 1906, the disclosures which had been made with regard to patent medicine frauds, involving the dishonesty of the advertising pages of not a few great newspapers, and the facts which had been given to the public about conditions in the stockyards, led to the passage of the Pure Food Act, which has proved of great protective benefit to American households. In the same year, laws were passed forbidding the corporations to make campaign contributions, and also an employer's liability Act.

Big business, however, seemed to be learning little or nothing. In 1907, it was found that the American Sugar Refining Company had been deliberately, and for years, defrauding the government on the

collection of customs duties, and over \$4,000,000 was recovered from it in the Courts. In spite of the law against rebates, it was likewise found that the Chicago & Alton Railroad was giving and the Standard Oil Company receiving them. The absurd fine of almost \$30,000,000 levied by Judge Landis on the latter corporation did not obscure the fact that apparently some of the richest business men in the nation were still defving the laws and adding to their wealth by deliberate fraud. Although the sugar and oil company scandals were the most spectacular of those unearthed in 1907, they were far from the only ones,the New York Central, for example, also being convicted of rebating,-and the people felt with steadily mounting enthusiasm that Roosevelt was almost the sole champion of the doctrine of one law for both rich and poor.

The financial situation by 1907 had become distinctly unstable. A series of good harvests had brought

THE NEW	
BAR-OMETER	
SCALE.	
25	MORTALLY INEBRIATED. Blind drunk.
BEDDING'S	Speechless drank.
	Drunk as an Alderman.
Missia Sahre	Drunk as a fiddler.
20	DRUNK.
CURES	Вооху
CUTS,	Can key on the ground without helding Worse for liquor.
	In liquor
15	FRESH.
BURNS,	Sober within but drunk without
	Half gone.
Flesh Wounds,	Slightly inebriated
10	DISGUISED IN LIQUOR.
10	Mysteriosisly drunk.
CHILBEALYS,	Can see a hole in a ladder.
	Sprung.
PILES. 5	As peace with all mankind, HAS HAD A DROP.
11mes, J	Balmy,
	Just comformble.
SORES,	Has had a smile,
	All right.
FELOXS.	SOBER d. Devillah day.
I LLUAS,	Dry as a chip.
41.44.40.	In want of a drop.
G (ausse) 3	
SALVE	
N AV AV	
T E	

A PATENT MEDICINE ADVERTISEMENT OF A MUCH EARLIER DATE

With an ascending scale on the right which might be taken as either pro- or anti-prohibition. From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

prosperity but this had been recklessly over-capitalized by financiers in the flotation of new enterprises, and there was heavy strain on credit. The stock market had risen rapidly and attracted a large public following, quite willing to share in the profits made for them by

HE GOT HIS BUMPS

From the time you start to toddle
'Till you're called a Mollycoddle
You, ill find this rocky road is full of stumps,
And a bunch of bum disaster
Like a piece of porous plaster
Keeps a trying hard and fast to give you bumps

Mr. Harriman Got his bumps
'Cause Teddy Roosevelt held the trumps
You can bet he got his bumps—he got his bumps

When Willie Randolph Hearst
Tried to land on Mackie first
He didn't count on Democratic slumps
But your uncle Charley Hughes,

Gave the grafters all the blues
And Willie got his bumps—got his bumps

Yes little Willie got his bumps

And calls McCarren—Croker chumps,

But he surely got his bumps—he got his bumps

Billy Bryan as a boy,
Filled his little heart with joy
When the funny—nologist felt his lumps,
And the bets were ten to one
That he'd land in Washirgton
But Billy got his bumps—got his bumps
Yes. Mark Hanna gave him dumps
And then Roosie held the trumps.
It's a shame but the same got his bumps.

@ Charles H. Walker.

PART OF A PHILOSOPHIC POEM OF 1907 TOUCHING ON PERSONALITIES
AND POLITICS

From the Library of Congress.

the very men whose methods they were denouncing. On the other hand, the succession of scandals had really undermined confidence in these men, and in the institutions which they controlled and operated. Panic would seize the public quickly if they came to suspect any crack in the strength of the general position.

In the spring of 1907 the banks, over-extended, had to call loans and the stock market began to tumble. There was a sharp break,

THE ROOSEVELT ERA

and throughout the summer confidence became more and more undermined. In October the crash came, precipitated by the failure of the great Knickerbocker Trust Company of New York and ten other financial institutions in that city within a few days. It was with great difficulty that others were saved, and currency went to a premium of five per cent. Business throughout the country received a very severe shock, and it was not until the Pennsylvania Railroad floated a successful loan in the following March that confidence began to revive.

Although Roosevelt used every legitimate means in his power to assist business, efforts were made by the larger interests to propagate the belief that it was his reckless meddling with business affairs and men and his wild radicalism that had brought the business structure crashing. A President usually has to suffer the onus of bad times if they come in his administration, but outside of Wall Street Roosevelt suffered less than might have been expected. His hold on the imagination of the ordinary citizen and the long succession of scandals, aired in magazines and courts, smudging the reputation of one great business man after another, made the President's word appear more reliable than that of big business.

The rigidity of the old bond-secured currency system of the nation had been again revealed by the panic of 1907, and the following year a commission, with Senator Nelson W. Aldrich at its head, was appointed to consider the whole problem of our banking system. Meanwhile, as a stop-gap, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, authorizing the Treasury to lend emergency currency to the banks in time of stress, secured by approved collateral, marked the first step toward reform and a more elastic currency system.

While we were in the midst of the panic, an episode occurred which, for the third important occasion, called attention to the dangers of our Federal system. Racial feeling in California had been steadily growing more intense against the Japanese for some years, when in 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education issued an order segregating Japanese school-children from the whites. A sensitive and proud nation, Japan promptly resented what she considered an insult, and what was unquestionably an infringement of her treaty rights with the United States. As in the previous cases of New York and Louisiana, however, the Federal Government had no power to

coerce a State, and a dangerous international situation developed. It was saved, though with only partial allayment of Japan's resentment, by the negotiation with her of the Root-Takahira Treaty and a "gentleman's agreement," the two covering the problems of the school children, immigration into the United States, and the larger questions of the Pacific and the Orient.

By the end of 1908 prosperity was returning, the Canal was being built, we were preparing to withdraw in a few weeks from Cuba, and an immense amount had been accomplished to purify the business life of the country. Roosevelt was at the summit of his popularity and prestige at home and abroad. A President would have to be chosen in November, but Roosevelt had declared that he would not accept another nomination.

CHAPTER X

THE NEW FREEDOM

HERE was little or no doubt in advance as to who would be the candidates of the two major parties in the campaign of 1908. Each party was wholly dominated by its leading personality, the Democratic by Bryan and the Republican by Roosevelt. Either could have received the nomination without effort, but whereas Bryan intended to accept it, and did, from the Democrats, Roosevelt, in view of his two terms and his self-denying pronouncement of 1904, made it clear that he would not accept, and that he intended to have the nomination go to William H. Taft.

Roosevelt was at the very height of his popularity, though possibly not of his power, for the rebellions against him in Congress of "Old Guard" Republicans like Senator Aldrich and Speaker Cannon had been increasing in bitterness and strength. It is an interesting but superfluous question as to how far the retiring President would have succeeded in the fights of a third term had he accepted it. But the very hostility to him of "the interests," inside and outside Congress, had served only to increase the idolization of him by the people at large, and there was no doubt that he could nominate his successor in the convention which met at Chicago on June 19.

The man whom he had chosen was apparently extraordinarily well trained both to make a great President and to carry out Roosevelt's policies. At fifty-five years of age, Taft had had a distinguished career as a judge in the Federal service, as a member of the Philippine Commission, as first civil governor of the Philippines, 1901—4, as Secretary of War in Roosevelt's Cabinet, 1904—8, as temporary governor of Cuba 1907, and as head of diplomatic missions to various courts, from that of the Pope at Rome to the Mikado in Japan. He had acquitted himself with marked ability in every post he had occupied, had been one of Roosevelt's closest friends, was in sympathy with the President's social policies, was incorruptibly honest, and was genial and popular.

There were, however, two points as to which Roosevelt miscalculated. One was a flaw in Taft's training, which has been exemplified again in the case of Hoover. The two cases, both of honest men with apparently exceptional preparation for the Presidency, are interesting. Neither had ever been in the rough and tumble of American political life, and did not know how to get on with politicians in the legitimate sense in which a President has to get on to get things

The Hit of the Campaign as sung by UNCLE SAM. SWEET BILLEE,

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BY CHAS. A. PENNELL (air Sweet Marie)

Respectfully dedicated to the Republican Party

2. What's this racket that I hear? Sweet Billee. Something's broken loose I fear, for I see

All the voters in the land, have resolved to take a stand And they will throw you on the strand. Sweet Billee.

For your platform it is weak. Sweet Billee.

Braced and patched with rotten timbers, don't you see?

And with Roosevelts help and rine, you tried to steal some planks of Bryan.

But you missed them every time. Sweet Billee.

CHORUS.

Oh William Taft just come to me and I'll whisper unto thee, William Bryan is on your trail don't you see? He is a daisy from the Platte and he will knock you out quite flat, When November winds come back. Sweet Billee.

© Charles A. Pennell, 1908.

A 1908 CAMPAIGN SONG From the Library of Congress.

done. Shortly after Taft's inauguration, Lodge wrote to Roosevelt saying that Taft was all they had thought but that "I am surprised that he has not, in all his years of public life, learned more about politics . . . as one of the conditions with which a man has to deal."

The other point which had escaped Roosevelt was the fact that al-

though Taft was not a reactionary and was in full sympathy with the President's own aims, his approach to the practice and theory of government was quite different. If there was one quality more lacking than another in Roosevelt, it was the judicial mind. Although he so often insisted upon the execution of the law impartially, he was so convinced of the rectitude of his own intentions and of the rightness of his own aims, that when, in his impatience, he found the law obstructing or delaying him, he was almost as contemptuous of it as the leaders of big business themselves. His later advocacy of the popular recall of judicial decisions was alone enough to indicate how little he had of the legal or judicial temper.

Taft was essentially judicial, and although liberal in his political and social outlook was extremely conservative when it came to questions of legal or constitutional methods of approach to them. These two points—his lack of political knowledge and finesse, and his judicial conservatism of mind—were to shipwreck him amid the swirling currents of American political life in the next four years, but were as hidden from the people as they were from the man who almost alone made him President.

In their conventions the Democrats chose Bryan on the first ballot and the Republicans Taft, the latter with James S. Sherman as his running-mate for the Vice-Presidency. The campaign, so tamely begun, continued without marked interest. Smaller parties, such as the Socialists running Eugene V. Debs, and the Independence League which nominated Hearst, were as usual in the field, but Taft polled about 7,700,000 of the popular vote to Bryan's 6,500,000, and was easily elected, together with a Republican Congress.

If the campaign was comparatively quiet, there were nevertheless a good many features in it to give the politicians pause. Not much attention was paid to party platforms, and the contest was really between the popularity of Bryan and that of Roosevelt, embodied in his candidate Taft. Issues, however, were not wholly ignored, and the fact that Taft ran far ahead of his ticket in all the States, and that many of those which elected him at the same time elected Democrats as Governors and members of legislatures indicated that there was much unrest and also dissatisfaction with Republican rule, notably in the matter of the tariff.

Although wages had risen in the preceding decade they had far

from kept pace with the rising cost of living, and the working class had shared to only a small extent in the prosperity of the great corporations. While the United States Steel Corporation, for example, had been rapidly changing the sea of water, which was all the common stock was originally, into the terra firma of a sound dividend-

Republican Campaign Song for 1908, Entitled

THE G. O. P.

1

Stand by the G. O. P. boys, stand by the crowd, Stand by the G. O. P. makes a nation strong and proud, Stand by the G. O. P., our opponents they have split And when the election's over they'l surely have a fit.

CHORUS.

Not without your wondrous story, G. O. P., Can be writ the nation's glory, G. O. P., On the record of the years Abraham Lincoln's name appears, McKinley, Logan and our tears, G. O. P.

II

Stand by the G. O. P., Teddy and his nag,
Stand by the G. O. P. our opponents we will bag,
Stand by the stars and stripes that wave so clear and
bright,
They'll carry the nation's problems thro' the darkest

They'll carry the nation's problems thro' the darkest night.

@ 1906 by Lewis T. Watkins.

A 1908 CAMPAIGN SONG From the Library of Congress. paying investment security, the workmen had demanded in vain most of the improvements in their condition which they had sought.

The business leaders appeared no more willing to share their prosperity or privileges than they ever had been, whereas the scandals revealed in the insurance and other investigations, the suits against the Sugar and other trusts, the mass of information and misinformation which the public had derived from the muck-raking magazines. had all aroused both a deeper and a more intelli-

gent resentment. It was realized that the Old Guard Republican leaders were making an effort to recapture control of the party and its policies, and the conflict between the reactionaries and the Progressives which was to split the party four years later was already foreshadowed.


In many directions the increasing lack of confidence of the rank and file of the people in the older organizations and forms of government was becoming manifest. Distrust of the Senate, the death-chamber of tariff reform and the stronghold of special privilege, was bringing on an ever stronger demand for a change in the Constitution which would permit of the popular election of its members.

The experimentation in many Western States with the initiative, the referendum, and the recall, as well as the acceleration in the movement for woman's suffrage, all were symptoms of the same mistrust of old ways of governing, and the belief that conditions could be

improved by bringing the governments into closer relations with a widening electorate.

The rise, from 1905, of the extreme radical groups in labor, such as the Industrial Workers of the World (I. W. W.), betokened likewise a menacing increase of unrest among the labor class, which in its Left Wing was now preaching violence as the only means of cure. On the other hand, the ultra-conservatives, whether in business or politics, instead of trying to remedy conditions were merely digging in to resist change.

If, in the situation, Taft failed to work out a policy which satisfied



1910.

A PROPHECY OF 1910

From the Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.

any one, it is far from certain that Roosevelt, facing conditions more difficult than any he had himself had to meet, would have succeeded any better. Having secured Taft's election, the former President, still the most popular man in the country, disappeared from the American scene to hunt big game in the wilds of Africa, in order that his successor should have a free hand. If there was a certain amount of egotism in his feeling that Taft could not be free unless he himself got out of America, there was also much truth in his belief. Other Presidents have been able to retire to the seclusion of private life with

dignity, but Roosevelt's abounding energy, his inability to keep out of a fight or the limelight of publicity, combined with the heroworship of him by the people, would have made the rôle of a retired elder statesman practically impossible for him in 1909. Unfortunately for his own reputation it was one he would never be able to play.

The rising resentment in the country against the tariff had forced the Republicans to put a plank in their platform promising revision in a special session of Congress to be called immediately following the inauguration of their President if elected. When Congress, called together by Taft, met to consider the problem, the new tariff bill proceeded through all the usual stages with which the nation had become all too familiar. As passed by the House it embodied in considerable degree a genuine downward revision. Both there and in the Senate it was subjected to the influence of the lobbyists of the special interests who would benefit by high rates, about the only interest not having a lobbyist to represent it being the American people.

In the Senate, under the lead of Aldrich, 847 amendments were made, mostly raising duties, in spite of the efforts of the group of Progressive Senators, including La Follette, Beveridge, Cummins, Bristow, and Dolliver, who were gradually emerging as insurgents from the Republican Party. When the bill finally went to Taft for his signature, it was evident to the people that there had been no downward revision to give them relief. The publicity given to the pressure brought to bear by particular interests made the whole thing appear more baldly than ever a raid on the public for the benefit of a few. To the disgust of the Democrats and the steadily more influential Progressive element among the Republicans, the President not only signed the bill, but in a speech in Minnesota defended it as the best tariff bill the Republicans had ever enacted.

The disappointment of the Progressives throughout the country was intense, and the fear that the man who had been elected to carry out Roosevelt's forward policies had gone over to the reactionaries was increased by the reliance placed by Taft upon Cannon in the House and Aldrich in the Senate, both of whom, with all they stood for, were the objects of determined opposition by the Progressives.

Balked of tariff reform, and suspicious of the President's alliance with Cannon and Aldrich, the Progressives were in no mood to reason calmly about the rights and wrongs of a bitter personal quarrel between officials which now broke out, and which was used to indicate that Taft was going back on one of Roosevelt's most important policies, that of the conservation of our natural resources.

Taft was as thoroughly in sympathy with the policy as was Roosevelt, but the difference between the two men came out clearly in connection with their attitude toward the legal questions involved. The problem was a confused one, both as to legislation and organization. Congress, which to some extent had fought Roosevelt on the point, had never passed proper conservation laws, and in the organization of the government the Land Office was in one Department, the Forestry Service in another, and there was as yet no Bureau of Mines at all, that being established only in 1910. For the working out of his plans, Roosevelt had relied chiefly on his young Secretary of the Interior, J. R. Garfield, and on the Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot, both ardent followers of the President. Pinchot in particular was fanatically devoted to the cause of conservation at all costs and a reformer of the impractical type.

Taft had replaced Garfield, when forming his Cabinet, by R. A. Ballinger, an Iowa lawyer, whose father had studied law in Lincoln's office. On examination of some of the withdrawals which had been made and of claims in connection with others, Ballinger was by no means as convinced of their legality as had been the ardent Garfield and Pinchot. At once, when Ballinger began to move slowly, the cry went up from the Conservationists that he was impeding the work and that he was even on the side of private interests as against the government. An employee of the Interior Department, L. R. Glavis, made charges against his chief in a letter to Senator Dolliver, and was dismissed. Pinchot also took the quarrel to the newspapers, and was removed for insubordination. A Congressional committee was appointed to investigate the charges, and although Glavis was represented by Louis D. Brandeis, later member of the Supreme Court, and Pinchot by George H. Pepper, the committee found that the charges brought by them were groundless, and that there was not a single fact to indicate that Ballinger had been actuated by any motive other than the public interest.

Under ordinary circumstances, the dismissal of two unimportant public officials might not have had serious results, but the circumstances were not ordinary. In the first place, Pinchot was a close friend of Roosevelt, and, like a small boy running to his mother, he hurried off to Europe to wait for Roosevelt's emergence from the African wilderness to be on hand to tell him all his woes. As his was the first personal account which Roosevelt received of the affairs of the Taft administration, the impression was important. In the second place the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy was used with great effect by the Progressives to emphasize the growing belief, due to the tariff and other matters, that Taft had betrayed the cause of liberalism and had gone over to the "interests."

There is ample evidence to disprove this, and even in the matter of conservation distinct progress was made in his administration. The taking over of the coal lands which Roosevelt had impulsively reserved without legal sanction was, at Taft's request, lawfully authorized by Congress. He also began the reservation of oil lands, and established the Bureau of Mines. In the same year, 1910, the passage of the Mann-Elkins Act greatly strengthened in some respects the Hepburn Act of the Roosevelt administration, giving to the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over the telegraph and telephone companies as well as railways, and authorizing it to suspend rates which it considered questionable pending investigation.

In his direct attacks on the great corporations, Taft was much more energetic than Roosevelt had been, the government during his four years bringing 67 bills and indictments against the trusts as compared with 43 during Roosevelt's seven and a half years. It was Taft's Attorney-General, George W. Wickersham, who secured the dissolution of the Standard Oil and Tobacco companies, and the government was successful in winning many of its other cases.

As a "trust buster," indeed, Taft was much more of a crusader than his sponsor, but it was already beginning to be recognized that in the new economic structure arising everywhere in the world, justice for the ordinary man would not be secured by the simple process of breaking up great aggregations of capital. By 1911 the Supreme Court was introducing into the conception of "restraint of trade" under the Sherman Act the qualifying adjectives "undue or unreasonable."

The fact is that Taft had to contend with a far more difficult situation than Roosevelt had, part of the difficulty having been made by Roosevelt himself. The tendency toward building up great national units of business, which had been a marked feature of our economic life ever since the Civil War, was a natural one. The population, which had numbered about 38,000,000 in 1870, and 76,-



"Jingle bells, jingle bells, jingle all the day!
Oh, what fun it is to ride in a one-horse open sleigh!"

A CARTOON BY F. OPPER IN THE NEW YORK AMERICAN, JANUARY 10, 1910 Showing popular idea of the power of the Trusts of the period.

000,000 when Roosevelt had been elected in 1900, had risen to 92,000,000 by 1910 when he returned from Africa. There had been a corresponding increase in national wealth, and in the aggregations of corporate capital.

Enormous abuses had crept into our political and social life in this progress of growth. Roosevelt had rendered a most useful service in arousing the people to a sense of these, and in serving as a leader. He had performed brilliant special feats, as the settlement of the coal strike and the Russo-Japanese War, and the building of the Canal.

The people had come to regard him as a Moses to lead us into the Promised Land of justice for the common man. But Roosevelt himself had no map of the way into that land. He had fumbled his way along with the trust problem, and in truth he did not have, as no man could, a policy which would quickly cure the fundamental evils of the new economic order. Having led the people to believe that a hero could save them, his term had come to an end, he had presented Taft to his followers as that saving hero, and then disappeared into the jungle.

When Taft failed to save them, the people murmured mightily. They did not realize, and there is no evidence that Roosevelt did, the magnitude of the incomprehensible forces which were changing the face of the world and society.

In the year that McKinley was first elected the world production of gold had been less than \$10,000,000. During Taft's four years it averaged about \$22,000,000. The shortage of gold which had brought about the hardships which had made possible Bryan's campaign of 1896 had changed into a plethora which was bringing to the front new problems and hardships for other classes. The rapid rise in prices was depreciating even increasing wages and salaries. The increased scale of big business was creating huge wealth and incomes for lucky individuals. The whole social structure seemed to be getting out of gear, and the resentment against dishonesty and injustice, which had been fanned by Roosevelt, sought an outlet in some quick remedy. Taft could not supply it, and was thus considered a failure and a reactionary. No one else, however, has done so as yet.

Roosevelt returned from Africa in June, 1910, after an extraordinary tour of Europe in which he had been fêted by many of the sovereigns in a manner hitherto unheard-of for a private citizen. He found a Republican Party rapidly splitting, with much bitterness, into Insurgents and Old Guard, and, although his self-appointed successor was not half through his term, Roosevelt could not resist the appeal of a fight. Within a few weeks he was making political speeches through the country, clearly showing his preference for the Insurgent wing of the party, hostile to Taft.

It cannot be said that Roosevelt had any specific programme to offer, and many of his suggestions were those of the Democrats of the seemingly far-off days of 1896. The chief point in the "New

Nationalism" which he preached appeared to be the injection of more democracy as a cure for our ills, notable in his appeals for an extension of the primary election as a means of nominating candidates, and in his demand for the recall of elected officials during the term for which they were elected if the people wished. The latter would, of course, make officials even more subject than they are now to the momentary whim or wrath of a temporary majority balloting for a recall. There was no doubt, however, of the dissatisfaction of the people with the world as it was, and the election returned 229 Democrats to 161 Republicans and 1 Socialist in the lower House of Congress, while of the 10 Republican majority left in the Senate enough were Insurgents to nullify the apparent advantage. Taft's administration, like so many others under our system, had to face its second two years ham-strung by having the legislature of a different party.

In April, 1911, however, the President had the temerity to call Congress into special session to pass a bill for reciprocity with Canada, which had failed in the regular session. The bill provided for free trade between the countries in about one hundred articles and for lower duties on about four times that number. Accepted by the low-tariff Democrats, it had encountered strong opposition from the Eastern big-tariff Republicans and the Western Insurgents, the latter of whom feared an influx of Canadian lumber and foodstuffs. Passed at the special session, it served only to increase the unpopularity of the President, although it never went into effect, as it was defeated in Canada.

In January, under the organizing lead of La Follette, the Insurgent Senator from Wisconsin, there had been formed the National Progressive Republican League, including among its sponsors such men as Cummins, Beveridge, Bristow, Senator Bourne of Oregon, and others who had long been fighting both the "interests" and the Old Guard. La Follette, who was able, honest and intelligent and had made an excellent record as a reform and progressive Governor of his State, had a large following in the Northwest, but was feared as a radical in the East.

There was no question that, from the date of Roosevelt's retirement, La Follette was the real leader of the Progressives, and by 1911 he had a long and honorable record of successful fighting for fair

play for the ordinary man. During the special session of Congress, the split in the Republican Party became complete, and in the Senate La Follette worked with the Democratic leader in the House, Oscar Underwood, to put through a new tariff bill, lowering duties, which barely failed of passage even over the veto of the President.

For the rest of Taft's term, the interest shifts from Congress to the Departments. That of Justice continued busy with suits against the trusts, while the State Department had its hands full with the relations to our neighbors on the south.

The building of the Canal and the policies connected with it initiated by Roosevelt had practically developed into the theory of our exercising a protectorate over all the Caribbean governments, except that of Mexico. Coupled with the practice of "dollar diplomacy," that is of using our diplomatic service for the purpose of promoting loans and other economic interests in foreign, and mostly backward, countries, the theory of protectorates quickly took further tangible form.

In 1911, as part of the terms of securing a loan from New York bankers, the custom house in Nicaragua was placed in charge of an American. The following year, we landed marines there to quell disorder, and, with a brief interval, they have been there ever since. In 1913, we supervised the elections in Santo Domingo, followed by the marines three years later. In 1915 (looking for a moment forward into the next administration), we established with marines a forcible protectorate over Haiti. Unquestionably much good work has been done during the American occupations, and we could not afford complications with European nations arising from lack of order in these ill-governed small countries. On the other hand, although the problem is understood by many in the greater nations of South America, there is no doubt that the southerly advance of the "colossus of the North" has caused much ill-feeling and alarm in that continent.

A far more serious problem was raised by the situation in Mexico. Owing to a revolution led by Francisco Madero, the long rule of the strong Dictator Diaz came to an end in May, 1911. There had been a good deal of fighting just over the line from the United States in which Americans on our side had been killed, and Western blood was hot for revenge. The President despatched 20,000 troops to patrol

the border, and although affairs quieted down, the pot boiled again at the end of Taft's term and when he left office he was to bequeath, as we shall see, a difficult problem and an army mobilized on the frontier to his successor.

In spite of some excellent achievements of the second half of his term (such as the establishment of the parcel post, his support of the Constitutional amendments providing for an income tax and popular election of senators, and his wide extension of Civil Service reform), he had completely lost the confidence of the Progressives. What seemed our new foreign policy, although initiated by Roosevelt, was also giving serious concern. The "dollar diplomacy" of Secretary Knox was greatly disliked and mistrusted by many. Whatever might be said for the necessity of administering small Caribbean states, the seeming willingness of the government to shut the "open door" in China and to pronounce blessing on the participation of American bankers in the "Six Power" loan of \$300,000,000 to that country with various entering wedges for the acquisition of its territory, appeared to be a complete reversal of our former high-minded policy. It began to look as though the Department of State were being used as a Wall Street office to get profits and commissions for bankers. By the time the question came up of Presidential nominations, Taft had seemingly lost almost all of the popularity and prestige with which he had begun his term.

With the opening of the Presidental year of 1912, it was clear that there would be a terrific struggle for control within the Republican Party between the Progressives and the Conservatives. If the latter, who were already in control of the machinery of the party, won they would undoubtedly nominate Taft, but if the former won, who would be the candidate? If Roosevelt had been killed by a lion in Africa, the answer would have been simple: La Follette, the man who more than any other had kept the Progressive banner flying the past four years and stood the heat and burden of the day. Roosevelt was not lying in an African grave but was in America, bursting with energy, and with the unanswered question as to what to do with a particular ex-President. He still had an immense public following, not diminished by the limelight which played over his every action. It might have been difficult to avoid it, for everything which he did had been, for long, "news" in an

extraordinary degree. But he certainly did nothing to avoid it, and by his constant writings and his speaking tours of the country he kept the spot-light on himself.

What would be his attitude toward the political complications of his party and nation? That had been the great American political enigma since the cables had announced in 1910 that he was safely out of the jungle with his trophies. He had stood on such a pinnacle




"WE NEVER SPEAK AS WE PASS BY"
From a cartoon in "Puck," February 19, 1912.
Courtesy of Roosevelt Memorial Association.

of popularity at home and fame abroad as no other American had ever before occupied, and had come to consider himself as the only American capable of leading the people and solving their problems. Given his character and temperament, there was really but one answer, however he might deceive himself. Roosevelt would run again for President. On the 21st of February, 1912, he gave out his political creed of the moment, a programme which could not be distinguished from that of La Follette and the Progressive League. Three days

later he announced that he would accept a nomination if offered. With Roosevelt's immense popularity in all parts of the country, the contest for the regular Republican nomination had now evidently been narrowed to that between him and Taft. La Follette had been eliminated. The nation was genuinely shocked when Roosevelt, speaking of the man who was then President of the United States, announced that "it is a bad trait to bite the hand that feeds you." Probably no other remark has ever been made by a man of Roosevelt's standing so insulting both to the nation and its elected head. But for the rest of his career, Roosevelt's melomaniac belief in himself as the savior of America was to scatter not a few unhappy recollections for his admirers on what had been a most distinguished career.

When the Republican Convention met at Chicago on June 18,

the question of the validity of the elections of about 200 delegates, about one fifth of the total, was, as always, settled by the Republican National Committee, and practically all in favor of the Taft delegates. Although Roosevelt had himself on previous occasions backed similar decisions when in his favor, he and his followers now raised the cry of fraud and "steamroller" in the convention, and when unable to



FIRST IN PEACE, FIRST IN WAR, FIRST IN THE HEARTS OF HIS COUNTRYMEN

From a cartoon by McBride. Courtesy of Roosevelt Memorial Association.

get their way, finally bolted the party, which chose Taft for reelection.

The schism in the Republican ranks appeared to make a Democratic victory certain, and the interest in that party's convention at Baltimore on June 25 was unusually keen. Bryan was still the most powerful individual leader but the contest for the nomination was between J. B. ("Champ") Clark, Speaker of the lower House of Congress, Oscar Underwood, Chairman on the Committee on Ways and Means of that House, and Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. The political career of the last had been extraordinary. A college professor who had become president of Princeton, his forceful personality and determined views had led to conflicts

between him and some of the wealthy trustees of the university, and finally to his retirement.

What seemed like a break in one career, however, was but the opening to another. The Democratic Party in New Jersey, normally a Republican State, had been casting about for a dignified figurehead



From a cartoon by Herbert Johnson in "The North American," September 25, 1912. Courtesy of Roose-vels Memorial Association.

to run as governor, and had chosen the president of Princeton. Wilson had not only won the election but had made such a record as governor as to fasten himself upon the attention of liberals and Progressives throughout the nation.

The contest at Baltimore, however, was long and bitter, with many dramatic moments. It was only on the forty-sixth ballot, after Bryan had thrown down the gauntlet to both Tammany Hall and the great bankers in New York, and given his full support to

Wilson, that this former president of Princeton was nominated for the Presidency of the nation.


It was not until August 5 that Roosevelt and the bolting Republicans held their convention at Chicago to nominate the ex-President as head of the ticket put forward by the newly organized Progressive Party. It was an extraordinary gathering even for American national conventions, Roosevelt being cheered for a whole hour, and the members marching round the hall while singing "Onward Christian Soldiers," and finally ending, after the nomination of Roosevelt and Hiram Johnson of California, with singing the "Doxology."

In spite of the religious fervor instilled into the Roosevelt campaign, and his unquestioned popularity, there was something about it all that rather rang hollow. He had himself announced most solemnly that the sound tradition of a President's not serving more than two terms looked to the substance and not the form, and though he now tried to explain that away by saying he had meant serving successively more than two terms, the problem of the substance and not the form remained. If Roosevelt's new application of his statement were to hold, what would there be to prevent a man of such vast popularity, or even greater, serving two terms, then putting in his own nominee as he had done with Taft to keep the seat warm, and serving himself for another eight years, and keeping it up indefinitely? Moreover, was there no alternative, as has sometimes been denied, for his action, granted his adherence to Progressive principles?

As far as principles were concerned, there was practically nothing to choose between the platform of the Democrats and that of the Progressives, or "Bull Moose Party" as it came to be called. The Democrats had nominated not Bryan but a man who had already become nationally known for a sane defence of those principles. Astute politician as Roosevelt was, he must have known that the only result of his splitting the Republican Party wide open would be to elect the Democrats, and leave his own party broken and full of bitterness. Throughout his life he had insisted that parties must be reformed, if necessary, from the inside, and had preached the need of party loyalty and of acquiescence in what the organization might do. In fact, his action did nothing to increase the Pro-

gressive spirit within the party, and when it was eventually to return to power after eight years it was with a Harding at its head.

The result of the campaign, which was less exciting than might have been anticipated, was to give Wilson a popular vote of about 6,300,000, Roosevelt 4,125,000 and Taft 3,500,000. As his leading two opponents alone thus polled 9,800,000 votes to Roosevelt's 4,125,000, it was evident that the nation had not insisted that he should save it. The wave of Progressivism was at its height, as was that of discontent with things as they were, evidenced by the polling by the



A SIMPLE EQUATION

A Cartoon in "Puck," August 13, 1912. Courtesy of Roosevelt Memorial Association.

Socialist Party of its highest recorded vote. Of the two Progressive candidates Wilson received nearly 60 per cent more votes than Roosevelt. With him, were elected a strong majority in the House of Representatives and a small majority of six in the Senate. The general Democratic landslide throughout the country in both local and national elections reflected the deep dissatisfaction of the people. It was to this dissatisfaction, characteristically and not untruly

It was to this dissatisfaction, characteristically and not untruly interpreted by Wilson spiritually, that he turned in his first Inaugural Address, the shortest in our history. In moving words he spoke of the greatness of the nation in spiritual and material goods, but added that "evil had come with the good, and much fine gold has been corroded. . . . We have been proud of our industrial achievements, but we have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully enough to count the human cost, the cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and spiritual cost to the men and women and children upon whom the dead weight and burden of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through. The groans and agony of it all

had not yet reached our ears, the solemn, moving undertone of our life, coming up out of the mines and factories and out of every home where the struggle had its intimate and familiar seat. . . . The great government we loved has too often been made use of for private and selfish purposes, and those who used it had forgotten the people. . . . There has been something crude and heartless and unfeeling in our haste to succeed and be great. Our thought has been 'Let every man look out for himself, let every generation look out for itself,' while we reared giant machinery which made it impossible that any but those who stood at the levers of control should have a chance to look out for themselves. . . . This is the high enterprise of the new day: To lift everything that concerns our life as a Nation to the light that shines from the hearthfire of every man's conscience and vision of the right. . . . We shall restore, not destroy. We shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified, not as it might be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon. . . . This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do."

It is one of the misfortunes, as I have pointed out, of a weak opposition party, seldom attaining to power, that when it does so at long intervals it has comparatively few men of marked ability and rich public experience to draw from for its chief posts. Wilson had no slight difficulty in filling both the chief diplomatic posts and his own Cabinet with men of the highest grade.

For the Cabinet, however, he managed to get on the whole a competent, though not a distinguished group. Unfortunately the necessity of placing Bryan at its head as Secretary of State was too obvious to be ignored. Not only did the President owe the nomination to him but his influence in a large section of the party was as yet so great as to make essential his loyalty to the administration if the Presidential policies were to be carried out by Congress. Only two other Cabinet members, W. G. McAdoo in the Treasury and Franklin K. Lane in the Interior Department, could be considered as even minor national figures. Both President Eliot of Harvard and former Secretary of State Olney declined the appointment to England, but that Ambassadorship, always the most important in our service, and

of supreme difficulty as it was to prove in the next few years, was at last happily filled by Walter Hines Page.

In the short list of problems with which Wilson in his Inaugural Address had promised to grapple he had placed first the tariff and the reform of the antiquated banking system. He at once called Congress in special session to consider both of these.

Under the lead of Oscar W. Underwood in the House, a bill was rapidly drafted which, although still keeping the protective principle, raised the duty on only 86 articles, left them unchanged on 307, and reduced them on 958. Any reduction in government income was provided for by taxes on incomes of over \$3000 for single and \$4000 for married persons, this provision having been made possible by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution which had been declared operative on February 25, just before Taft's retirement.

The first genuine effort made to reduce the tariff for a generation was promptly successful in the House, where it was passed early in May by 281 to 139 votes, but it still had to run the ruthless gauntlet of the Senate, where the Democrats had a majority of only six. As usual, every entrenched interest was represented, and the emasculation of the bill commenced. Although Louisiana produced only about 500,000,000 of the 8,000,000,000 pounds of sugar which the American public consumed, the two senators from that State were adamant as ever against allowing us to get our sugar cheaper by putting it on the free list, and all the other industries "protected" likewise at the expense of the public started the customary "log rolling," agreeing to vote for somebody else's absurd duty if that somebody else would vote for theirs.

Into this maze of corrupt bargaining Wilson threw a bombshell when he appealed directly to the people with the statement that a "numerous, industrious, and insidious lobby" was at work trying to prevent a reduction in the tariff. In answer to this charge, which might have been as true of any other tariff measure in the past two generations, Congress had to appoint an investigating committee. The public attention thus focussed was undoubtedly the means of eventually securing the passage of the bill through the Senate so that it could at last receive the President's signature on October 3. He had won his first round and carried out his first pledge.

As may be recalled, our banking system had been evolved during the exigencies of the Civil War, and our bank-note currency, being based on government bonds as security, bore a direct relation to the amount of bonds available profitably at any time but none whatever to the shifting demands of trade activity. One result had been an annual scramble for money in the autumn when the crops were being moved, and a succession of minor and major "money panics" or crises. On occasions, reputable New York banks might be charging 6 per cent on call loans to one customer and 120 per cent to another, or even the two rates on different loans simultaneously to the same customer. Founded by the Republicans, that party had made no effort to amend the system for fifty years, save for the appointment of the Aldrich Commission to investigate the subject and the passage of the stop-gap Aldrich-Vreeland Bill in 1908 after the devastating money panic of 1007. The commission had made exhaustive investigations, the results of which had been published in nearly forty volumes, but nothing further had been done.

Wilson now undertook this second task, and the result of his efforts was the great Federal Reserve Act under which the banking system of the nation now functions, and without which we could not have gone through the ensuing twenty years without meeting colossal financial as well as economic disaster.

The bill itself was drafted by the President, by McAdoo, and the chairmen of the Committees on Banking and Currency in the two Houses of Congress, Carter Glass and Senator R. L. Owen, with, of course, help from many sources. There has been no little effort made to spread the belief that the Federal Reserve system as we now have it varied but little from what Aldrich had proposed, but that can hardly be maintained. Aldrich, in fact, declared it to be "revolutionary, socialistic and unconstitutional," and most of the leading bankers who had been in favor of the Aldrich plan were bitterly opposed to the Wilson one.

The chief point of contention was that the bankers insisted upon a highly centralized institution which should be in the control of private bankers, whereas the Wilson administration insisted that it should be largely decentralized and under the control of the government. In his autobiography, McAdoo gives an amusing list of the opinions of leading financiers of the country with regard to the

dire evils that the Federal Reserve system would inevitably bring upon us.

In general the plan called for twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks to be located in various parts of the United States, under the control of a central Federal Reserve Board to be made up of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency and other members (now six), to be appointees of the President. Two of the principal objects to be attained, and which have been, were to establish regional banks in which the individual commercial banks could safely keep their reserves, and to provide an elastic currency which would expand and contract with the varying demands of business. Wilson took a leading part in helping the bill through both Houses of Congress, and it was no small feat of statesmanship that it could be passed for him to sign by December 23, less than ten months after he had taken office. Although J. R. Mann, the Republican leader in the House, had asserted that after all, it did not make any difference how bad the bill was because none of the national banks would go into the system, within a week after the bill's passage 767 had applied for admission.

With a successful revision of the tariff accomplished,—that reef on which so many Presidents have foundered,—and with the great reorganization of the banking system of the nation to his credit, Wilson might well take pride in the accomplishment of his first few months in office. Unfortunately some other matters were not going so well. He had never given much attention to or had much interest in diplomatic or foreign affairs. His teaching and his writings had been almost wholly devoted to the constitutional aspects of the history of his own country, and he had entered upon office with the burning desire to readjust the economic and social life of that country to conform more closely to the new spiritual vision of what it might be which he had suggested in his inaugural. Before leaving his home at Princeton to go to Washington he had remarked to Professor Conklin that "it would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs." It was to be not only the irony but the tragedy of it.

Wilson was an idealist, perhaps the greatest idealist in the history of the world who has held the post of a responsible statesman of such surpassing importance in any crisis of world history. Had he

been called upon to deal only with American affairs, as he hoped he would, during his terms of office, his idealism would have been wholesomely kept in touch with practicality by his knowledge of the psychology and history of his own countrymen. But when he had to do with foreign nations, his lack of sound knowledge let his idealism fly loose, like a balloon whose string has been cut and which floats away from the solid earth. His first test was the Mexican situation which he inherited from Taft, and of that he wrote to a friend "I work hard . . . But it is not that that tells on a fellow. It's the anxiety attending the handling of . . . affairs in which you seem to be touching quicksilver,—matters (in) which your own judgments and principles furnish no standards." That was the great tragedy of Wilson. At the flood tide of American revolt and idealism he was precisely the leader we needed in our own affairs. Instead of that, he was forced to a position of world leadership for which nothing in his career had previously prepared him.

Wilson had a profound belief in morality, and also believed that a government could not govern usefully or efficiently unless its acts were moral. He believed, again, profoundly in democracy, and in the ability of the ordinary human being to govern himself wisely. Knowing only American conditions—though even those might have given him pause—he extended this belief to the entire world and to peoples of all races and conditions. It was with this background of rigid beliefs that he undertook to solve the Mexican problem.

Briefly the situation was that the new dictator, Madero, after he had gone through the forms of a popular election as President, had been assassinated, and the government overturned, by a new faction under a ruthless general of Indian blood, Victoriano Huerta. Opposed to Huerta was yet another faction under Carranza, and Mexico was plunged in civil war, in so far as the struggle between rival leaders with their followers could be dignified by that name. In any case, conditions were so disturbed as to make life and property unsafe.

Mexico is a country of the richest natural resources, and American capitalists, whose investments had been estimated by Taft at over \$1,000,000,000, and European capitalists were heavily interested in the establishment of stable conditions. The English oil concessions,

belonging to companies headed by Lord Cowdray, were alone colossal, and tied up with the British navy. Huerta might be considered not unreasonably by any one as a bloody usurper, but he was strong, and capitalists and foreign governments believed that rule by him offered the best chance at least of maintaining order in a nation in which, owing to illiteracy and the depressed economic condition of the mass of the people, genuine democracy could not be expected to exist. Huerta was promptly recognized by England and other European countries, but Wilson refused to recognize a government which he declared did not represent the people and which was founded on bloody crime.

He insisted that "just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval." Unfortunately, as far as Mexican conditions were concerned, this was merely an ideal gyrating in a vacuum. Among the mass of Mexicans there were much suffering, ignorance, and injustice, but it was impossible for almost any one except Wilson to think of them in terms of an American or British electorate. To insist, in Mexico, upon a democratic government based on the consent of the governed and an intelligent public opinion and conscience was to dream of building a skyscraper on a quicksand.

Wilson drifted along, largely ignoring the State Department officials, goaded by the business interests which felt that hundreds of millions of dollars were being sacrificed to his impractical policy of "watchful waiting," and thwarted by a political situation which he simply did not understand. There was no doubt that Huerta was unspeakably bad, but even the Mexicans themselves resented our not acknowledging their government, and so far from appreciating Wilson's desire for their welfare as he saw it, were maddened by what appeared to be our officious interference with their internal affairs.

On April 9, 1914, a boatload of American sailors with one or two officers, who had gone ashore at Tampico for supplies for the U. S. S. Dolphin, were arrested by the Mexican authorities, and although they were released, Huerta declined to offer the salute to the American flag which Admiral Mayo demanded as an apology. We were slipping into deeper water, and about two weeks later, to prevent a German vessel from landing arms for Huerta, Wilson

cabled Mayo to seize the port of Vera Cruz, later sending General Funston with 6000 men to hold the city.

It looked like war, and the three great South American powers, Argentine, Chile and Brazil, offered their mediation, which was accepted. The negotiations were only partly successful, but by July Huerta abdicated and sailed to Europe. In February, Wilson had abandoned neutrality by lifting the embargo on arms for Carranza, although he had not allowed arms to go through for Huerta, and his policy toward the latter prevented the dictator from getting loans abroad. Wilson had thus drifted into actively intervening to overthrow a government which did not suit his own constitutional and moral ideals, and had incurred the enmity of Mexico and the suspicion of all South America by doing so.

Nor did the accession to power of Carranza settle the Mexican question. He was well-meaning, but the uprising against him of the bandit Villa continued disorder in Mexico, and with Carranza's permission the United States despatched General Pershing across the Mexican border to capture Villa, without success. Wilson, by 1916, had 150,000 militiamen from various States patrolling the frontier, and we seemed as far as ever from having a Mexican policy. Our troops were withdrawn in January, 1917, when Carranza proclaimed a constitution for Mexico, but three years later he himself was to be assassinated.


If Wilson had muddled rather than solved the Mexican problem, his anti-Huerta policy had one important result. Under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, the United States had agreed that all vessels of all nations should be allowed to use the Panama Canal on a perfect equality. This agreement had been lived up to, and American vessels had been charged the same tolls as those of foreign nations, with one exception. For a very long period no foreign ships had been allowed to engage in our purely domestic coastwise business, a rule of many other nations as well as of our own. As there was thus no question of competition in this traffic, both parties in Congress had considered that the exemption from tolls of our own ships when merely passing from one coast to another and not engaging in foreign trade was not an infringement of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and in 1912 this business had been granted exemption from tolls.

England, however, bitterly denounced the exemption as a breach of good faith, and was probably right, although it had certainly not been deliberately intended as such. The fact that the Canal had been built by American enterprise with American money, and that the only shipping exempted from tolls was local American business in which foreigners could not lawfully compete in any case, obscured for many honest Americans the fact that the exemption was in its larger aspects a genuine infringement of England's treaty rights. A good deal of irritation had been aroused on both sides of the water, and the question had become so tinged with emotion as to make it difficult of adjustment.

Suddenly, on March 5, 1914, Wilson appeared before Congress, and asked for a repeal of the exemption clause in the Act of 1912, not only because it was in violation of our solemn pledge but also, he added, because if Congress did not grant him confidence "in ungrudging measure" and repeal the clause without further delay he would not "know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence." No one knew what important complication in our foreign affairs might be signified by these cryptic words, but the clause was promptly repealed, and it seems possible that what Wilson intended was to secure the co-operation of England in his Mexican policy against Huerta. In this he was successful, for Lord Cowdray's oil interests ceased to dominate the British Foreign Office, and in less than four months Huerta had fled.


Although it seems certain that the repeal was asked for in connection with the Mexican policy, it has also been said that it was on account of the complicated and threatening situation in which Wilson found himself with regard to Japan. This arose again from the form of our Federal Government. About eleven months before Wilson appeared before Congress, the Japanese Ambassador had protested against the law then being considered in California forbidding aliens from owning land, a law directly aimed at Japan and which appeared to be in contravention of her treaty rights with us.

The feeling against the Japanese had continued strong in California, and indeed, was not friendly throughout the nation. Laws relating to land ownership were within the legislative jurisdiction of the individual States and not of the Federal Government, which nevertheless was responsible for making treaties and for foreign rela-



SIXTH INFANTRY AT EL VALLE, MEXICO, 1916


Adobe shelter for two men in semi-permanent camp after active pursuit of Villa had ceased.



GENERAL PERSHING AND STAFF, PUNITIVE EXPEDITION


Left to right: Captain W. O. Reed, 6th Cav., M.I.D. 1st Lt. J. L. Collins, 11th Cav., A.D.C. Col. DeR. C. Cabell, 10th Cav., Chief of Staff. Brig.-Gen. J. J. Pershing, Commanding. Major John L. Hines, Adj. Gen. Col. G. O. Cress, Div. Inspector. Capt. L. B. Kromer, 11th Cav. Div., Q. M.

From photographs in the War Department.



Courtesy of Swift and Company.

CHICAGO STOCKYARDS OF SWIFT AND COMPANY IN 1861



Courtesy of Mrs. Joseph Pennell.

CHICAGO STOCKYARDS OF ARMOUR AND COMPANY IN 1917 From the lithograph by Joseph Pennell in the Joseph and Elizabeth Robins Pennell Collection, Library of Congress.

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tions. Theoretically a treaty, as the "supreme" law of the land, supersedes local law, but in practice, when feeling is strong, it does not. California declined to change her policy, passed the law, and with a jingo press in both countries doing its best to exacerbate instead of to smooth over the situation, the affair began to appear extremely serious. We could not afford war with Japan while getting more and more mired in Mexico and with a quarrel with England on our hands. With reference to the tolls, the Mexican and Japanese situations may perhaps thus be regarded as one.

In April, 1914, Wilson also made an effort to adjust the old Panama dispute with Colombia by negotiating a treaty which expressed "regret" for the incident and which gave Colombia \$25,000,000 in lieu of all claims. Roosevelt at once proclaimed that the administration had forfeited all right to the respect of the American people, and called the payment "belated blackmail." It is probable that his subsequent bitter hatred of Wilson was in no small measure due to what seemed to him this suggested placing of a stigma on his own acts. In any case, the treaty failed in the Senate, and the matter had to wait until a Republican administration finally made amends to Colombia, without expressing regret other than in terms of cash.

Absorbed as the President was in the spring of 1914 with these foreign entanglements, which he had so much dreaded, he continued to push forward his programme of internal reform. He was urging on Congress the creation of a Federal Trade Commission, which should collect information as to industrial organizations and take the initiative in securing the enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. He was also outlining the Clayton Act, which diminished the evils of interlocking directorates; declared that labor and agricultural organizations were not in restraint of trade; and prohibited the issue of injunctions in labor disputes unless it were clear that irreparable damage would otherwise be done. Both of these were passed by Congress in the early autumn. Meanwhile, the swift occurrence of unpredictable events in Europe had relegated Japan, Mexico, and our domestic policies to positions of almost neglible interest.

Glancing ahead for a moment we may note two other important accomplishments of Wilson's administration. The Farm Loan Act

of 1916 was epochal in its effect on the farmers, always as a class likely to suffer from the incubus of debt. Local banks had not seldom charged them as high as ten per cent for accommodation. The Farm Loan Act provided means for their borrowing from the government at rates as low as six and even five per cent, thus saving nearly half their interest charges. Whether or not this sudden facility in borrowing should be wisely used or induce unwise increase in obligations would naturally depend on the wisdom and restraint of the individual farmer. That it came as a blessing to many cannot be denied.

Another Act, the so-called La Follette's Seamen's Act of 1915, was directed at ameliorating the condition of another class of workers, though its beneficent influence may be questioned. In the opinion of some it is "the charter of liberties for America's seamen" which "freed the men in the forecastle from the tyranny of the bridge," whereas others consider that it "prescribed such rules for the wages, food and accommodations of sailors as made it impossible to compete with foreign shipping." There would seem to be more truth, if less emotion, in the latter statement. With England operating her ships at twenty-five per cent lower costs and Japan hers at fifty per cent less, and with the high wages offered American workmen in other employments, there was in any case little hope ahead for an American merchant marine unless heavily subsidized. Both these Acts, however, marked a proper and growing interest in the welfare of the ordinary man as contrasted with the larger business interests which had formerly considered government aid as rather peculiarly a perquisite of their own.

The vast economic changes in the preceding forty years or more which had been developing problems for Americans to solve had also been altering the entire world. The race for overseas possessions, which had made the period from 1880 onward so markedly imperialistic, had been but one expression of the new demands for sources of raw materials and for markets as outlets for manufactured products. The European balance of power, always rather delicately poised, had been subjected to new stresses and strains, although the individuals in each nation had continued to live their lives with little realization of the instability in which they were placed.

In determining the "causes" of the war which was now to burst on

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the world, one may go back many decades to trace the growing tension among nations or may consider merely the events of the few weeks following the assassination of an Austrian archduke and his wife by a Serbian. If we consider the broader "causes," those tensions which sooner or later would have caused an upset of the unstable equilibrium of the great powers, it is difficult to apportion the blame between nations for bringing the catastrophe about. If we consider the events of the last few weeks before the conflagration blazed, Germany and Austria must bear the heaviest part of the responsibility.

It is impossible here to give a detailed narrative of those momentous days between the murder on June 28 and the first week in August when war had actually started with Germany and Austro-Hungary on one side and Russia, Serbia, Belgium, France, and England on the other. Before the war, Austria, Germany, and Italy had been united in the Triple Alliance, and France, Russia, and England in the Triple Entente, and when Russia came to the aid of her fellow Slav state of Serbia, which Austria claimed the right to chastise, Germany had realized that France would go to the aid of Russia. Counting on disposing of the French quickly before the great Russian war machine could get into motion, Germany invaded France by way of the neutral state of Belgium, breaking the treaty, nearly a century old, guaranteeing the neutrality of that little country.

The act shocked the world, but we had had nothing to do with the treaty or guaranty, and at this stage we were in no way concerned with the causes of the conflict. We were not international policemen to defend the injuries of the weak or to enforce treaties to which we were not parties. Nor had other nations in the past undertaken such duties. In 1866, for example, England had made no move when Prussia made a war of aggression against Denmark and took from her the province of Schleswig and Holstein, nor had she moved when Germany attacked France in 1870.

For us, in 1914, there were special reasons for trying to maintain neutrality. Not only had it been, for more than one hundred years, our traditional policy to avoid European entanglements, but under the Monroe Doctrine we had demanded a free hand for ourselves in the New World and had coupled that assertion many times with the counter declaration that we should keep out of the local quarrels of the Old. Moreover, of our people, literally several tens of mil-

lions were immigrants or children of immigrants from the races now locked in a death struggle, and their sympathies were naturally divided between the two groups of contestants. It was right, therefore, that on August 4, 1914, Wilson should proclaim our complete neutrality.

In view of the claim raised later in so many quarters, both at home and abroad, that it had been "our war" from the start and that we shirked our duty for a long time, it is well to bear these facts in mind. Even Roosevelt, more than six weeks after the war began and Belgium had been raped, wrote in *The Outlook* that it was desirable and right for us to remain neutral, and that we had "not the smallest responsibility" for what had happened in Belgium.

It was one thing, however, to proclaim neutrality, and another to maintain it. Gradually the conflict took on the aspect of a world war. In the summer and autumn, Turkey joined the Central Powers and Japan the Allies, other smaller nations also being drawn in. Italy, in spite of her alliance with Austria and Germany, hesitated for ten months, and then, after securing a treaty guaranteeing her additions to her territory, joined their enemies, the Allies, in May, 1915.

Meanwhile, our whole life had been changed by the sudden upheaval in Europe. To avoid a fatal collapse of all values, the Stock Exchange had been forced to close on July 31 to remain closed for many weeks. On the other hand, the break-down of the economic life of Europe, and the colossal war-time demand for food stuffs, ammunition and goods of all sorts at any prices, brought quickly a feverish activity to American business life. Our excess of exports over imports rose by leaps, \$470,653,000 in the year ending June 30, 1914, \$1,094,000,000 in 1915, \$2,135,000,000 in 1916 and \$3,630,000,000 in 1917. In 1914 we had exported only \$6,272,000 of explosives. In 1917 we exported them to the amount of \$802,789,000. Our total exports, which had been \$2,329,000,000 in 1914, were \$4,272,000,000 by 1916 and \$6,227,000,000 by 1917.

It was very far, however, from being a golden shower for all Americans. As usual in wartime, some grew immensely rich and many made fortunes from the profits of war contracts and opportunities. The daily wage earner had ample work at rapidly rising wages. But for a vast number of Americans, especially for those who were neither war-profiteers nor wage earners, the fast mounting

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cost of living, with incommensurate or no increase in salaries or other income, played havoc with family budgets.

As in the Napoleonic struggles of just a century earlier, when France and not Germany had been trying to over-run Europe, the United States was the most important neutral nation, and upon her rested the responsibility of maintaining neutral rights. The problem was an extremely difficult one, for the nature of war had completely altered whereas international law had not. We alone could not alter the latter in the midst of the struggle without being accused of being unneutral, and if both sides claimed at times that we took too narrow a legalistic view, that is perhaps as good proof as any that we were trying to steer a middle course.

The chief trouble came, as of old, on the sea. Within our own borders, though we might resent the propaganda of both sides, designed to stir up racial feeling among our mixed population, we could take care of the grosser forms of violation, such as the Austrian and German efforts to destroy ammunition and other plants to prevent supplies being sent to the Allies. In September, 1915, Wilson had to ask for the recall of the Austrian ambassador, and not long after of two of the attachés of the German Embassy for connection with such plots.

But if there was no question as to the laws of our own land, there were many and difficult ones as to sea-borne commerce under the conditions of modern war. As the German navy had quickly been cleared off the sea, most of the earlier problems arose between us and England. They proved so delicate that had Germany not undertaken her submarine campaign it is not impossible that there might have been a new "War of 1812."

The nature of war, as we have said, had changed greatly in a century. In 1909, in what was known as the Declaration of London, ten of the greatest maritime powers had signed a convention modifying the international law relative to contraband, seizures at sea, and other such matters. England had signed this but Parliament had refused to adopt it. Through the summer of 1914, England, by the Orders in Council of which we had such unpleasant recollection from the Napoleonic Wars, had added thirty-two articles to the list of contraband which had not been specified in the Declaration of London, and which included some of our most important products,

such as cotton and various metals. When Wilson asked both sides to adhere to the Declaration of 1909, the Central Powers naturally agreed but the Allies refused.

According to international law we had a right to export goods as a neutral nation to other neutral nations. To the north of Germany were the neutral states of Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, and our trade with them increased at such a rate, about fivefold in a year, that it was evident our exports to them were in reality going to Germany. As the Allies were not in a position to stop the trade over the German borders, from those countries, the only thing they could do was to prevent it on the high seas. This England, as the chief naval power on the Allied side, did, stopping our ships, which were heavily laden with essential war material for her enemies, confiscating cargoes and even capturing our mails. Such action was necessary to win the war but was against international law, and as immensely valuable cargoes of cotton, meats, and other goods were seized and confiscated, although with promise of eventual payment, the wrath of the American shippers grew, precisely as the wrath of English merchants would have been aroused had the position been reversed.

Just as, a century before, Napoleon and England had answered each other with orders and blockades, now Germany declared, February 4, 1915, that she would answer the Allied effort to cut off her food supplies by the arbitrary extension of the contraband list of the Declaration of London and by illegal seizures, with the proclamation of a war zone around the British Isles within which zone German submarines would sink enemy vessels without attention to the international law that demanded the placing of the crew and passengers in safety.

When we notified the German Government that this was illegal and that we would have to hold them to "strict accountability," the reply was that the government would reconsider its action if we would insist upon England's observing the terms of the Declaration of 1909. Later, Germany also demanded that we stop supplying the Allies with munitions, which they were getting from us in huge quantities and which she, from her position, could not get. This, as a highly unneutral act which would have given the victory almost at once to Germany, we promptly declined to do. Germany claimed,

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however, that if we were supplying the Allies with all they needed, and that if they illegally stopped goods destined for her, she would also adopt illegal methods. With that the submarine campaign was on.

What Germany did not realize was the difference between life and property. In about two and a half months the submarines sank over sixty ships belonging to different countries, including an American steamer, the Gulflight, with a total loss of 250 persons, of whom one was an American. On the very day the Gulflight was sunk, a notice appeared, signed "Imperial German Embassy," in the New York papers warning Americans not to sail that day on the Lusitania. Few, however, cancelled their passage, and the great English liner, with war supplies and 1250 passengers on board, sailed as usual. Six days later she was torpedoed off the Irish coast and sank with over 1150 men, women, and children, of whom 114 were Americans.

The country, however, was not ready for war. In the vast Mississippi Valley and over the mountains on the Pacific slope, thousands of miles from Europe, and with a population a considerable part of which was of Teutonic descent, the Lusitania sinking, although it carried a thrill of horror, did not appear to most as a cause for plunging a nation of 110,000,000 people into war, if any other way out could be found. It was frequently said that if a few Americans wished to take the risk of travelling through the war zone on an

OCEAN STEAMSHIPS.



EUROPE VIA LIVERPOOL

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TRAVELLERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adja-cent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal no-tice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 22, 1915.

THE LUSITANIA ADVERTISE-

MENT IN THE NEW YORK HERALD OF MAY 1, 1915

armed ship of a nation at war loaded with ammunition, they had no right to demand that their own nation go to war to avenge them. Whatever the justice of this pacifist doctrine, the general disinclination of the people for war had to be taken into account by Wilson.

Instead of declaring war, he demanded that Germany make reparation, and stop the illegal submarine sinkings. Although two more American lives were lost in the sinking of the *Arabic* on August 18, on the 27th of the same month the German Government solemnly agreed that liners would not be sunk without observing the laws of



TWO TORPEDOES SINK LUSITANIA; MANY AMERICANS AMONG 1,446 LOST; PRESIDENT, STUNNED, IN SECLUSION.

THE WORLD HEADLINES OF MAY 8, 1915

war, and later offered an apology and indemnity for the sinking of the *Arabic*. In the following February, although unwilling to avow the illegality of the *Lusitania* sinking, Germany also offered indemnity for that.

In January, Wilson went on a tour of the Middle West to rouse the people and to gain support for preparing for war, pointing out that the national honor must be upheld and could not be without adequate preparation. His own ideas as to what that might be, or what the people would support, was nevertheless so far below that of his Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, that the latter had resigned, as, for the exact opposite reason, had Secretary of State Bryan who felt that Wilson was taking too strong a stand and endangering peace. When, on March 24, 1916, the Germans broke their pledge, and sank the Sussex without warning, Wilson refused to accept Germany's statement as to the circumstances, and wrote that unless such attacks immediately ceased for good and all, he would break off relations. For the next nine months they did stop.

The election of 1916 clearly showed that the nation was divided.

THE NEW FREEDOM

The Republicans nominated Charles E. Hughes on a platform which denounced Wilson's war policy and demanded preparedness and a more energetic attitude, whereas the Democrats, with Wilson as their candidate for renomination, praised his policy and adopted as their campaign slogan "He kept us out of war." The election was one of the closest in our history, Wilson carrying the whole South and Far West, and Hughes most of the East. At first it was thought the latter had been elected, the result not being certain for two days. It was then found that Wilson had polled 9,128,836 votes to 8,536,380 for Hughes, and had won.

America was still primarily interested in her domestic affairs, and it is probable that the apparent lack of interest shown by Hughes in progressive policies at home, as well as his somewhat evasive speeches on all topics, had gained as many votes for Wilson as the slogan that he kept us out of war. As the results of the campaign reached Europe, however, it was the latter which made the most impression. The Germans had heard it, and giving much too great significance to it, were to act upon their interpretation of it to their ruin.

CHAPTER XI

THE WORLD WAR

HERE is no doubt that for at least a year and a half before we actually entered the war, Wilson had clearly recognized the possibility of our having to do so. On his Western tour to stir up the people as early as January, 1916, he had told them that they had laid two duties upon him, one to keep out of war if possible and the other to preserve the honor of the United States. There might come the time, he had added, arguing for preparedness, when he could not any longer preserve both honor and peace.

As the months of what seemed to be the interminable nightmare which had engulfed a large part of the human race went on, he ceaselessly turned over in his mind what might be the noblest and most useful service to all humanity which the United States could render. Wilson was neither a weak nor a timid man. If his dealings with Mexico had shown too much of the dreamer and idealist, his years at Princeton and his career since he had become governor of New Jersey showed equally that he could be a hard and determined fighter. That he should think of the possibility of himself playing a great rôle in bringing about peace, such as Roosevelt had played in 1907, only on a far vaster stage, was legitimate, but it is only fair to him to believe that he was not swayed in his course by personal ambition.

Apart from the wish of America to remain neutral if possible, there was the importance of limiting the already vast field of slaughter and madness and impending bankruptcy of civilization as much as might be. Finally, there was Wilson's belief—that when peace might come America could play a better part as the one great neutral nation untouched by the hatreds of the conflict than she could as one of the war-maddened belligerents.

Slowly there had developed in his mind, as there had also in the minds of such men as Taft, Hughes, Lord Robert Cecil, and others, the possibility of using the terrible war as the means to end all wars.

and of building up through some League of Nations a better order than that based on the old nationalistic ambitions and diplomacy. As in the case of Mexico, Wilson did not give sufficient weight to the actualities of the real springs of action in men, and to the strength of historic factors and conditions, but he did see clearly and rightly that there was little hope for mankind if no better foundation for lasting peace could be found than the armed balance of the great powers of Europe, which broke of its own weight about once a century.

There had been the devastating wars, ending temporarily in the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. A hundred years later the balance had been upset by the insensate ambition of Napoleon and the militarism of the French, which had again drowned all Europe in blood, and involved America also. By 1913 a new balance, that of the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance, all armed to the teeth, had become unstable. Had it not been for the alliances and the armaments, designed to preserve peace, we might not have had war, but in the world as it was there seemed nothing to do but to build up alliances.

The great underlying tensions in the world structure are rarely perceived by the average citizen, who in modern civilized countries is naturally a peace-loving person. For the most part, these citizens have to be moved by great ideals, such as patriotism, the belief in the absolute justice of their cause, or by profound emotions of hate or fear or opposition to injustice, to turn them into fighting men. Hence the need of propaganda in all modern nations under modern conditions of warfare. Hate becomes almost as essential as ammunition, and how hate is manufactured, any one can recall with shame who worked in the propaganda section of any nation in those years of war. On the other hand, the propaganda of the righteous cause has also to be circulated, and just as every nation prayed to God for the victory, so practically every citizen in all believed implicitly in the justice of his own side.

By December, 1916, the war had been going on for nearly two and a half years, with no prospect of ending. Had it ended with a victory for the Prussian "Potsdam Gang," and the enforcement of their ideas on a large part of Europe, the result would have been as bad as would have been a victory by Napoleon and the French at Waterloo. Wilson had no doubt of that, but what he wanted was not

merely to end the war, but to do so in such a way as to bring about the new order under a League. This he felt would have to be done if possible before the bitter hatreds, growing more bitter every day, would put the feasibility of such a new order out of the question. On December 18, therefore, he addressed notes to all the belligerents asking them to define their war aims, and on what terms they would be willing to consider the making of such a peace. All, in general terms, he said had defined what they were fighting for, but each had done so in much the same words to their own peoples.

If, he added, "million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on one side or the other there are no more to offer; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle." He did not, in these all too-prophetic words of what was to come to pass, suggest either peace or mediation, but a mere statement of war aims by both sides to see how far apart they might be.

The notes aroused a good deal of bad feeling, particularly on the side of the Allies who complained that Wilson could not see the difference between what they were fighting for and what the Germans were. The Allies had the better case. If we look only to the immediate causes of the war, the events in the few weeks before August, 1914, the chief responsibility for toppling over the delicate balance of Europe belonged to Austria and Germany, though France, Russia, and England are far from being free of all responsibility. However, it had been Germany which had talked about the Belgian treaty as a "scrap of paper," and which had committed the crime of invading that neutral state. Moreover it had been Germany which had introduced the horror of the submarine war.

Wilson was looking not at the moral question of this particular war, however, so much as at the whole problem of war, its causes and its possible cure. To understand his policy, this fact has to be kept in mind. Whatever might be the immediate and ostensible causes of this one, he saw the *larger* causes. There had been for some centuries the nationalistic desires to expand and to exert power. Whether or not an archduke had been murdered, Austria and Germany wanted to extend their power toward the southeast into Asia

BATTLEGROUND OF THE WORLD WAR

Minor. But this would have thwarted Russia's hope of some day having Constantinople and a southern outlet to the sea. When she had come to Serbia's aid, it had been with this ultimate thought in mind.

Moreover, in the last few hectic days of July, 1914, when the world was frantically trying to patch up a peace, it had been the huge size of modern armies and the necessity of having the whole machinery move, once a button had been touched, which seemed to make any recall impossible; and the Czar was not without his own responsibility for bringing on the war at the last moment. Again, there was the system of alliances. England and France were bound to Russia. If Russia came in, Germany knew she would have to attack France. England, after some days of hesitation, came in partly to defend the Belgian treaty but also largely because she had been so bound to Russia and France in the Entente that if she did not go in she would win their enmity, and—whichever side won—would find herself in dangerous isolation, and the route to India threatened by either Russia or Germany. All this has been clearly brought out by Lord Grev. Greedy nationalism, the system of alliances, and vast and unwieldy armaments thus appeared to Wilson as the real causes of the world débâcle.

A conflict of expansive policies between the Central Empires and Russia; then such huge fighting machines that each side dared not wait a moment too long lest the advantages go to the other; then the necessity of extending the conflict to all allies lest the balance of power be overthrown;—so the war had begun, and after it had begun came the hope of spoil and the madness and hate of propaganda and war emotion. Italy, after ten months, deserted her former allies and made a secret treaty with her new ones which promised her additions to her territory on the Adriatic. Japan, likewise bribed with the promise of loot in Shantung and elsewhere in the East, joined the Allies. Others had been drawn in, and now it looked as though we might be, with every wish in the world not to be.

Wilson was pro-Ally in sympathy, but he was almost wholly concerned with how to prevent in future this recurring disaster to mankind. Even if the Allies won, and there was a redistribution of territory and a nominal peace, the President saw that if the old system of armed balance of power were set up again, there would be no guarantee of peace. It would be only a question of time when the

whole thing would happen again, whatever the spark might be that next time would be called the "cause."

He came to believe with his whole soul that the only hope for humanity was the inauguration of a new order, of a genuine "society" of nations on the same basis of mutual trust and confidence as that on which citizens of the same country live with each other. But every month that the war went on with increasing bitterness then and to come, seemed to him to make such a plan less and less possible. It was this thought he had in mind when, on January 22, 1917, he addressed the Senate as to the result of his notes, and used the famous phrase, which aroused almost universal resentment, that there must be "peace without victory."

There must be in future, he said, not a "balance of power" but a "community of power," "only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe." The right state of mind is as necessary to lasting peace, he added, as "is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance." A victor's terms "would be accepted in humiliation . . . and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon a quicksand." The fifteen years following the Peace of Versailles, with their increasing tension of national animosities, their growing sense of instability, their mad increase of national jealousies and almost complete breakdown of economic civilization, were to prove Wilson a seer. We had a dictated victor's peace, a renewal of the old system of armed alliances, and—disaster.

Unfortunately it takes more than vision to make a statesman, and Wilson over-rated both the willingness of his own countrymen and of the world at large to assume the risks of trying to establish a new order in place of the old, while he under-rated the forces of nationalism. He also overestimated his own ability to solve the problem.

Before the Senate in January, he pleaded for no more alliances but for a concert of power beneath which all men could "live their own lives under a common protection." The rest of his own life, which he sacrificed to the cause, was devoted persistently and with a tragic disregard to actuality, to the attempt to make his vision real for all mankind. He failed, but he failed nobly, in perhaps the greatest effort that any statesman has ever made to bring content and lasting peace to all mankind.

Wilson was always a puzzle to the diplomats of the Old World, and Germany had interpreted the election of 1916 as indicating not that America was idealistic but that she was cowardly and would stand any amount of abuse. At once the building of new submarines had proceeded rapidly, and on January 31, nine days after Wilson had addressed the Senate as we have noted, Germany curtly told us that,



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GERMANY'S PROMISE!
From "The Evening World," New York.

in utter disregard of her former promise, she would thereafter sink at sight every vessel, neutral as well as belligerent, in the Mediterranean or in the waters adjacent to Great Britain.

The German Ambassador in Washington, Von Bernstorff, had been trying to influence his government against such a measure, and on January 23, cabled to Berlin that he had just received a formal offer from Wilson to act as mediator. Word came

back, however, that the military operations already set in motion were of such magnitude that they could not then be halted. On February 3, the Ambassador was given his passports by the American Government, and relations with Germany were broken.

Events now moved more swiftly. On January 19, the German Government had instructed its minister in Mexico to urge that nation to attack us if we attacked Germany, absurdly offering to Mexico as loot the American southwestern States. This precious document was made public by the British Intelligence Service on February 28, and a wave of indignation swept the United States. Meanwhile the German submarines had gone promptly and effectually about their dastardly work. In the month of February they sank 200 vessels, of which number three quarters were neutral although only two were American.





P.S. Ridsdale, Secretary


WAR POSTERS

Charles Lathrop Pack, President

The Recruiting Poster by James Montgomery Flagg; the National War Garden Commission by Leonebel Jacobs; the Red Cross by Harrison Fisher.



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NATIONAL SERVICE SECTION
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WAR POSTERS

The Victory Liberty Loan, drawn by Howard Chandler Christy; Veteran Relief, by James Montgomery Flagg; United States Shipping Board, by Charles Dana Gibson.


Two days before the Zimmerman note to Mexico was made public, Wilson had asked Congress for power to arm our merchant vessels with the idea of using the "armed neutrality" policy of a century earlier. The authority asked was granted by the House by an overwhelming vote of more than thirty to one, but in the Senate, where there was no rule limiting the time which a Senator could speak or for bringing debate to an end, twelve senators, about equally divided between the two leading parties, maintained a filibuster which prevented the passage of the bill before the session closed on March 3. The dozen senators had also prevented the passage of the Army Appropriation bill, so that the President had to call Congress back into extra session to meet April 2.

Before that date, the Russian Government had fallen, and the revolution, believed, as they all are at first, to be controlled by the intelligent Liberals, had begun. With the Russian Czar as one of the principal three Allies, it had not been easy to make out a case for the war as a struggle of "free peoples" against "autocracy." But in the first days of the revolution, when it was believed that a great democratic and popular government might be established in the former Russian Empire, the war began to appear more as one of liberalism and liberation. Moreover, the submarines were sinking more American ships, and forty-eight Americans had lost their lives.

When Congress convened, Wilson appeared before it and asked for a declaration of war against Germany, it having been shown to be impossible to deal with the government of that nation in any other way. We had, he said, no quarrel with the German people themselves, and the war on our part should not be for revenge but for human rights. It is well, in view of all that was to happen, for us to stress his very words, for the aims at which he was striving really changed not at all. Those aims had been, and continued to be, the safeguarding of the democratic way of governing and the inauguration of a new era of the *concert* instead of the *balance* of powers.

On April 2, before the crowded seats and galleries of the House, he again expressed these aims as clearly as any one could. "The world," he said, "must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We

seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall make. . . . It is a fearful thing to lead this great and peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest in our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples



FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, APRIL 3, 1917

as shall bring peace and safety to all nations. . . . The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other." That night the Resolution declaring war with Germany was introduced in both Houses and the Declaration of War received the President's signature on April 6, 1917.

Several points may be noted as to our entry into the war. First, the "causes" of our going in were not those which had led the "Allied Powers" to do so. Of them all, Belgium was the only one which had gone in solely on account of the attack on her neutrality. That had counted heavily with England, but so also had her alliances and her long-range policy. Russia had gone in to preserve her possible future in southeastern Europe, and France had been drawn in by her alliance with Russia. In regard to the other greater powers, we have already spoken of the extremely practical motives which had influenced Italy and Japan. All these nations were, among themselves, partitioning the world anew if they should win.

Having had nothing to do with the original causes of the war, we had at last gone in solely because the attacks on neutral rights had become intolerable.

Secondly, our aims were wholly different from those of the "Allies." Wilson had utterly disclaimed any intention on our part to seek revenge, indemnities or territory. Partly for these differences in causes and aims, and partly because of our traditional policy, we did not enter the war as an "ally" of the "Allied Powers" but as an "Associated Power." We did not even go to war with all their enemies. We did, indeed, declare war on Austria on the 7th of the following December, but never declared war on Turkey, and did not even break off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. All these points of difference were little regarded at the time, and because we had gone to war against Germany, our entry was proclaimed with wild enthusiasm in all the Allied countries.

We had not made adequate preparation for hostilities but the immediate assistance that we could give was to save the credit of the Allies, which had become exhausted. Mr. Balfour, who arrived with the governor of the Bank of England and other members of the British War Mission in Washington on April 22, assured the Secretary of the Treasury that the financial position was even more menacing than the submarine peril. Two days later, Congress passed the largest finance bill in the history of the world, authorizing the raising of \$7,000,000,000,000, of which \$3,000,000,000 could be loaned to the Allied Powers. The next day McAdoo handed Lord Cunliffe for England a check for \$200,000,000. Thus began the colossal financing of the struggle in America, and the loans to foreign nations, which latter, together with other causes, were to bring the world to the edge of collapse within fifteen years and to win for us the hostility of all our debtors.

The total face value of the loans we made to foreign countries before interest began to run was \$9,466,000,000, of which \$2,170,000,000 was loaned after the Armistice. In order to make these and to pay our own governmental expenses and our own cost of the war, which was nearly \$35,500,000,000, we increased our national debt by \$21,439,394,500, and during the two war years raised in addition, nearly \$11,300,000,000 by taxation. Had the war not ended in 1918, it was estimated by the Treasury that for the year ending June 30, 1919, we

should have had to raise, for the needs of ourselves and the other nations, in that one year alone \$24,000,000,000.

Before the war we could not possibly have raised any such sums, for we were ourselves a debtor nation, owing Europe from \$2,500,-000,000 to \$3,000,000,000. A new country always borrows from the older ones to develop its resources until such time as it has itself accumulated capital sufficient for the purpose. Until 1914 we had always been heavily in debt to the Old World, but the sudden demand for all our goods at war prices had, as has been noted, so increased our exports as to enable us to buy the \$2,000,000,000 of our own securities which Europe dumped on us almost at the beginning of the struggle. By the time we entered it we had become, for the first time in history, a creditor nation, and able to finance both ourselves and the Allies. No one can help prices going up in a war, and when Europe sometimes scornfully points to the profits which we made in the first two years and more that she was fighting, it should not be forgotten that, had we not done so, there would have been no such reservoir of credit as Europe tapped on such a colossal scale after 1917.

Although the available man power in America for an army was obviously enormous, it had been the opinion of many that even if we should enter the war, our great value to the Allies would lie in the opening of credits and the production of the material resources for their armies rather than in any large army of our own. No nation under modern conditions had ever carried on a war of the first magnitude 3000 miles from its base. In view of the decreasing amount of shipping due to the submarine sinkings, and the dire need of transporting huge stores of supplies, not only for the armies already in the field but to keep the civilian populations of England and the other countries from starving, it was a question whether the sending over of a large army, with its additional need of food and other supplies, might not hinder rather than help. Germany believed the task impossible, and for that reason had looked with unconcern upon forcing us in.

Although our army was almost negligible in April, 1917, we had taken an important step in the organization of our resources by the creation of the Council for National Defense in the preceding August, and out of this organization there developed many of the great

Boards which had to undertake the co-ordination of the entire industrial life of the nation. In the six months after our entry into the war, the United States had been transformed from a highly individualistic society of competing business concerns into what was almost a great socialistic State, in which the control of the whole industry, life, and purpose of the nation was directed from Washington. It was an amazing transformation, for nothing like it had ever been attempted before on any such scale, and the process was wholly antipathetic to our ordinary ways of doing things.

Volumes might be, and have been, written on the complex problems with which the complicated group of Boards had to grapple. Here we can only suggest in broad outline the magnitude of these. One of the early offsprings of the Council of Defense was the War Industries Board, which in turn was made up of many Divisions, such as the Price-Fixing Committee, the Allied Purchasing Commission, the Labor Division, Building Material, Chemical, Priorities Divisions, and many more. There were sub-committees for all sorts of products essential for the war,—acids, alkalis, copper, steel, pyrites, nickel, and some thirty others. The chief task of the War Industries Board was to rearrange the industry of the nation so that all war materials should be produced in sufficient quantities and supplied when and where needed.


All this involved in many cases the transformation of plants from producing things used in peace to those needed in war, and as new capital was suddenly required on a great scale, a War Finance Corporation was set up to provide it, and a Capital Issues Committee to pass on all new issues of stocks and bonds. Foreign trade had to be revolutionized, and so a War Trade Board was organized, which, for one thing, put the neutral nations on rations so that, while their legitimate needs should be supplied, there should be no surplus to be handed over to the enemy. America itself was rationed in essential foodstuffs, so that every bit possible could be shipped to the Allies, a work taken over by the Food Administration. It soon became necessary also to ration fuel to ourselves, and the Fuel Administration followed the Food Administration in economizing the use of coal and other fuels, stimulating production and getting all possible shipments across to Europe. The forced stimulation of all our industries, including agriculture, was to cost us dear when deflation came

after peace, but during the war there was nothing to be done but to increase all our means of production,—farms and factories,—to the fevered needs of a mad world, far beyond those of normal times of peace.

One of the most essential problems was that of transportation by land and sea. In a country as vast as the United States, 3000 miles wide, which it takes four days to cross by fast train, there could be no question of building emergency lines. The existing ones had to serve, and in order that they should all be co-ordinated to the one end of rushing supplies to Europe, 240,000 miles of lines, owned by several hundred private corporations, with 2,000,000 employees, were taken over by the government and operated by McAdoo, who added to his duties as Secretary of the Treasury, those of Director-General of the Railroads. In the midst of confusion, and with no time for careful planning, nearly a quarter of a million miles of railroad had to be operated by the Federal Government, the mere suggestion of which in peace times would have been regarded as the most dangerous of radical doctrines.

Before we entered the war, we had already felt the lack of shipping, and in 1914 the government had inaugurated a Bureau of War Risk Insurance to insure cargoes which could not be privately insured. In September, 1917, a United States Shipping Board was created to regulate and increase shipping, and immediately on our entry into the war, in April, 1917, Congress organized the Emergency Fleet Corporation which spent \$1,000,000,000 and built ships faster than the Germans could sink them. We had not been a shipbuilding nation and almost everything had to start from nothing. During the war, however, we built 875 vessels and when the Armistice came 380,000 men were at work in the yards so that by 1919 our tonnage had risen from the 1,066,000 of 1914 to 6,665,000.


After a good deal of confusion and delay in the beginning, most of the work done by all these boards and committees, headed for the most part by the leading business men of the country, was excellent, although naturally there was much waste, including the inevitable profiteering by private firms. The only complete failure was that of the War Department in the matter of airplanes. Congress appropriated \$640,000,000 in July, 1917, and the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, who had been against preparedness, de-



THE ANTS, 1917

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BUILDING ENGINES FOR THE ALLIES, 1917
From the lithograph by Joseph Pennell in the Joseph and Elizabeth Robins Pennell Collection, Library of Congress.

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clared that within a year we should have 20,000 planes in France. In fact not a single American fighting plane was shipped to France until May, 1918, and we had to rely on France and Italy for this branch of the service, the administration of which provided the leading scandal of the war.

The navy was far better prepared than the army. In so small a regular land force as that of the United States, seeing active service only about once in a generation save for a bit of police duty now and then, the tendency to dry-rot and lax inefficiency is almost irresistible, and war usually finds us with a lot of dead wood in high places. The routine of an American army officer's life is conducive neither to ambition nor energetic work, and as we had not had a major war for a half century, and apparently had no enemies who could attack us on shore, planning for the possible use of an army of millions had lacked any real interest. The life of a naval officer, however, with its regular turns of sea duty, produces a much higher professional morale. The mistakes of an army officer, in command of a few hundred or thousand men in a well-appointed peacetime post, cannot have very startling results, but the mistakes of an officer in charge at sea of a cruiser or a battleship may be very startling indeed. The navy, therefore, was in shape to do its part immediately in European waters in blockading, mine-laying and other services.

Whatever may have been thought earlier of the possibility of sending large forces abroad, within three weeks after war was declared Congress passed the Army Bill which had been prepared by the General Staff. This provided for the immediate raising to their maximum strengths of the regular army (223,000 men) and of the militia (425,000) by voluntary enlistment, and for the raising of a new force by conscription of 500,000, or, if the President believed it necessary, of 1,000,000. The War Missions sent to us by the Allies begged for man-power as soon as possible, admitting that Germany was winning, that the courage of the French was giving way, and even a small force must be sent almost immediately to save the situation.

The problem was a difficult one. It was useless to send mere fresh recruits with no training, and our regular force was so small that if we sent any considerable part of that we should have few or no

officers to train the millions of civilians who might have to be put into the service. Moreover, it was clear that in a nation so divided in its racial blood and sympathies, we could never raise millions by volunteering. To vast numbers in the great Mississippi Valley and the Far West, as well as to others in all sections, the war seemed almost as remote from their daily concerns as a flood in China. Moreover, with recollections of the draft riots in the Civil War, it was a question what might happen if we tried conscription on a large scale. Would all those who were opposed to the war and those millions whose German, Austrian, Hungarian and other racial descent and affinities bound them to the Central Powers rather than to the Allies, accept peaceably being drafted to go overseas to fight their own kin? It was freely predicted that conscription might mean for us torrents of blood and even civil war.


To the enormous relief and pride of America, the draft was carried out, as were subsequent ones, with perfect ease. Whatever the racial descent of our new citizens, they accepted their obligations to their new country as paramount and with an admirable spirit once the die was cast. The first draft included all men between the ages of 21 and 31, of whom over 9,500,000 registered in the 4557 registration districts into which the country had been divided. Each was given a number, and as these were drawn in Washington, the man in every district whose number was so drawn was drafted into the army. About 1,374,000 were taken on the first draft in July, of whom about half were accepted. These were distributed into thirty-two training camps, which were quickly built and equipped.

The President had decided, perhaps with memories of the Civil War in his mind, that this should be a war in the hands of experts, wholly unhampered in its military aspects by civilian meddling. He prevented, on the one hand, the formation of a Congressional Committee to supervise the conduct of the war, such as made so much trouble for Lincoln, and, on the other, he himself rigidly kept from meddling with his generals. He was, of course, technically Commander-in-Chief but he did not think, as Roosevelt appeared to with regard to himself, that that gave him adequate military knowledge for any post.

Roosevelt had asked to be allowed to start at once for France as commander of a division of 30,000 men, and was extremely resentful



FIRST REGIMENT INFANTRY, ILLINOIS NATIONAL GUARD, LEAVING THE ARMORY, CHICAGO, 1917




SECRETARY OF WAR NEWTON D. BAKER DRAWING THE FIRST NUMBER IN THE SECOND MILITARY DRAFT, JUNE 27, 1918

From photographs in the War Department.



OUTPOST SENTRIES ON DUTY, MARCH 5, 1918

This post was destroyed by enemy shell fire a few minutes after this picture was taken.



GUN CREW OF THE 23D INFANTRY (2D DIVISION) FIRING 37M. GUN DURING AN ADVANCE AGAINST GERMAN ENTRENCHED POSITIONS

From photographs in the War Department.

when not allowed to do so by Wilson. Roosevelt's military career had been limited to a few weeks in the Cuban campaign of 1898.

Your Song-My Song-Our Boys' Song

With Both English and FrenchText as sung by ENRICO CARUSO
ONE OF THE MOST POPULAR OF THE AMERICAN WAR SONGS

He was in no way fitted for the post of chief command in Europe, and yet with his enormous prestige and popularity, with his ability

always to make himself the centre of every scene, most disastrous possibilities of friction might easily open up if he went as a subordinate in high position.

The command of all the American forces in Europe was given to General John J. Pershing, an officer of the regular army who had an admirable record in the Indian wars and later in the Spanish War and in the Philippines and Mexico. In response to the wish of the Allies, he had sailed for France the end of May, and within a few weeks was joined by several divisions,—the "Yankee," "Sunset," and "Rainbow,"-which formed the "American Expeditionary Force." On July 6, he cabled to



SELF-CARICATURE OF ENRICO CARUSO MADE ABOUT 1916

From the collection of Erskine Hewett, Museum of the City of New York.

the War Department that there should be at least 1,000,000 troops sent to France by the following May. That proved impossible, but in June, 1918, we did have in France 722,000 of the 2,112,000 total of the army, and on the Fourth of July we launched ninety-five ships

in one day, the tonnage of which was more than equal to that of all American ships sunk by the Germans in four years.

Ships and ever more ships, however, were needed. Thanks to mine barriers—the U. S. Navy laid over 55,000 mines in the barrier in the North Sea—the submarine had ceased to be a serious factor. But the supplies of all kinds for the Allied nations, armies and civilians, and for our own growing foreign forces, had to be brought from all parts of the United States and from a few ports and carried the 3000 miles across the ocean. In France new docks had to be built, ports extended, and railways constructed to receive the swelling stream of goods and men.

The last great German offensive against the Allied lines was so threatening on June 2, 1918, that the Prime Ministers of England, France, and Italy cabled to Wilson that in the opinion of Foch the situation was of the utmost gravity, and that as the British and French could do no more to keep up their numbers, the war would be lost unless we could rush troops with all speed, at the rate of not less than 300,000 a month, across the ocean. This we did. In June we had had 722,000 men in France. In July we had just under 1,000,-000, in August just under 1,300,000, in September 1,576,000, in October 1,843,000, and in November, when the stream stopped early in the month owing to the Armistice, just under 2,000,000. Of the 1,200,000 troops carried overseas in less than five months, 49 per cent were transported in British vessels and 46 per cent in American, the American Navy supplying 83 per cent of the convoying warships, and American cargo vessels carrying 95 per cent of the supplies.

On August 31, to secure a greater reservoir of man-power, a new Draft Act had been passed by Congress, including, with the usual exemptions, all men between 18 and 45. This immediately added 13,000,000 men to the list of registrants, and preparations were made to raise the army to 8,000,000 by 1919, of whom 5,000,000 were to be in France. Although these plans were halted with unexpected and almost stunning suddenness by the Armistice, when that came we had 2,000,000 men overseas, another 2,250,000 in military service, and nearly 11,500,000 civilians working at war jobs of one sort or another.

So vast, complex and interwoven were the military operations of the Western front, which stretched all the way from Italy to Bel-


gium, that it is impossible to disentangle the specific operations of the Americans from the general maze to give an intelligent understanding of their contribution. All that can be done in brief compass is to point out some of the operations in which they were engaged.

The hasty training which they received in America before being sent across had to be supplemented by a more intensive one in France, and the assistance, other than psychological, which the American Army rendered before the beginning of the great German drive in the spring of 1918 was slight. Pershing had believed and insisted, apparently wisely, that it would be best in the end to organize a distinct American army rather than merely to mingle our troops with the French, British or Italians. So desperate, however, was the need for men to resist the terrific onslaught of the Germans on the war-weary Allies, that from April to August, 1918, he consented to the use of our troops wherever needed to strengthen the lines, and to this phase of our operations belong the fights at Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood, where the Americans had their first chance to show their mettle, and acquitted themselves to the great admiration of the French.

By midsummer, however, the distinct American Army could be formed, and all the scattered troops were brought together from different sections and given the task of pushing back the Germans from the strongly protected indentation which they had made in the Allied lines in 1914 and held ever since, known as the St. Mihiel salient. The attacking force consisted of about 660,000 men, of whom 550,000 were Americans and 110,000 French, with some British aviators in addition. By September 13 the victory at this point was complete, and the enemy was driven back so as to restore 200 square miles of soil to France and free the Paris-Nancy railway and other lines of communications in such a way as greatly to assist the larger offensive against the Germans which was in contemplation. It was the beginning of the end.

The Germans had held also the Meuse-Argonne sector since early in the war. This was strongly fortified and of great importance to them from the standpoint of all their co-ordinated operations. The number of Americans available had been rapidly increasing, as we have seen, and in the operation in this sector Pershing had to handle more than 1,200,000 men. The struggle, which began on 2

front of 24 miles, and later extended to 90 miles, lasted for 47 days, and as Pershing wrote, was the "greatest, the most prolonged in American history." Steadily the Germans yielded to the pressure, retreating with heavy losses and with breaking morale. Similar pressure was being brought on them along the whole front to the



THE WESTERN FRONT

North by the Allied forces, and by the second week of November the retreat had become general. With such huge forces, with corresponding needs for communication and supplies, a retreat would certainly become a disastrous rout. It was all over, and on November 11 the Armistice was signed. The war had ended.

We must neither over-estimate nor under-rate our own part in it. There had been no reason for our entering it before we did, but we had been slow in many respects in getting started after we did so, and even to the end we had to lean heavily on the Allies for such things as airplanes, the larger guns, and certain other supplies. It was a year after we declared war before we had a consid-

erable army in Europe. On the other hand, it must be remembered that we were working under exceptional difficulties. The European countries were small, highly centralized, with short distances to be covered, and for three years had been organized on a war basis. Our very size made for unwieldiness, and never before had any nation attempted to carry on such vast military operations 3000 to 6000 miles from the sources of all its men and supplies. The 240,000 miles of railway which had to be taken over and co-ordinated was symbolic of the complexity and scale of all the problems. The whole fabric of one of the most populous and widely extended nations in the world had suddenly to be altered from its very foundations.

Without our fresh aid to the worn Allied countries it is quite evident from the despatches of both their military and civil authorities that they would have lost the war. At critical moments when all seemed over, we could throw in new supplies of financial credit, of material, and at last, in the final crisis, a supply of fighting men to overwhelm the enemy. Not having passed through the terrible ordeal of the earlier years, our troops were fresh and, as Foch exclaimed after the Argonne, "superb." But if, at the end, our added weight tipped the scales in favor of Allied victory, we must recall how heavy had been that heat and burden of the day which the other nations had borne year after year.

We can appraise our share, as well as the incredible magnitude of the calamity which had overtaken mankind, by a glance at some of the figures. Taking all the nations which had been engaged on both sides, over 65,000,000 men had been mobilized in the fighting services, 8,538,000 had been killed or died, 21,219,000 wounded, and at the end 7,750,000 were prisoners or missing. The table below gives the numbers of those who were killed or died in the armies of the chief belligerents:

Germany	00
Russia	
France	
Austro-Hungary1,200,0	00
British Empire 908,3	71
Italy	00
Roumania 335,7	06
Turkey 325,0	000
United States	


After the American Army was formed, the fighting in which it took part, especially in the Argonne, was so severe that the rate of casualties was high, and our low total was due to the short length of time in which our forces were engaged. The whole number of killed and wounded, about 360,000, may be contrasted, however, with the 500,000 a year which it is estimated are killed or injured merely in our industries in peace times.

Never before had soldiers been treated as well as were the Americans in this war. The pay of a private was raised to \$33 a month, of which half could be held out for his family if he desired, and in addition allowances were made for certain classes of dependents. A man with a wife and two children, for example, received \$50.50 a month. Vocational training was promised after the war for all those who might have been incapacitated in such a way as to prevent their taking up their former work, and, in the vain hope of avoiding the pension scandals of former wars, each soldier was given the opportunity to insure himself at the rate of \$6.60 a month for \$10,000. Over 4,000,000 men took advantage of this offer, the average policy being for \$8744 and the total amount of insurance underwritten by the government was over \$35,000,000,000, or \$5,000,000,000 more than the total carried for civilians by all the companies in the country. The soldiers' comforts, as far as might be, were also catered to by such voluntary organizations as the Salvation Army, Knights of Columbus, Y. M. C. A., and Red Cross, the amounts spent probably running to well over \$1,000,000,000, the Red Cross alone expending \$400,000,000 in less than two years.

The basis on which the pension scandals were to be revived under the forms of "bonuses" and "adjusted compensation" was to be the claim for the difference between what the soldier received, when conscripted, and what his fellow who was not conscripted might have received at home in high wages. Except in the form of taxes and often illegitimate pressure to buy "Liberty Bonds," there had been no conscription of either capital or labor, and with the enormous war-time demands and scarcity of men, wages soared in all kinds of work, as did also almost equally however the cost of living, a cost that the soldier did not have to pay unless he had dependents, as many of the younger soldiers did not. Labor leaders, notably Gompers who was head of the American Federation, were given places




Y. M. C. A. THEATRICAL CORPS
Giving performance for 101st Machine Gun Battalion directly behind the lines, Bois de Rehanne,
France, May 20, 1918.



HEADQUARTERS OF KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS, DRAVEGNY, AUGUST 6, 1918

A sixteenth-century church was used for this purpose.

From photographs in the War Department.



RED CROSS CANTEEN AT SOUILLY, MEUSE, FRANCE, OCTOBER 13, 1918



SALVATION ARMY GIRLS SERVING MEN OF THE 26TH DIVISION, ANSAUVILLE, FRANCE, APRIL 9, 1918

From photographs in the War Department.

THE WORLD WAR

on most of the War Boards, and many of the peace-time restrictions and demands were abrogated, labor agreeing to work whole-heartedly for the cause, to forego strikes, and in all cases of dispute to accept the verdict of arbitrations.

In spite of the fact that the war altered so greatly the ordinary daily life of tens of millions of Americans there was a curious

RED CROSS BANDAGES POISONED BY SPIES

Startling Plot Reported by Director Stand in Urging Precautions by Philadelphia Workers.

Special to The New York Times. PHILADELPHIA. March 28.-Albert REJECTED W. Staub. Director of the Atlantic Division of the American Red Cross, addressing the local Red Cross organiza- But Now, He Says, "We're in the tion today, said:

"You women of Philadelphia must clean house. Go over the list of your members and make sure of the loyalty low any one in your board rooms unless you know who they are. Keep persons out of the workroms who have no right, clation of Newark is drawing up a proto be there. of every one. Under no circumstances al-

CONVERTED TO WAR BY GERMAN CRUELTY

The Rev. Dr. Johnstone Tells Presbyterian Conference Why He Forsook Pacifism.

BRYCE REPORT

Work of Clearing Out a Jungle of Beasts."

test to Congress against "the spread of slanderous stories throughout the land." 'At a meeting in Turn. Hall. Newark, the

ITEMS SUCH AS THESE, WHICH WERE OF COMMON OCCURRENCE, CALLED FOR A PROTEST FROM GERMAN-BORN AMERICANS

"The New York Times," March 29, September 25, November 13, 1917.

unreality about it. The European participants suffered incomparably as contrasted with ourselves, but unprecedently horrible as it all was, there was a stark reality about it all for those in European countries which gave a normal outlet for the emotions. The actual fighting was, so to say, within sight, and the sick and wounded were to be cared for. So great, indeed, was the strain on the emotions that Europe was left almost exhausted emotionally.

In America it was different. The usual war propaganda, designed for that purpose, stirred the feelings of fear and hate to a frenzy but there seemed no moral outlet for them. The enemy was so remote

as to seem to innumerable Americans as unreal, lost in space. Wilson might talk about a war to end war and of making the world safe for democracy, but those phrases appeared insubstantial. Until the very last months before the Armistice, our participation in the fighting was slight, and even at the end our total casualties of all sorts of 360,000, scattered as they were among our population of 110,000,000 in communities divided by thousands of miles, although they brought sorrow to individual homes, did not effect that purging of the heart of the whole nation as did the death tolls of Europe.

The fact that on the one hand our fears and hatreds were fanned into fierce flames, and on the other that our emotions did not have the outlets of fighting and sorrow, brought about, in a considerable degree, an abnormal psychology of the nation. On June 15, 1917, Congress had passed the Espionage Act which provided heavy penalties for any offenders who should be convicted of making false statements intended to interfere with the operation of our military forces or who should obstruct recruiting and in certain other ways interfere with the prosecution of the war. This was followed by an amendment, May 16, 1918, which extended the original offences to others in such broad and uncertain terms as to make prosecution possible by over-zealous or hysterical officials against citizens who might be honestly criticizing the inefficiency of the government or its officials in conducting the war, who might object to the material war aims of the Allies,—as in proposed cessions of territory,—or say a word on behalf of the enemy. The punishment was set at a maximum of \$10,000 fine, twenty years in prison, or both. Enormous power was given to the Postmaster-General, who could exclude from the mails anything which "on evidence satisfactory to him" might be considered as constituting any of the offences named.

Freedom of speech and of the press was thus muzzled far more effectually than under Lincoln in the Civil War or than in any of the Allied countries. Public opinion both during the war and for several years after upheld the most drastic treatment of any one who, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, could be considered in the slightest degree unpatriotic or "radical." There was a veritable panic over the possible workings of German spies and later of the Russian Bolsheviks, which was part of the abnormal psychology of the times. About 2000 prosecutions were brought by the government, which

THE WORLD WAR

imprisoned Eugene Debs and indulged in an orgy of attacks on people who might merely hold unorthodox opinions. Rose Pastor Stokes, for example, was sentenced to twenty years in prison for saying "I am for the people, and the government is for the profiteers," a statement that in view of such matters as the airplane scandals contained all too much truth.

But if America was abnormal and "jumpy," the morale of the German people was completely going to pieces in the late summer of 1918. Their losses and sufferings had been more than human beings could stand. Realizing that the whole structure of the state was fast crumbling, the German Government asked Wilson on October 4 to open negotiations for peace, based on his speech of January 8 and his subsequent utterances. This the President did only after the resignation of General Ludendorff and other evidences of a genuine change in the internal affairs of Germany had made it ap-

FIND DEBS GUILTY OF DISLOYAL ACTS

Socialist Convicted of Violating
Espionage Act — Jury
Out Six Hours.

SATISFIED WITH THE TRIAL

Rose Pastor Stokes Holds Defendant's Hand When the Verdict Is Announced.

THE NEW YORK TIMES OF SEPTEMBER 13, 1918

pear possible to base peace upon the sincere wishes of the German people themselves.

Detailed terms for an armistice were drawn up by the Supreme War Council of the Allies and presented to the German representatives who had been brought, blindfolded, within the Allied lines. It is to be noted that the President had suggested to the Allied powers that the armistice could be arranged if they would make peace in accordance with the principles laid down by him and accepted by Germany. Although the terms of the armistice as presented by the military heads were extremely severe, there was nothing for the Germans to do but accept, which they did on November 11, the Kaiser having abdicated and fled to Holland two days before.

We have already indicated at length the views which Wilson held both as to the war and the possible peace. As far as America was concerned the armistice had been asked for by Germany and granted to her on the understanding that a peace treaty would be drawn up in accordance with Wilson's principles, notably as expressed in his speech before Congress, laying down his famous "fourteen points." He had, as we have seen, no trust in a peace negotiated on the basis of the old system of imperialistic diplomacy and national rivalries, and the publication by the Bolsheviks in Russia of some of the secret treaties of the Czarist régime proved all too clearly that the Allies, in spite of their idealistic propaganda, had made bargains among themselves for a division of territorial spoils based on the old system rather than on the broader basis of preparing for friend-liness and co-operation among the nations of the world.

In brief, the "fourteen points" had laid down in the first five of them certain broad principles as the foundation of the future policy of the world. These were, speaking generally, that there should be no more secret diplomacy but "open covenants . . . openly arrived at," and no more secret treaties; that the seas of the world should be free to all to navigate in war as in peace; the removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers between nations; the reduction of armed forces to the lowest point adequate for domestic safety; and an impartial adjustment of all colonial problems. The next eight points dealt with specific territorial changes in Europe, such as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the re-establishment of Belgium, and the erection of an independent state of Poland, with "secure access to the sea." The final "point," which in Wilson's mind could alone be counted on to assure the new order, demanded the formation of a "general association of nations."

It had been on the basis of a peace wrought out somewhat on the lines of these points that Germany had offered to end the war, and although they had never been formally accepted by either the Allies or the American Congress, there had certainly been a tacit, if somewhat vague, assumption of them by the Allies in granting the armistice asked on the basis of them.

The task, however, which Wilson had set himself in proposing to alter the world order in accordance with the "points" was a stupendous and probably impossible one. It may be admitted, especially in

THE WORLD WAR

view of the conditions in Europe since 1918, that a peace which merely renewed, in fresh combinations and with changed tensions and lines of cleavage, the old pre-war system of nationalistic jealousies and ambitions, and of armed balance of powers, could not be lasting. Wilson was right about that. On the other hand, in thinking out his new plan, the President, as he had done in Mexico, had flown too far above the actualities of the situation. To convert America to his views, he would have to alter our century-long fear of alliances and desire for isolation. To convert Europe, convulsed as she was by the bitterest of hatreds, with France especially burning for revenge and the desire of a new dominance, he would also have to alter human nature at a moment when it was not even sane. With regard to one point, the freedom of the seas, unjust as it may be that any one nation should set up a claim to rule them, it was most unlikely that the great maritime empire of England would consent to give up her private power for the sake of the public good.

Unfortunately, also, Wilson had made, and was to make, a succession of political blunders at home that rendered his defeat almost certain. To a very great extent, party politics had been laid aside during the war, and Republicans and Democrats had worked loyally for the sole purpose of helping the government to win. There was, however, much dissatisfaction with the way the war had been managed, and the President had powerful enemies, such as Lodge and Roosevelt, both within and without the government, and a considerable part of public opinion was naturally ranged against him.


Since the Civil War, our mid-term elections have frequently gone against the administration, and, in any case, it was likely that in 1918 the Congressional election would turn the Democrats out and put the Republicans in. Even so, however, they might have worked loyally with the President in international affairs, but Wilson made the extraordinary blunder of appealing to the nation before election to vote only for Democrats so as to strengthen his hand. The result was a howl of both rage and genuine disappointment from the public, and a sweeping victory for the Republicans, who now came in angered against the President instead of being ready, as far as they could, to work with him.

Had an election gone against the government in England, France, or other countries with a parliamentary system, and had Wilson

been a European Prime Minister instead of an American President, he would have lost office with his party, but under our peculiar form the Executive continues, and for the second half of his term has to get along as best he can with a minority support in the legislature, though he still remains to a great extent, particularly in foreign relations, responsible for the conduct of affairs.

Wilson's second mistake, particularly in view of the strong and open hostility to him now to be expected in Congress, was not to appoint a senator a member of the delegation which set out for Paris on December 4, 1918, to negotiate peace. Nobody knows just what may be meant by the clause in the Constitution which provides





CONGRESS LEFT TO COPE WITH DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES WHILE WILSON WENT ABROAD TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

From "The National Republican."

that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" to make treaties, but if the meaning of "advice" is uncertain, that of "consent" is not, and it was clear that no treaty negotiated by the President could be ratified unless two thirds of the senators present concurred when a vote was taken.

Wilson's decision to lead the Peace Commission at Paris in person was also a great and unfortunate innovation, arousing much criticism on several well taken grounds. Of the other four members only one, Henry White, was a Republican, and he, although he had done good diplomatic work in Europe, and was a close friend of Roosevelt, was not a national figure, and politically was a man of no importance whatever. Another member, the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, had been a good Counsellor of the State Department but had been a mere figurehead since the resignation of Bryan and his own elevation to the Secretaryship. General Tasker H. Bliss was a strong man. Colonel House was not, although he had for some

THE WORLD WAR

years occupied a position of peculiar confidence in his friendship with Wilson and had been abroad on many confidential missions before and during the war, and was supposed to have an intimate knowledge of the European situation. The make-up of the Commission did not indicate the slightest effort to gain the support or confidence of the Senate, and the inclusion of White as the only Republican was considered by some almost an insult to the party rather than a friendly gesture. It was clear that the President, in Paris in person, intended to dominate the Commission.

It was also clear, from the December elections in both France and England, that the Peace Conference intended to have as little as possible to do with any healing peace or change in the political order. In France, Clemenceau, one of the most reactionary of French statesmen, was re-elected on a platform of keeping to the old system of alliances and balance of power. In England, Lloyd George won by the most disgraceful appeals to mob passion, with such battle cries as promising to "hang the Kaiser" and to make Germany pay the entire cost of the war, shilling for shilling.

Thus it was that, leaving hostility behind him and sailing straight into a seething cauldron of hatreds ahead of him, Wilson landed at Brest on December 13. Whatever statesmen might think and promise, however, the peoples were heartily sick of war and of the old order. In the few weeks in which Wilson visited Italy, France, and England he was everywhere received with unparalleled enthusiasm as the savior of mankind from a recurrence of the overwhelming horrors of the past four years and as the herald of a new world. Then the Peace Conference got down to work.

The problems had to deal with almost every quarter of the globe, and thirty-two nations, though none of the enemy ones, were nominally represented. Even while the Conference was sitting, minor wars were still going on, and famine and Bolshevism were stalking over eastern Europe. It soon became evident that the real work would have to be carried on by the great powers alone, and for the most part decisions were reached behind closed doors by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy.

Little by little, Wilson, who had gone over with the hopes of negotiating a just and lasting peace, had to give way. He had trusted, like Lincoln, that he might bring healing as well as peace, but

there was no healing, and many times it seemed as though there might be no peace. Paris in that winter was the scene of perhaps the most virulent hatreds the world has ever known, and statesmen, who had come to power by promising their peoples impossible

DISPATCH TO BE SENT.

Date	February 19, 1919							
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36	cret	for	the :	P resi de	nt from	Colonel Ho	280;	

The fellowing memorandum by the Chief of the British General Staff has just been sent me: UOTE:

I had an interesting interview with Marshal Fech this meralag.


In which he expressed the following views:

As the result of his recent discussions with the German representatives at Treves, he is of opinion that under existing conditions we can dictate terms of peace to Germany. The German Government will agree to whatever terms we exact. But, he says, there is no time to lease.

PART OF THE FIRST PAGE OF A DISPATCH ON THE PEACE TERMS, FROM COLONEL HOUSE TO PRESIDENT WILSON, FEBRUARY, 1919


From the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

spoils, felt themselves on the edge of the volcanoes of revolution. The desire of the French leaders was not healing but revenge to the uttermost, and the ruin of the enemy. Japan held out for her promised plunder. Italy wanted her pound of flesh in extension of territory, and at one time her delegates left the Conference and threatened to plunge Europe again into war. Wilson himself, at one critical juncture, ordered the *George Washington* to be ready at Brest to take home the whole American delegation.



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AIRPLANES ATTACKING TROOPS AT VIERZY DURING SOISSONS ATTACK



Copyright, Wendell Westever.

MARCHING IN ALONG A CAMOUFLAGED ROAD

From the lithographs by Lucien Hector Jonas. By permission of Wendell Westover, F.sq.



THE MORNING WASH-UP
Sketched at Neufmaison, France, by Capt. Wallace Morgan, official artist of the A. E. F.
From the War Department.



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NO MAN'S LAND

From the lithograph by Lucien Hector Jonas. By permission of Wendell Westover, Esq.

THE WORLD WAR

Much had to be surrendered of what he had hoped might redeem humanity from the curse of lasting hatreds and recurring wars, but he did save the League of Nations, which was written into the Treaty despite all the French strove to do to keep it out. It is impossible, as in an American history it is unnecessary, to follow the negotiations in detail or to describe the Treaty which itself fills a volume of 80,000 words. Many of the points for which the President fought would unquestionably have greatly helped the recuperation of the world had they been adopted. For example, he tried hard to have a definite sum named as that which Germany should pay in reparations, so that she and the world would know what had to be done. In the face, however, of the fantastic claims of France and England, Lloyd George demanding, in view of his election pledges, the incredible sum of \$120,000,000,000,000, that proved impossible.

We cannot exaggerate the aid which would have been given to the economic recuperation of the world and to the restoration of confidence if the question of the reparations could have been settled, as Wilson urged, on a sane basis in 1919, instead of acting as a virulent cancer in the whole world system for the years that were to follow. Had it been so, there might have been also a prompt and reasonable settlement of the war debts to the United States. There was no reason at that time for our cancelling the debts when the nations that owed us persisted, against our strongest advice, in demanding for themselves the huge sums which Clemenceau and Lloyd George insisted upon from Germany, and, as the years went by, both questions were to become tinged with bitterness and political jealousies.

In the midst of the Conference, immediately after the League had been accepted, Wilson made a quick trip to the United States, in part, to consult prominent leaders of opinion, such as Taft, Root, and Hughes, and a number of suggestions made were later written into the Treaty by him. Meanwhile the opposition in the Senate was growing rapidly. Senators claimed that they were not being consulted or even kept posted as to what was going on, though we now know that Henry White, though loyal to Wilson, was keeping the chief opponent of the President, Senator Lodge, who was Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, well informed of every move.

On the President's return to Paris, the work continued, and finally, on the 28th of June, the Treaty was signed at Versailles by

Wilson, the Allies, and Germany, the latter complaining bitterly, and not without cause, of the extreme injustice of the terms, and that the whole document was contrary to the "fourteen points" which they had accepted as a preliminary to the armistice. On the 10th of July, the President submitted it to the Senate for ratification.

Paris. 29 May. 1919.

My dear Lansing;

I have the letter signed by yourself, General Bliss, Mr. White, and House about the desirability of calling a meeting of the Commissioners, technical experts, and advisors connected with the American Mission to discuss the German proposals about to be received, and am heartily in sympathy with the idea. Indeed, it is just what I myself had in mind.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Windows Wils.

Hon. Robert Lansing.

Secretary of State.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT WILSON TO SECRETARY OF STATE LANSING IN PARIS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE, APPROVING THE MEETING OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION TO DISCUSS GERMAN PROPOSALS

From the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

There at once it encountered, as was to have been expected, a storm of opposition. Lodge, twenty years before at the end of the Spanish War when defending the Treaty of Paris against its critics, had said that not to accept it as offered would "be a repudiation of the President and humiliation of the whole country in the eyes of the world." Now he fought bitterly to have this new treaty, negotiated by a President in person, rejected except with such reservations as

THE WORLD WAR

Wilson would not accept. The Republican opposition was led by Lodge, but there was also a strong Democratic group, under the leadership of G. M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, which was equally opposed, as was the small but powerful group of "irreconcilables" led by Borah.

counted on being able to offset it or to bring it to terms by appealing to the country and bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear. In pursuance of this plan, he started on a nation-wide tour to explain the Treaty directly to the people. The strain, however, of the last six years had been too great. The tour was undertaken against the advice of his physician, and while speaking in Colorado he suffered a paralytic stroke. He had staked all on his personal appeal to the nation, and had lost. Borne back to Washington a broken man,

The President, who knew of the Senatorial opposition, had



A SERVICE STRIPE FOR WILSON
With the subtitle—Why Not? Been there long enough.

From "The Republican" (Laramie, Wyoming).

he recovered to some extent but was more or less shrouded in the mystery of a sickroom for the remainder of his term.

Meanwhile the interminable debate continued in the Senate, becoming more bitter. Much of the discussion centred about Article X, which it was held by some might force us to go to war merely to preserve the present territorial status of any of the countries in the League, though Wilson denied this. He also declined to accept the Treaty with any reservations, although it is more than probable that certain reservations would have been gladly accepted by the other nations as the price of our adhesion to the League. On November 19, a vote showed that the necessary two thirds could not be won in favor of the Treaty, either with or without the reservations, this being partly due to Wilson's known opposition to the latter.

Under Hitchcock's lead, the Democrats themselves drew up a set of reservations, and in March the vote was again taken, with failure to ratify. The Presidential election was then less than eight months off, and political motives were becoming dominant. The groups became more stubborn, and in May, despairing of ratifying the Treaty, the two Houses of Congress, in order to put a technical end to the war, passed a mere joint Resolution declaring it at an end. This Wilson at once vetoed as a disgrace to American honor. Thus the deadlock continued. In the Senate there was opposition which could not be overcome unless reservations were added to the original Treaty. In the White House was the sick President, whose precise physical condition was a matter of uncertainty, and who stubbornly resisted the suggestion of any reservations whatsoever.

Whether Wilson would have succeeded in winning the country if he had been able to continue his tour can never be known. Once in the war, the nation had worked whole-heartedly for it, but it had not gone into it whole-heartedly, and, as we have said, the entire affair had always been somewhat unreal. We had no interest in the Old World and were more or less resentful at having been dragged into what had started as purely a European quarrel of the old sort. Many of the 2,000,000 soldiers who had been overseas had come back with no love for the Allies and with a wish to be done with Europe. On the other hand, had it not been for the stroke suffered by the President, with whatever influence it may have had on his mind, it may be conceived that Wilson might have accepted some reservations, and the deadlock have been broken in one way or another. He was stubborn but not as stubborn as many of his enemies made out, and at the Peace Conference had taken advice freely. But in his sick room he was cut off from all contacts with the world and men, and no one can tell what thoughts passed through his partly broken mind.

Outside of that room, the whole current of American life had changed with amazing swiftness since the armistice, and the people whom the retiring President in the autumn of 1920 asked to take a "great and solemn referendum" on the Treaty and on our future part in the world, was a people anxious above all to forget the war and Europe and to take up again their old accustomed life.

CHAPTER XII

A MAD DECADE

HE "great and solemn referendum," which the President had asked for, was declined by the American people in a campaign and election which largely resembled a rush of a herd of ostriches to hide their heads in the sand in the hope of avoiding suspected dangers. The whole question of accepting the Treaty of Versailles centred about that of our entering the League of Nations, with or without reservations. Opinion cut across party lines, and leading Republicans such as Root, Taft, Hughes, and others were more favorable toward our joining with reservations than were many of the leading Democrats. The long discussion in the Senate and press had confused, rather than clarified, public opinion and had given time for the sentiments of nationalism and the desire for isolation to become dominant again.

Although the treaty was one of the issues of the campaign of 1920, the fight was really between those of our citizens who realized that as a result of the war both we and the world were entering upon a new era of international relations and those others who frantically desired solely a return, which they did not realize was impossible, to our pre-war conditions of life and policies. The chief issue of the campaign was whether we should go forward boldly into the unknown and untried or pretend to go back to the old and accustomed. The referendum on that was to prove overwhelmingly in favor of trying to go back, of returning to what the successful Republican candidate was to term "normalcy."

The United States, as we have noted in the course of our story, had never been able to maintain its theory of complete isolation. Economically, however, we had appeared to ourselves to be self-sufficient to a large degree so long as we had exported chiefly food-stuffs which other nations had had to buy, and so long as we had allowed them to a considerable extent to pay for these by lending us the money which, as a rapidly developing debtor nation, was essential to the exploitation of our natural resources.

Of course, even economically, we had not been independent, but that fact had been more or less obscured until the years when the war, involving almost the entire world, dislocated all the accustomed exchange of commodities. Our moving-picture industry, for example, was dependent on a Japanese Government monopoly,—camphor,—for its films. Our great motor-car industry was dependent on foreign countries for the rubber which we could not produce in any of our own territory. In 1921 the United States Steel Corporation made up a list of forty commodities essential to manufacture which we had to import from fifty-seven foreign countries. The army discovered, if it did not know it before, that thirty commodities of one sort and another, necessary to the prosecution of modern warfare, could not be produced in the United States, or only in insignificant quantities.

(Indeed, one of the underlying causes of the war itself had been the fact that for many years the political forces of exaggerated nationalism had been cutting across, and coming into conflict with, the economic forces of a commerce which had become world wide. No nation was any longer self-sufficient either in raw materials or markets for products. To be nationally prosperous involved exchanges with other nations, but the desire of each nation to be as prosperous as possible itself at the expense of any or all others brought about the conflict of wish and fact that had plunged the world into the Great War, as it might do again.)

In addition to this general situation, that war had wrought changes for the United States which made the dream of isolation more difficult than ever of realization. Our industrial development had been rapid before the war, but the demands of that struggle had resulted in a colossal increase in our capacity for production. We had to export manufactures on a huge scale or to write off the cost of much of our new plant as dead loss. Such great new twentieth-century industries as the automobile and moving picture rested on the one hand, as we have seen, on essential imported articles, and, like all our mass-production industries, were dependent, on the other, on ever-expanding markets. Moreover, from a debtor nation we had suddenly become the world's largest single creditor. Besides the war debts of over \$10,000,000,000 we had invested in foreign countries by 1928 about \$15,500,000,000 more. Our great corporations, such

as the Ford Company, Standard Oil, General Electric, and many others built plants in other lands. Our banks were opening branches in the principal cities of Europe and South America. In a myriad ways our own prosperity was becoming linked to that of the world at large.

This sudden elevation to a position of dominance in world economics found us almost wholly unprepared. England had built up her foreign trade and her system of banking through centuries during which she had developed her technique and steadily grown in economic wisdom and knowledge. For us, the situation was much as though a branch-office manager had been called upon without notice to run the Steel Corporation as president.


As was pointed out in the previous chapter, a great revulsion of feeling as to Europe followed the end of the war, and by the election of 1920 the one great wish of the majority of our people was to avoid all responsibility and to get back to the days of 1913 before we had plunged into the maelstrom of the world outside. That it was impossible made no difference. We declined to see that we could not sell to others if we would not buy from them; that rapidly accumulating half the world's gold supply in our vaults we would force the world to a breakdown if we demanded more and more in payment of the debts due us if we would not take goods in payment; that by a thousand links we were at last bound to the rest of the globe whether we liked it or not. Like ostriches, we thought we would be safe if we stuck our heads in the sand.

There was little doubt about the result of the 1920 election. At their convention which met in Chicago on June 8, the Republicans on the tenth ballot nominated Warren Gamaliel Harding for President after it had become clear that none of the three leading candidates, General Leonard Wood, Senator Hiram Johnson, or Governor Lowden, could receive the necessary number of votes. Calvin Coolidge, Governor of Massachusetts, was named as Vice-President. On the 28th the Democrats met for the first time in San Francisco, and it was only on the forty-fourth ballot, after a bitter fight between the forces of ex-Secretary McAdoo and Governor Smith of New York, that Governor James M. Cox of Ohio received the nomination for President, with Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York as his running-mate.


Although the question of the League was presumed to be one of those which divided the parties, Harding's straddling of the issue and the varying opinions of men in both camps undoubtedly justified Coolidge in saying that the election could not be taken as a mandate from the people on the subject. What had chiefly been decided was merely that the electorate was tired of Wilson and his idealism; that they wanted a change in the direction of "practicality"; that they wished to forget the war and all its problems; and that large numbers of persons of all shades of opinion were ready to unite against a man and a party that had of necessity aroused resentments during eight years of one of the most critical periods in the history of the nation. The quick disintegration of Harding's large majority showed that the backing he received came from a temporary situation and was not based on principles. Of these, Harding had none, but his majority was staggering, approximately 16,000,000 votes to 9,000,000 for Cox.

The new President had been a small-town newspaper man in Marion, Ohio, a party regular always, and with the help of Harry M. Daugherty, a local politician, had been elected in 1914 to the United States Senate for the term 1915-21. In the Senate he had rendered no distinguished service whatever, but had cast his vote in favor of Prohibition although he was himself then and always a heavy drinker. He was what is considered a "good mixer" in certain circles. He played poker, had dissipated habits, stuck by his friends, was untroubled by ideas or ideals, and was wholly commonplace in his mentality. On the other hand he often gained the liking of men who, at the same time, had no respect for him. Incapable and weak, the play of forces and passions which he did not understand, both in himself and others, made his rise to the Presidency a calamity for him. Of all our Presidents, except perhaps Grant, he was to be the most ill-served by his intimate friends, and the scandals of his régime were to spring from his own weakness and the rapacity of his "Ohio Gang."

His Cabinet was an odd assemblage of able men and of others who were much mistrusted. Charles E. Hughes as Secretary of State (the place had been offered first to George Harvey!), Andrew Mellon in the Treasury, and Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce, were welcomed by the public as wise choices, but those of



AN EARLY MOVING PICTURE STUDIO IN CALIFORNIA Established by Selig in March, 1908.



THE MOVIES IN 1932

Getting ready to "shoot" a scene from "Grand Hotel" (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer). The actors stand beneath the "bungalow camera."







THE EFFORTS TO WIN SUFFRAGE

Top: An informal talk with the bathers at Long Beach, New York, 1912. Centre: Inez Milholland heading a parade in Washington in 1913. Bottom: Passing through Newark on the New York to Washington hike to present their cause to President Wilson, 1914.

Albert B. Fall, in the Interior Department, and of Will H. Hays as Postmaster-General, were not approved, while that of Harry Daugherty as Attorney-General was incredible in its unfitness. Some of the other appointments, such as Charles R. Forbes as head of the Vet-

erans' Bureau and Thomas W. Miller as Alien Property Custodian, were equally bad.

In his inaugural address, the new President stressed the policy of keeping out of European affairs and of our own return to normal conditions, which were interpreted as being those prevailing before the Wilson administration, Although those had covered only eight years it seemed a century or more in looking back to the America of the days of Taft, due in part to the enormous acceleration which the war had given to various tendencies, many of which had long been in progress.

One of these had been the struggle for woman's

Sixty-fifth Congress of the United States of Imerica; 2st the Second Session,

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the third day of December, one thousand nine hundred and seventeen.

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following amendment to the Constitution be, and hereby is, proposed to the States, to become valid as a part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of the several States as provided by the Constitution:

"ARTICLE -..

"SECTION 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

"SEC. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power

to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

"SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress."

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Thrs. R. Marchane

Tice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT

From the original in the Department of State, Washington.

suffrage, carried on since 1848, steadily gaining strength, but brought to a successful conclusion only by the war. The nineteenth amendment to the Constitution, proposed by Congress in 1919, had been approved by sufficient States to permit women to vote for the first time in a national Presidential election in 1920. The eighteenth amendment was likewise the result of the war psychology operating on a movement with a long history behind it. Adopted by thirty-six States by January 19, 1919, it was by its terms to go into effect a year from

that date. By January 19, 1920, therefore, it had become illegal to manufacture, sell, or transport "intoxicating" liquor within the United States for beverage purposes. The definition of what might be intoxicating was provided in the Volstead Act (passed by Congress over President Wilson's veto October 28, 1919), which stated it to be one half of one per cent of alcohol. It is impossible to tell whether or not at the time the amendment was adopted it may have been approved by a majority of the voters, to whom it was never submitted.

When Taft had been elected in 1912, the possibility of women voting for President seemed to belong only to a quite indefinite future, while no sane man would have dreamed of Federal prohibition. Other changes, however, had also come with equally unexpected swiftness. After the turn of the century, H. G. Wells had made what then seemed the audacious prophecy that by 1950 airplanes would be used in warfare. By December 21, 1914, German planes were dropping bombs on English soil, and so rapid was the development of aeronautics that in the first year of peace, 1919, two Englishmen, Captain Alcock and Lieutenant Brown, flew the Atlantic without stop from Newfoundland to Ireland in sixteen hours, and another British plane had made the trip from England to Australia. In a few years more men were to be flying over the frozen waste of the North Pole (1926), and Lindbergh in "The Spirit of St. Louis" was to make his famous solo flight across the sea from America to France (1927). Although the general commercial use of flying belongs to the end of the decade, a new dimension had been given to men's thought and activity, and a new standard of speed had been established at its beginning.

Speed had also influenced the tempo of mind and life with the marvellous expansion of the motor-car industry. Ford had marketed his first car in 1903 but at the beginning of the war in 1914 the total sales of all motor vehicles was only about 500,000 a year. By 1920, however, over 8,000,000 passenger-cars were owned in America, a figure which grew to nearly 22,000,000, or one for every 5½ families, by 1928. Another industry of vast cultural influence, for good and bad, was that of moving pictures, which entered its real career only with the production of Griffith's "Birth of the Nation" in 1914. In 1920 perhaps about 30,000,000 persons were going to the

movies once a week, and by 1930 100,000,000 were doing so. The radio, which had been used to some extent before the war for transmission of messages only, began to revolutionize the lives of the people with the erection of the first broadcasting station in 1921, and by the end of the decade probably 50,000,000 were daily "listening in" on the 10,000,000 receiving sets throughout the country.

One result of these inventions and of their extraordinarily wide use in America was to do away to a great extent with the difference which had always hitherto marked urban and rural communities. The car, and the better roads which followed it, permitted the country dweller to reach the nearest big town or city with ease, and to travel perhaps thousands of miles in his holiday season. The screen brought to his eye the same pictures seen by his fellows in the largest centres, and the radio brought to his ear the same music, news, and talk which all the nation heard simultaneously. That America owned approximately 80 per cent of all the motor cars in the entire world was merely an indication of how much further this urbanization of the provincial mind had gone with us than with any other nation, whatever its influences might prove.

As a result partly of the increased demand for opportunity by the laboring class and people of small incomes, we may note another phenomenon, the effect of which is difficult of appraisal. Between 1920 and 1926 the number of boys and girls at college increased from about 460,000 to over 800,000. Minimizing, as we well may, the intellectual benefit which many derived from their experience, the social effects of taking the youth from home for four years and of bringing him into contact with those of other classes and regions cannot be neglected.

It is impossible to say how far the above changes, putting us so suddenly under the nervous strain of adjustment to a vastly quickened tempo of living and of a barrage of new sensations, and how far the war itself, may have been responsible for the abnormal mental condition in which the American nation found itself in the years following the coming of so-called peace. The two or three years immediately after were years of almost pathological unrest and mental panic.

One form which the panic took was a hysterical and almost sadistic persecution of innumerable individuals suspected of being radi-

cal or "red" in their political or social views. The Attorney-General of the United States, A. Mitchell Palmer, who had been transferred to that post, made himself notorious by his arrests and deportations, many of them on fantastically inadequate legal evidence. But local authorities also took a hand in what became a fanatical "witch hunt" on a national scale. Free speech came almost to an end and American Legionaires and other "hundred per centers" indulged in defending what they considered American institutions by persecuting individuals with no due process of law. In the staid Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the case of Sacco and Vanzetti in 1920 was to bring an indelible stigma on our administration of justice, whatever may be thought of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and to have repercussions all over the world.

One of the most remarkable and cowardly of all the attacks on the constitutional freedom of the individual citizen was that made by great numbers of men, ranging from narrow-minded "hundred per centers" to mere ruffians, who enrolled themselves in what was called the Ku Klux Klan. This had no connection with the old Ku Klux of Reconstruction days, but its members adopted the same white-sheeted garb which effectually disguised them by covering the face, and in some respects the methods of the earlier Klansmen. Directed against Jews, Catholics, foreigners, and any to whom mistaken patriotic zeal, personal grudge, or religious bigotry might point as targets for persecution, the new Klansmen, by intimidation, flogging, and even murder, spread a veritable reign of terror throughout a large part of the country. From the narrowest mind of a country village, bent on rooting out any opinion with which it could not agree, to the highest legal officer of the United States, jailing and transporting suspects, the population seemed bent on suppressing every expression of thought which did not square with the standardized ideas of a Protestant Main Street.

The immediate post-war period was also marked by labor unrest in the form of strikes, of which that of the men in the Pittsburgh steel mills was the most bitter. The great prosperity of this tariff-protected industry had been but slightly handed on to the workmen engaged in it, and Chairman Gary of the United States Steel Corporation had resolutely fought against less than a twelve-hour day. A committee of the United States Senate, stronghold as that body is

of corporation privilege, sided with the men on this point, and although the strike failed in its immediate results, working conditions were remedied a few years later. Troubles were general in other cities and industries, and in Boston the police force astounded the nation by going on strike, and gave Governor Coolidge a chance to make a belated gesture toward restoring order which somewhat absurdly gave him a national reputation as a defender of stability and won him the Vice-Presidential nomination.

Combined with a wave of passionate desire to withdraw from all world responsibilities and to reassume a rigid isolationist policy, there was felt equally strongly, and quite as irrationally, a dislike and mistrust of idealism and of all that had been considered progressive, before the war, under Roosevelt and Wilson. The people and the government seemed gripped by fears—fear of responsibility, fear of Russia, fear of whatever was foreign, of whatever was different, of whatever might take us farther on the road from the accustomed. So strong was the tide of reactionism that citizens quoted passages from even Jefferson and Lincoln at their peril, audiences, ignorant of their source, denouncing them as Bolshevik, Communistic, and traitorous.

In the midst of this mad distortion of genuine Americanism, Harding took office, pledged to lead the nation back to "normalcy," as he called it. This he appeared to think of solely as related to business. While his attorney-general hunted "reds," and the President's friends hunted plunder for themselves from the public purse, Harding served big business. The railroads had been turned back to their owners under Wilson in 1920 by the terms of the Esch-Cummins Act, but there remained much to be done in liquidating the various Bureaus and other war organizations. The complete change in our position due to our having become a creditor and exporting industrial nation had been pointed out by Wilson the day before his retirement in his message caustically vetoing the tariff bill sent to him by Congress. That we could not continue to sell to the world if we declined to buy was obvious, but those who benefited by the tariff refused to see it. The first month of his term, Harding sent a message urging the immediate necessity of higher rates. An emergency tariff and, in 1922, a permanent one, were passed by Congress, raising duties to far the highest points yet attained.

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The attitude of the people at large toward the great corporations had completely changed since before the war, and during the years from 1920 to at least the great crash of 1929, the big business man was to be America's hero, and business was to reign supreme. A number of causes may be assigned for the change, chief among them probably being the increased participation in stock ownership by the public. Over 21,000,000 persons had subscribed to the last Liberty Loan, and the great majority of them had become familiar with ownership of a security for the first time during the struggle. The fortunes made in stocks affected by war demands, the so-called "war brides," and the increasing newspaper publicity given to stockmarket excitements, served to increase both the speculating and investing publics.

On the other hand, as we have seen, neither Roosevelt nor the other Progressive leaders had thought out any satisfactory plan for controlling corporations in the interest of the people, who had discovered that mere legal proceedings to break up a great combination brought no results to the ordinary citizen. The latter was tired of idealism, sceptical of government regulation or interference, rabid to make money for himself as he had seen others do, and was coming to care little about anything else provided he was allowed to do so. In that simple situation is the key to much of the history of the mad decade.

Moreover, the man in the street, whether laborer or capitalist, had got drunk on figures. Just as airplanes and automobiles had given us new standards of intoxicating speed, so the figures of wartime industry and debts had given us new and equally intoxicating standards of financial magnitude. In 1901 the United States Steel Corporation had seemed a malign colossus with its billion-dollar capitalization. In 1916 the entire debt of the United States Government had been only about \$970,000,000. By the end of the war it was twenty-five and a quarter billions. Such incomprehensibly huge sums as this introduced a new standard of comparison and made the big corporation seem not so big after all.

Practically every great war of modern times has been followed by a business depression about two years later, and by a far more severe secondary depression about eight years after peace. The World War was to prove no exception, although the general failure

of business leaders to forecast the situation properly was to result in a total collapse of that excessive confidence in their ability as leaders which was notable before war-time prosperity gave way.

By 1920 the primary depression had begun, brought on partly by general underlying conditions and partly by the "buyers' strike" entered upon by a public whose income had been deflated before the cost of living had been lowered. From being wildly extravagant during flush times, people suddenly held parades and formed organizations protesting against high prices, pledging themselves to wear old clothes and even overalls for the sake of economy. Retail prices soon fell, and the wholesale prices of commodities crashed from an index figure of 231 in 1920 to 125 in April, 1921. The great manufacturing companies, whose managements had been for the most part blind to what was historically inevitable, had to take huge losses in depreciated inventories, while the agricultural population was nearly ruined.

The corporations were to come back to a new and greater prosperity but the farmer was not. In 1921 he was getting only \$1.19 a bushel for his wheat as compared with \$2.14 two years before, 12.3 cents for cotton as compared with 29.6 cents, and much the same proportion for his other crops, whereas it has been estimated that one third of the farm income was taken for taxation. In the six years following 1920 the average value of his land fell from \$108 to \$76 an acre. In 1921 the so-called "Farm Bloc" was formed in Congress by representatives of the Middle Western States to secure relief specifically for the farmers, but the various panaceas proposed, such as the McNary-Haugen bill and others, have been more or less economically unsound, and during the wild period of stock speculation and inflation which was to follow the general business recovery after 1921, farming remained the dangerously unprosperous industry of the nation. The problem of markets and of the relation of agricultural prices to high wage scales and tariff-protected manufactured articles remains to be solved.

In spite of continued strikes, such as that of 300,000 railway shopmen in 1923, prosperity began to return with the huge gold imports which started in 1922. The Federal Reserve system which Wilson had given to the nation, after having stood the strain of war, unquestionably helped to pull us through the slough of de-

flation. But in the years immediately to follow, the fire of American prosperity, and more particularly of American speculation, was to blaze so fiercely as to astonish the whole world. The imports of gold, which did not stop until we had more than half the world supply, were but one of the forced draughts which made the blaze. Another was the first trial on a gigantic scale of national advertising which made its new and almost irresistible appeal to the potential buyer through his emotions skilfully played upon by psychological experts. The willingness of business men suddenly to increase so remarkably the sums spent in this way was largely due to the income tax. If, for example, the net income of a corporation was taxed 50 per cent it meant that the corporation could save 50 per cent on an increased expense. If it did not expend a million dollars on advertising the government would take a half million in taxes on earnings. If it did spend a million it would not have to pay the half million to the government on that particular million, and so it got a million dollars' worth of advertising for half that sum. The effect on the public of having their minds thus played upon at colossal expense and with consummate skill was, for the time being at least, immense. What a decade before had been luxuries, many of them unthought of in personal terms by a large part of the population, came to be considered necessities, under the insidious appeals to fear, pride, social prestige, duty to one's family, the lightening of work, or mere enjoyment.

The demand for goods made business, and the new economic theory, identified with the name of Ford, that high wages increased markets, seemed to open endless vistas of ever-rising purchasing power, broadening markets, and increasing production. Like the old legend of the Fountain of Youth, a new belief arose that we had discovered the way to eternal prosperity. If that were so, why wait until one had saved the money for anything one wanted? The introduction on a great scale, and in new fields, of the instalment-purchase idea became another forced draft under production and apparent prosperity. Mass-production methods, of which the full implications were not yet realized, also seemed to promise an indefinitely descending scale of prices for goods produced in ever-enlarging volume with attendant economies. The increasing market required would be created by increasing wages,

and if wages were steadily to rise and prices to fall, the ordinary man saw a veritable New Jerusalem opening before him. If wise sceptics hesitated to accept the theory of a "new era," the actual increases in production, wages, and profits satisfied the more gullible, whether servant or captain of industry, and America had got started on the wildest debauch economically that she has ever enjoyed.

As the ordinary man became more and more anxious to make money, he cared less and less about the affairs of the world at large. Foreigners were to sell us raw materials, buy our mass-produced goods, and send us gold in payment, while we reserved our entire domestic market for our own manufactures. Although Harding, when a candidate for the Presidency, had made many contradictory statements as to his attitude toward the League of Nations, he became opposed to it after his inauguration, and in October, 1921, the Senate in passing

Attacks Instalment Buying.

Speaking before the State Secretaries Section, C. F. Zimmerman of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association, said that the tremendous growth of local merchants' credit' bureaus and of household loan companies during the last decade is convincing evidence of a "broad misunderstanding of right methods—to-say nothing of profilgacy—in the use of the family income." Country bankers in particular have occasion to listen day after day to stories of financial grief and need experienced by those who have been hopelessly improvident with their money, he said.

THE BANKERS' OPINION OF INSTAL-MENT BUYING

From "The New York Times," October 3, 1928.

the Knox resolution ratifying the treaty with Germany and declaring the war at an end, inserted a clause prohibiting the President from appointing any representative of the United States to serve on any body, commission, or agency set up by the Versailles Treaty (which meant, of course, the League of Nations), without the consent of Congress. For many years after, in the absence of that consent we have had to be represented on many European commissions by an "unofficial observer" only.

So far did our fear of the League go that it has been said our Government at first would not even answer communications from it lest it become involved! Although successive Presidents, beginning with Harding, have endeavored to have the United States declare, with reservations as usual, its adherence to the World Court, the Senate was still blocking final action in 1932. As much of the international functioning of the nations of the world now proceeds through the League, we have, for the most part, either had to de-

cline to take our proper place in conferences or do so in an undignified way.


In 1921, although anxious to take part in the movement for disarmament, which had always been an American ideal, we felt unable to do so with any body in any way connected with the League. As a result of both our desires and fears, Harding invited nine powers, including Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to meet in Washington to discuss reduction of naval power, and on November 12 the meeting was opened by Secretary Hughes. A first beginning toward reducing naval expense was made by the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, which allotted equal strength of capital ships to the United States and Great Britain, and gave Japan three fifths of the strength of each of the others. Italy and France agreed to smaller percentages, but although sixty-eight capital ships were scrapped by the treaty, no progress could be made when other forms of naval weapons were discussed, France particularly objecting to limitation of her submarines. Submarines, however, were excluded as commerce destroyers.

Perhaps more important than the naval treaty were the two which were made at the same conference regarding affairs in the Far East. In place of a renewal of the British-Japanese alliance, the nine nations represented at the conference, including China, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal, as well as those named above, in what is called the "nine-power treaty," mutually guaranteed the integrity of Chinese sovereignty and the policy of the "open door" for trade. In a four-power treaty, Great Britain, France, Japan, and ourselves agreed to respect each other's possessions in the East, and to submit any question likely to cause trouble to the decision of a joint conference. Various minor matters were also adjusted in other treaties, and the conference was the one outstanding feature of Harding's term, probably due almost wholly to the Secretary of State, Hughes.

For twenty years before the war, restriction of immigration had been discussed, and several measures had been passed by Congress for the purpose, all of which had been vetoed. The unusual condition brought about by the war, however, gave added strength to the movement, and in 1917 a measure, based chiefly on a literacy test, was passed over Wilson's veto. The extreme nationalism aroused during the struggle and the danger, after its close, lest vast numbers

of Europeans might rush to America to escape post-war poverty and unemployment in their native lands, led Congress to pass an Act in 1921 limiting immigrants to 3 per cent of the number of their several nationalities in the United States according to the Census of 1910.

Although this was also vetoed by Wilson, practically the same



IMMIGRATION FROM 1880 TO 1930

bill was approved by Harding in the special session immediately following his election. Under Coolidge the year chosen as a base was changed to 1890, which greatly favored emigrants of the north European nations as contrasted with those of the southeastern countries, but after 1927 it was provided that the total immigration should be not more than 150,000 persons a year, and that each nation might send only as many emigrants to us in proportion to that figure as the total number of its nationals in the United States in 1920 bore to our total population. This "national origins" sys-

tem did not go into operation, owing to various difficulties, until 1930, but is now the basis of our immigration policy. Although under it only 146 Japanese could enter the country each year as immigrants, Congress was so afraid of the California problem that it specifically excluded all Japanese entirely, to the natural irritation of that proud nation, which had lived up to the spirit of the gentlemen's agreement made with Roosevelt.

The principal financial measures undertaken during Harding's administration were the effort to give a bonus to the ex-soldiers, the lowering of taxes with the beginning of cutting down the national debt, and the first funding of the European war debts.

Our soldiers in the war, as we have said, had been treated more liberally than those of any other nation or period. The high pay, the insurance, the vocational training, and the pay for disability, had all been given in the hope of doing away with the subsequent pension scandals following our other wars. The American Legion, however, soon began its demand for what is called "adjusted compensation," the word pension being in bad odor. In March, yielding as always to pressure from the "soldier vote," Congress passed a bill granting extra compensation to ex-soldiers to an amount estimated at \$3,000,000,000,000, although the government had already given the soldiers \$256,000,000 on their discharge, had paid out about \$2,500,000,000 to the disabled, and was paying out \$1,000,000 a day for soldiers and their dependents, besides carrying the low-rate wartime insurance for them. Harding vetoed the bill, but the House passed it over his veto by a majority of nearly five to one. The Senate narrowly defeated it, but it was clear that it was only a question of time when the old-time pension scandals would be renewed.

Mellon, who was to serve as Secretary of the Treasury longer than any other who has ever held the office, began at once his programme of tax reduction, much criticized by some sound financiers, but which he carried on for ten years, until the crash of American business in 1929 and the subsequent events afforded only too unhappy confirmation of the prophecies of his critics. The system of a national budget, which had been agitated for ten years, came into operation under Harding, but Congress continued to vote money lavishly, the national expenses in 1930 being nearly five times those of 1914. The prosperity which lasted from 1922 to 1929 enabled Mel-

lon to play the wizard apparently, and continually to lower the rates of taxation, especially for the very rich (to which class he himself belonged), while at the same time reducing the total debt from \$25,484,000,000 in June, 1919, to \$15,922,000,000 in June, 1930. The steady reduction in taxation, however, begun under Harding and continued under Coolidge, gave the people at large a false sense of sound government finance, and disguised to a considerable extent the continued extravagance of government expense, a point which was to be most sharply brought to their attention by the staggering deficit left the moment "prosperity" could no longer be blown to a blaze by the forced draughts. The beginning of the policy may be noted here but the catastrophe was to occur under Hoover.

Another factor which gave a false sense of security in expenditure was the belief that the European war debts could be funded and paid practically in their entirety. In 1922 Congress passed a measure designed to facilitate the refunding of the debts, almost nine tenths of which were owed by Great Britain, France, and Italy. The first, which owed much the largest sum, sent representatives to Washington in January, 1923, to arrange terms of settlement. The promptness with which Great Britain, with her unrivalled financial strength, agreed to pay \$4,604,000,000 over a period of sixty-two years, lulled the average man into the belief that the entire amount of approximately \$9,400,000,000 was a sound asset.

There was, indeed, a lack of sound basis for the whole of the "mad decade," and, as one looks back, men seem to move in a fog of abnormality and unreality. Unhappily by the end of his second year of office, the results of Harding's easy handing over of responsibility to others, and of his own personal habits and weakness, were beginning to involve him in a situation from which there appeared to be no escape. The newspaper reporters had been extremely considerate of him, both as a newspaper man himself and as President of the United States, so that the public at large knew practically nothing of his former mistress, his drinking parties in the White House, and his wilder ones outside. The doings, however, of the "Ohio Gang" and of other friends whom Harding had appointed to office could not be so well concealed.

On February 12, 1923, the Senate appointed a committee to investigate alleged irregularities in the Veterans' Bureau. Three days

later, Harding's friend, Forbes, resigned as its head, though he could not stave off judicial proceedings, as a result of which he was convicted of defrauding the government and sent to Fort Leavenworth prison for two years. Thomas W. Miller, the Custodian of Alien Property, was also caught in fraudulent transactions, and, in 1927, finally likewise sentenced to prison. Daugherty, the Attorney-General and member of the Cabinet, was the centre of extraordinary intrigues which have never yet been cleared up. He was later to be forced out of office by President Coolidge, for obstructing the investigation of his own conduct, and appears to have been able to escape more serious results only by destroying his papers and records in several places. His explanation for the destruction of his bank records when he was later being tried in court was that their preservation would have deeply stained the memory of Harding.

Even a worse scandal, if possible, than that created by the character and conduct of Daugherty, involved two other members of the Cabinet. In May, 1921, at the request of Secretary of the Interior Fall, the President was induced to sign an order transferring the oil reserves of the navy from the custody of the Navy Department to that of the Interior. One of the reserves was located at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, and the scandal became known as "Teapot Dome," owing to the fact that it was that particular reserve which Secretary Fall, after having accepted a bribe of \$100,000, leased to Harry F. Sinclair, the Elk Hills reserve being likewise leased to Edward L. Doheny. The leases, which were of colossal value, were made secretly and without competitive bids. Harding's own order had been wholly without constitutional authority, and Denby, the Secretary of the Navy, had no right to comply with it.

Under the lead of Senator La Follette, the Senate demanded an investigation, although Harding issued a statement approving of Fall's actions. Denby resigned under fire, and the investigation revealed the worst state of corruption which the nation had ever known. All of these various scandals were becoming ripe, and to some extent known or suspected, by the beginning of 1923, although it was to take longer to fathom them, and for obvious reasons Harding's successors were not anxious to air them. In the case of Secretary Fall it was not until October, 1929, that, after availing himself of every possible legal device for delay, he was finally sen-

A MAD DECADE

tenced to a year's imprisonment. Considering the position he occupied and the heinousness of his offence, this was assuredly light enough, but Doheny managed to get off altogether, and Sinclair with only a short prison term for contempt of the Senate and for using private detectives to shadow members of the jury sitting on his case.

How much or how little Harding may have known of the utter rottenness of much of his administration it is as yet impossible to tell, as well as what such other Cabinet officers as Hughes and Hoover or Vice-President Coolidge, who sat with the Cabinet, may have known or thought about it all. At any rate it was not until long afterward that any one of them expressed abhorrence of the scandals or their authors.

There is good evidence that by the summer of 1923 Harding was becoming greatly worried over the situation of both his administration and himself, including his former relations to a certain Nan Britton. The results of his own weakness seemed to be closing in on him when he started on a trip to Alaska in June. A cipher message from Washington received by him in July nearly caused his collapse, though no one knows what was in it. Returning from Alaska to San Francisco, he was said to be suffering from ptomaine poison and on August 2 he died. Without accepting the most sensational of the stories of his death, it must be admitted that the mystery of it has never been cleared up, and as all of his papers were destroyed by Mrs. Harding before her own death, an unprecedented proceeding in the case of a President, there was evidently much that may now never be known.

One cannot but feel a certain pity for the man who, somewhat against his will and better judgment, allowed himself to be elevated to a position for which he was wholly unfitted and who let himself become surrounded by and dependent upon the worst gang of ruffians and grafters that have disgraced any administration in our history.

There is no real evidence that Harding himself profited financially by any of the corruption. He was merely a weak man of rather low tastes, who was comfortable chiefly in the society of men of inferior character and attainments. His own pleasures,—drink, women, or a poker game with the "crowd,"—were those of count-

less very ordinary men. The misfortune for himself and the nation was that when he had risen to the position of President, he was not able, as, for example, Chester Arthur had been, to rise also to the dignity and responsibility of his high office. At the time of his death the people at large realized little or nothing of the scandals, and knew only the rather likeable man as the newspapers made him appear to be. It was long before the public, or at least the Republican portion of it, could be brought to admit the truth.

The Vice-President was as yet but little known when, after Harding's death, he took the oath of office in his father's house at a cross-roads hamlet in Vermont. Like Hughes and Hoover, Coolidge had been wholly unsmirched by the dirt of the "Ohio Gang" and other malefactors of the Harding régime, and his accession to office and Harding's death were the most fortunate possible happenings for the Republican Party. He was to prove an extreme conservative, interested almost wholly in the economical running of the government, although with lavish Congresses he did not make the progress in that direction which was as needful for the nation as it was desired by him. His interests were narrow, and he apparently knew and cared little about international affairs or the larger problems of the post-war world. His comment on the debts when there was a question of their reduction,—"they hired the money, didn't they?"—gives a fair measure of the man.

Silent, without culture or intellectual tastes, a mind that in many respects was singularly ordinary and commonplace, he nevertheless had a certain hard-bitten Yankee shrewdness and common sense which made him appear to many as a wise and safe leader. As prosperity returned in steadily increasing measure under him, as it would have done under any one else, he became a legend, almost as closely identified with national economic well-being as the "good medicine" of the Indians. When, after more than a year of serving in Harding's stead, he ran for the Presidency in his own right, the campaign cry was "Coolidge or Chaos," and, absurd as this was, it expressed at once the chief interest of the people and the aspect in which the President was to be constantly presented.

By the latter part of 1923 it had become increasingly evident in Europe that the \$33,000,000,000 of reparations which had been laid upon Germany were impossibly large and would require

A MAD DECADE


readjusting. Whether or not Europe had "hired" our money during the war, it realized that its ability to pay was closely linked with the payments which the debtor nations might or might not receive from Germany. The United States had declined to take part in European conferences, but in Europe it was thought it might he well if influential men in America knew and shared in the anxieties of the situation. The Reparations Commission thus asked General Dawes, a successful business man of the Middle West, who had served under Pershing in France and who had been the first director of the Budget Bureau under Harding, to head a committee which should study the problem of Germany's capacity to pay and the methods of her doing so. In April, 1924, the committee made public its findings and suggestions, which became known under the name of "the Dawes Plan," although in fact it was chiefly the work of Owen D. Young and not of Dawes. It brought the latter, however, prominently into the international limelight, and at the Republican Convention, which met at Cleveland on June 10, he was nominated for Vice-President on the ticket with Coolidge, who had received the Presidential nomination on the first ballot by an overwhelming majority. The platform on which the candidates stood called for rigid economy, further reduction of taxes, payment of war debts, and a high protective tariff.

Fourteen days later the Democrats met in New York, but the long-drawn-out battle between Governor Smith of New York and William G. McAdoo, which made it the lengthiest convention in American history, tired the country, created a bitter split in the party, and destroyed what chances John W. Davis, the candidate finally chosen as a compromise, might have had. The scandals of the Harding régime were scarcely used in the campaign, contrary to what might have been expected. This was partly due to the fact that the public was curiously apathetic about them, and partly to the fear of the Democrats that the Republicans might reply by digging up such scandals of the war administration as might have been afforded, for example, by the air service. Moreover, Harding had been dead for more than a year and the Republican candidate could in no way be connected with the misdoings of his predecessor's appointees.

The Progressive Party, led by La Follette, interested the public only slightly, the minds of the people being far more concentrated

on problems of money-making and prosperity than of social matters, and the Republicans won a sweeping victory, polling over 15,700,000 votes to about 8,400,000 for Davis, and 4,800,000 for La Follette. Only about 51 per cent of the total eligible voters took part in the election.

International affairs under Coolidge led the United States no further afield than they had done under Harding. Our Caribbean



FRUEH'S CARTOONS ON THE CONVENTION IN THE WORLD, JUNE 30, 1924

policy, which had developed around our ownership of the Canal Zone and the necessity of extending our sphere of influence over a wider and wider extent of neighboring territory for what was considered the necessity of defending the canal, led us again to send troops to Nicaragua in 1926 to maintain order. They have remained there ever since.

Although the Republican platform, and Coolidge, like Hoover, advocated our joining the Court of International Settlement, the Senate continued, as we have noted, successfully to block such a

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participation by us in the life of the world. Also, although the League of Nations was at work upon plans for disarmament of the nations, we declined to have anything to do with such an effort, and in 1927 Coolidge issued invitations to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to join us in another conference to make further progress beyond that achieved at Washington. Italy and France rejected the suggestion, France noting in her reply that her loyalty to the League, which was then at work on the same problem, would prevent her from undertaking the task through other channels. Even friendly Great Britain warned us that the relating of any conference with us would require careful adjusting to the proceedings of the League. Although Japan and Great Britain did send representatives to confer with our own at Geneva, the conference broke down and was a complete failure.

Throughout the latter part of 1927 and the first half of 1928, negotiations proceeded with Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and France with a view to a multi-lateral treaty, subsequently known in America as the "Kellogg Pact," from the name of our Secretary of State, although the first suggestion came from Briand in France and it is known in Europe as the "Pact of Paris." The object of the treaty was to "outlaw war" except in necessary self-defence, the definition of what constitutes both aggression and self-defence being left rather vague. As usual in the post-war years, although we were willing to make a gesture, we were unwilling to assume any international responsibilities in the way of sanctions, and it is questionable as yet just how important this verbal outlawry of war may prove to be. A certain moral effect it unquestionably has, but it remains uncertain how far this moral effect would withstand the strain of a genuinely serious international quarrel.

Coolidge's Cabinet had been made up of a number of new men, but Mellon had remained at the Treasury, and Hoover as Secretary of Commerce. The most characteristic portion of the history of the Coolidge administration was to be centred about the Treasury head.

The President in his inaugural address had truly said that "the collection of any taxes which are not absolutely required . . . is only a species of legalized larceny." Not a little of his popularity was to flow from his steady resistance to the quite opposite doctrine held by Congress, too ready to spend the people's money for the

benefit of special groups who may be counted upon to help return a congressman to his office. The readjustment in business due to deflation had continued into 1922, which year witnessed the largest number, save for the preceding one, of big failures in our history up to that time. But after that, general business had picked up rap-

MELLON FORESEES NO BUSINESS SLUMP; TAX SHIFT BY SMOOT

Secretary Is Optimistic Over Conditions Now and Finds No Sign of End of Prosperity.

SENATOR IS LESS SANGUINE

He Urged \$300,000,000 Cut in Taxes, but Now Holds More Than \$225,000,000 Unsafe.

FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 15, 1927

idly about the date of Harding's death, and in 1924 left the United States Treasury with the greatest surplus on record, over \$500,000,000. Congress availed itself of this to pass a new bonus bill for the soldiers, over Coolidge's veto.

Within the three years after Great Britain had funded her debt with us, practically all the other nations had done the same. France delaying the longest of the great powers. Subsequent to the ready acceptance of our terms by the British it became evident that the other nations either could not or would not honor their bond in the same degree, and it became necessary to find some formula for treating them on a different basis, both as to the amount of the original principal and ac-

crued interest which should be re-funded, and as to the terms of future payment. This was found in the alleged "capacity to pay," which it may be noted by 1932 had become a farce so far as the genuine capacity of the several nations was then concerned. Of the total amount funded of \$11,671,953,490, Great Britain had promised to pay us \$4,600,000,000 at 3.3 per cent interest, France \$4,025,000,000 at 1.6 per cent, and Italy \$2,024,000,000 at 0.4 per cent, the average rate for all loans being 2.1 per cent. That Great Britain paid heavily by being the first to come forward to settle with us is

A MAD DECADE

now generally acknowledged even by those who wish to collect every cent due.

The prosperity which returned to the United States, as might have been expected after the first post-war depression, followed a normal course up to about 1926 or 1927. The factors we have mentioned above did, indeed, supply forced draughts and to that extent emphasized the magnitude of the prosperity which might have been expected, and by doing so lent some plausibility to the in-

COOLIDGE VISIONS NEW ERA OF PROGRESS IN AMERICA; HOLDS PROSPERITY A TEST



FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES OF NOVEMBER 18, 1927

sistence of many business leaders that all precedents should be scrapped and that American business had entered upon a "new era" in which the old economic laws no longer held sway.

The extraordinary earnings, especially of some of the new massproduction enterprises, and the generally excited condition of mind in the decade, had also greatly stimulated speculation, so that in the five years from 1921 to the close of 1926 the average price of twenty leading industrial stocks on the Stock Exchange had risen from \$67 to \$177. Brokers' loans had also steadily risen, \$1,750,000,000 on January 1, 1925, \$2,500,000,000 a year later, and \$2,820,000,000 at the beginning of 1927. By the latter year, in which normally the sec-

COOLIDGE SEES LOANS AS BUSINESS TREND

President Not Disturbed by \$3,810,023,000 Held by the Federal Reserve Members.

INTERESTS WALL STREET

Financial Circles Have Been Discussing the Mounting Loans for Some Time.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6 (1).~

The President, it was said at the White House today, believes that the increase represents a natural expansion of business in the securities market and sees nothing unfavorable in it.

COOLIDGE'S OPTIMISM GIVES STOCKS A LIFT

Market Booms and Sales Are Second Largest on Record for a Saturday.

DURANT HELPS MOVEMENT

Predicts Brokers' Loans Will Exceed \$5,000,000,000 This Year—Some Profits Taken.

Above—HEADING AND A PARAGRAPH FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES OF JAN-UARY 7, 1928; and Below—THE RESULTS, FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES OF JAN-UARY 8, 1928. ondary and greatest post-war depression might have been expected to appear, business had in fact begun to turn downward.

The unprecedented size of the loan account was seriously dis-

THE "BROKERS' LOANS" CONTROVERSY.

That President Coolings should have allowed to be publicly quoted the remarks ascribed to him, regarding the unprecedentedly large expansion of bank loans to the Stock Exchange, can hardly be classed as wise or prudent. This judgment does not depend on the correctness or incorrectness of the White House view of such credits. But it was much like passing offhand judgment to describe that increase as a "natural expansion of business," in which the President could see "nothing unfavorable." Mr. Coolinge was described as not attempting " to qualify as an expert," or indeed to be in a position to say whether these brokers' loans had "reached a stage of disproportion." But if this was so, it would surely have been better to say nothing.

PART OF THE NEW YORK TIMES' EDI-TORIAL ON THE "BROKERS' LOANS".

turbing the minds of the more conservative students of business. In January, 1928, the leading financial journal, *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, stated that "there could no longer be any doubt that a business reaction was well under way." During the year there were to be

A MAD DECADE

23,146 mercantile failures, with liabilities of \$520,000,000, the largest number, though not the largest liabilities, for any year since 1922. The stock market began to fall in January and February, higher interest rates were feared, and the normal processes of correcting

an over-extended position began to operate. Both the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, however, advised the people that all was well. Coolidge apparently told the public what Mellon told him to say, and between them they managed so to whet the public appetite for speculative profits, that until after the end of Coolidge's term of office the stock market with its gambling possibilities became the chief centre of the interest of Americans of all social and economic grades.

By January, 1928, the brokers' loans had risen to \$4,400,000,000, but in spite of protests from leading bankers the President issued a statement to the public that the amount of the loans was not too large. Newspapers like *The New*

YOUNG FAVORS CHECK ON ABNORMAL CREDIT

Reserve Board Governor Tells Bankers System Can 'Properly' Limit Undesirable Growth.

BUT SPEAKS GUARDEDLY

And Declines to Answer Ten Questions on His Attitude on Brokers' Loans and the Like.

WARNING ON SECURITIES

ONE OF THE WARNINGS, FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES OF OCTOBER 3, 1928

York Times pointed out that no President before had ever given out stock-market advice, but the people, by then completely mad over the boiling market, ignored the extraordinary fact that the President of the United States and his Secretary of the Treasury should be acting as market tipsters, and eagerly acted on the tips. It did not seem possible to the people that the President and so wealthy and distinguished a financier as Mellon might be wrong.

In spite of banking warnings, of the obvious fact that the whirlpool of American speculation was sucking in gold from all the world and seriously deranging world finance, and of the successive sinking spells in the market itself, the determined President and

Secretary continued to tell the public that all was well whenever the market needed a dose of such medicine. Under pressure it continued to rise to fantastic heights. Business leaders and many bankers lost their own heads. Many companies "split" their shares, giving their stockholders three, five, or, as in the case of the General Electric Company, even sixteen shares for the one share only previously held. These new shares rose rapidly in price, thus multiplying many times the price of the original shares. Every one, women with no knowledge of business, business men who ought to have had some, college professors, bootleggers and bootblacks, stenographers, the whole, it seemed, of the United States, had stocks on margin, and as they watched them rise in price felt that they had discovered a source of unlimited wealth. Personal expenditure, in view of such supposed profits and ease of money-making, became insanely extravagant. People bought as never before of all sorts of goods, which itself acted as a stimulus to trade. Aluminum Company of America, Secretary Mellon's own company, rose above \$500 a share, although no one knew what it was worth and it was paying no dividends. Radio Corporation of America likewise crossed 500, and General Electric which could have been bought after the war for 110 sold at the equivalent of over 1600.

The newspapers, intent on circulation and quick to play up every story, whether a Hall murder case, a Lindbergh flight, or the public's stock-market insanity, to the utmost, gave the possibilities of fortune-making first-page space month after month, until, under the influence of the pronouncements of Coolidge and Mellon, the daily stories of winnings by friends, and the insistent headlines which could not be avoided in the daily papers, there must have been few individuals in 1928 and 1929 who had or could borrow money who had not found the combined psychological pressure too great for them and had not abandoned themselves to buying stocks at prices which bore no conceivable relation to values.

The rest of the world might be poor, and struggling to work out of the financial débris of the war. America had defied economic law to rise, apparently, to hitherto undreamed-of heights of wealth and prosperity. There seemed no end, no limit to possibilities of enhanced earnings and prices of securities. All one had to do was to

A MAD DECADE


buy and grow rich. Leading men of the nation assured the people that it was so. A "new era" had dawned in which all were to have money and poverty was to be abolished. As the decade drew toward its end, America was living in the fantastic dreams of opium or delirium.

CHAPTER XIII

THE WORLD CRISIS

-N the mad decade, America was not wholly concerned with money-making, and the roll of accomplishment in the arts was a notable one. Eugene O'Neill in drama, Edwin Arlington Robinson and a host of others in poetry, Sinclair Lewis, Willa Cather, Sherwood Anderson, Thornton Wilder, Edna Ferber. and James Branch Cabell, to mention only a few in prose, and Frank Lloyd Wright in architecture, clearly indicated the stirrings of artistic life below the crass materialism of the period. In science, generally considered as rather peculiarly the province of America, our contributions were for the most part of a practical nature and in the first three decades of the new century, in proportion to population, we were far behind Europe. A rough indication of this may be found in the awards of the Nobel Prize which, on the above basis, went six times to France, eight times to Germany and eight times to England as contrasted with once to the United States. There was a leaven of noble and disinterested artistic and intellectual striving and achievement, but on the whole, as after the Civil War, and as in almost all post-war periods in all countries, life had become vulgarized, selfish, and material.

To realize the change which had come over the American people one has only to contrast the leadership of Roosevelt and Wilson with that of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. In spite of a certain lip-service to old ideals by the latter three, their real interest, as well as that of the people at large, lay in creating prosperity, it being assumed by all that happiness, contentment, and spiritual good would somehow automatically and inevitably follow in the wake of high wages, stock-market profits, and big dividends. By 1928 the good life had become synonymous with the possession of ever greater amounts of money by the individual, and identified with the person of the President even more than with the Republican Party. Both the genuine basis of good business and the false marshlight of stock speculation had become known as the "Coolidge Prosperity."



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
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MANUSCRIPT OF "BEYOND THE HORIZON," BY EUGENE O'NEILL

 $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}$ Pulitzer Prize Play, with sketches for the setting by the author.

Fram the Theatre Collection of the Museum of the City of New York.



1 Pan American Airways System.

Top: Orville Wright at Fort Myer, Virginia, September 9, 1908, delivering the U.S. Army's first airplane. Centre: The navy seaplane N-C 4, on the famous Trans-Atlantic flight of 1919. Bottom: M-130 type "clipper ship" designed by Glen L. Martin Co., 1932.

In the early summer of 1928 the party conventions met for the nomination of Presidential candidates. Months before, Coolidge had made his famous statement that he did not "choose" to run, and the Republican Convention, which met at Kansas City on June 14, nomi-



THE 1928 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
From the cartoon by Thomas in "The Detroit News."

nated Herbert Hoover on the first ballot. Senator Charles Curtis, of Kansas, whose chief claim to fame was the fact that he was partly of Indian blood, was named for Vice-President. At the Democratic Convention at Houston, June 28, Governor Smith of New York was easily nominated for President on the first ballot, with Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas as his running-mate.

As usual, the platforms of both parties dodged the chief issues, and there was little to choose between them in the intentional haze

of misleading verbiage. In the campaign speeches both candidates declared for a tariff, and both promised relief to the farmers, but whereas Hoover stood for prohibition and private development of our water-power resources, Smith, although promising enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, counselled a modification of that experiment and the retaining in the hands of the Federal Government, for the benefit of all the people, of the great water powers already in its possession.

During the campaign Smith was bitterly assailed as a Roman Catholic, a "wet," a representative of the Irish immigration, and a tool of Tammany. He was also accused of favoring saloons and commercialized vice, and of being unfit for office. On the other hand, Hoover was proclaimed as the great organizer, executive, and engineer who would consolidate prosperity and lead the nation to yet greater wealth,—a description of his function and powers which the candidate himself accepted. Asserting that America was at that moment nearer to the abolition of poverty than any other nation had ever been, and that "the policies of the government bear an increasing responsibility for continued national prosperity," he also promised that "the victory of the [Republican] party will ensure stability of business and employment."

There was a much increased popular interest in the election as contrasted with that of 1924, as evidenced by the fact that 6,600,000 more votes were cast. Although Smith polled only about 1,000,000 less than Coolidge had in the former year in the great Republican victory, the 21,429,000 votes for Hoover as against Smith's 15,000,000 gave the former a plurality of about 6,429,000.

Hoover had been elected not only on the promise of continued prosperity but of a prosperity which should be in part manufactured by the government itself. If there were any failure in the continuous flow of business and stock-market profits, the President would therefore be likely to be held accountable for it and would find it hard to avoid the responsibility. Almost as soon as he had been nominated in June, talk began about a "Hoover market" to commence in September. During the summer, business improved and, under continued whipping of the public interest, participation in the delirious speculation had become phenomenal by the time September came. On the 13th, The New York Times noted that the public

was so wild about stocks that it would believe any yarn, and the next day Secretary Mellon gave out an interview about the great prosperity of the country, adding that he saw no indication of a possible depression. The violent advance continued until October 26 when the American Bankers Association again issued a warning against



THE DANGEROUS AND FANTASTIC GAME OF WALL STREET From "The New York Times," July 15, 1928.

the danger of the situation. On the 31st, however, President Coolidge tried to counter this with a public statement that the foundations of business were very strong.

The following week, Hoover was elected but Coolidge had still four months to serve. The dangerous and fantastic game went on in Wall Street. The entire nation was participating, and the United States was drawing money from wherever possible to aid it in carrying stocks. The whole world was becoming deranged by the process and in February, 1929, Governor Norman of the Bank of England found it necessary to come to Washington to consult with the Fed-

eral Reserve Board. Money was getting tight, interest rates rising to 12 per cent and more in New York, and responsible individuals and bodies were warning the public against the danger of the speculative orgy. The Bank of England rate had to be put up 1 per cent to 5½ per cent, and the strain on European money centres was beginning to tell.

On February 8, the Federal Reserve Board issued a statement

STOCKS SWEPT HIGH AS INAUGURAL NEARS

Lively Trading Brings Gains Up to 601/2 Points in Renewed "Hoover Market."

\$25,000,000 LOANS CALLED

But 10% Rate Fails to Check Buying Rush—Copper Shares Lead the List.

FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES OF MARCH 1, 1929 warning the American public and threatening that the Board would have to take measures if the brokers' loans were not reduced to a point which would no longer endanger the stability of the commercial and financial structure. Mr. Mellon then took it upon himself to issue a statement denying that the Federal Reserve Board intended to bring about a slump in stocks. A sudden reduction in loans, such as was absolutely essential, however, could mean nothing else, and stocks had slumped seventeen points after the warning. Indeed, the very day after, the New York Stock Exchange had to close for a day, the

reason suggested being the need to catch up with the bookkeeping. In spite of Mellon, the Federal Advisory Council, on the 15th, recommended that the regional Federal Reserve Boards should ask all member banks to co-operate in the curbing of stock speculation.

After a break, the market started up again as wildly as ever, and on March 1 big headlines on the first page of *The Times* announced "Stocks Swept High as Inaugural Nears. Lively Trading Brings Gains Up to 60½ Points in Renewed 'Hoover Market.' "Although money was stiff at 10 per cent, the average price of industrial stocks rose to a new high of 366. Another heading on the same page of *The Times* read "First National Bank Stock Up \$950 in 2 Days; Gain for Baker's Holdings Put At \$13,000,000." That the market

value of one man's holdings in one investment alone should rise \$13,000,000 in two days made it seem as though we were indeed in a "new era."

The next day the first page of *The Times* carried the heading "'Inaugural Market' Brings Public Back, Sends Stocks Higher. Sustained Climb on Belief in an Extended 'Hoover Boom' Puts Gains Up To 25 Points." On the 4th, Hoover, in his inaugural address, spoke of "our abounding prosperity" and of a future "bright with hope," explaining again that the government should co-operate closely with business organizations to ensure the continuance of good times.

Although the new President stressed the growing lawlessness of

A PAGE OF PICTURES OF PRESIDENT HOOVER'S INAUGURATION-PAGE 7



HOOVER INAUGURATED BEFORE THRONG OF 50,000 IN RAIN; PLEDGES EFFORT TO ENFORCE LAWS, AID WORLD PEACE; PARTING WITH COOLIDGE IS CLIMAX OF DAY'S CEREMONY

THE NEW YORK TIMES OF MARCH 5, 1929

the nation, the parts of his speech which struck the most responsive chord in the mind of the public were unquestionably those in which he discoursed of business and prosperity. As The Times said in the next morning's leading editorial, "the moving principle of Mr. Hoover's inaugural address, if it has one, is to be found in his assertion of what should be our 'larger purpose' at the present time. It is to 'establish more firmly stability and security of business and employment and thereby remove poverty still further from our borders.' This is the passage in his address which undoubtedly will be received with the greatest favor. Of course, he believes that incidentally this will yield moral and spiritual benefits of a high order. He thinks that individual betterment and social righteousness will go hand in hand with an enlarged prosperity. But prosperity is the great goal for which he will be found to be striving. Nor can it be said that in this he is not a true interpreter of the existing desires and plans of the American people." Opposed to the League of Nations, Hoover advocated our entering the Permanent Court of Interna-

tional Justice, but neither that nor his assertion that our increasing crime and lawlessness was the "most malign of the dangers" threatening the nation aroused much interest.

The continuance of Mr. Mellon as Secretary of the Treasury in the new Cabinet pleased the country, although the rest of the President's appointments were unexpected, and the Cabinet was not as strong as the public had anticipated it would be. Henry L. Stimson became Secretary of State, and Charles Francis Adams, representative of a distinguished family which had given the nation three Ministers to England and two Presidents, became Secretary of the Navy. Otherwise the public scarcely recognized the names of the new President's advisors. Almost immediately he disclosed his characteristic approach to problems in the appointment of commissions of enquiry, notably that headed by George W. Wickersham on law enforcement, including Prohibition, which was to be followed by almost innumerable other ones. In the complexities of modern life there is much to be said for fact-finding commissions. A year later, however, the country was to be somewhat shocked to find that although the President had abdicated leadership in order to allow the National Enforcement Commision to discover the facts and give its opinions, he declined to be bound by them when found. Of the eleven members who made their report in January, 1930, five advocated modification of the Eighteenth Amendment and two declared for straight repeal, leaving only four who wished to give the experiment further trial in its present shape, which they all agreed was eminently unsatisfactory.

Hoover, however, remained of the same opinion still. In spite of the year and more his commission had spent finding the facts the President refused to face them. Meanwhile, the Jones Act, passed by overwhelming majorities in both Houses of Congress in 1929, had made certain violations of the Prohibition law liable to punishment of \$10,000 fine and five years in prison, raising them to the rank of felonies. In view of the state of public opinion few laws could have been devised more calculated to bring law into contempt, and to add to that disrespect for law which Hoover had rightly declared to be one of the greatest menaces to the national life.

In this he was right, for lawlessness had been increasing to an extraordinary extent, and apparently with little or no recognition

of its seriousness by the ordinary citizen, who so long as he was making money, and was not personally interfered with, paid slight attention to this hideous cancer in our social system. Although in such cities as London and Paris, millions of dollars in gold continued to be moved through the streets in ordinary trucks with no armed protection, New York City alone had to employ a fleet of 155 armored cars to carry pay rolls and any valuables that could not be concealed on one's person. The kidnappings, racketeering, and other evidences of violent crime had increased so rapidly as to make daily life in what we like to consider our civilized country take on the aspect of war in an enemy's territory.

From 1900 to 1930 the homicide record in thirty-one leading American cities had steadily mounted from 5.1 per 100,000 of population to 10.8, whereas in the latter year the rate for Liverpool was .5, that for London .8, for Canadian cities 1.6, and the average for the fifty-three chief cities of the entire world was 3.5. For every 109 homicides in the United States, Canada had 16 and London 8. In many of our states, although the honest citizen could frequently secure a permit to own a revolver only with the greatest difficulty, including perhaps the bribing of the police officer in charge of their issuance, criminals had no difficulty in providing themselves with entire arsenals of weapons, from pocket automatics to machine guns.

The public seemed to enjoy the show, much as they would a thrilling screen play, and to take no heed of the possibilities or to consider the situation as indicating a deep-seated disease in the body politic. The forces of municipal and State police appeared to be paralyzed, and our record of proportional captures and convictions was as small in comparison with European countries as our record of crimes was appallingly great. America's particular hero was the modest aviator Lindbergh, who properly occupied a position of peculiarly affectionate regard in the hearts of the public. Yet when his only child was kidnapped from its nursery in March, 1932, although a shudder ran through the country, nothing could be done about it, and our leading newspapers were soon treating every aspect of the case as a means of securing additional circulation, and the public read the story as a "thriller" with apparently little influence upon its attitude toward crime. In spite of a gesture of the Federal Government, which pledged its aid to the recovery of the child, precisely nothing was

done. The Lindbergh case was spectacular only because of the prominence of Lindbergh himself. It was, however, but one glance at what was going on all over the country, in many different sorts of crime. For a few days it was hoped that the very prominence of the specific instance might awaken the public to existing conditions, but it did not, and after the one gesture, even the Federal Government relapsed again into supine surrender to the gangsters. The mention of this striking case is anticipating somewhat, and we must return to the beginning of Hoover's term.

In accordance with his pre-election pledge of a special session of Congress to do something for the farmers, Hoover called that body together on April 15, but nothing was accomplished, after much discussion, beyond the appointment of a Farm Board which was authorized to expend \$500,000,000. In the course of the subsequent débâcle in American business, the Board was to prove extremely incompetent and ill-advised, and the several hundreds of millions which they expended in the purchase of wheat and cotton in a wholly vain effort to hold up prices were not merely wasted but, by creating hoards of vast amount of high-priced produce which overhung the market, continued to be a menace to the recovery of prices.

The smash came in the autumn of 1929. By that time the forces which had been at work for nearly two years to bring about a normal and natural depression finally won over the official hypodermic injections given to speculation. The crisis of one of the greatest stock-exchange panics in the history of the world came on October 29. The "Coolidge Prosperity" lay buried beneath the smoking ruins of the inverted "Hoover Market." In one week, brokers' loans, which within a fortnight had stood at the fantastic figure of over \$8,500,000,000, decreased nearly \$1,100,000,000. Considering the character of the speculating public, which had come to include persons of every sort in every walk of life, such loans as are indicated by the above figures were bound to have enormous repercussions.

No individual or political party could have prevented the working out of the economic laws into an inevitable depression of the first magnitude following the war. Neither Mr. Hoover nor the Republicans can be blamed for that. What they can rightly be blamed

WORST STOCK CRASH STEMMED BY BANKS; 12,894,650-SHARE DAY SWAMPS MARKET; LEADERS CONFER, FIND CONDITIONS SOUND

FINANCIERS EASE TENSION

Five Wall Street Bankers Hold Two Meetings at Morgan Office. Wall Street Optimistic After Stormy Day; Clerical Work May Force Holiday Tomorrow

Confidence in the soundness of the stock market structure, notwithstanding the uphcaval of the last few-days, was voiced last night by bankers and other financial leaders. Sentiment as expressed by the heads of some of the largest banking institutions and by industrial executives as well was distinctly cheerful and the feeling was general that the worst had been seen. Wall Street ended the day in an optimistic frame of mind. LOSSES RECOVERED IN PART

Upward Trend Start*
With 200,000-Share
Order for Steel.

From "The New York Times," October 25, 1929.

STOCK PRICES SLUMP \$14,000,000,000 IN NATION-WIDE STAMPEDE TO UNLOAD; BANKERS TO SUPPORT MARKET TODAY

Sixteen Leading Issues Down \$2,893,520,108; Tel. & Tel. and Steel Among Heaviest Losers PREMIER ISSUES HARD HIT

From "The New York Times," October 29, 1929.

STOCKS COLLAPSE IN 16,410,030-SHARE DAY, BUT RALLY AT CLOSE CHEERS BROKERS; BANKERS OPTIMISTIC, TO CONTINUE AID

LEADERS SEE FEAR WANING

Point to 'Lifting Spells' in Trading as Sign of Buying Activity.

GROUP MEETS TWICE IN DAY

240 Issues Lose \$15,894,818,894 in Month; Slump in Full Exchange List Vastly Larger

The drastic affects of Wall Street's October hear market is shown by valuation tables prepared lack night by Ture New York Thems, which place the decline in the market value of 260 represeniative issues on the New York Stock Eschange at \$15.904,315,900 during the period from Oct. It is yesterday's closing. Show there are 1.579 issues listed on the New York Stock Eschange, the total depreciation for the month is estimated at between two and three these the loss for the 260 causes covered by Two Triest below

Among the losses of the various groups comprising the 240

CLOSING RALLY VIGOROUS

Leading Issues Regain From 4 to 14 Points in 15 Minutes.

INVESTMENT TRUSTS BUY

From "The New York Times," October 30, 1929.
THE SAD STORY OF OCTOBER, 1929

for, and heavily, was their stubborn resistance to facts and their insistence, against every indication to the contrary and the best advice, that all was well when the economic patient was becoming, in fact, very ill. When *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle* announced

BANKERS EMPHASIZE DANGER OF INFLATION IN SPECULATION RISE

L. P. Ayres Tells Convention "Stocks Are Selling on Expectation," Not Realization.

HE SAYS PRICES MUST FALL


And Predicts a "Sober Era" in Which "Hour of Old-Fashioned Virtues" Would Strike.

FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 3, 1928 in January, 1928, that a depression was inevitably on its way, it was right, as were the various bankers, singly or in groups, who endeavored to stay the madness during the rest of that year. By the end of 1928, however, the spectacle of the wildly rising stock market, which had been evoked by the government, had become too much for ordinary cool heads, and many bankers and business leaders, as well as the rank and file, lost their balance then who had maintained it hitherto.

When in 1930, 1931, and later, the depression deepened, it became clear that the nation's incredible losses in the stock market in 1929 were as much responsible for the complete pessimism, loss of confidence, and slowness of recovery as

was the business depression itself. Large sections of the public, indeed, should have been better off in 1931 than in 1928-29, as their salaries or wages had been little reduced, if at all, whereas the cost of living had gone down nearly 25 per cent. Unlike former panics, such as that of 1873 and 1893, the great bulk of conservative bond investments continued to pay interest. Had the nation owned sound securities, it could have stood reduced business incomes considering reduced living costs. The trouble was, to a considerable extent in countless cases, that pay cuts were mild compared with the loss of a lifetime's savings. It is those losses which can fairly be laid at the feet of those in the administration who did all they could to whip the people into a frenzy of stock speculation which they called "prosperity."

Throughout the early part of 1930, Mr. Hoover and most government officials kept repeating that all would be well in a few weeks or a month or two, regardless of the fact that the depression was steadily becoming worse. In his message to Congress in December,



PRESIDENT HOOVER'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 2, 1930
"New York Times," December 3, 1930.

the President continued optimistic, although he admitted that the number of unemployed had been 2,500,000 "on April 1" and had increased since. Had Mr. Hoover made no impossible promises in the campaign in the year 1928, he would have been pitied more and criticized less, but as unemployment rose to six, seven, and even eight millions, it could not be forgotten that the President when candidate had declared that the only way to ensure employment had been to vote for him. When with wearisome sameness, month after month, and year after year, his promises of immediate betterment in business, whether based on mistaken facts or a mistaken notion as to the necessity of a false optimism, were proved wrong, the public

grew more and more irritated. Moreover, in spite of certain excellent qualities as an executive and administrator, the President had always found it difficult to work in harmony with others, and the rift between him and Congress steadily widened.

In June and July, 1930, two important measures were passed, both destined to bring trouble on the country. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Bill, which raised duties to the highest point yet attained, was passed by both Houses and signed by the President, June 17. In view of the fact that we had already drained the rest of the world of half its entire supply of gold, and that we insisted upon the payment of war debts, the Chinese Wall against imports of foreign goods, the sale of which to us constituted the only method possible of debt payment, alarmed all the debtor nations. It was clear that others could not pay us in more gold. If we did not allow them to pay us by selling us goods, there could be nothing left but bankruptcy if we still insisted upon being paid at all. It was no solution to the problem to point to the fact that a very large percentage of total imports still came in free. If we levied prohibitive duties on the goods which our debtors could ship to us it did them no good if we allowed free entry to certain goods from other countries. At the very moment when the world needed to build up its foreign trade again, the new tariff bill not only hindered us from doing so but in the way of reprisal or self-defence brought into being such a vast number of retaliatory tariffs in other countries as to bring the trade of the world almost to a stand.

If the world crisis demanded as free a flow of goods through normal trade channels as possible, so it also demanded the saving and creation of new capital, the reduction of expenditure and taxation, and the balancing of budgets. Congress took the moment to pass a new Pension measure for the veterans of the Spanish War, which provided pensions up to sixty dollars a month for soldiers who were disabled, the disability not being required to have anything to do with the war. A man, for example, who had come out of the war perfectly sound but who thirty years later might, from immoral habits, have acquired a loathsome disease, could claim a pension from the United States Government. It is difficult to conceive of a more unjust or indecent measure, but both Houses of Congress, for the sake apparently of buying themselves votes, passed the bill by large majorities over

Hoover's veto, as they also passed a liberalizing pension bill for the World War veterans which the President signed.

The hopes which had been expressed both by the administration and many economic experts and business leaders that business would improve were wholly falsified, and the depression merely deepened as the months passed. The year 1931 was indeed to witness what may be considered as a financial panic superimposed on the already existing commercial depression, with a resultant new crash of American security prices which carried them by June, 1932, to depths undreamed of even in 1930.

Up to the close of the Seventy-first Congress, which ended its sessions on March 4, 1931, the administration and the people at large had assumed that the United States could maintain its complete isolation and in some way pull itself out of the slough by its own bootstraps. The more important measures which the government had taken had indicated clearly the acceptance of that view. The ill-fated and uneconomic efforts of the Farm Board to maintain the prices of American farm products in the face of the world decline, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Bill which built a wall against imports around us, the bills restricting immigration, and others all showed our belief, as did Hoover's own pronouncements, that we could play a lone hand and avoid the evils from which the world system was suffering. Nor were the various disarmament conferences in a different category.


Congress in the winter had seemed to have little realization of the situation, and on February 27 had passed over the President's veto a bill which gave the World War veterans the right to secure loans against their bonus certificates to the extent of fifty per cent of their face value, although the Treasury pointed out that this might involve the government in expenses amounting to over a billion dollars.


From April onward, the commercial depression deepened throughout the world, and the movement of gold was rapidly draining most nations of the metal, which flowed only to France and the United States. On May 11 the Austrian Government announced that the *Kredit Anstalt*, one of the great banking institutions of Europe, controlled by the Rothschilds, was in serious difficulties, and the second phase of the world panic set in. It is impossible to tell in

any detail the spread of the trouble, but by this time it had become clear, even to the administration, that the United States could no longer isolate herself. All the nations of Central Europe were threatened with bankruptcy, including Germany, to the governments and private concerns of which latter country Americans had loaned about \$2,500,000,000. In an effort to stave off complete disaster which might tear down the financial structure of the whole world, Hoover, unfortunately without consulting France, proclaimed a moratorium on all international war debts so as to give the world, and particularly Germany, a breathing spell. The good effect of the one-year postponement was largely lost by the delays and objections interposed by France, which, as always, insisted upon keeping up the fiction of the integrity of the Versailles Treaty.

Although this might possibly have been avoided had Hoover consulted the French Government as to his intentions, he had consulted the leaders and many of the other American congressmen in order to ensure their endorsement of his action when Congress met. Not only, however, had Hoover and Congress been growing more antagonistic toward one another, but the November elections had resulted in a Democratic majority in the House. When Congress met in December, they did indeed ratify what the President had done, but, returning to isolationist principles and desirous of retaining all initiative in their own body, they so tied Hoover's hands as to make it practically impossible for him to recommence any negotiations or even conversations with our debtors. The various starts which we had made toward taking official part in international conferences, such as the appointment of Secretaries Stimson and Mellon as delegates, and not merely "official observers," to the economic conference in London in July, appeared to have been effectually quashed by the reactionary attitude of Congress.


Meanwhile our own situation as well as that of the world was growing steadily worse. The earnings of practically all of our great business enterprises of all sorts seemed to be melting down to nothing. Even the New York Central Railroad, which had paid continuous dividends for 60 years, suspended them, and its stock which had sold over 300 two years before dropped to 25, and was to sell under 9 in the next spring. The end of September the New York stock market recorded new and alarming low prices, and the leading





Top: Elgin Botanic Garden, Fifth Avenue, New York, about 1816. In 1802, the Common Council granted Dr. Hosack, a professor of Columbia College, fourteen acres of land for a botanic garden. The garden was purchased by the State in 1814 and presented to Columbia College. Part of the land is now the site of Rockefeller Center.

Below: The proposed buildings of Rockefeller Center, New York.



THE FEDERAL AND STATES BUILDING, CHICAGO'S CENTURY OF PROGRESS FAIR, 1933 Designed by Edward H. Bennett. From a photograph by Kaufmann and Fabry.

New York bank stocks, which many thought thoroughly deflated when selling at an average price of 114 in February, had dropped to 44 ten months later. Banks throughout the entire country had been failing by hundreds, and many communities, even some of our larger cities, were left without any banking facilities at all. In their efforts to prepare for runs, institutions had been forced to sell their holdings of bonds at any prices obtainable, and the drop in prices of first-class securities added to the growing mistrust, and in turn caused more runs.

Mistrust in the ability of even the British Government to weather the storm had already caused that nation to go off the gold standard with resultant shock to the rest of the world, when our own situation became so alarming as to lead the President to summon a hasty meeting of the leaders of both Houses of Congress and other officials and advisors at the White House on October 6. Our Federal deficit for the year had already reached \$600,000,000 as against the Treasury's estimate of a surplus at the beginning of the fiscal period, and fear of the safety of the banks had led people to hoard another \$600,000,000 by October 1. European nations, led by France, which country, as she had done in the case of England, took action calculated to bring about the very condition she feared, hastily rushed to draw gold against their balances with us, until \$588,000,000 was shipped in three weeks.

Fearing that we ourselves should be forced off the gold standard and that with continued runs and failures our entire banking structure might collapse, it was agreed at the White House conference to form a national corporation to help keep the banks solvent and to ask Congress, when it should meet, for further legislation. Pending the assembling of that body, the banks agreed among themselves to assist their weaker members.

On the meeting of the new Congress, both Democrats and Republicans joined to pass the needed legislation, and on January 22, 1932, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Bill was signed by the President. The Corporation, which was to some extent modelled on the lines of the War Finance Board, was provided with a capital of \$500,000,000, all to be subscribed by the government, and permitted to lend three times that amount if necessary. It was authorized to make loans to banks and other fiscal institutions and to aid in

"financing agriculture, commerce, and industry." This included making loans to railroads, which it was hoped might thus be saved from defaulting on their obligations and going into bankruptcy. The management of the Corporation's business was put in the hands of a board of seven members, our ambassador to England, Mr. Dawes, resigning that post to become the head of the new agency.

DRIVE OPENS IN CITY TO CHECK HOARDING

200 Business and Civic Leaders
Spur Effort to Return Idle
Money to Circulation.

WILL PUSH "BABY" BONDS

Gen. Harbord, Miller and Others Warn Prosperity Waits On Liquefied Credit.

FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES OF MARCH 1, 1932

Although the runs on the banks stopped to some extent, hoarding was only slightly relieved and the general situation continued to be critical. The Federal deficit hetween June 30, 1931, and the end of February, 1932, had risen to \$1,781,000,000 and was calculated to amount to nearly \$3,000,000,000 by the end of the fiscal year. Leading cities of the country, such as New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia, as well as numberless smaller municipalities, were on the verge of bankruptcy from a combination of graft, mismanagement, and the effects of the depression on the raising of taxes. In two years the inventory value of live

stock alone on our farms had dropped nearly \$3,000,000,000, and the farmers were worse off than ever, after the expenditure of about \$500,000,000 on their behalf by the Farm Board.

On February 10, a non-partisan meeting was again held at the White House to consider further measures. That week, in spite of the operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, hoarding of currency had risen to \$1,300,000,000, with a consequent restriction of credit of five times that amount, or \$6,500,000,000.

As a result of the conference, Congress passed an Act, signed by the President February 29, known as the Glass-Steagall Bill, which permitted member banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve on paper which had previously been ineligible under the earlier Federal Reserve Act. The several objects of the bill were to assist banks

in trouble by making the conditions of borrowing easier; to attract hoarded money back into banks and circulation; to free more gold for foreign demands; and to help in financing the Treasury deficit. It was estimated that the possible additions to the currency under the terms of the Act might run from two to two and a half



WILL THE SKY NEVER CLEAR UP? Fitzpatrick's cartoon in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

billion dollars, but although many considered that this might bring about dangerous inflation of the currency, the bill met with little serious opposition. In the same month in which this Act was passed, Secretary Mellon retired from the Treasury and was appointed Ambassador to England at the unusual age, for that post, of seventy-seven.

Having maintained strict allegiance to their party leaders and made a notable show of non-partisanship patriotism, Congress soon ran wild, and threatened, even against the vote of the American Le-

gion itself, to pass a new Bonus Bill which it was estimated would take another \$2,000,000,000 from the Treasury to add to the already appalling deficit. As always in hard times, all sorts of heresies as to the nature of money were abroad, and in the spring of 1932 business, struggling hard with almost unparalleled world conditions, began to fear in addition radical legislation which might still further de-



BALL AND CHAINS THAT DRAG
As News of the World (London) regards hindrances to World Recovery.

range conditions and make any return to a sound basis more difficult if not impossible. The debates over the problem of meeting the hitherto unheard-of deficit in the Treasury by taxation became so wild and acrimonious that Congress had to be adjourned for tempers to cool and reason to reassert itself.

Although it had become more and more evident that there could be no recovery for the United States without a readjustment of the international exchanges and a reasonable improvement in economic conditions in the rest of the world, Congress still set its face resolutely against any possibility of further discussion of the war debts, and the end of the period of the Hoover moratorium hung over the heads of business men everywhere as the possible precipitation of

more national bankruptcies and general financial chaos. In June representatives of England, France, Italy, and Germany met at Lausanne and settled the reparations question by a practical cancellation of all future payments due to any of them from Germany, although as payment of war debts to the United States from the first three would depend to some extent on payments from Germany to them, final ratification of the cancellation had to be made to wait upon action by us on the debt problem. Owing to the fact that our presidential election was to take place in November there was no possibility of favorable action by Congress until at least the December session, but much interest was aroused by the fact that the former irreconcilable Senator Borah came out in July for cancellation under certain conditions, thus indicating that possibly America was at last willing to take a responsible position again in world affairs.

Meanwhile, we had been forced again to take some part in international affairs by the attack on China by Japan, both in Manchuria and at Shanghai. Although we declined to participate in the League of Nations, we did consult with that body and, invoking the "Kellogg Pact" and the Nine-Power Treaty, succeeded, with the help of the League, in staving off a Sino-Japanese war of magnitude. Little by little, it was becoming evident that, if we were to do business with the rest of the world, it would be necessary for us, whether we wished to or not, to assume some of the responsibility for international stability, either by joining the League or by working with it from the outside. In the long run one of the most lasting effects of the world depression beginning, for us, in 1929 may well be the enforced change from our old policy of isolation.

The nominating Conventions of the two greater parties met in the early summer of 1932 when panic and depression had reached the most alarming point yet attained. The prices for securities in Wall Street appeared to indicate universal bankruptcy for even the strongest of business concerns; and conditions were unprecedented in some of the agricultural States. In one day, in April, one quarter of the entire State of Mississippi is said to have been sold at auction for non-payment of taxes and debts. The lands sold included 20 per cent of all the farms in the State and from 12 to 15 per cent of all town property. Almost 40,000 farms were sold by seventy-four sheriffs, and the State itself had to take over as owner 400,000 acres, raising its own-

ership to more than 1,000,000 acres formerly owned by individual farmers. In addition, vast tracts had been turned over to insurance companies, loan agencies, and mortgage holders. One of the causes, apart from the drop in the prices and lessened demand for farm produce, had been the enormous increase in taxation. Between 1913 and 1930, not only had the bonded debt of the Federal Government risen from about \$1,000,000,000 to over \$16,000,000,000, but that of the States had grown from \$300,000,000 to \$1,800,000,000, and that of smaller political divisions from \$3,500,000,000 to \$12,600,000,000. In other words, besides all the huge sums which had been raised in those seventeen years by annual taxation, we had increased our permanent governmental debts from \$4,800,000,000 to \$30,400,000,000. Both the industrial and agricultural sections of our nation were in despair. In 1928 we had been told that we were within sight of perpetual prosperity and the abolition of poverty. By 1932 we seemed to see nothing but poverty and to be faced by stark ruin on every side. Few nations, if any, have ever had to drop with such appalling swiftness from superhuman hopes to blank despair.

In spite of the great unpopularity of Hoover, it was evident that the Republicans would renominate him, although both the candidate and the party appeared to be doomed to certain defeat. In June he was given the nomination on the first ballot and the Vice-President, Curtis, was named again for the same post. There was no interest at all in the Convention, its results being a foregone conclusion.

There was more excitement when the Democrats met in Chicago on June 27. Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, a fifth cousin of former President Theodore Roosevelt, had been the leading candidate, with Al Smith as his only serious rival. In view of factional feeling within the party, however, it was thought that unless Roosevelt could secure the nomination by the fifth ballot many of the delegates pledged to him without enthusiasm would swing into some other column and a dark horse might receive the nomination. Three ballots had been taken when the Convention adjourned for the night. Before it reconvened in the morning a deal had been made by which John N. Garner of Texas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and William G. McAdoo of California decided to support the Roosevelt candidacy, and the Governor was nominated on the fourth ballot, Garner later receiving the nomination for Vice-Presi-

THE WORLD CRISIS

dent. Little need be said about the platforms, which differed chiefly on the tariff, the Democrats standing for a revision downward whereas the Republicans upheld the standard of high duties. The Democrats also came out more clearly for a repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment than did the Republicans, and for non-cancellation of the war debts, though they wisely said nothing about reduction. On the whole the Democratic platform was the more clear-cut and satisfactory of the two documents.

In June, while the European nations were meeting at Lausanne



1932's SOAP BOX
Cartoon by Fitzpatrick in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

trying to disentangle the problem of reparations and debts, a socalled army of ex-service men marched on Washington, encamping there with the avowed object of forcing Congress by their presence to pass new legislation in their favor at the expense of the already so deeply suffering public. After some weeks and when efforts proved

THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY


unavailing to get them to return to their homes at the expense of the government, they were finally driven out of the city by the use of Federal troops and the local police.

A slight slackening of the depression during the summer had no effect on the election in November, and as was to be expected, the Democrats won an overwhelming victory at the polls, the Republicans losing the electoral vote of all but six States—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Delaware, and the rock-ribbed Republican stronghold of Pennsylvania. In the Electoral College Roosevelt received 472 votes to Hoover's 59, and his popular majority of over 7,000,000 was crushing. His party also gained control of the Senate and a huge majority in the House, a number of prominent Republicans of long service going down to defeat, led by Senator Smoot, who had been the chief sponsor of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill.

In domestic affairs, one of the results of the election had been to open the way at last to submitting the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment to the people, two thirds of the new Senate being apparently "wet" and 343 "wet" members being found in the new House. Various polls taken in the preceding months, notably that of *The Literary Digest*, which latter had been found accurate on former occasions, had indicated that the sentiment of the voters had become preponderantly in favor of doing away with Prohibition, and this had brought about a change of position in candidates.

Neither the new President nor the new Congress, however, could come into office until March 4, 1933, and meanwhile Hoover and the "lame ducks" in the legislature would have to carry on, while both our domestic affairs and foreign relations needed definite policies. Never before has the clumsiness of our form of government which requires such an interregnum between election and inauguration of a President been so clearly demonstrated. Fortunately in the election which we had had to hold during the struggle of the Civil War there had been no change of party. The crisis would have been great had Wilson been defeated in 1916 when war with Germany was hanging in the balance. In 1932, however, we felt to the full the effect of passing a vote of confidence in one administration without having the power to install the new one except after months of delay.


We have now traced the history of our nation from the earliest



THE FIRST YACHT RACE AT NEW YORK

Colonel Morris's Fancy turning to the windward of another sloop.

Redrawn by F. S. Cozzens from the rare view of New York by William Burgess in 1717, in the Library of Congress.



THE DEFENSE OF THE AMERICA'S CUP IN 1930

After the start of the first race. Left to right: Enterprise, Vanitie, Whirlwind, Resolute, and Westamoe.

By courtest of Hand S. Vandalde.



All precedent was broken by the Demeratic nominee when he slew to Chicago to receive notification of his nomination. PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT ARRIVING AT THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, JULY 2, 1932

THE WORLD CRISIS

discovery of the continent upon which that nation has evolved until the very day of our present confusion. There have been high lights and deep shadows, much in which we can take a legitimate pride and much which we would wish to efface from the record. That is



NOW LET'S GET BACK TO WORK

President Hoover's offer of co-operation with President-Elect Roosevelt after the election.

A cartoon by Sykas in "The New York Evening Post."

true of the history of any people. What is often forgotten by ourselves as by others is that in the short period in which we have spread across a wilderness 3000 miles wide, American morality and culture have both been subjected to extraordinary and peculiar strains.

The world is just beginning to realize that much of that debasement and vulgarization of old values which it has been fashionable to consider as "Americanization" is in truth but the working out



CHIEF SMILING-ROOSEVELT BREAKS A HOLE IN THE DRY ARMOR From "De Notenkraker," Amsterdam.



END OF THE BIG SCRAP
From "Daily Express," London.

AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1932 WAS VIEWED ABROAD

THE WORLD CRISIS

everywhere of the results of a too-rapid development of the mechanization due to the industrial revolution and of the modern democratizing of political machinery. In Europe, there were innumerable dykes of old customs, institutions, classes, privileges, ways of life and thought, which for long helped to keep the new flood from obliterating the values of an earlier and different age.

In America there was, to a great extent, an absence of such protecting dykes, and also, in the unparalleled opportunities for economic exploitation of natural resources and in the incomparable increases in population, there was a greater sweep and power in the encompassing flood. We felt the effects of machinery and democracy sooner, and to a greater extent, than did Europe. It is possible that in the new civilization to arise, whatever it may be, America may emerge first, as it has so often done from the lesser world depressions of a mere economic sort.

This is, perhaps, to take too hopeful a view, and, in any case, prophecy is no part of the task of the historian. One of the great problems of the world is how to preserve, in a mechanized and democratic order, those higher human values which have been slowly evolved in the past 2000 years or more of European civilization, and which, to a considerable extent, were based upon an aristocratic and not a democratic form of society and upon an economic order which is fast disappearing into the irrecoverable past. As yet, the cleavage between that past and the chaotic present is less complete in Europe than in America, leaving Russia out of the European picture. So far as we can understand the mind of western, or European, man, it is incredible that he will be able to scrap all the values he has so hardly evolved in the past few thousand years. The problem is not one of starting entirely fresh, but of a deep and radical readjustment to a changed social environment without sinking into a new dark age as a period of transition.


Europe, as we have said, had many anchors which held it to its old moorings in spite of the fact that it, and not the United States, initiated the industrial revolution. Europe thus swung out into the uncharted sea upon which all of us in the world are now afloat, more slowly than did our America which had few or none of such anchors. Moreover, we in this new world encountered in our frontier and the riches of a virgin continent, the electrical storms of un-

THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY

limited economic opportunity which too often set the compass of our life spinning toward strange quarters. Europe is only just beginning to have its own compass of spiritual life deflected in the same way by the unlimited opportunities and problems of the new economic order which now embraces the markets and raw materials of the entire world. The "old Europe" is rapidly passing, though in some ways the safety of its readjustments may be greater than our own.

If, however, there was much in the old order the passing of which would be an irreparable loss to mankind, a study of that older order, as contrasted with what has so far emerged of the new, makes it clear that there are values evolving in the latter which are also of supreme importance. America has played no small part in the creation of these, and although there is ample ground for pessimism as we survey the moral and cultural life of the United States today, there is also much that is hopeful.

Such a statement is no less true because it is a mere commonplace. It is impossible for any one man to know the whole of American life in its vast and quickly shifting currents as we watch them swirl from day to day. There would seem, however, to be as little cause for despair of the future as there is for a shallow and unthinking optimism. The frontier has been closed to us. The unceasing streams of fresh and alien blood have been cut off in the closing of our ports to unrestricted immigration. The needs of the new economic order are insistent upon our taking our part in the affairs of the world. Isolation is now as impossible for us as for China or Japan. The economic barriers of the world have been broken, however politicians may try feverishly to reconstruct and patch them up. A new era is dawning, the nature of which no man can forecast. For good or for evil, the United States will be forced to play its part. The most interesting, the most important, and, let us at least hope, the greatest, pages in our history are those which must await the hands of the historian of the future. We can but end our own task here.



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